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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis includes four empirical studies related to foreign direct investment (FDI), 
governance, economic growth and the environment. We firstly investigate the existence of 
the so called pollution haven hypothesis (PHH) in China, i.e. the impact of regional 
environmental regulations (ER) on FDI inflows. We then examine the other determinants 
of FDI: regional government effort to tackle corruption and government efficiency. It then 
extends the methodology of the first two studies and revisits the PHH issues by treating 
ER as endogenous. Finally, we observe the effects of economic growth and foreign direct 
investment on the environmental quality across Chinese cities. After addressing the 
weaknesses in previous literature, our findings provide the following results. First, an 
intra-country pollution haven effect does exist in China. Such an effect is also found when 
ER is treated as endogenous but not robust for the sensitivity checks using different 
instrumental variables and estimators. Second, FDI is attracted to regions that have made 
more effort on fighting against corruption and that have more efficient government. Third, 
government variables do not have a significant impact on ER. Fourth, economic growth 
has a negative effect on environmental quality at current income levels in China. Finally, 
foreign investment has positive effects on water pollutants and a neutral effect on air 
pollutants. Such effects vary across pollutants and investment from different sources. 
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INTRODUCTION 
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The immediate motivation for this research is to investigate the impact of environmental 
regulation stringency and the governance quality on the cross-province foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows in China; and the impacts of economic development and foreign 
investment on the levels of industrial pollution emissions between Chinese cities.  
Since 1978 the Chinese government has been reforming its economy from a centrally 
planned to a market-oriented economy, known as “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. 
The results of this dramatic transformation have been the generation of wealth on a 
previous unimagined scale and the removal of millions from absolute poverty, bringing the 
poverty rate down from 53% in 1981 to 8% in 2001 (World Bank).1 According to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), China is the second largest economy in the world 
when measured by purchasing power parity (PPP) gross domestic product (GDP), and is 
the fourth largest in the world when measured by nominal GDP, and is the fastest growing 
country with a consistent annual GDP growth rate above 10%.2   
Much of China’s success has been driven by a tremendous growth in exports coupled with 
equally impressive increases in FDI. According to the statistics from United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), between 1980 and 2000, the volume 
of China’s exports grew by 14.75% a year and at the end of 2004 China’s global trade 
exceeded $1.15 trillion. From then on China became the world’s third largest trading nation 
behind the United States (US) and Germany ($2.344 trillion and 1.629 trillion in 2004, 
respectively). In addition, China’s trade surplus has been stable at around $30 billion from 
1999. In terms of FDI, by 2005 Chinese inward FDI flows had reached $72.41 billion, up 
                                                
1 ‘Fighting Poverty: Findings and Lessons from China’s Success’, World Bank, available online:- 
http://go.worldbank.org/QXOQI9MP30 
2 In 2006, the nominal GDP of China was $2.64 trillion (4th in the world), and $10.2 trillion (2nd) with PPP. 
Its per capita income was approximately $2,000 (104th), and $7,800 (86th) with PPP, and rising rapidly.    
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from an average of $30.10 billion between 1990 and 2000.3 The stock of FDI has 
increased similarly, rising from $20.69 billion in 1990 to $272.09 billion in 2005. 
The Chinese government launched a range of policies to encourage FDI inflows. In 1979, 
the government introduced legislation and regulations designed to encourage foreigners to 
invest in high-priority sectors and regions. The government eliminated restrictions and 
implemented permissive policies in the early 1980s. It then established Special Economic 
Zones and opened up coastal cities and development regions in coastal provinces in the 
mid-1980s. More favourable regulations and treatments have been used to encourage FDI 
inflows in these regions. In the 1990s, the policies began to promote the high-tech and 
capital intensive FDI projects in accordance with domestic industrial objectives. More 
preferential tax treatments were granted for the investment in selected economic zones or 
in projects encouraged by the government, such as energy, communications and transport. 
Such preferential policies have resulted in an overwhelming concentration of FDI and 
rapid economic development in the east. The spillover effects from coastal to the inland 
provinces are limited, and therefore, the regional development gap has widened.   
The huge amount of FDI inflows and unbalanced geographical distribution of FDI have 
attracted several studies to investigate the determinants of FDI location choice in China 
(see e.g. Wei et al., 1999; Coughlin and Segev, 2000; Cheng and Kwan, 2000; and Amiti and 
Javorcik, 2008). In addition to the preferential policies, many factors may have affected 
where foreign investors locate their production facilities within China, such as labour costs, 
                                                
3 Before 2005, the FDI data were only for the investment into non-financial sectors. From 2005, Chinese 
government relaxed the restrictions of the market access of foreign financial institutions and the FDI data 
started to comprise the investment into financial sectors. Therefore, the inward FDI in 2005 ($72.41 billion) 
includes the investment into financial sectors ($12.08 billion) and non-financial sectors ($60.33 billion). In 
addition, from 2005, the statistical scope of FDI was enlarged according to the principles in the IMF Balance of 
Payment Manual (Fifth Edition). Therefore, FDI data shows a jump in 2005. In 2006, the total FDI inflows 
decreased by 4.1% to $69.47 billion but the FDI in non-financial sectors grew to $63.02 billion. 
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potential market size, market access, supplier access, infrastructure, productivity, education 
level, location, and spatial dependence. However, these studies all omitted certain structural 
determinants of FDI in China, including environmental regulation stringency and 
government quality. 
Some environmental economists and environmentalists claim that firms in developed 
countries may relocate their “dirty” industries to developing countries to take the 
advantages of the less stringent environmental regulations (see e.g. Pearson, 1987; Dean, 
1992; and Copeland and Taylor, 1994). Such a point of view is known as “the pollution 
haven hypothesis” (PHH).  
In China, the legal system has lagged far behind the overall economic development. 
Although China has established a comprehensive environmental regulatory framework with 
a range of laws, regulations and standards, the strength and the enforcement of the 
regulations are much weaker than those in developed countries. An important issue in the 
enforcement of environmental regulations is of the government itself violating the law. 
Some local governments will protect polluting enterprises in the name of local interest. 
Land appropriation, excessive mining and the failure to carry out environmental impact 
assessments: such situations continue due to the lack of the environmental awareness 
among local government officials. Environmental enforcement also suffers from a lack of 
public participation and social supervision, as well as low awareness of citizens (Ma, 2007).  
The differences in the performance of local government and the characteristics of the 
public have led environmental stringency to vary among regions.  
Multinational corporations (MNCs) could be attracted by the weak environmental 
regulations in China. Ma Jun, director of the nongovernmental Institute of Public and 
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Environmental Affairs (IPE), announced in August 2007 that over 100 multinational 
corporations were punished by the government for their violation of the environmental 
laws and regulations in terms of water pollution from 2004. And in January 2008 this figure 
increased to 260 corporations for water pollution and more than 50 corporations for air 
pollution. The exposed companies include subsidiaries of world-renowned corporations 
such as American Standard, Panasonic, Pepsi, Nestle, 3M, Whirlpool, Bosch, Carlsberg, 
Samsung, Nissin and Kao. These corporations are mostly from Japan, US and Europe. 
One third of their polluting subsidiaries are located in Shanghai, and others scattered over 
the country. Liu (2006) reported that according to Lo Sze Ping, campaign director of 
Greenpeace China, the “words” of multinationals are often better than their deeds. 
Multinationals are more willing to invest in public relations than in actually cleaning up the 
manufacturing process. Local governments seek to attract more FDI and hence do not take 
strict measures to address pollution by multinational corporations. Lo also observes that 
since multinational corporations typically perform better than the domestic enterprises 
environmentally, their activities do not attract the attention of the environmental 
authorities, and hence avoid the supervision. 
Therefore, the regional differences in environmental stringency may have a significant 
impact on the FDI location choice in China, i.e. an intra-country pollution haven effect 
may exist. Previous empirical studies have adopted different approaches to investigate the 
PHH (see e.g. Levinson, 1996a & 1996b; List and Co, 2000; Keller and Kevinson, 2002; 
Xing and Kolstad, 2002; Eskeland and Harrison, 2003; Fredriksson et al., 2003; Dean et al., 
2005; and Smarzynska-Javorcik and Wei, 2005). The results are mixed and do not provide 
robust evidence to support the existence of PHH. However, these studies have several 
methodological weaknesses and are mostly centred on US data, a few studies look at 
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developing countries and only Dean et al. (2005) look at China. Therefore, this thesis, 
addressing weaknesses of previous studies, makes some contribution to the literature on 
PHH.  
Rapid economic growth with the lagged development of the legal system has resulted in a 
serious social problem in China – corruption. The transition to a market-based economy 
has resulted in considerable changes to how firms operate within the new commercial 
business environment. The huge increase in opportunities in the private sector combined 
with the traditional power of local and national officials led to a proliferation of corruption 
at all levels of the Chinese economy. Corruption has been recognised as an emerging 
challenge to China’s economy and social reforms.  
Corruption is widely recognised as a deterrent of foreign investment but is only considered 
in a few empirical studies on a cross-country basis (see e.g. Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Hines, 
1995; Wei, 2000; and Smarzynska and Wei, 2000). Although China has received a high 
volume of foreign capital, corruption has deterred FDI inflows, especially those from 
Europe and the US. Wei (1997) notes that FDI from the ten largest source countries in the 
world, all of them members of Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), accounts for a relatively small portion of total FDI going to China, because 
investors from the major source countries prefer to go to less corrupt countries. Similarly, 
the corruptibility of local government in China may affect the location of FDI. Moreover, 
corruption should not be considered in isolation and is strongly correlated with the quality 
of government (see Globerman and Shapiro, 2002 & 2003; Globerman et al., 2006; and Fan 
et al., 2007). Thus, government quality is another important determinant of FDI inflows. 
Therefore, this thesis is the first to examine the effects of inter-regional differences in 
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corruption and government quality on FDI location choice within a large developing 
country.  
Rapid export driven economic growth enhanced by large investment inflows from abroad 
has come at a cost. A harmful by-product of globalisation has been increased pollution. 
The State Environmental Protection Administration reported that two thirds of Chinese 
cities are considered polluted according to the air quality data. Respiratory and heart 
diseases related to air pollution are the leading causes of death in China. Almost all of the 
nation’s rivers are polluted to some degree and half of the population lacks access to clean 
water. Water scarcity occurs most in northern China and acid rain falls on 30% of the 
country. The World Bank estimated that pollution costs about 8-12% of China’s GDP each 
year. Environmental degradation and the increase in poor health are all signs that China’s 
current growth path is unsustainable.4  
There have been numerous theoretical and empirical studies that examine the relationship 
between economic growth and various indicators of environmental degradation. The aim 
of the research is to examine the existence of the “Environmental Kuznets Curve” (i.e. the 
total amount of environmental impact of economic growth initially increases, reaches a 
peak and then falls), which is found firstly in Grossman and Krueger (1991). In addition, 
some researchers have started to use empirical methods to examine the effects of FDI on 
environmental quality, especially in developing countries. However, the majority ofstudies 
on both the environmental effects of economic growth and FDI, are cross-country 
analyses and the results are often inconsistent.  
                                                
4  Sustainable development refers to development that “meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”, which is defined in the UN Report 
of the World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987 (available online:- http://www.un.org 
/documents/ga/res/42/ares42-187.htm). 
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Therefore, in the case of China, the following questions are worthy of consideration. Does 
the environmental Kuznets curve hold for some pollutants? If it does, where is the 
threshold income level and how many regions have passed it? As an important driving 
force of economic growth in China, does FDI benefit/harm environmental quality? These 
questions have attracted relatively few research using different datasets and methodologies, 
with mixed results.  
This thesis combines various aspects within the broad area of FDI, governance and the 
environment. It firstly examines the structural determinants of FDI, and then investigates 
the effects of economic growth and FDI on the environmental quality in China. The thesis 
is structured as follows. 
Chapter two considers environmental regulatory stringency as a structural determinant of 
FDI. We test the so called pollution haven hypothesis using socioeconomic and 
environmental data for 30 Chinese regions over the period from 1999 to 2003. We address 
the methodological weaknesses in the previous literature and employ a feasible generalised 
least square method that controls for both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The 
findings provide some evidence to support the existence of a pollution haven effect within 
China. 
Chapter three re-examines the determinants of FDI by allowing regional government 
corruption and governance quality to have an impact on FDI inflows. However, the lack of 
a perceptive index of regional government corruption leads us to develop two objective 
indices, measuring the effort of local government in fighting against corruption and local 
government efficiency respectively. The empirical results show that government 
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anti-corruption effort and efficiency are both significant determinants of FDI. We retain all 
the independent variables in Chapter two and obtain consistent results. 
Chapter four methodologically extends the work in Chapters two and three. We revisit the 
pollution haven issue but treat environmental regulations as endogenous. We employ an 
instrumental variable approach, with the first stage regression examining whether 
government characteristics affect the environmental stringency. The results confirm the 
existence of an intra-country pollution haven effect in China but are not robust to a battery 
of sensitivity checks.  
Chapter five examines the relationship between economic growth and a range of industrial 
pollution emissions in China using data for 112 major cities between 2001 and 2004. After 
separating foreign investment from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan from the investment 
of other foreign economies, we also observe the environmental effects of different 
ownership groups of investment. The results provide some evidence that economic growth 
induces more pollution at current income levels in China. And the environmental effects 
vary across investment groups.  
Chapter six concludes with a review of the results, a discussion of the limitations and 
improvements in data and methodology, the contributions to the literature, and an outline 
of the potential for further research.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
FDI AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS IN 
CHINA: DO INTRA-COUNTRY POLLUTION 
HAVENS EXIST? 
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2.1 Introduction 
Traditional international trade theory tells us that trade is governed by comparative 
advantage, which postulates that the efficient exchange of goods leads to optimal outcomes. 
Multinational firms, as agents of free trade, seek cost reductions and respond to market 
imperfections. Higher domestic costs therefore provide the motivation for multinational 
corporations to expand their geographical range into other areas.  
Stringent environmental standards in developed countries will drive up production costs of 
those firms with higher sensitivity to the pollution abatement costs by, for example, 
prohibiting certain inputs and outputs, or where strict emission standards requires the use 
of specific technologies. It may, therefore, be in the firms’ interest to close 
pollution-intensive plants at home and to relocate their production facilities to those 
developing countries with lower environmental regulations. The suggestion is that the 
profit-maximising, pollution-intensive multinational firms will move operations or part of 
operation to developing countries to take advantage of the less stringent environmental 
regulations. Such a strategy could trigger competition for lax environmental policies in 
order to gain competitive advantage in “dirty” goods production. A corollary is that 
developing countries may join a “race to the bottom” by undervaluing environmental 
damage in order to attract more FDI. Either way, the result is excessive levels of pollution 
and environmental degradation (Dean et al. 2005). This phenomenon is the so called “race to 
the bottom” hypothesis or pollution haven hypothesis.5   
                                                
5 Aliyu (2005) summarises three dimensions of the pollution haven hypothesis. The first is the relocation of 
heavy pollution industries from developed countries with stringent environmental regulations to developing 
countries without or with lax or not enforced regulations. The second dimension is the dumping of 
hazardous wastes generated from developed countries to developing countries. The third is the unrestrained 
extraction of non-renewable natural resources in developing countries by multinational firms.  
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To date, one of the most contentious debates in the FDI and the environment literature 
focuses on whether inter-country differences in environmental regulations are turning poor 
countries into “pollution havens”. This argument centres on the cost effect of 
environmental regulations and presumes that there are environmental regulation-induced 
production cost differentials that encourage a firm to relocate its production facility.6 
Theoretical models of pollution havens, including Pearson (1987) and Baumol and Oates 
(1988), illustrate that developed countries control pollution emissions whilst developing 
countries do not, and hence become pollution havens.  
Thus far the empirical results for tests of the PHH are mixed. Levinson (1996b), Keller and 
Levinson (2002), List and Co (2000), and Fredriksson et al. (2003) all find evidence that 
environmental stringency has some impact on inbound FDI locations in the US. Xing and 
Kolstad (2002) find that environmental regulations in host countries have a significant 
impact on outbound FDI from the US for heavily polluting industries. In contrast, 
Levinson (1996a) finds little evidence for inter-state pollution havens in the US, and 
Eskeland and Harrison (2003) suggest it is difficult to find a robust relationship between 
pollution abatement and US outbound FDI. For the evidence of other countries, 
Samarzynska-Javorcik and Wei (2005) find that the overall results are relatively weak when 
they examine the relationship between FDI and environmental stringency for the firms in 
Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union; Dean et al. (2005) find environmental stringency 
only affects FDI projects in China that originate from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. In 
general, previous empirical studies suggest that there is little evidence to support the 
pollution haven hypothesis.  
                                                
6 Esty and Gentry (1997) and Aliyu (2005) outline four types of FDI – market seeking, production platform 
seeking, resource seeking and low cost seeking FDI. Environmental policy/cost has less impact on the 
categories of market seeking and production platform seeking, but certainly has an effect on resource seeking 
and/or low cost seeking FDI. 
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China has, in recent years, been one of the largest recipients of worldwide FDI inflows. 
FDI has contributed significantly to economic growth in China since it adopted economic 
reforms from 1978. However, there remains a significant disparity in the geographical 
distribution of FDI inflows into China. The majority of the FDI has tended to concentrate 
in the eastern regions. However, environmental deterioration has become a serious 
problem associated with rapid economic growth, and industrial pollutant emissions are the 
major source of the environmental problem. Similarly, pollution emissions also vary across 
regions. Simultaneously, China’s environmental regulation standards are relatively weaker 
than those in developed countries, and the strength of the enforcement of the 
environmental regulations is different across regions.  
Using provincial socioeconomic and environmental data, this chapter investigates whether 
there exists an intra-county pollution haven effect for China. It therefore examines whether 
differences in the stringency of environmental regulations affects the location choice of 
FDI in China.  
In this chapter, we employ three measures of regional environmental stringency that vary 
across time and province. The first measure is the level of industrial pollution treatment 
investment by province, the second is the number of administrative punishment cases 
related to environmental issues by province, and the third is the average level of pollution 
emission charges by province. In addition we include a standard set of control variables 
that capture provincial level differences in income, labour costs and quality, infrastructure, 
agglomeration, population density, etc.  
Our results suggest that environmental stringency has a significant and negative effect on 
FDI, leading us to conclude that, ceteris paribus, FDI prefers to locate in regions with 
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relatively weak environmental regulations and provides some support for the existence of a 
pollution haven consistent effect within China.  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the previous theoretical and 
empirical literature on FDI and the environment. In section 2.3, we describe FDI inflows 
into China and China’s environment problems and environmental regulation system. 
Section 2.4 presents our methodology and data, while section 2.5 reports and discusses the 
empirical results. The final section concludes. 
  
2.2 Literature Review 
This section commences by reviewing existing theoretical and empirical studies of FDI and 
the environment. It then discusses some of the empirical findings of research into FDI 
patterns in China, and finally examines the weaknesses of the previous empirical literature.  
2.2.1 Trade and Investment Theory and the Environment  
According to the theory of comparative advantage, in order to allocate resources efficiently 
and hence maximise global output and income, countries should specialise in the 
production and export of products that use in their production a relatively large amount of 
the resources that the country has in relative abundance. Therefore, countries should 
produce and export products for which they have a comparative advantage, and they 
should import products in which they have a comparative disadvantage. 
Pearson (1987) shows that the environmental media (air, water, soil) provides a supply of 
assimilative capacity for waste disposal. In a country with low income levels, the absence of 
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industry or low competing demand for these environmental services, means that the 
demand for these services is low relative to supply, and therefore, the economic price of 
the waste disposal services should also be low. A low price means a relative abundance. 
Other things being equal, this country would have a comparative advantage in “dirty” 
production, and a comparative disadvantage in “clean” production. Conversely, countries 
where assimilative capacity is exhausted and incremental residual discharge has a high cost, 
would have a comparative disadvantage in dirty production and a comparative advantage in 
clean production. Thus, specialisation through comparative advantage and international 
trade (investment) efficiently allocates resources, increases production and improves world 
welfare. Therefore, the supply and demand for environmental services can be treated as an 
additional factor of production, and that an efficient pattern of world production will 
reflect that factor. 
Baumol and Oates (1988) set up a simple partial equilibrium model that focuses on the 
environmental impacts of international trade in a two-country (one rich, one poor), 
two-good (one whose production can, but need not, be dirty and one whose production is 
non-polluting) world where the rich country successfully adopts an environmental control 
programme while the poor country does not. They find several results: 
1) The decision to use a dirty production process for dirty goods in a poor country will 
reduce the world price of that good and hence results in excess of world demand for 
the dirty good. 
2) The poor country will produce more of the dirty good by using a dirty production 
process. 
3) As a result, total world emissions of pollutants will be higher. 
4) The long-run consequence will be that the poor country will increase its comparative 
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advantage in dirty goods by using dirty production processes, while the rich country 
will specialise in the other, less polluting product.  
Baumol and Oates (1988) then claim that developed countries control pollution emissions. 
Developing countries will, therefore, become “pollution havens”. Other theoretical studies 
(for example, Copeland, 1994) support the findings of Baumol and Oates (1988). However, 
the resulting pattern of production and trade is based on a general presumption that 
developing countries neglect the environment and pursue a “pollution haven” strategy 
which according to Pearson (1987) is ill-founded. 
The traditional approach to the trade-environment relationship declares that the 
environmental damage is a result of market and government failures, or the existence of 
externalities, rather than the trade itself. Therefore the best solution is to internalise the 
externalities, that is, prices should reflect both private and social costs. Internalised social 
costs will generate higher prices for the environmental damaging products, and as a result, 
will alter production, trade and investment patterns. However, the internalisation is difficult 
to implement in reality. Runge (1994) points out that it is far easier to recommend that 
environmental externalities be “internalised” than it is to implement and enforce 
internalisation.  
2.2.2 Empirical Literature on FDI and the Environment 
Recently, much of the literature on FDI has provided models of FDI that are concerned 
about the sensitivity of investment location decisions to different elements, such as factor 
costs, infrastructures, local demand, and labour quality. A multinational firm is treated as 
one that wants to invest capital somewhere to maximise its profit, i.e. to minimise 
production cost. The presumption is that production cost differentials are a sufficient 
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inducement for a firm to relocate. Many empirical studies on FDI believe that stringent 
environmental regulations increase production costs by, for example, prohibiting certain 
inputs and outputs, paying levy rates for emissions that exceed certain standards, or using 
specific technologies to meet strict emission standards. Therefore, the multinational firm 
will locate in a region with weaker environmental standards. To examine the impact of 
environmental regulations on the location of FDI, we firstly introduce the frameworks in 
the FDI empirical research.   
2.2.2.1 Three Frameworks of Foreign Direct Investment 
In addition to the costs of the main factors of production which impact the investment 
location choice, are there any other potential determinants that can influence an investment 
decision? Eskeland and Harrison (2003) concluded that there are three frameworks that 
explain the potential determinants of foreign investment.  
The first is that factor proportions explanations for trade can also be used to explain the 
pattern of foreign investment (Caves, 1982; Helpman, 1984; and Brainard, 1993). Holding 
everything else equal, foreign firms would like to locate in a country that has cheaper 
factors of production that they use in high proportions. Then the pattern of FDI can be 
captured through variables such as skill intensity, capital-labour ratio and wage differentials 
between countries.  
Factor proportions alone, however, cannot satisfactorily explain foreign investment. Other 
foreign investment theories focus on the role of ownership. An important role is played by 
intangible assets such as superior knowledge and technology, and managerial abilities. This 
intangible asset theory of FDI is developed by Horstmann and Markusen (1989). To the 
extent that intangibles are usually linked to advanced technology, multinational firms may 
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be better able to comply at a lower cost than local firms, thereby gaining a comparative 
advantage. Therefore, to capture the importance of intangibles as a motivation for FDI, 
factor productivity growth is used when data are available.  
The third framework is the proximity-concentration trade-off between multinational sales and 
trade, which is described in more details by Brainard (1997). Some important factors (other 
than intangible assets and factor prices), such as tariff barriers and transport costs, will 
make firms locate near the target market. The protection of domestic markets has been one 
of important attractions for foreign investment. Some trade measures, for example, import 
penetration and export shares, are often employed to capture the importance of protected 
markets. Since there is trade-off between the advantages of proximity and the benefits of 
concentration of production in one location in sectors where there are economies of scale, 
measures of economies of scale/concentration (for instance, the numbers of employees per 
plant) are important in such models.  
2.2.2.2 Empirical Evidence for the Pollution Haven Hypothesis  
Although there are many articles focusing on trade and the environment, few studies have 
studied the relationship between foreign investment and environmental issues. Of those 
papers that do examine the relationship between FDI and the environment, most of them 
are centred on US data, only few studies looking at developing countries and even less that 
look at China.  
Thus far, the empirical evidence for the existence of a pollution haven consistent effect is 
mixed. Generally, empirical studies suggest that there is little evidence to support the 
pollution haven hypothesis. Early non-parametric evaluations (Walter, 1982 and Pearson, 
1987) find that there is FDI in pollution-intensive industries but little evidence that it is 
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influenced by differing pollution abatement costs, or has flowed faster into developing 
countries relative to industrial countries. Leonard (1988) finds evidence that governments 
in developing countries used lenient environmental regulations to attract FDI in the 1970s 
but this incentive was not substantial enough to offset other main determinants of location 
such as the level of training of labour, infrastructure and stability.  
Dean et al. (2005) and Smarzynska-Javorcik and Wei (2005) summarise three approaches 
which have been adopted in recent econometric studies on whether or not FDI flows are a 
result of pollution haven effects. They are 1) inter-state plant location choice; 2) inter-industry FDI 
flows within a country and; 3) inter-country FDI location choice. The results of these studies are 
mixed.  
Using the first approach, Levinson (1996a) finds little evidence that inter-state differences 
in environmental regulations affect the US plant location choice. Levinson (1996b) 
employs a conditional logit model and finds only one of six environmental stringency 
indicators has a significant but small impact on the location choice of new branch plants in 
the US. A similar approach is adopted by List and Co (2000), who estimate the effect of 
state environmental regulations on foreign multinational corporations’ new plant location 
decisions from 1986 to 1993, using four measures of regulatory stringency. They find that 
environmental stringency and attractiveness of a location are inversely related. Keller and 
Levinson (2002) test whether FDI to US states has responded significantly to relative 
changes in state’s environmental compliance costs. Keller and Levinson (2002) address the 
main drawbacks in previous studies. They control for unobserved heterogeneity among 
states and use a panel of pollution abatement cost indices that control for states’ industrial 
composition. It robustly documents moderate effects of pollution abatement costs on 
capital and employees at foreign-owned manufacturing affiliates, particularly in 
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pollution-intensive industries, and on the number of planned new foreign-owned 
manufacturing facilities. Similarly, Fredriksson et al. (2003), which uses US state-level panel 
data from four industrial sectors over the period 1977-1987, finds that environmental 
policy plays a significant role in determining the spatial allocation of inbound US FDI and 
such effect depends critically on the exogeneity assumption of environmental policy.  
There is a scarcity of research that assesses the relationship between the distribution of 
foreign investment and pollution intensity. One exception is the recent work of Eskeland 
and Harrison (2003), which adopts the second approach to examine the pattern of FDI 
across industries in Mexico, Venezuela, Morocco and Cote d’Ivoire. Their results suggest 
that it is difficult to find a robust relationship between pollution abatement and the volume 
of US outbound investment. They find a positive relationship between FDI share and air 
pollution-intensity of an industry but negative relationship between FDI share and both 
water pollution and toxic release-intensity. They also find foreign ownership is associated 
both with lower levels of energy use and the use of cleaner types of energy. In addition, the 
results suggest that any impact of abatement costs on the distribution of FDI is small, if 
not zero. It is suggested that these results are because pollution abatement costs are only a 
small fraction of overall costs.   
A paper employing the third approach is Xing and Kolstad (2002), which presents a 
statistical test on how US FDI is influenced by the environmental regulations of foreign 
host countries. To be specific, they have examined the relationship between the capital 
outflows of six US manufacturing sectors – including industries with high pollution control 
costs (chemicals and primary metals) as well as industries with more modest pollution 
control costs (electrical and non-electrical machinery, transportation equipment, and food 
products) – and the environmental policy of 22 destination countries. They argue that 
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environmental regulatory stringency is not directly observed and hence use an instrumental 
variable approach to examine the effect of environmental regulations. The results show 
that the laxity of environmental regulations in a host country is a significant determinant of 
FDI from the US for heavily polluting industries and is insignificant for less polluting 
industries.7 Their findings provide indirect support for the pollution haven hypothesis. 
However, the small size of the data and the imperfect coverage of sulphur emissions data 
mean that care must be taken with the reliability of their results. A more recent paper, 
Smarzynska-Javorcik and Wei (2005) examines the relationship between cross country FDI 
flows and environmental stringency for 143 multinational firms in 25 countries in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. In this paper they emphasise a number of omitted 
variables from previous studies, such as bureaucratic corruption, which deters FDI but at 
the same time is correlated with laxity of environmental protection. However, they find 
little evidence for the hypothesis that lower environmental standards attract investment, 
nor for the hypothesis that these countries are more attractive for pollution-intensive FDI. 
They find some evidence for the PHH when regressions employing Treaties as the proxy 
for environmental standards in a host country, but the overall evidence is relatively weak 
and does not survive numerous robustness checks using other proxies of pollution 
intensity or regulatory stringency.  
 
 
 
                                                
7 Xing and Kolstad (2002) find that there is a negative linear relationship between FDI of the US chemical 
industry and the stringency of environmental regulation in a foreign host country. Lax environmental policy 
tends to attract more capital inflows form the US for pollution intensive industries; whilst tough 
environmental regulations would tend to impede or discourage FDI from these industries. 
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2.2.2.3 Empirical Evidence on Chinese Data 
Recent Empirical Evidence on Intra-Country FDI Location in China 
Many researchers have focused on the geographical distribution of aggregate FDI flows 
among Chinese provinces. Wei et al. (1999) analyse the determinants of regional 
distribution of both pledged and realised FDI within China from 1985 to 1995. The unit 
root test results indicate the existence of a long run relationship between the spatial 
distribution of FDI and a number of regional characteristics. The error components 
(random effect) model results suggest that pledged FDI is positively affected by the level of 
international trade, the number of scientists and researchers in total employment, GDP 
growth, preferential investment policy, improvement in infrastructure, and advances in 
agglomeration; while negatively affected by wage rates and information costs. However, 
GDP growth, infrastructure and agglomeration do not have significant effects on realised 
FDI.  
Using provincial data between 1990 and 1997, Coughlin and Segev (2000) examine the 
geographic pattern of FDI location within China. They extend the methodology of 
pervious studies by introducing some new control variables and test the existence of spatial 
heterogeneity and spatial dependence. The ordinary least square (OLS) and spatial error 
regressions both suggest that only spatial dependence exists, i.e. increased FDI in a 
province has positive effects on FDI in nearby provinces. Their findings on other control 
variables are consistent with past studies of FDI location choice among Chinese provinces 
and with studies of FDI location in general: economic size, productivity and coastal 
location are positive determinants of FDI location; wage and illiterate rate are negative 
determinants; and their infrastructure measures do not have significant effects on FDI.  
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Cheng and Kwan (2000) employ a dynamic model of foreign investment and use 
Generalised Method of Moment (GMM) estimator to investigate the impact of the 
determinants on the stock of FDI in 29 Chinese regions from 1985 to 1995, and find that a 
large regional market, good infrastructure, and preferential policies have positive effects but 
wage has a negative effect on FDI. The effect of education is positive but not significant. 
They also find a strong self-reinforcing effect of FDI on itself. 
Gao (2002) concentrates on the effect of labour quality on the location of FDI within 
China from 1996 to 1999. Gao (2002) employs OLS, between effects, fixed effects and 
random effects models and finds that labour quality plays a significant and positive role in 
attracting FDI. The evidence in this paper also indicates that the location of FDI from 
developed economies, such as US and Japan, is more sensitive to labour quality than FDI 
from Asian developing economies. However, the wage is not found to be a significant 
determinant and even has a positive coefficient in some specifications. 
In a similar paper, Fung et al. (2002) examine the determinants of US and Japanese FDI 
location among Chinese regions from 1991 to 1997 using a generalised least square 
estimator and compare the results with those investments from Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
GDP and certain policy variables are found to have significant positive impacts on inflows 
of FDI. Labour quality exerts a larger influence on Japanese investment than on US 
investment. Lagged wage is negatively related to FDI. However, compared with investment 
from Hong Kong and Taiwan, US and Japanese investments are more sensitive to the local 
markets because they are mostly producing for the domestic Chinese market while FDI 
from Hong Kong and Taiwan is mostly producing for export. Labour quality does not have 
a strong influence on FDI inflows from Hong Kong and Taiwan because such investment 
is more concentrated in labour-intensive industries that require relatively low labour skills. 
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Additionally, good infrastructure has a strong effect of FDI from Hong Kong and Taiwan 
but only a moderate effect on US investment and no effect on Japanese investment. Fung 
et al. (2003) examine the determinants of Japanese FDI in China using a regional dataset 
from 1990 to 2000 and form a comparison with investment from Hong Kong. The main 
results are similar to those in Fung et al. (2002).  
Amiti and Javorcik (2008) is the latest paper which examines the determinants of entry by 
foreign firms using a comprehensive dataset that includes 515 industries in 29 Chinese 
provinces during 1998-2001. The analysis is based on a new economic geography model 
and focuses on the relative importance of market and supplier access within and outside 
the province of entry, as well as trade costs and factor costs. The non-linear least square 
results suggest that market access and supplier access are the key determinants of FDI 
inflows. The presence of customers and suppliers in the province of entry matters more 
than the market and supplier access to the rest of China, which is consistent with market 
fragmentation in China due to underdeveloped transport infrastructure and informal trade 
barriers. In addition, production costs also play an important role in determining the 
location of FDI, but the effects are only around a quarter of the market and supplier access 
effects.  
Empirical Evidence on Intra-Country Pollution Havens in China 
A recent study that searches for empirical evidence of intra-country pollution havens in 
China is Dean et al. (2005). In this study they estimate whether weak environmental 
regulations attract foreign investment in China. Dean et al. (2005) derive a location choice 
model containing firm’s production and abatement decisions, agglomeration and factor 
abundance. They estimate a conditional logit model using a dataset that includes 
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information on 2,886 manufacturing joint venture projects, effective environmental levies 
on water pollution, and estimates of Chinese emissions and abatement costs across 3-digit 
ISIC industries and provinces between 1993 and 1996. The results show that FDI flows to 
provinces with high concentrations of foreign investment, relative abundance of skilled 
labour, concentration of potential local suppliers, special tax incentives, and less state 
ownership. Environmental stringency just affects certain types of projects in highly 
polluting industries, with investment originating from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan 
seemingly attracted to provinces with relatively weak environmental controls. This finding 
is consistent with the pollution haven hypothesis but contradicts the notion that pollution 
havens are generated by industrial country investors. In contrast, investment from 
non-Chinese sources appears not to be attracted by low levels of pollution levies, regardless 
of the pollution intensity of the industry. This is opposite to the pollution haven hypothesis. 
In sum, the results suggest little evidence for the pollution haven hypothesis.   
2.2.2.4 Weaknesses of Previous Work on Pollution Havens 
The general lack of support for the pollution haven hypothesis in previous studies can be 
summarised as follows:  
First, as Pearson pointed out, “environmental control costs are a small fraction of 
production costs in virtually every industry, and the effect on trade will be correspondingly 
small”.8 This is reinforced by the results of Eskeland and Harrison (1997), where the 
empirical results show that environment costs may be too small relative to overall costs to 
impact the location decision. Second, FDI may be combined with new techniques, 
including the latest abatement technologies, rendering the relative stringency of the host 
                                                
8 Pearson (1987), pp.124. 
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country’s environmental regulations unimportant. Third, if firms are producing for export, 
then they may have to meet the environmental product standards of developed countries in 
order to gain the access to these markets. Finally, firms may predict that there will be future 
increases in environmental regulations, and hence choose a production process today that 
will meet the higher standards of the future (Dean et al., 2002).   
Smarzynska and Wei (2001) point out there are two possible ways to summarise the 
existing empirical studies on pollution haven hypothesis. “The first possibility is that the 
‘pollution haven’ hypothesis is after all just a popular myth that does not hold in reality. An 
alternative view is that the ‘pollution haven’ hypothesis is valid but the empirical 
researchers have not tried hard enough to uncover this ‘dirty secret’.”9 There exist several 
weaknesses in previous studies that may have impeded the exposure of the “dirty secret”. 
First, in some studies, the absence of some important variables, such as relative factor 
abundance and agglomeration, will lead to omitted variable bias. Markusen and Zhang 
(1999), Head and Ries (1996), and Cheng and Kwan (2000) have demonstrated the 
importance of these variables in explaining FDI incidence (Dean et al. 2005). 
Second, it is difficult to quantify international differences in environmental regulations 
(Smarzynska and Wei, 2001; and Keller and Levinson, 2002). “This difficulty is further 
exacerbated by the possibility that laws on the book may not be the laws that are actually 
enforced”.10  
Third, Keller and Levinson (2002) & Levinson and Taylor (2008) both demonstrate that 
cross-section analyses cannot control for unobserved heterogeneity among countries. 
                                                
9 Smarzynska and Wei (2001), pp. 2.    
10 op. cit. pp. 3.    
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These unobserved characteristics, such as unobserved resources and unobserved protection 
of polluting industries, may be correlated with both regulatory compliance costs and 
investment. If the estimation does not allow for these unobserved characteristics, it will 
generate an omitted variable bias to the predicted effect of regulatory compliances costs on 
investment. Therefore, using a continuous, time-varying (panel) dataset becomes 
important.  
Finally, most literature uses cost-based measures of environmental standard stringency. 
Copeland and Taylor (2003) developed a model linking the firm’s production and 
abatement cost. It suggests a particular specification for testing a firm’s responsiveness to 
changes in environmental regulations, which raises the possibility of specification error.     
In this chapter, we address a number of those limitations by adopting a five-year panel 
dataset for 30 provinces in China that includes three measures of environmental regulations 
that vary across time and province, and a significant number of control variables, including 
measures of agglomeration and factor abundance. We control for unobserved 
heterogeneity by using the feasible generalised least square estimator.  
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2.3 FDI, the Environment and Environmental Regulations in 
China 
Section 2.3.1 firstly lays out the circumstances of foreign investment in China, including its 
development since 1978 and the characteristics of its uneven distribution. In the second 
part, it elucidates the environment problems that China faces at present, especially the 
industrial generated wastewater pollution, air pollution and solid wastes pollution. 
Following a brief description of environmental investment in China, the environmental 
regulatory framework, FDI related environmental regulations and the stringency of 
environmental regulations are expounded in detail.    
2.3.1 Foreign Direct Investment in China 
Since it launched economic reforms in 1978, China has received enormous FDI flows. In 
2005, it received FDI in actually utilised value of $72.41 billion compared with $0.64 billion 
in 1983 (China Statistical Yearbook).11 China has been the second-largest recipient of 
foreign capital ranking after the US. 
2.3.1.1 Trends in Chinese FDI 
General trends and the characteristics of FDI in China have been reviewed by many studies, 
e.g. Wu (1999), OECD (2000), Wei and Liu (2001), and Wei (2002). At the beginning of 
China’s economic reforms, FDI inflows were not significant. FDI increased in the 
mid-1980s and reached a peak level in the early 1990s. Since the mid-1990s China has been 
a major host country for FDI. Table 2.3.1 shows the number of contracted projects, the 
                                                
11 Actually used FDI refers to the amount which has been actually used according to the agreements and 
contracts, i.e. the realised FDI. 
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amount of contracted and the amount of actually used FDI and the corresponding annual 
growth rate from 1979 to 2003. The development path of inward FDI is shown more 
clearly from Figure 2.3.1. Following the surveys of OECD (2000) and Wei (2002), the 
general trends can be distinguished by five phases: the experimental stage (1979-1983), the 
growth stage (1984-1991), the peak stage (1992-1994), the adjustment stage (1995-1999), 
and the renascent/recovered stage (2000 onwards).  
During the first stage, the Chinese government established four Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs) in Guangdong and Fujian Provinces, and provided special incentive policies in 
these SEZs.12 FDI inflows were mainly concentrated in these SEZs; however, the total 
amount was rather low, only $1.8 billion. 
With the successful experiment in the first stage and a satisfactory economic situation 
nationwide, China formulated a series of laws and regulations to improve the business 
environment. In 1984, China established another SEZ – Hainan Island (which became a 
province in 1988) and opened fourteen coastal cities across ten provinces.13 There was a 
steady and rapid growth of FDI flows during the second stage, with a growth rate of 
approximately 20 per cent.  
  
                                                
12 Guangdong and Fujian are both coastal provinces in the southeast of China. The four SEZs are Shenzhen, 
Zhuhai, Shantou in Guangdong, and Xiamen in Fujian.  
13  The fourteen cities include: Dalian (Liaoning Province), Qinhuangdao (Hebei Province), Tianjin 
(municipality), Yantai (Shandong Province), Qingdao (Shandong Province), Liangyungang (Jiangsu Province), 
Nantong (Jiangsu Province), Shanghai (municipality), Ningbo (Zhejiang Province), Wenzhou (Zhejiang 
Province), Fuzhou (Fujian Province), Guangzhou (Guangdong Province), Zhanjiang (Guangdong Province), 
and Beihai (Guangxi Province). 
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Table 2.3.1 FDI Inflows into China 1979-2004 
USD billion (Current Price)  
Year 
# of 
Project 
Growth 
Rate 
Contracted 
Value 
Growth 
Rate 
Actually 
Used Value 
Growth 
Rate 
Total  508465  1096.36  560.39  
1979-1982 922 N/A 6.01 N/A 1.17 N/A 
1983 470 N/A 1.73 N/A 0.64 N/A 
1984 1856 294.89 2.65 53.18 1.26 96.88 
1985 3073 65.57 5.93 123.77 1.66 31.75 
1986 1498 -51.25 2.83 -52.28 1.87 12.65 
1987 2233 49.07 3.71 31.10 2.31 23.53 
1988 5945 166.23 5.30 42.86 3.19 38.10 
1989 5779 -2.79 5.60 5.66 3.39 6.27 
1990 7273 25.85 6.60 17.86 3.49 2.95 
1991 12978 78.44 11.98 81.52 4.37 25.21 
1992 48764 275.74 58.12 385.14 11.01 151.95 
1993 83437 71.10 111.44 91.74 27.52 149.95 
1994 47549 -43.01 82.68 -25.81 33.77 22.71 
1995 37011 -22.16 91.28 10.40 37.52 11.10 
1996 24556 -33.65 73.28 -19.72 41.73 11.22 
1997 21001 -14.48 51.00 -30.40 45.26 8.46 
1998 19799 -5.72 52.10 2.16 45.46 0.44 
1999 16918 -14.55 41.22 -20.88 40.32 -11.31 
2000 22347 32.09 62.38 51.33 40.72 0.99 
2001 26140 16.97 69.20 10.93 46.88 15.13 
2002 34171 30.72 82.77 19.61 52.74 12.50 
2003 41081 20.22 115.07 39.02 53.51 1.46 
2004 43664 6.29 153.48 33.38 60.63 13.31 
Note: a) The number of project refers to the project numbers of the enterprises with foreign 
investment. The amount of contracted FDI refers to the amount of project investments supplied 
by the foreign businessmen in terms of approved or signed contracts. The amount of actually used 
FDI refers to the amount which has been actually used according to the agreements and contracts. 
     b) The values for 1979-1986 are different among the China Statistical Yearbooks for various 
years, possibly due to different measurements. The values presented in the table are collected from 
the corresponding year’s Yearbook so that the total volumes are different from those in the latest 
Yearbook.  
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
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From 1992 to 1994, contracted and actually used FDI increased quickly and exceeded the 
corresponding figures for the previous years. In 1993, the contracted FDI value reached a 
peak level of $111.4 billion. This situation was closely associated with a number of events, 
including Deng Xiaoping’s visit to the southern coastal areas and SEZs, nationwide 
implementation of opening up policies for FDI and the world wide rise in FDI flows.14 
From 1994, the growth rate of actually used FDI slowed down and became negative in 
1999. The number of projects and contracted FDI mostly kept falling during the period 
1994 to 1999 and both arrived at their lowest point in 1999. This was mainly due to the 
impact of the Asian financial crisis and the rise of acquisition transactions in both OECD 
and non-OECD countries.  
From 2000 onwards, inflows of FDI into China recovered quickly in terms of both 
contracted and actually used FDI. In 2003, it overtook the US as the biggest recipient of 
FDI in the world with contracted value of $115.07 billion and actually used value of $53.51 
billion. National Bureau of Statistics of China reported that in 2004 the contracted value of 
FDI increased to $153.48 billion and the actually utilised amount rose to $60.63 billion, 
with the rank after US.   
It should be noted that the growth of FDI is positively associated with the economic 
growth in China. It is also illustrated by Figure 2.3.1. FDI and economic growth interact 
with each other. GDP per capita increased quickly in the stage that FDI was booming, and 
slowly when FDI inflows decreased. 
                                                
14 Deng’s visit in the spring of 1992, pushed China’s overall economic reform process forward and 
emphasised China’s commitment to the open door policy and market-oriented economic reform. It gave 
greater confidence to foreign investors in China. From then on, China adopted new approach, which pushed 
more nationwide implementation of open policies to encourage FDI inflows.  
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Figure 2.3.1 FDI Inflows into China 1979-2004 
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
 
2.3.1.2 Unbalanced Distribution of FDI in China 
Although the total amount of FDI inflows into China is extremely high, there are 
significant imbalances in FDI stocks across China in terms of its source, form, geographical 
and sectoral distribution.  
1) Main Countries of Origin of Investment 
According to the report from China’s Ministry of Commerce (Tables 2.3.2 and 2.3.3), 
Asian countries contribute most of the FDI inflows into China, which takes up more than 
70% of total actually used FDI into China between 1979 and 2003. It is followed by North 
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America and the EU, with 9.57% and 7.55% respectively. Among those countries with the 
highest investment in China, the majority of investors were ethnic Chinese, e.g. the share of 
FDI from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao was about 52.69% between 1979 and 2003.15 
Among developed countries, the US and Japan have been the most important investors in 
China, with about 8.79% and 8.25% respectively. Other developed countries invested lower 
amounts of FDI in China. In recent years the share of FDI from Hong Kong, Macao and 
Taiwan has decreased while that of the US and the EU has increased.  
2) Forms of Investment  
In terms of the form of FDI, the establishment of new enterprises like joint ventures and 
foreign invested companies seem to be the main types of FDI into China at the current 
time. From Table 2.3.4, it is clear that until 2003, equity joint ventures accounted for 41% 
of the inward actually used FDI and wholly owned foreign invested enterprises accounted 
for appropriately 40%. Cooperative operations have been the third important mode, which 
took 17.27% in terms of actually used FDI from 1979 to 2003. As mergers and acquisitions 
have become popular forms of global FDI, they may also have potential for further 
expansion in China. Additionally, the share of wholly owned foreign invested enterprises 
shows an increase in China in recent years (OECD 2000). 
                                                
15 For historical reasons, Hong Kong Dollar, New Taiwan Dollar and Macao Pataca had been called “foreign 
currencies”, and the investment from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao has been counted as “foreign 
investment” since the 1980s, although Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao are all part of China. Currently, some 
researchers have named the investment from these three regions as “non-RMB domestic investment”. 
However, here we follow the traditional statistical classification, and treat all non-RMB investment as 
“foreign investment”. 
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Table 2.3.2 FDI to China by Major Countries/Regions 1979 - 2003 
USD billion 
Country 
(Region) 
# of 
Project 
% 
Contracted 
Value 
% 
Actually 
Used 
Value 
% 
Total 465277 100 943.13 100 501.47 100 
Asia  369789 79.48 654.14 69.36 357.41 71.27 
Hong Kong 224509 48.25 414.51 43.95 222.58 44.38 
Indonesia 1079 0.23 2.58 0.27 1.27 0.25 
Japan 28401 6.01 57.49 6.10 41.39 8.25 
Macao 8407 1.81 12.09 1.28 5.19 1.03 
Malaysia 2888 0.62 7.16 0.76 3.09 0.62 
The Philippines 1945 0.42 3.74 0.40 1.65 0.33 
Singapore 11871 2.55 43.57 4.62 23.53 4.69 
Korea 27128 5.83 36.65 3.89 19.69 3.93 
Thailand 3375 0.73 6.32 0.67 2.55 0.51 
Taiwan 60186 12.94 70.03 7.43 36.49 7.28 
EU 16158 3.47 65.94 6.99 37.87 7.55 
Belgium 470 0.10 1.08 0.11 0.67 0.13 
Denmark 267 0.06 1.41 0.15 0.52 0.10 
UK 3856 0.83 20.84 2.21 11.44 2.28 
Germany 3504 0.75 15.71 1.67 8.85 1.76 
France 2302 0.49 7.92 0.84 6.15 1.23 
Ireland 61 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.05 0.01 
Italy 2137 0.46 3.81 0.40 2.55 0.51 
Luxembourg 96 0.02 0.61 0.06 0.28 0.06 
Netherlands 1254 0.27 9.93 1.05 5.06 1.01 
Greece 47 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.01 
Portugal 80 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.07 0.01 
Spain 755 0.16 1.36 0.14 0.45 0.09 
Austria 573 0.12 1.04 0.11 0.44 0.09 
Finland 181 0.04 0.61 0.06 0.39 0.08 
Sweden 575 0.12 1.27 0.13 0.93 0.19 
North America 48281 10.38 98.43 10.44 48.01 9.57 
Canada 6941 1.49 11.99 1.27 3.92 0.78 
US 41340 8.89 86.44 9.17 44.09 8.79 
Some Free Ports 11665 2.51 81.05 8.59 38.14 7.61 
Cayman Islands 923 0.20 11.18 1.18 4.67 0.93 
Virgin Islands 8877 1.91 62.01 6.58 30.17 6.02 
Samoan 1865 0.40 7.86 0.83 3.30 0.66 
Source: http://www.chinafdi.org.cn [Accessed 20/03/2005]. 
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Table 2.3.3 Share of Major Source Countries/Regions of Actually Used FDI in 
China 
Year 
Hong Kong 
& Macao 
(%) 
Taiwan 
(%) 
US 
(%) 
Japan 
(%) 
EU 
(%) 
1986 59.22  14.54 11.74 7.96 
1987 69.08  11.36 9.50 2.28 
1988 65.60  7.39 16.11 4.92 
1989 61.24 4.56 8.38 10.50 5.53 
1990 54.87 6.38 13.08 14.44 4.23 
1991 59.96 10.68 7.40 12.20 5.63 
1992 70.03 9.54 4.64 6.45 2.21 
1993 64.91 11.41 7.50 4.81 2.44 
1994 59.75 10.04 7.38 6.15 4.55 
1995 54.64 8.43 8.22 8.28 5.68 
1996 50.95 8.33 8.25 8.82 6.56 
1997 46.46 7.27 7.16 9.56 9.22 
1998 41.64 6.41 8.58 7.48 8.75 
1999 41.35 6.45 10.46 7.37 11.11 
2000 38.92 5.64 10.77 7.16 11.00 
2001 36.35 6.36 9.46 9.28 8.92 
2002 34.75 7.53 10.28 7.94 7.03 
2003 33.86 7.35 7.85 9.45 7.35 
Source: http://www.chinafdi.org.cn [Accessed 20/03/2005]. 
Table 2.3.4 FDI in China by Type up to 2003 
USD billion 
Type 
# of 
Project 
% 
Contracted 
Value 
% 
Actually 
Used 
Value 
% 
Total 465277 100 943.13 100 501.47 100 
Joint Ventures Enterprises 238367 51.23 351.84 37.31 206.03 41.08 
Cooperative Operation 
Enterprises 
54512 11.72 170.80 18.11 86.62 17.27 
Foreign Invested Enterprises 172108 36.99 414.15 43.91 199.00 39.68 
Foreign Invested Share 
Enterprises 
67 0.01 1.46 0.15 1.55 0.31 
Cooperative Development 191 0.04 4.74 0.50 7.40 1.48 
Others 32 0.01 0.15 0.02 0.87 0.17 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various years, and http://www.chinafdi.org.cn [Accessed 
20/03/2005]. 
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3) Geographical Distribution  
The geographical distribution of FDI in China is very unbalanced. Figure 2.3.2 is a map of 
China with the names of administrative areas. It shows the traditional division of three 
regions in China. Eastern regions have received most of the FDI inflows. In addition to the 
natural and historical advantages of the eastern regions, the government’s favourable 
policies towards FDI also offer a better business environment in this region than the 
others. 16  Although the central government began to place more attention on the 
development of central and western China in 2000 and “Western Development 
Programme” has been implemented, the economic development gap between coastal and 
inner regions is still large. 
Table 2.3.5 demonstrates that 86.27% of cumulative FDI was located in the eastern region, 
8.93% in the central region and only 4.80% in the western region between the years 1979 
and 2003. Among the eastern region provinces, Guangdong has attracted more than a 
quarter of the total cumulative FDI (Figure 2.3.3). Jiangsu and Fujian, which have received 
14.24% and 8.75% of the total FDI respectively, ranked second and third among thirty-one 
provinces in mainland China. Other eastern provinces, Shanghai, Shandong, Liaoning, 
Zhejiang, Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei also ranked in the top group. These eastern provinces 
are also the richest regions in China, in terms of both GDP and per capita GDP. 
                                                
16 China has a vast territory with coastal plains in the east and altiplano in the west. Eastern regions have an 
advantageous geographical position, which is favourable for international trade. The SEZs and fourteen 
opened coastal cities are the traditional industrial and commercial centres which offer better infrastructure 
than the inner areas of China. Numerous development zones have been established in eastern region, such as 
Yangtze River delta, the Pearl River delta, Bohai Sea Coastal Region and Pudong District of Shanghai. 
37 
 
Figure 2.3.2 Map of China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eastern Regions 
Central Regions 
Western Regions 
China administers 34 province-level 
divisions, including 4 municipalities 
(Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and 
Chongqing), 23 provinces (Hebei, 
Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, 
Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, 
Hunan, Guangdong, Hainan, Sichuan, 
Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, 
Qinghai, and Taiwan) , 5 autonomous 
regions (AR) (Inner Mongolia AR, 
Guangxi Zhuang AR, Tibet AR, 
Ningxia Hui AR, and Xinjiang Uyghur 
AR) , and two special administrative 
regions (SARs) (Hong Kong and 
Macao). In this thesis, we only consider 
the 31 divisions in mainland China. 
Non-RMB domestic investment from 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao are 
treated as “foreign investment” (see 
footnote 15). 
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Table 2.3.5 FDI in Different Regions in China up to 2003 
USD billion 
Region 
# of 
Project 
% 
Contracted 
Value 
% 
Actually 
Used Value 
% 
Total 465277 100 943.13 100 501.47 100 
Eastern Region 381527 82.00 819.16 86.86 432.61 86.27 
Central Region 52424 11.27 71.21 7.55 44.79 8.93 
Western Region 31326 6.73 52.75 5.59 24.07 4.80 
 
Source: http://www.chinafdi.org.cn [Accessed 20/03/2005]. 
 
Figure 2.3.3 FDI Shares of Provinces 1979-2003 
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Source: http://www.chinafdi.org.cn [Accessed 20/03/2005]. 
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4) Sectoral Distribution 
Chinese industry can be split into three main categories, primary industry, secondary 
industry and tertiary industry.17 Thus far, the majority of FDI has flowed into the 
secondary industry.  
Table 2.3.6 shows that among secondary industries, manufacturing has taken 63.66% of the 
total cumulative contracted FDI by 2003, with construction taking a significant proportion 
(2.57%). The tertiary industry comes second with the proportion of real estate (the leading 
sector) accounting for about 20%. The primary industry attracted less than 2% of the total 
FDI inflows.  
According to the analysis of OECD (2002) and Wei (2002), much of FDI in the 
manufacturing sector was concentrated in labour-intensive sectors such as textiles, clothing 
and assembly lines of mechanical, electronic and electric products. However, there is a 
significant increase of FDI inflows into capital- and technology-intensive sectors.  
In the future, especially with the accession to the WTO and further liberalisation, service 
trade, such as finance and insurance, telecommunications, wholesale and retail, are 
expected to increase. Further investment will also take place in traditional industries. 
Investment in agriculture depends on the extent of the opening up of the market for 
agricultural products and the industrialised process of production operations (OECD 
2000). 
                                                
17 Primary industry refers to extraction of natural resources, i.e. agriculture (including farming, forestry, 
animal husbandry and fishery). Secondary industry involves processing of primary products, i.e. industry 
(including mining and quarrying, manufacturing, production and supply of electricity power, gas and water) 
and construction. Tertiary industry refers to all other economic activities not included in primary and 
secondary industry. 
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Table 2.3.6 Cumulative FDI in the Three Industries 1979-2003 
USD billion 
Sector 
# of 
Project 
% 
Contracted 
Value 
% 
Total 465277 100 943.13 100 
Primary Industry 13333 2.87 18.04 1.91 
Farming, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and 
Fishery 
13333 2.87 18.04 1.91 
Secondary Industry 350170 75.26 632.01 67.01 
Mining and Quarrying 524 0.11 1.68 0.18 
Manufacturing 338952 72.85 600.40 63.66 
Electricity Power, Gas and Water 
Production and Supply 
654 0.14 5.68 0.60 
Construction 10040 2.16 24.25 2.57 
Tertiary Industry 101774 21.87 293.08 31.08 
Transport, Storage, Post and 
Telecommunication Services 
5235 1.13 23.81 2.52 
Wholesale & Retail Trade (& Catering 
Services) 
23565 5.06 28.84 3.06 
Finance and Insurance 48 0.01 0.87 0.09 
Real Estate Management 40941 8.8 180.90 19.18 
Renting and Business Services 15438 3.32 30.17 3.20 
Scientific Research, Polytechnic Service & 
Geological Prospecting 
3528 0.76 4.16 0.44 
Household and other Services 10333 2.22 16.32 1.73 
Education (Cultural & Arts, Radio, Film 
& Television) 
1482 0.32 2.59 0.27 
Health Care Sports and Social Welfare 1204 0.26 5.43 0.58 
Source: http://www.chinafdi.org.cn [Accessed 20/03/2005]. 
 
2.3.2 Pollution in China 
China has been a large polluting country with rapidly increasing industrial production, 
domestic and foreign trade and investment. Central and local governments and some 
industrial managers have recognised the problem and made an effort to reduce pollution 
and to encourage cleaner production. Environmental protection has been one of the 
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“national fundamental policies” in China. However, economic growth is still the priority. 
The general public has little awareness of the threats of environmental degradation. Weak 
and uneven enforcement of environmental laws also discourage industries from reducing 
pollution and increasing efficiency. The disparity of economic growth and enforcement of 
environmental regulations has resulted in accumulated environmental problems especially 
in certain areas.  
China’s State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) reported that five of the 
ten most polluted cities worldwide are in China; acid rain is falling on one third of the 
country; half of the water in the seven largest rivers is “completely useless”; a quarter of 
China’s citizens lack access to clean drinking water; one third of the urban population is 
breathing polluted air; and less than a fifth of the rubbish in cities is treated and processed 
in an environmentally sustainable way. SEPA officials reported in early August 2006, that 
China has become the world’s top emitter of acid rain causing sulphur dioxide (SO2), with 
discharges rising 27 per cent from 2000 to 2005, mostly from coal-burning power stations 
(Reuters, 16/08/2006).  
Industrial pollution is a primary source of the environmental problems. SEPA reported 
that in 2004 industrial air pollution accounts for over 80% of the national total, including 
83.9% of SO2 emissions and 80.9% of flue dust. Although industrial water pollution has 
decreased year by year, it still accounts for about 45.8% of national total, including 38.1% 
of Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) and 31.7% of Ammonia and Nitrogen. 
Table 2.3.7 provides an insight into the discharge levels of industrial wastewater and 
industrial solid waste disposal from 1987 to 2004, and industrial waste gas emissions 
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(including emissions of industrial SO2, Soot and Dust) from 1991 to 2004. Figure 2.3.4 
presents the emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) up to 2004.  
These facts clearly show the pollution trend. Industrial wastewater pollution has been 
declining steadily; solid wastes disposal dropped quickly before the mid-1990s, and then fell 
slightly but has appeared to rise in recent years.   
Air pollution is a serious problem. Waste gas emissions have increased rapidly since early 
1990s. Among the air pollutants, industrial soot emission remains relatively stable, except 
an unexpected rise in 1998. Industrial dust stayed around 6 million tons from 1991 to 1997 
and then jumped to over 10 million tons in 1998 and kept at this level until 2004. SO2 and 
CO2 emissions have generally maintained rapid growth and the emissions from the burning 
of solid fuels have contributed the most to CO2 emissions.   
Table 2.3.8 provides a regional perspective. Observe that the eastern region, which covers 
only 11.1% of the country’s surface, has about 50% of the wastewater and waste gas 
emissions in 2004. However, in terms of solid wastes, the western region, which covers 
70.1% of the country’s surface, discharged over 50% of the total volume; while the eastern 
region only discharged about 5%.18 Figures 2.3.5 -2.3.7 present a comparison of pollution 
in levels for 2004. The red coloured provinces have the highest emissions of pollutants in 
levels, while the yellowed provinces have the lowest emissions. 
 
                                                
18 Eastern regions have produced the 42.1% of the total volume of solid wastes. However, the utilise rate and 
treat rate of solid waste in eastern regions are much higher than the other two regions. Therefore, the 
discharged volume of solid wastes is low is eastern regions. 
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Table 2.3.7 Industrial Wastewater, Solid Wastes Discharges and Waste Gas 
Emissions up to 2004 
Year 
Wastewater 
(billion 
tons) 
Solid 
Wastes  
(million 
tons) 
Waste 
Gas  
(billion 
cu.m) 
SO2  
(million 
tons) 
Soot  
(million 
tons) 
Dust  
(million 
tons) 
1987 26.38 87.19     
1988 26.84 85.45     
1989 25.27 52.65     
1990 24.87 47.67     
1991 23.57 33.76 8473.4 11.65 8.45 5.79 
1992 23.39 25.87 8963.3 13.23 8.70 5.76 
1993 21.95 21.52 9342.3 12.92 8.80 6.17 
1994 21.55 19.32 9746.3 13.41 8.07 5.83 
1995 22.19 22.42 10747.8 14.05 8.38 6.39 
1996 20.59 16.90 11119.6 13.64 7.58 5.62 
1997 18.83 15.49 11337.5 13.63 6.85 5.48 
1998 20.06 18.21 12120.3 15.93 11.75 13.22 
1999 19.73 11.54 12680.7 14.60 9.53 11.75 
2000 19.42 10.40 13814.5 16.15 9.53 10.92 
2001 20.26 28.94 16086.3 15.66 8.52 9.91 
2002 20.72 26.35 17525.7 15.62 8.04 9.41 
2003 21.24 19.41 19890.6 17.92 8.46 10.21 
2004 22.11 17.62 23769.6 18.91 8.86 9.05 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook and China Environment Yearbook, various years. 
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Figure 2.3.4 Carbon Dioxide Emissions in China 1899-2004  
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Table 2.3.8 Regional Comparison of Industrial Pollutions 2004 (proportions of total 
in brackets) 
Region 
Area 
(million 
km2) 
Wastewater 
(billion tons) 
Waste Gas 
(trillion cu.m) 
Solid Wastes 
(million tons) 
Eastern Regions 1.07 
(11.1%) 
11.55 
(52.2%) 
11.79 
(49.6%) 
0.87 
(4.9%) 
Central Regions 1.68 
(17.5%) 
5.67 
(25.6%) 
6.00 
(25.2%) 
7.35 
(41.7%) 
Western Regions 6.73 
(70.1%) 
4.89 
(22.1%) 
5.98 
(25.1%) 
9.39 
(53.3%) 
Source: China Environment Yearbook, 2004, and http://www.usacn.com/china/brief/population.htm 
[Accessed 23/March/2005]. 
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Figure 2.3.5 Wastewater Discharges in Levels in 2004 
 
Source: China Environment Yearbook, 2005. 
 
Figure 2.3.6 Waste Gas Emissions in Levels in 2004 
 
Source: China Environment Yearbook, 2005. 
>= 1 trillion cu.m 
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Figure 2.3.7 Solid Wastes Disposals in Levels in 2004 
 
Source: China Environment Yearbook, 2005. 
 
2.3.3 Environmental Investment 
Facing such serious environmental problems, China’s central and local governments, as 
well as some enterprises, have invested a great amount of money for environmental 
pollution treatment every year. In 2004 this investment amount increased to 190.98 billion 
RMB yuan (about $24.04 billion), which accounted for 1.40% of the country’s GDP. 
Among this investment, 114.1 billion (59.8%) was used for city environmental 
infrastructural construction. Another 30.8 billion (16.1%) was provided for industrial 
pollution treatment. Figure 2.3.8 shows the rising trend of investments in industrial 
pollution treatment from 1987 to 2004. The investment in 2004 was more than eight times 
the 1987 value. 
>= 1.0 million tons 
0.5 to 1.0 million tons 
< 0.5 million tons 
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A disparity of investment in industrial pollution treatment also exists across provinces. 
Figure 2.3.9 shows that the provincial share of pollution treatment investment relative to 
GDP varies across province, an imbalance that is not consistent with GDP levels.  
 
Figure 2.3.8 Investments in Industrial Pollution Treatment 1987-2004 
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Figure 2.3.9 Provincial Difference in Pollution Treatment Investment per unit of GDP and GDP in Levels 2004  
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2.3.4 Environmental Regulations in China 
2.3.4.1 Regulatory Framework 
Environmental protection in China began to be the responsibility of the country in 1978 
based on the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. China established the Environment 
Protection Law (EPL) in 1979 (provisional), and officially enacted it in September 1989. The 
EPL provides the basic principles governing the prevention of pollution and environmental 
protection and imposes criminal responsibility for serious environmental pollution. Based 
on EPL, China has had an established regulatory framework since 1979, with nine 
environmental protection laws, fifteen resource conservation laws and more than 50 pieces 
of environmental administrative regulation. Over 660 regulations have been issued by 
related ministries of central government and local governments. Environmental standards 
are another important component of this regulatory system. By the end of 2005, China has 
issued over 800 national environmental standards and more than 30 local environmental 
standards. All of these have formed a comprehensive and complex legal framework on 
environmental protection (China Environment Protection 1996-2005, SEPA).     
The current environmental management system contains the following four important 
components:  
• The environmental impact report system: every project that has possible negative 
effects on the environment should go through an environmental impact review process. 
It is only after the verification by national or local regulatory authorities, that the 
project can be legally established. 
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• Three synchronisations: Article 26 of EPL states that the pollution-preventing facility 
must be designed, constructed and operated simultaneously with the design, 
construction and operation of the main production line of the project. The 
environmental authorities are in charge of checking the project design in the review 
process and monitoring the construction. After inspection and approval of the 
environmental authorities, the project can start operation.  
• The registration and licensing system for the discharge of pollutants (self-reporting 
system): Article 27 of EPL specifies that institutions and enterprises that emit 
pollutants must register and report to the environmental protection authorities. They 
should report six following categories: (1) basic economic information (sector, major 
products and raw materials); (2) production process diagrams; (3) volume of water use 
and wastewater discharge and pollutant concentrations in wastewater; (4) waste gas 
volume and air pollutant concentrations (before and after treatment); (5) noise 
pollution by source; and (6) discharge of solid wastes. It is an important tool in 
controlling pollution.  
• Pollution levy system: any firm that discharges pollutants exceeding designated 
standards will be charged an excess effluent fee. Charges are levied for 29 water 
pollutants and 22 air pollutants, as well as solid wastes, radioactive wastes and noise. 
Among the pollutants, the major focus for monitoring and levy collection is on 
chemical oxygen demand and total suspended solids for water, and SO2 and flue dust 
for air. Funds from the pollution levy have been used for pollution source control, 
damage remediation and development of environmental institutions. The lion’s share 
of the levy has been used for pollution abatement. It should be noted that the charge 
paid for discharging does not legalise the pollution process. After paying the charge the 
enterprises should also face the costs of controlling and eliminating the pollution. To 
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encourage pollution reduction, levy charges increase with the duration of 
non-compliance. After two years of paying the levy, polluters are subject to an annual 
5% increase in the charge rate. In the levy system, polluters have to report their 
emissions (including water and air pollutants, noise pollution, solid wastes, etc.) and the 
local environmental authorities check the reports and then decide the amount of levy to 
be collected. Penalties are imposed for false reporting and non-cooperation with the 
government. The levy design, verification and collection, and the development of levy 
system are fully described in Wang and Wheeler (2002). 
2.3.4.2 Environmental Regulatory Framework towards Foreign Investment 
Generally, there are no separate environmental standards for foreign investment, but 
foreign investors’ environmental behaviour must abide by Chinese environmental laws and 
regulations and meet the environmental standards. There are some specific policies and 
administrative procedures governing and monitoring of FDI with respect to environmental 
protection.  
The Provisions on Guiding Foreign Investment Direction set out environmental protection 
requirements for foreign investment projects. It encourages investment in environmentally 
sound technologies and new technologies for controlling environmental pollution. It also 
limits the foreign investment in exploring rare and precious mineral resources and prohibits 
investment in those that pollute the environment, threaten human health or destroy natural 
resources.  
Notice on Reinforcing Environmental Protection Management of Foreign Investment Projects, which was 
issued in 1992, states that foreign investors should abide by Chinese environment 
protection laws and regulations. They should prevent environmental pollution and 
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ecological damage, and accept monitoring and supervision by environmental protection 
authorities. There are also other regulations such as Regulations of Ocean Oil Exploring by 
Foreign Firms, Implementing Regulations on Joint Ventures, Project Construction and Operation in Part 
III of the Application Form for Establishing Foreign Invested Enterprises in China, etc (Xian et al. 
1999). 
Xian et al. (1999) also provides the environmental aspect of approval procedures for FDI 
projects in China, shown by the following figure. 
 
Figure 2.3.10 The Environmental Aspect of Approval Procedures for FDI Projects  
 
Source: Xian et al., 1999. 
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2.3.4.3 Implementation of Environmental Regulations 
Although the regulatory framework seems comprehensive, enforcement is weak. Ma (2007) 
points out that the limited power of environmental authorities is one reason for the failure 
to implement environmental law. SEPA has limited administrative power, and is not 
allowed to participate fully in national decision making. Local environmental authorities are 
subordinate to local government. They are reliant on the government for both funding and 
enforcement, making them hard act freely for local interest and protect the environment. 
Current legislation only allows the environmental authorities to make suggestions and issue 
fines. For example, local environmental authorities do not have the power to force a 
company to make changes within a certain time limit. In addition, the fines are usually 
small, thus it may cost more to obey the law than to break it.  
Environmental policy is set by the government, overseen by the environmental authorities 
and implemented by various government departments. Such a principle is reasonable but 
the coordination between the environmental authorities and other departments is poor, 
mainly because the huge amount of overlap among departments. For example, water 
pollution is the responsibility of the environmental authorities, but water and groundwater 
are managed by the Ministry of Water Resource, sewage is dealt with by the Ministry of 
Construction, which also has the functions of directing the utilise and protection of 
groundwater in city. This problem has been solved in other countries, through greater 
departmental communication, but is failing in China due to the lack of legislative clarity of 
role, power and responsibilities of each department. Additionally, the public lacks 
awareness of environmental protection and participation in social supervision also to the 
detriment of enforcing the environmental regulations. 
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Furthermore, the environmental regulatory stringency varies among regions. The 
environmental standards are set jointly by local and national regulators. The levy rates are 
formally established by a national regulator but the actual levies are decided and collected 
by local regulators. Some local regulators protect the pollution companies for economic 
interests. Excessive pollution happens in some regions due to the failure of local 
government. The situation continues because of the lack of awareness of some local 
government officials about the environment, environmental laws and the rule of laws in 
general. Therefore, the local levies may vary for identical industries and pollutants. In 
addition, the discretion of local regulators’ inspections varies as well. Some regions have 
better environmental management systems than others. As a result, regulatory strength 
varies across regions.  
The weak environmental regulatory stringency in China provides an opportunity for some 
multinational firms to take advantage of weak environmental standards to transfer their 
out-of-date technologies and pollution-intensive production to China. Xian et al. (1999) 
find that about 30 per cent of the FDI in China was in pollution-intensive industries, of 
which 13 per cent was from highly-pollution-intensive industries. The recent report from 
Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE) in January 2008 also shows that over 
300 MNCs have violated environmental regulations in China and only 8 of them passed the 
examination after controlling the pollution. The majority of these MNCs are from US, 
Japan and European countries. None of their subsidiaries are polluting firms in their home 
countries due to the strict environmental standards. The report also shows that a 
considerable number of these foreign polluting subsidiaries (about one third) are located in 
Shanghai, which have attracted over 15% of the national cumulative FDI inflows since 
1979 (see Figure 2.3.3) and have relatively low environmental investment (see Figure 2.3.9). 
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It suggests that polluting firms would like to locate in the regions that have paid relatively 
less attention to the environment protection. 
In sum, economic development, FDI inflows, levels of environmental deteriorations, and 
environmental regulations differ across regions in China. Correlations between these 
variables are useful if we wish to model the determinants of inter-province foreign plant 
location choice.  
 
2.4. Methodology 
We follow the methodology of previous studies on inter-state plant location choice and 
investigate the interaction between FDI flows and environmental regulations in China. This 
section firstly introduces the empirical models. It explains how we construct the explained 
and explanatory variables and how these variables capture provincial characteristics. Finally, 
a description of the data used in the empirical estimation is provided and some discussion 
of the selection of the estimators. 
2.4.1 Estimating Models 
Esty and Gentry (1997) and Aliyu (2005) outline four types of FDI – market seeking, 
production platform seeking, resource seeking and low cost seeking. A MNC will view and 
compare different locations to assess differences in, for example, production costs, market 
size, government regulations, infrastructure, agglomeration effects and so on. To examine 
whether FDI is attracted to provinces with relatively weaker environmental enforcement, 
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we observe the location of FDI across 30 administrative areas (for simplicity we refer to 
these as regions/provinces).19 
An empirical model that is adopted by some FDI researchers is given by 
),,( γηXfFDI =                          (2.4.1) 
where X is a vector of regional characteristics that may affect the inflows of FDI; η is the 
unobserved provincial/regional effect; and γ is the unobserved time effect. 
When considering the impact of environmental regulations on foreign plant location choice, 
a variable ER (the vector of level of environmental stringency) is included in the Equation 
2.4.1 to give:  
 ),,,( γηXERfFDI =                        (2.4.2) 
where  
FDI is the amount of FDI inflow into region i in time period t; 
ER is the vector of measures to capture environmental stringency in region i in 
time period t; 
X is the set of other regional characteristics that may affect FDI in region i in time 
period t; 
η is time-invariant regional effects in region i;  
γ is location-invariant time effects in time period t; and 
ε is the idiosyncratic error term.   
                                                
19 Tibet is not included in our estimating sample due to the lack of data on FDI inflows.  
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FDI inflows are captured by the actually used value of FDI according to the agreements 
and contracts. It measures total amount of new foreign direct investment of the year, 
including the investment from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao, and the investment from 
foreign countries. The data are aggregated comprising of the investment in all the sectors in 
the economy. FDI inflows cannot be broken down by source country or by industrial 
sector as a result of the data unavailability.  
Since the regions vary in size, we normalise the actually used FDI inflows by two measures 
of regional size, one of which is the value of FDI divided by regional GDP (FDI/GDP) 
and the other is FDI divided by regional population (FDI/POP). Scaling FDI by GDP or 
population does not affect the absolute value of FDI but allows FDI to be comparable 
across regions and time (see Appendix 2.1 for variable definitions and sources). 
Factors that may influence provincial level FDI include environmental stringency, factor 
prices, infrastructure, and agglomeration effects.  
The level of environmental stringency in different provinces is proxied by three variables:  
• EI1 – the share of investment in industrial pollution treatment projects in total 
innovation investment. Industrial pollution treatment investment is the total 
investment of enterprises in construction and installation projects, and purchasing of 
equipment and instruments required in the pollution harnessing projects for the 
treatments of wastewater, waste gas, solid wastes, noise pollution and other pollution. 
Industrial pollution treatment investment is accounted in innovation investment, which 
is one part of the total investment of fixed assets. Environmental regulations require 
that the pollution treatment facilities have to be designed, constructed and operated 
simultaneously with the design, construction and operation of the main production line 
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of the projects. A region with more stringent environmental regulations is expected to 
have relatively more investment in pollution treatment projects. Therefore, investment 
pollution treatment project could be treated as environmental protection costs for any 
production project. We use the share of industrial pollution treatment investment in 
innovation investment to reflect the local government effort on environmental 
protection. Since a small fraction of the sources of industrial pollution treatment 
investment comes from state budgetary appropriations on capital construction 
investment, in our sensitivity analysis we separately normalise industrial pollution 
treatment investment by the sum of investment in innovation and capital construction 
(EI2) and by total investment in fixed assets (EI3). Details are in Appendix 2.2. 
• Punish – the total number of administrative punishment cases filed by the 
environmental authorities in each region normalised by the number of enterprises in 
each region. 20  Administrative punishment cases are those cases that breach 
environmental protection laws and regulations. According to the Measures on 
Administrative Penalty for Environmental Offences, the types of administrative 
punishment includes: 1) warning; 2) fine; 3) confiscation of illegal gains; 4) compelling 
to stop producing or using; 5) revoking licence/permit or other permission certificates; 
and 6) other types of administrative punishments from Environmental Protection Law, 
laws and regulations. If the environmental illegal activity offends the criminal law and is 
suspected of a crime, the case should be transferred to judicial authority to investigate 
the criminal responsibility according to law. We normalise the number of cases by the 
number of enterprises. It is possible that the normalised punishment cases could 
capture the levels of firms violating the environmental regulations. However, given the 
                                                
20 The enterprises are all state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises above a designated size, which refers 
to enterprises with an annual sales income of over 5 million RMB yuan (about 0.60 million USD). 
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general weak environmental regulation stringency in China, we expect that the more 
enterprises are punished the more stringent of the environmental regulations exist in a 
region. Punish measures the prosecution cost of firms if they breach the laws and 
regulations and hence proxies the strength of enforcement of regional environmental 
legislation. 
• Charge – a pollution emission charge normalised by the number of organisations that 
paid this charge. Pollution emission charge refers to the total amount of 1) pollutant 
emission charge exceeding the discharge standards; 2) sewage discharge levy; and 3) 
other four kinds of charges, including increasing levy standards, double charges, 
overdue charges and compensation fines. Pollutants include water and air pollution, 
solid wastes, noise and others. Although supervised by central government, the 
pollution charge is implemented by regional governments. Charge measures the penalty 
costs of firms if they emit pollutants more than the emission standards. Therefore it 
reflects the provincial differences in implementation of the pollution levy system. 
These three measures are time varying, which improves upon the 0-3 type of measure of 
environmental stringency used in Smarzynska-Javorcik and Wei (2005). Since more 
stringent environmental regulations will generate higher pollution taxes or higher pollution 
abatement costs for the firm, the environmental regulation stringency variables should have 
a similar impact to factor prices on foreign investment location choice. It is expected that 
FDI is attracted to provinces with weaker regulations, i.e. with a lower share of investment 
in industrial pollution treatment investment, with a lower number of normalised 
administrative punishment cases related to environmental issues, and/or with a lower 
normalised pollution emission charge.    
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Since the pollution emission charge is more visible to enterprises than administrative 
punishment cases and environmental investment, we expect that Charge has the strongest 
impact on FDI location choice, followed by Punish and EI1, respectively.   
Our control variables are as follows: 
Manufacturing wage is included as a proxy for factor price differences across each region. 
The quality of labour force in a region is captured by two measures, labour productivity 
and the illiteracy rate. Population density is employed as a proxy for land prices and 
potential market size (assuming that labour mobility between provinces is low). The 
availability and quality of infrastructure also impacts the overall cost on doing business and 
hence is an attractive factor to FDI location. We include both railway density and road 
density to measure the quality of regional transportation network and thus to proxy the 
cost and availability of material inputs. Gross regional product (GRP) per capita is included 
to capture the average quality of the government, general infrastructure and the effect of 
market size differences across regions. We use regional gross industrial product (GIP) to 
capture the industrial agglomeration effect whereby firms locate where hubs of economic 
activity already exist (Bartik, 1988). GIP measures the concentration of the whole industrial 
sectors and also the regional availability of providing intermediate inputs.21    
The regional fixed effects capture the effects specified to each region which do not change 
over time (including the unobserved preferential policies such as tax benefits and subsidies 
to foreign firms and exports). The year specific effects measure any effects that are 
common to all provinces but which change over time. 
                                                
21 Gross industrial product is the total volume of final industrial products produced and industrial services 
provided during a given period. It measures the total achievement and overall scale of industrial production 
during a given period. Industrial enterprise is used as the basic accounting unit. Double counting does not 
exist within the same enterprise, but may exist between enterprises. 
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Following the literature, foreign investors are seeking a location with comparative 
advantages such as cheaper factors that they use in higher proportions. It is expected, that 
foreign investment will be attracted to provinces with relatively low labour costs, i.e. low 
manufacturing wages. However, wage has positive relationship with local income levels. 
Some recent empirical studies on intra-country FDI flows, such as Wei et al. (1999), 
Coughlin and Segev (2000), Cheng and Kwan (2000) and Fung et al. (2003), find 
significantly negative effects of wage on aggregate FDI flows in China. Conversely, wage is 
also found to be positive related with FDI flows (Gao, 2002). To specify the real impact of 
wage on FDI inflows, we add wage squared in our estimations and expect an inverted-U 
relationship between FDI and wage. When wage is below some benchmark, foreign 
investment are attracted to provinces with high wage level because labour cost is not the 
most important determinants compared with other factors, such as high regional income 
and good infrastructure. But when wage is beyond the benchmark, FDI is deterred by wage 
because it becomes more important in the standard profit function. 
Since low labour cost is associated with low labour quality, foreign investment will be 
attracted by high illiteracy rate and/or low labour quality. However, some previous studies, 
such as Cheng and Kwan (2000), Gao (2002), and Fung et al. (2002), find that FDI prefers 
to locate into the regions that have high percentage of high education enrolment. 
Therefore, the impacts of illiteracy rate and productivity are ambiguous.  
According to the previous work of Head and Ries (1996) and Dean et al. (2005), it is 
expected that FDI would flow into provinces with better industrial agglomeration and 
infrastructure. Therefore we expect a positive coefficient on GIP and transportation 
infrastructure variables. In addition, for foreign investors seeking a large local market they 
may be expected to invest in areas that have large consumption capability and potential 
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which can be proxied by population density and per capita income. However, population 
density also proxies land price. In more densely populated areas, land price is usually higher 
than that in less densely populated areas. The sign of population density is therefore 
expected to be ambiguous.  
Our five-year time period panel data help to control for unobserved heterogeneity. We 
presume that all the control variables are exogenous. However, environmental regulation 
stringency may be endogenous partly because the regions with relatively low FDI inflows 
may lower their environmental regulation standards in order to attract more FDI, and 
partly because FDI is an important engine of growth and hence helps to improve regional 
environment and environmental standards. Simultaneously, FDI could have an impact on 
other control variables, such as income, wage, population density and infrastructure quality. 
We therefore employ a one-year lag for all independent variables to minimise any possible 
causality links from FDI to the explanatory variables. Another reason to lag the 
independent variables is that the impact of these variables on FDI is unlikely to be 
immediate.   
The estimating equation is therefore: 
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(2.4.3) 
where i refers to province t refers to year. 
We firstly regress the model only including the major explanatory variable ER, and then 
add the control variables one by one in accordance with the selection of control variables 
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in previous studies on China’s intra-country FDI location choice. Regional GDP per capita 
and wage rate are commonly used determinants of FDI and hence we introduce them into 
the model as control variables in the first place. GIP and population density are usually 
omitted in some studies. We thus add them in the next place in order to check if they have 
significant and stable impacts on FDI. Infrastructure variables and labour quality variables 
are also controlled in some previous studies and the selection usually depends on the 
emphasis of the papers. We therefore subsequently include these variables in the 
regressions. In addition, adding the independent variables incrementally is helpful to find 
whether ERs have stable and significant effects on FDI inflows. 
We use the log transformation model which could help to correct the positive skewness of 
variables and make the error term close to homoskedestic (see Appendix 2.3 for the level 
model and results).22  
If there is no effect of the stringency of environmental regulations on FDI across regions, 
we would expect β1=0. If β1 < 0, we cannot reject the hypothesis that FDI is attracted to 
provinces with lower regulatory stringency. 
The expected signs of the coefficients are as follows: 
 
Coefficients β 1 β 2 β 3 β 4 β 5 β 6 β 7 β 8 β 9 β 1 0 
Expected Signs - + + - + -/+ + + -/+ -/+ 
 
                                                
22 After taking logs, the positive skewness of all the variables is significantly reduced. 
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2.4.2 Data Description 
A complete description of all variables definitions and sources is provided in Appendix 2.1. 
The China Statistical Yearbook (various years) was used to compile data on the 
manufacturing wage, illiteracy rate, infrastructure, agglomeration, market size and 
population data. The China Industrial Economy Statistical Yearbooks provide the labour 
productivity for all foreign funded enterprises. The raw data for the three environmental 
regulation standard variables are collected from China Environment Yearbook. Because 
one year lags are used for all independent variables in the estimation, all the independent 
variables of 30 regions are from 1998 to 2002. FDI data used for estimations are therefore 
from 1999 to 2003.  
To gauge the consistency of the sample with what is known about the provincial 
distribution of foreign investment, Table 2.4.1 compares the provincial shares of total 
actually used FDI value in the sample. It illustrates, consistent with Figure 2.3.3, that most 
FDI inflows were located in eastern regions/provinces: Guangdong; Jiangsu; Shanghai; 
Fujian; Shandong; Liaoning; Zhejiang; and Beijing. 
Table 2.4.2 shows the summary data for the provincial characteristics in 2002.23 The 
maximum value of EI1 is found in Ningxia with 910 RMB yuan per 10 000 RMB yuan 
innovation investment, while the lowest investment share is only 31.65 RMB yuan in 
Shanghai. For Punish the most stringent province is Heilongjiang with 5877 cases per 1000 
enterprises, and the weakest province is Qinghai with 75. In terms of Charge, Shanghai 
becomes the most stringent province, where the charge is more than 32,793 RMB yuan per 
organisation, and Hainan is the lowest with a charge 2,775 RMB yuan per organisation. We 
                                                
23 Because all independent variable are one year lagged, the value of the two dependent variables, FDI1 and 
FDI2 are the values for 2003. 
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find that the values of our three environmental stringency variables vary widely across 
province, and a province could appear to be stringent using one measure of environmental 
regulations but not using the others. The correlation matrix (See Table 2.4.3) shows that 
these three environmental stringency variables do not have a strong correlation and we 
even find insignificant negative correlation between Punish and Charge.  
The correlation matrix also shows that our FDI variables seem to have a negative 
correlation with EI and Punish, but a positive correlation with Charge. The correlations 
between the two FDI variables and other independent variables implies that FDI prefers to 
flow into provinces with better infrastructure, higher population density, higher income 
level, better agglomeration, higher quality of labour and higher labour costs. 
The correlation matrix shows that per capita income is highly correlated with wage, 
population density and infrastructure variables, probably because per capita income could 
capture the similar things. Then the effect of income on FDI probably will be accompanied 
by strong side effects via these variables on FDI. Due to the importance of these variables 
and the availability of data, we cannot drop any of these variables or enlarge the sample size 
to remedy to this multicollinearity problem. However, mutlcollinearity does not actually 
bias the results but just produces large standard errors for income variable, i.e. may cause 
income becoming insignificant. And we estimate the model using generalised least square 
estimator, which will produce better results than ordinary least square estimator (see 
section 2.4.3). 
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The values of all the data are deflated by the GDP deflator, which is set to 100 for the year 
1990.24 All the FDI data, which are measured in US dollars, are converted to RMB yuan at 
the middle exchange rate of the year. Table 2.4.4 provides the descriptive statistics for each 
of our variables. 
Table 2.4.1 FDI Distribution by Province, 1997-2003 
Province 
FDI at 1990 
Constant Price 
(USD 10 000) 
FDI at 1990 
Constant Price 
(RMB 10 000) 
Shares of 
National FDI (%) 
Beijing 10611 58152 4.07 
Tianjin 10425 56729 3.97 
Hebei 5433 29560 2.07 
Shanxi 1453 7937 0.56 
Inner Mongolia 569 3139 0.22 
Liaoning 13082 71982 5.04 
Jilin 1814 9862 0.69 
Heilongjiang 2370 12819 0.90 
Shanghai 22473 123330 8.63 
Jiangsu 41995 231648 16.21 
Zhejiang 12695 70472 4.93 
Anhui 1926 10536 0.74 
Fujian 21328 116404 8.15 
Jiangxi 3643 20225 1.42 
Shandong 19362 107168 7.50 
Henan 3089 16822 1.18 
Hubei 6275 34616 2.42 
Hunan 4687 25673 1.80 
Guangdong 63197 345308 24.17 
Guangxi 3397 18377 1.29 
Hainan 3047 16568 1.16 
Chongqing 1644 8921 0.62 
Sichuan 2374 13100 0.92 
Guizhou 222 1208 0.08 
Yunnan 698 3789 0.27 
Tibet 0 0 0.00 
Shaanxi 2036 11064 0.77 
Gansu 277 1523 0.11 
Qinghai 91 514 0.04 
Ningxia 122 671 0.05 
Xinjiang 117 640 0.04 
Sum 260450 1428755 100 
                                                
24 An alternative measure of inflation is consumer price index. However, GDP deflator is a better measure of 
overall inflation than the consumer price index because it is based on a broader market basket including every 
item in the GDP. 
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Table 2.4.2 Provincial Characteristics in 2002 (All values are at 1990 constant price) 
Province 
FDI/GDP* 
(yuan /10000 
yuan) 
FDI/POP 
(yuan) 
EI1 
(yuan/ 
10000 yuan) 
Punish 
(case/1000 
firms) 
Charge 
(yuan/ 
organisation) 
GRP per 
capita 
(yuan) 
Beijing 495 657 315 229 18916 15312 
Tianjin 519 663 611 256 8907 12045 
Hebei 112 62 262 433 7266 4906 
Shanxi 72 28 418 822 9010 3308 
In. Mongolia 34 16 197 1165 4327 3897 
Liaoning 389 293 280 4451 11147 6989 
Jilin 63 31 305 524 5662 4485 
Heilongjiang 60 37 703 5877 6836 5481 
Shanghai 724 1395 32 176 32794 21876 
Jiangsu 702 623 166 264 13918 7745 
Zhejiang 439 465 294 268 3839 9062 
Anhui 77 25 191 412 5395 3131 
Fujian 411 325 326 267 7084 7264 
Jiangxi 471 165 72 460 4041 3137 
Shandong 400 288 484 267 14681 6267 
Henan 63 24 313 512 9241 3464 
Hubei 240 114 222 456 6090 4477 
Hunan 182 67 202 660 6195 3533 
Guangdong 475 429 210 195 5947 8089 
Guangxi 127 38 151 411 6619 2744 
Hainan 520 227 78 133 2775 4200 
Chongqing 96 36 142 832 11117 3416 
Sichuan 63 21 264 255 4628 3103 
Guizhou 28 5 157 156 5269 1697 
Yunnan 28 8 309 113 7200 2787 
Shaanxi 115 39 226 955 5470 2973 
Gansu 15 4 373 225 6630 2418 
Qinghai 54 21 110 75 3827 3459 
Ningxia 37 13 910 1389 9864 3124 
Xinjiang 7 3 147 243 4455 4511 
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Table 2.4.2 continued  
Province 
Manu. 
Wage 
(yuan) 
GIP 
(100 
million 
yuan) 
Pop. 
Density 
(persons 
per km2) 
Rail 
Density 
(km/10 
000km2) 
Road 
Density 
(km/10 
000km2) 
Illiterate 
Rate 
(%) 
Produc- 
tivity 
(yuan/ 
person) 
Beijing 9497 1708 847 677 8547 5.4 66663 
Tianjin 7663 1789 891 603 8581 6.7 61220 
Hebei 4736 2311 354 241 3320 7.8 42067 
Shanxi 4260 925 211 196 3821 6.4 47136 
In. Mongolia 4388 535 22 56 661 13.5 51482 
Liaoning 5657 2631 288 261 3298 5.2 44956 
Jilin 5487 1169 144 190 2198 4.4 113101 
Heilongjiang 4735 1339 81 117 1344 6.5 46886 
Shanghai 11885 4166 2621 414 10139 8.2 66363 
Jiangsu 6200 7463 719 131 5862 14.3 53099 
Zhejiang 7157 5263 456 128 4484 13.5 32884 
Anhui 4497 1143 456 160 4860 17.9 60328 
Fujian 6133 1979 289 121 4513 13.7 37445 
Jiangxi 4475 640 253 142 3643 10.8 26283 
Shandong 4716 6188 594 187 4839 11.2 35999 
Henan 4218 2316 576 215 4296 9.1 43656 
Hubei 4793 1932 320 127 4594 15.1 63844 
Hunan 5337 1130 316 131 4038 8.4 41774 
Guangdong 7912 8815 423 113 5835 7.0 35459 
Guangxi 5360 635 210 119 2448 9.5 47779 
Hainan 5053 142 236 63 6140 8.9 42054 
Chongqing 5497 661 379 88 3788 10.3 59041 
Sichuan 5303 1473 178 60 2293 13.6 49243 
Guizhou 5019 429 226 111 2601 18.7 9276 
Yunnan 6343 711 110 60 4184 23.1 55359 
Shaanxi 5058 810 179 141 2271 15.6 99224 
Gansu 5427 557 58 52 894 21.1 39205 
Qinghai 5821 112 7 15 333 24.8 81609 
Ningxia 5142 145 87 119 1704 17.5 38201 
Xinjiang 5590 494 12 17 518 8.2 34454 
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Table 2.4.3 Correlations of the Variables  
 
 
 FDI/GDP FDI/POP EI1 Punish Charge 
GRP per 
capita 
Wage (Wage)2 GIP 
Pop. 
Density 
Rail 
Density 
Road 
Density 
Illiterate 
Rate 
Productivity
FDI/GDP 1.000              
FDI/POP 0.859 1.000             
EI1 -0.095 -0.120 1.000            
Punish -0.108 -0.113 0.154 1.000           
Charge 0.294 0.601 0.060 -0.014 1.000          
GRP per capita 0.617 0.904 -0.084 -0.029 0.700 1.000         
Wage 0.511 0.781 -0.108 -0.062 0.568 0.862 1.000        
(Wage)2 0.475 0.791 -0.134 -0.108 -0.162 -0.083 0.654 1.000       
GIP 0.544 0.553 0.019 -0.027 0.409 0.488 0.433 0.409 1.000      
Pop. Density 0.502 0.807 -0.143 -0.157 0.801 0.865 0.674 0.742 0.429 1.000     
Rail Density 0.393 0.616 -0.010 0.007 0.465 0.723 0.555 0.571 0.120 0.606 1.000    
Road Density 0.697 0.798 -0.098 -0.173 0.538 0.771 0.695 0.701 0.456 0.729 0.723 1.000   
Illiterate Rate -0.321 -0.353 0.004 -0.229 -0.150 -0.421 -0.345 -0.322 -0.266 -0.279 -0.451 -0.430 1.000  
Productivity 0.007 0.148 -0.114 0.054 0.114 0.253 0.359 0.334 -0.002 0.181 0.251 0.159 -0.147 1.000 
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Table 2.4.4 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Medium Max 
FDI/GDP (FDI in RMB yuan per 10 000 RMB yuan GDP) 149 265.80 271.11 6.76 140.66 1140.13 
FDI/POP (FDI in RMB yuan per capita) 149 188.62 276.04 3.19 42.89 1395.25 
EI1 (yuan per 10 000 RMB yuan  innovation investment) 150 342.20 216.12 31.65 289.32 1163.74 
EI2 (yuan per 10 000 RMB yuan Inno.Inv.+ Capital Construction Inv.) 150 92.63 57.22 6.19 80.43 285.53 
EI3 (yuan per 10 000 RMB yuan total investment in fixed assets) 150 55.04 35.78 4.46 44.71 185.08 
Punish (Cases per 1000 enterprises)  148 452.34 701.53 29.18 267.30 5877.36 
Charge (RMB yuan per organisation) 150 4319.00 2363.26 1467.24 3679.30 17649.92 
GRP per capita (RMB yuan) 150 4765.65 3591.10 1255.09 3376.21 21876.21 
Wage (RMB yuan at 1990 price) 150 4720.76 1549.53 2614.68 4399.02 11885.36 
GIP (100 million RMB yuan at 1990 price) 150 1556.23 1713.53 79.41 912.00 8815.18 
Pop. Density (persons per km2) 150 376.11 460.55 6.99 251.56 2700.00 
Rail Density (km/ 10 000 km2) 150 151.39 145.08 8.38 109.65 690.83 
Road Density (km/ 10 000 km2) 150 3341.10 2110.37 204.76 3053.05 10138.71 
Illiterate Rate (%) 150 13.13 6.46 4.36 12.11 42.92 
Productivity (RMB yuan/person at 1990 price) 150 41039.37 18996.94 9276.10 35999.46 156645.80 
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2.4.3 Selection of Estimators 
A problem faced when estimating the model is whether the unobserved individual-specific 
effects and time effects (ηi and γt) should be treated as random variables or as parameters to 
be estimated for each cross region observation i and time t. In this chapter we estimate 
both two-way fixed effects and random effects error component models. For our fixed 
effects models we initially use the within regression estimator which is a pooled OLS 
estimator based on time-demeaned variables, or uses the time variation in both dependent 
and independent variables within each cross-sectional observation (Wooldridge, 2000). For 
our random effects models we choose the generalised least square (GLS) estimator, which 
produces a matrix-weighted average of the between and within estimator results.25   
Few assumptions are required to justify the fixed effects estimator. In the estimation, 
however, ηi and γt are not assumed to have a distribution, but are treated as fixed and 
estimable. The random effects estimator requires no correlation assumptions, that is ηi 
~IID (0, 2ησ ), γt ~IID (0,
2
γσ ), and εit ~IID (0,
2
εσ ) are independent of each other. In 
addition, all the independent variables (ER and X in equation 2.4.2) are independent of ηi , 
γt , and εit for all i and t.  
In order to calculate whether itε  are uncorrelated with the independent variables, we use 
the Hausman specification test under the null hypothesis H0: 0)( =itit XE ε .
26  We 
compare the covariance matrix of the regressors in the fixed effects model with those in 
                                                
25 The between estimator is obtained by using OLS to estimate the models which use the time-averages for 
both dependent and independent variables and then runs a cross sectional regression (Wooldridge, 2000, 
Chapter 14, pp.442). GLS estimators produce more efficient results than between estimators because they use 
both the within and between information. 
26 Here Xit proxies all the independent variables in the estimated model. Since we take one-year lag for all 
independent variables, the hypothesis is to test whether 0)(
1
=−itit XE ε . 
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the random effects model in order to find out whether the random effects specification is 
powerful and parsimonious. The Hausman specification test results are reported in 
Appendix 2.4. The results of Hausman specification tests suggest that, in most cases, the 
individual effects and time effects could be adequately modelled by random effects models.  
When using data on different provinces that have variation of scale, the variance for each 
of the panels will differ. The Breusch-Pagan test results reject the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity in our models. Both of the fixed effects and random effects estimators 
can solve the problem of heteroskedasticity across panels. However, neither controls for 
possible autocorrelation within the panels. In order to test whether or not the errors follow 
an autoregressive process of order one AR(1), we apply the following dynamic regression 
model: 
Ttititit ,,2,1 K=+= − νρεε .                    (2.4.4) 
where 1<ρ  and itν ~ IID(0, )
2
νσ . 
The null hypothesis is H0: ρ  = 0. Thus, ρ  should be estimated from the regression of 
itε on 1−itε , for all t = 2,…,T. The t statistics (see Table 2.4.5) for ρˆ  show that we reject 
the null hypothesis for all log models. That is, there is AR(1) autocorrelation within panels 
in our log specifications. 
One solution of AR(1) autocorrelation is to include the lagged dependent variables in the 
right-hand-side of Equation 2.4.3 and construct a dynamic model. In that case, an 
alternative estimation method is system Generalised Method of Moment (GMM) estimator 
by Blundell and Bond (1998) for AR(1) panel data models. System GMM estimator can 
tackle the problems of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation as well as the endogeneity of 
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variables. However, GMM estimator requires two or more lags of all the right-hand-side 
variables as instruments. Due to our relative short panel we cannot use GMM estimator. 
Another solution is to use the feasible generalised least square (FGLS) estimator. In this 
study, we have a large number of panels (30 provinces) relative to time period (5 years). 
The FGLS estimator is appropriate for such a case.27 FGLS models allow cross-sectional 
correlation and heteroskedasticity. It also allows models with heteroskedasticity and no 
cross-sectional correlation. In addition, it is possible to relax the assumption of 
autocorrelation within panels. FGLS is therefore more efficient than the other two 
estimators mentioned above.  
Table 2.4.5 Autocorrelation Tests 
 Levels  
 
EI1  Punish 
 
Charge 
FDI/GDP 
FDI/PO
P 
 FDI/GDP FDI/POP FDI/GDP FDI/POP 
ρˆ  0.064   -0.136   0.076   -0.129  0.067   -0.142   
t Statistics 0.67 -1.38  0.79  -1.30  0.70 -1.44 
p-value 0.504 0.169     0.430    0.197 0.488 0.153    
 Logs  
 
EI1  Punish 
 
Charge 
FDI/GDP FDI/POP  FDI/GDP FDI/POP FDI/GDP FDI/POP 
ρˆ  0.258   0.254    0.265   0.260  0.220   0.218   
t Statistics 2.92 2.86  2.97 2.91   2.54 2.50  
p-value 0.004 0.005     0.004 0.004 0.012    0.014    
 
Since the GLS estimator is less efficient than the FGLS estimator, the random effects 
results (in Appendix 2.4) are relatively weak even though GLS estimator is not rejected in 
                                                
27 David Greenberg, who is an expert in Stata in New York University, states on the Stata Listserver that 
FGLS is feasible when the number of panels is larger than time period. Clive Nicholas from Newcastle 
University agrees Greenberg’s point of view and specifies that FGLS is efficient when the degree of freedom 
is larger than 25, which is the case in our model (see Greenberg, 26/January/2004; and Nicholas, 
10/August/2004).  
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most specifications by Hausman specification tests. We therefore concentrate on the FGLS 
estimation results in the main text. Estimations are run using STATA 9.28 
 
2.5 Empirical Results 
In this section we only report the FGLS log results because of the advantages outlined 
above. We also include a series of sensitivity checks. For example, we normalise industrial 
pollution treatment investment by the sum of investment in innovation and capital 
construction (EI2), and by the total investment in fixed assets (EI3). The results are 
provided in Appendix 2.2. All levels estimations can be found in the Appendix 2.3. The 
random effects specification is not always efficient and hence are provided in Appendix 5. 
In this section, we also compare our main results with those in the Appendices as well as 
those of previous empirical studies.  
2.5.1 FGLS Regression Results with Log Specification 
Tables 2.5.1- 2.5.6 respectively present the FGLS regression results for the impact of 
different levels of environmental stringency on two measures of provincial level FDI 
inflows using data in logs for thirty provinces in China. Tables 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 are the 
results for EI1, Tables 2.5.3 and 2.5.4 for Punish, and Tables 2.5.5 and 2.5.6 for Charge.29 
In Table 2.5.1, the dependent variable is the amount of FDI inflows divided by the regional 
GDP (FDI/GDP). The results show that the share of industrial pollution treatment 
                                                
28 The major syntaxes include xtreg with fe and re, and xtgls. 
29 Regional-specific effects and time effects are not reported in all the tables in the main text and appendices. 
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investment has a negative effect on FDI inflows into a province. The coefficients in each 
of the nine regressions are relatively stable and statistically significant. In column (10) the 
coefficient (-0.062) indicates that a 10 per cent increase in the share of environmental 
investment of a province leads to a 0.62 per cent decrease in the amount of FDI inflows to 
regional GDP. Therefore, stringent regional environmental regulations have detrimental 
effects on FDI inflows. 
Turning to the other explanatory variables, as expected, per capita income generally has a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient, which means that the richer the province, 
the more foreign investment is attracted. Among all the independent variables, per capita 
income level has the strongest effect on FDI inflows. The coefficient could be treated as 
the income elasticity of FDI inflows. From column (10), a 10 per cent increase in 
provincial income level could lead to a more than 34 per cent increase in FDI/GDP.  
The signs on the coefficients for manufacturing wage and wage square are consistent with 
our prior expectations, and reveal an inverted-U relationship between FDI and wages. 
Although they remain relatively stable in absolute values, they are not significantly different 
from zero in most regressions and only achieve marginal significance in the final two 
columns. For column (10), the turning point is 8.11, i.e. 3,336 RMB yuan ($698) in level.30 
From the descriptive statistics reported in Table 2.4.4, manufacturing wages in most 
Chinese provinces are higher than this level. Table 2.4.2 shows that in 2002, the provincial 
manufacturing wages are all above 4,000 RMB yuan (the lowest wage is found in Henan 
with 4,218 RMB yuan), that is, high wages currently deter FDI in China.  
                                                
30 exp[6.49/(0.04×2)] = 3,336. RMB3,336 at 1990 price is equivalent to $698 at the 1990 middle exchange 
rate that $1=RMB4.78.  
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Table 2.5.1 FGLS Regression Results on FDI/GDP for Log Data with EI1  
FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EI1† 
-0.071 -0.081 -0.083 -0.087 -0.11 -0.11 -0.063 -0.062 -0.063 -0.062 
-(2.30)** (-2.92)*** (-2.93)*** (-2.69)*** (-3.20)*** (-3.16)*** (-2.00)** (-2.09)** (-1.94)* (-2.03)** 
GRP per capita 
 2.77 2.53 2.82 3.20 3.48 3.41 3.38 3.42 3.44 
 (5.02)*** (4.10)*** (4.03)*** (4.32)*** (4.66)*** (4.98)*** (5.00)*** (4.78)*** (4.86)*** 
Wage 
  0.23 5.76 5.82 3.22 5.34 5.42 6.41 6.49 
  (0.65) (1.56) (1.63) (0.81) (1.45) (1.45) (1.69)* (1.68)* 
Wage2 
   -0.33 -0.33 -0.19 -0.32 -0.34 -0.38 -0.40 
   (-1.48) (-1.52) (-0.78) (-1.44) (-1.49) (-1.67)* (-1.71)* 
GIP 
    -0.51 -0.60 -0.25 -0.15 -0.23 -0.16 
    (-1.76)* (-2.00)** (-0.80) (-0.47) (-0.70) (-0.50) 
Pop. Density 
     -1.14 -1.01 -1.07 -1.07 -1.13 
     (-1.50) (-1.49) (-1.57) (-1.60) (-1.68)* 
Rail Density 
      -0.21 -0.23 -0.22 -0.25 
      (-1.98)** (-2.20)** (-2.08)** (-2.32)** 
Road Density 
      0.42 0.45 0.42 0.45 
      (4.14)*** (5.03)*** (4.25)*** (5.30)*** 
Illiterate Rate 
       0.27  0.27 
       (2.36)**  (2.34)** 
Productivity 
        -0.17 -0.18 
        (-1.37) (-1.47) 
Constant 
6.82 -18.798 -18.56 -44.122 -44.69 -27.27 -40.74 -40.77 -43.42 -43.51 
(35.48)*** (-3.68)*** (-3.64)*** (-2.45)** (-2.55)** (-1.28) (-2.11)** (-2.08)** (-2.23)** (-2.20)** 
Wald χ2 4902.89 6449.04 6788.36 5384.91 5486.04 5717.34 7051.28 7398.75 6546.07 7071.95 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and 
time dummies are included. 
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Table 2.5.2 FGLS Regression Results on FDI/POP for Log Data with EI1  
FDI/POP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EI1† 
-0.079 -0.080 -0.083 -0.094 -0.10 -0.10 -0.062 -0.063 -0.062 -0.062 
(-2.61)*** (-2.59)*** (-2.74)*** (-2.75)*** (-2.97)*** (-2.93)*** (-1.93)* (-2.02)** (-1.86)* (-1.96)** 
GRP per capita 
 3.38 3.04 3.43 3.71 3.99 4.04 3.97 3.98 3.98 
 (6.13)*** (4.93)*** (4.93)*** (5.04)*** (5.42)*** (6.04)*** (6.03)*** (5.69)*** (5.74)*** 
Wage 
  0.37 7.95 7.87 5.53 7.48 7.52 8.52 8.54 
  (0.99) (2.24)** (2.25)** (1.41) (2.03)** (2.02)** (2.25)** (2.22)** 
Wage2 
   -0.46 -0.45 -0.32 -0.45 -0.46 -0.50 -0.52 
   (-2.11)** (-2.10)** (-1.36) (-2.01)** (-2.04)** (-2.21)** (-2.24)** 
GIP 
    -0.35 -0.42 -0.057 0.056 -0.036 0.045 
    (-1.13) (-1.31) (-0.18) (0.17) (-0.11) (0.13) 
Pop. Density 
     -0.96 -0.88 -0.93 -0.86 -0.92 
     (-1.25) (-1.21) (-1.28) (-1.20) (-1.28) 
Rail Density 
      -0.16 -0.19 -0.17 -0.20 
      (-1.43) (-1.68)* (-1.52) (-1.78)* 
Road Density 
      0.45 0.47 0.44 0.47 
      (4.47)*** (5.17)*** (4.59)*** (5.47)*** 
Illiterate Rate 
       0.27  0.27 
       (2.29)**  (2.23)** 
Productivity 
        -0.16 -0.17 
        (-1.25) (-1.34) 
Constant 
6.79 -24.54 -24.50 -59.51 -59.41 -44.54 -58.28 -58.10 -61.11 -60.91 
(37.03)*** (-4.80)*** (-4.77)*** (-3.43)*** (-3.46)*** (-2.10)** (-2.96)*** (-2.94)*** (-3.10)*** (-3.05)*** 
Wald χ2 8255.26 9891.48 10168.32 8913.67 9078.33 9316.90 12471.36 13105.58 12174.31 13239.35 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and 
time dummies are included. 
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Table 2.5.3 FGLS Regression Results on FDI/GDP for Log Data with Punish  
FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Punish† 
-0.043 -0.043 -0.041 -0.051 -0.074 -0.078 -0.082 -0.076 -0.081 -0.076 
(-2.06)** (-1.94)* (-1.74) (-2.13)** (3.05)*** (-3.01)*** (-3.16)*** (-2.79)*** (-3.23)*** (-2.85)*** 
GRP per capita 
 2.90 2.92 3.13 3.50 3.79 3.84 3.93 3.70 3.85 
 (5.02)*** (4.52)*** (4.51)*** (4.83)*** (5.13)*** (5.94)*** (6.01)*** (5.65)*** (5.75)*** 
Wage 
  -0.089 5.42 6.43 3.41 4.78 4.45 5.99 5.73 
  (-0.21) (1.35) (-1.70)* (-0.81) (-1.24) (-1.14) (-1.51) (-1.42) 
Wage2 
   -0.33 -0.39 -0.21 -0.30 -0.30 -0.36 -0.36 
   (-1.36) (-1.67)* (-0.84) (-1.28) (-1.24) (-1.50) (-1.48) 
GIP 
    -0.49 -0.62 -0.41 -0.36 -0.39 -0.36 
    (-1.75)* (-1.98)** (-1.36) (-1.19) (-1.32) (-1.17) 
Pop. Density 
     -0.94 -0.98 -1.03 -0.97 -1.02 
     (-1.26) (-1.57) (-1.61) (-1.58) (-1.63) 
Rail Density 
      -0.30 -0.31 -0.30 -0.31 
      (-2.87)*** (-2.89)*** (-2.86)*** (-2.90)*** 
Road Density 
      0.44 0.45 0.44 0.46 
      (4.44)*** (5.05)*** (4.58)*** (5.28)*** 
Illiterate Rate 
       0.22  0.21 
       (1.88)*  (1.83)* 
Productivity 
        -0.14 -0.16 
        (-1.16) (-1.32) 
Constant 
6.62 -20.24 -19.67 -44.12 -48.62 -31.19 -39.87 -38.85 -43.17 -42.58 
(47.34)*** (-3.78)*** (-3.44)*** (-2.30)** (-2.66)*** (-1.40) (-2.00)** (-1.93)* (-2.16)** (-2.10)** 
Wald χ2 5027.47 5287.33 5059.49 4945.25 6701.13 6263.02 8235.71 8374.58 8231.85 8466.13 
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 
z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and 
time dummies are included. 
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Table 2.5.4 FGLS Regression Results on FDI/POP for Log Data with Punish  
FDI/POP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Punish† 
-0.043 -0.047 -0.045 -0.054 -0.074 -0.074 -0.078 -0.071 -0.076 -0.070 
(-2.20)** (-1.97)** (-1.89) (-2.26)** (-2.78)*** (-2.57)** (-2.62)*** (-2.33)** (-2.66)*** (-2.38)** 
GRP per capita 
 3.55 3.37 3.63 3.95 4.28 4.46 4.46 4.30 4.36 
 (6.50)*** (5.45)*** (5.34)*** (5.40)*** (5.79)*** (6.99)*** (6.99)*** (6.52)*** (6.58)*** 
Wage 
  0.096 7.63 8.13 5.54 6.64 6.49 7.83 7.67 
  (0.23) (1.98)** (2.17)** (1.33) (1.72)* (1.67)* (1.97)** (1.91)* 
Wage2 
   -0.45 -0.48 -0.34 -0.41 -0.41 -0.47 -0.47 
   (-1.92)* (-2.08)** (-1.33) (-1.73)* (-1.73)* (-1.95)* (-1.94)* 
GIP 
    -0.42 -0.48 -0.20 -0.13 -0.18 -0.13 
    (-1.34) (-1.40) (-0.63) (-0.40) (-0.55) (-0.39) 
Pop. Density 
     -0.69 -0.82 -0.83 -0.76 -0.77 
     (-0.90) (-1.18) (-1.19) (-1.11) (-1.13) 
Rail Density 
      -0.26 -0.26 -0.25 -0.26 
      (-2.25)** (-2.31)** (-2.22)** (-2.28)** 
Road Density 
      0.46 0.47 0.46 0.48 
      (4.72)*** (5.17)*** (4.90)*** (5.43)*** 
Illiterate Rate 
       0.21  0.20 
       (1.77)*  (1.68)* 
Productivity 
        -0.13 -0.14 
        (-1.05) (-1.14) 
Constant 
6.55 -26.34 -25.52 -58.88 -61.28 -47.77 -56.75 -56.29 -60.33 -59.97 
(49.65)*** (-5.19)*** (-4.72)*** (-3.19)*** (-3.40)*** (-2.16)** (-2.80)*** (-2.76)*** (-2.97)*** (-2.92)*** 
Wald χ2 7444.30 9495.49 9524.93 8280.40 8966.73 8852.64 13005.62 13285.83 13022.54 13589.33 
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 
z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and 
time dummies are included. 
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Table 2.5.5 FGLS Regression Results on FDI/GDP for Log Data with Charge  
FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Charge† 
-0.054 -0.14 -0.15 -0.12 -0.098 -0.14 -0.22 -0.18 -0.21 -0.18 
(-0.49) (-1.30) (-1.40) (-1.01) (-0.84) (-1.16) (-2.00)** (-1.66)* (-1.86)* (-1.54) 
GRP per capita 
 2.94 2.73 2.89 3.11 3.47 3.50 3.47 3.47 3.47 
 (4.87)*** (4.15)*** (3.95)*** (3.98)*** (4.42)*** (5.02)*** (5.01)*** (4.78)*** (4.80)*** 
Wage 
  0.14 3.87 4.38 0.49 1.99 2.37 2.89 3.26 
  (0.34) (0.94) (1.07) (0.11) (0.49) (0.58) (0.69) (0.77) 
Wage2 
   -0.23 -0.26 -0.039 -0.12 -0.15 -0.17 -0.20 
   (-0.90) (-1.03) (-0.14) (-0.48) (-0.61) (-0.66) (-0.78) 
GIP 
    -0.23 -0.31 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.14 
    (-0.72) (-0.94) (0.39) (0.46) (0.38) (0.42) 
Pop. Density 
     -1.39 -1.54 -1.52 -1.63 -1.61 
     (-1.67)* (-2.27)** (-2.22)** (-2.40)** (-2.34)** 
Rail Density 
      -0.37 -0.36 -0.38 -0.37 
      (-3.45)*** (-3.34)*** (-3.44)*** (-3.34)*** 
Road Density 
      0.42 0.44 0.42 0.44 
      (3.92)*** (4.39)*** (3.93)*** (4.46)*** 
Illiterate Rate 
       0.22  0.22 
       (1.69)*  (1.68)* 
Productivity 
        -0.16 -0.16 
        (-1.25) (-1.32) 
Constant 
6.90 -19.58 -18.74 -35.64 -38.32 -14.44 -24.28 -26.01 -25.81 -27.59 
(-7.06)*** (-3.57)*** (-3.38)*** (-1.81)* (-1.95)* (-0.60) (-1.15) (-1.23) (-1.22) (-1.29) 
Wald χ2 4233.42 4850.38 5313.72 4558.54 4456.13 4891.34 7336.94 7180.77 6906.39 6817.20 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and 
time dummies are included. 
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Table 2.5.6 FGLS Regression Results on FDI/POP for Log Data with Charge  
FDI/POP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Charge† 
-0.043 -0.14 -0.16 -0.098 -0.091 -0.13 -0.21 -0.18 -0.20 -0.17 
(-0.38) (-1.31) (-1.47) (-0.84) (-0.77) (-1.10) (-1.92)* (-1.65)* (-1.75)* (-1.50) 
GRP per capita 
 3.65 3.32 3.57 3.67 3.99 4.15 4.06 4.07 4.02 
 (6.30)*** (5.18)*** (4.95)*** (4.78)*** (5.25)*** (6.27)*** (6.15)*** (5.85)*** (5.77)*** 
Wage 
  0.28 6.69 6.82 3.02 4.18 4.50 5.19 5.47 
  (0.68) (1.67)* (1.70)* (0.67) (1.02) (1.09) (1.23) (1.29) 
Wage2 
   -0.39 -0.40 -0.19 -0.25 -0.28 -0.31 -0.33 
   (-1.59) (-1.63) (-0.68) (-0.99) (-1.10) (-1.18) (-1.28) 
GIP 
    -0.097 -0.15 0.30 0.35 0.31 0.34 
    (-0.29) (-0.45) (0.89) (1.02) (0.88) (0.97) 
Pop. Density 
     -1.22 -1.42 -1.37 -1.45 -1.41 
     (-1.45) (-1.92)* (-1.87)* (-1.96)** (-1.92)* 
Rail Density 
      -0.31 -0.30 -0.32 -0.31 
      (-2.69)*** (-2.65)*** (-2.72)*** (-2.68)*** 
Road Density 
      0.45 0.47 0.44 0.46 
      (4.20)*** (4.52)*** (4.19)*** (4.57)*** 
Illiterate Rate 
       0.21  0.21 
       (1.63)  (1.58) 
Productivity 
        -0.15 -0.16 
        (-1.19) (-1.25) 
Constant 
6.73 -26.23 -25.48 -54.22 -54.99 -32.42 -42.16 -43.47 -44.37 -45.52 
(6.81)*** (-4.93)*** (-4.65)*** (-2.81)*** (-2.85)*** (-1.36) (-1.96)** (-2.02)** (-2.05)**  (-2.09)** 
Wald χ2 6988.72 8136.79 8700.20 7749.89 7766.79 8301.63 12585.14 12298.18 12247.58 12082.78 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and 
time dummies are included.
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GIP is intended to capture the degree of industrial agglomeration in a province and is 
expected to have a positive effect on FDI. However, none of the coefficients on GIP are 
positive and a statistically significant negative coefficient is found in regressions (5) and 
(6).31 The coefficient on population density is found to be negative and only significant at 
10% in the final column. It appears that FDI locates in less densely populated areas 
possibly due to the higher land prices.  
We now consider our infrastructure variables. The railway density coefficient is contrary to 
our prior expectations. It has a significant negative effect on FDI inflows and is also found 
in all the other regression results in Tables 2.5.2 – 2.5.6 and most of the tables in 
Appendices 2.2, 2.3 and 2.5. A possible explanation is the relatively lower railway density in 
some coastal provinces with higher incomes and higher shares of FDI inflows. For 
example, Guangdong attracted the greatest FDI flows in China and its GDP accounts for 
about 10% of total. However, the railway length is 2,112.5 km with a density of 0.01 
km/km2, which ranks 11th from bottom and only slightly higher than the average level of 
the country.32 The situation in other FDI preferred provinces, such as Hainan, Fujian, 
Zhejiang and Jiangsu, is similar to that of Guangdong. Although other eastern regions, 
such as Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Liaoning, Hebei and Shandong, have very high railway 
densities, these six regions account for 28 per cent of national GDP and 36 per cent of 
FDI inflows compared with 31 per cent in GDP and 50 per cent in FDI inflows of the 
                                                
31 We also estimate our regressions using the numbers of enterprises as a proxy of agglomeration. These 
enterprises include all state-owned and non-state-owned industrial enterprises with an annual sales income of 
over 5 million RMB yuan. Our main results are unaffected. 
32 The average railway density for a province in China is 0.0077 km/km2 in 2003. The 10 provinces with the 
lowest railway density are Tibet, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Gansu, Inner Mongolia, Yunnan, Sichuan, Hainan, 
Chongqing, and Guizhou. These provinces all have geographical restrictions on building railways. Tibet and 
Qinghai are located on Qinghai-Tibet Plateau; Xinjiang and Gansu both have large areas of Gobi desert; 
Inner Mongolia has the largest grassland; Yunan, Sichuan, Chongqing and Guizhou are in the mountainous 
regions; and Hainan is an island province. Except Hainan, the other nine regions are all located in western 
China.  
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other five provinces with lower railway densities. In contrast, other measure of a region 
infrastructure, road density, has a positive and significant coefficient in all regressions in all 
the six tables. The value of the coefficient remains relatively stable.33 The different results 
in railway density and road density are consistent with the real situation of transportation 
infrastructure in China. During the past 30 years, central and local governments have 
invested a great amount of money to improve the highway construction (at all classes) 
because road transportation network is regarded as an important sign for urbanisation and 
modernisation. “Building road is the fist step to become rich” has been a widely spread 
common saying since 1980s. Therefore, rich regions always have high road density but do 
not certainly have high railway density.  
The rate of illiteracy in a province has a positive and significant coefficient as expected, 
indicating that FDI prefers to locate into regions with a high proportion of unskilled labour. 
Similarly, our measure of productivity has a consistent sign but it is not significant 
indicating that province level productivity does not appear to play an important role in 
investment location decision making. 
Using the per capita FDI inflows (FDI/POP) as our dependent variable, the specifications 
of Table 2.5.2 are the same as those in Table 2.5.1. The coefficients for EI1 in these two 
tables are very similar. Therefore, for both FDI measures, a 10 per cent increase of 
industrial pollution treatment investment in a province would lead to an approximate 0.62 
per cent decrease of the amount of per capita FDI inflows into the province. The 
coefficients on other independent variables are robust across all regressions, except wage 
and squared wage which both become more significant. The turning point in the final 
                                                
33 We also estimate our regressions including railway density and road density separately but the results were 
very similar. We also estimated the regressions respectively including numbers of ports in each province and 
dummy variable for coastal provinces. Both coefficients are positive but not significant.  
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regression is 8.21, i.e. 3,683 RMB yuan ($770) in level. It again indicates that wage has a 
negative effect on FDI inflows at current wage level in China. 
Tables 2.5.3 and 2.5.4 show the FGLS regression results when we use Punish to measure 
the strictness of environmental regulations. The coefficients on punishment cases are 
negative and statistically significant in all regressions in Tables 2.5.3 and 2.5.4, and the 
absolute values are relatively stable. In column (10) of Table 2.5.3, the coefficient is -0.076, 
which means that a 10 per cent increase in environment litigiousness of the province leads 
to a 0.76 per cent decreases in the amount of FDI/GDP. As a result, the provinces with 
stricter environmental standards attract less FDI.  
The effect of per capita income is still significantly positive. Similar to the EI1 results, the 
coefficients on manufacturing wage does not have significant effect on FDI/GDP but have 
significant effect on FDI/POP; and the turning point is also below 4,000 RMB yuan (3,497 
in regression (10) in Table 2.5.4). GIP and population density remain negative and 
insignificant. The results for railway and road density are similar to the EI1 regressions. 
Their coefficients are robust for both signs and magnitude. The performances of rate of 
illiteracy and productivity are also similar to those in previous tables.  
In terms of the results using normalised pollution emission charge, Tables 2.5.5 and 2.5.6 
both indicate that foreign investors would like to locate in provinces with lower pollution 
emission charge standards, i.e. provinces with weaker implementation in environmental 
standards. However, the results are not as significant as EI1 and Punish. And a 10 percent 
increase in pollution charge standard may lead to an approximately 1.8 per cent decrease in 
FDI/GDP or FDI/POP inflows. Compared to the industrial pollution treatment 
investment and administrative punishment cases, foreign investors are more sensitive to the 
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pollution emission charge, possibly because it is more visible to the investors and has a 
more direct impact. The magnitudes of the coefficients on our three measures of 
environmental regulations are consistent with our expectation that Charge has the strongest 
elasticity, while EI1 has the weakest. However, the impact of Charge is only significant at 
10% level in regressions (7)-(9). 
The results of per capita income and infrastructure variables are very similar to those in the 
previous four tables. However, wage and squared wage are now insignificant in the 
regressions on both measures of FDI. The GIP coefficient becomes positive in most 
regressions, although it still not different from zero. Population density becomes negatively 
significant, indicating that foreign investment prefers less populated provinces where land 
prices are lower. The coefficient on the illiterate rate is less significant but remains stable in 
magnitude. The results of productivity do not change.  
We also apply some additional sensitivity checks to the labour quality and manufacturing 
wage. We include the percentage of enrolment in different levels of education to substitute 
for the rate of illiteracy. We find positive but insignificant results for primary school 
enrolment; positively significant results for junior high school enrolment; and negative but 
insignificant results for both senior high school and high education enrolments. These 
results support our premise that FDI is attracted to regions with relatively low education 
levels. We also include interaction terms for certain variables, for example, wage × income, 
wage × rate of illiteracy and wage × productivity. The results are remained broadly similar.   
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2.5.2 Comparison with Results in Appendices 2.2, 2.3 and 2.5 
Appendix 2.2 
Turning to the two alternative measures of the share of industrial pollution treatment 
investment, the results in Appendix 2.2 do not change our main results. The coefficients on 
EI2 and EI3 remain negative and stable in magnitude; however, they are not statistically 
different from zero in some regressions estimating on both measures of FDI inflows. The 
results of the other independent variables are very similar to those including EI1.  
Appendix 2.3 
Compared to the results using level equations in Appendix 2.3, the log specification results 
are more significant and robust. EI1 is found to have significantly negative impacts on 
FDI/GDP. In terms of FDI/POP, the share of environmental investment is also found to 
have negative coefficient but only significant in a few regressions. Punish is generally 
negative but not significant. For Charge, we find positive coefficients in some specifications 
but none are statistically significant.  
Per capita income has a significantly positive effect on FDI/POP. In the estimations on 
FDI/GDP, we find a positive and significant effect, as well as some negative results in 
some regressions. However, the negative coefficients are not statistically significant. The 
coefficients on manufacturing wage and its square when estimating FDI/POP including 
EI1 and Charge (in Tables A2.3.2 and A2.3.6) are not statistically significant. In other 
estimations we only find a significant coefficient for wage squared in the estimations on 
FDI/GDP.  
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GIP is now positive in all tables and has significant effect on FDI/POP. Population density 
becomes positive and has relatively stable absolute values, but is only significant in some 
regressions for FDI/POP. The results on railway density and road density are not changed. 
We find inverse signs for the two measures of labour quality although neither is significant.  
Appendix 2.5  
Compared to the results using a random effects estimator provided in Appendix 2.5, the 
FGLS results are more robust. The log specifications of random effects results are roughly 
consistent with our main results, although they are relatively weak. A possible explanation 
is the disadvantage of GLS estimator in controlling for AR(1) autocorrelation for the log 
specifications. 
2.5.3 Comparison with Previous Empirical Evidence 
In contrast to the majority of existing studies of the PHH we do find consistent support 
for the existence pollution haven hypothesis within China. When we consider the effect of 
per capita income on aggregate FDI inflows to Chinese regions we find a strong and 
positive effect which is consistent with previous studies.  
With respect to wage, we firstly include wage squared in the estimating equation and find 
an inverted-U relationship between FDI and wages. At the current wage level in China, our 
finding that wage deters FDI inflows are consistent with most empirical studies focusing 
China. We do not find a robust result for agglomeration effects, which is usually omitted in 
other studies. The measurement of agglomeration effects varies across empirical studies so 
in future research we will try alternative measures of agglomeration.  
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Growth of population density has been used in Wei et al. (1999) as a control variable to 
proxy the improvement in agglomeration effect and is found to be insignificant in all 
regressions for the realised FDI inflows, and has a negative sign when controlling for 
autocorrelation. In our case, population density is found to be significantly negative in our 
main results where a possible explanation is that it reflects regional land prices. 
Infrastructure tends to be measured differently in other studies; however, most of them are 
measured by the characteristics of transportation (densities of highway, paved road, railway, 
waterway, etc.) and do not get constant significant results. Cheng and Kwan (2000) 
estimate the regression separately with all roads, paved roads and railways and also find the 
unexpected sign in the case of railways that is consistent with our findings. Gao (2002) 
combines the density of roads, railway and waterway together and finds the effects of 
transportation is not different from zero. A possible explanation for Gao’s finding is that 
the strong negative effect of railway density, which is found in our results, may offset the 
positive effect of road density. 
In terms of our labour quality variables, Coughlin and Segev (2000) employ similar 
measures and find that labour productivity is a positive determinant of FDI while rate of 
illiteracy is negative, which are opposite to our findings. Other studies have used the 
percentage of enrolment in different levels of education as the proxy of education or 
labour quality (Cheng and Kwan, 2000; Gao, 2002; Fung et al. 2002; and Fung et al. 2003), 
and the results are found to be better for junior and senior high schools and higher 
education than primary school education. Our sensitivity check results using the similar 
measures are also opposite to those in pervious studies. Cheng and Kwan (2000) argue that 
it is not surprising because at the beginning of China’s open door policy, FDI was attracted 
not to areas with higher education attainment, but to South China due to preferential 
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government policies and its geographical proximity to Hong Kong. Such a situation also 
exists during our sample period (1999-2003) even though China had been open for 20 years. 
This might be a possible explanation for our contrary results. The second reason is that 
illiteracy rate data is noisy because it measures the education level of household population, 
which may be affected by labour migration. Another explanation is that we use different 
normalisation of FDI inflows (FDI/GDP) and (FDI/POP) rather than FDI level data in 
USD at a constant price. Our normalisation does not reflect the absolute level of FDI but 
the relatively abundance of foreign investment. It may generate the different signs of some 
control variables.   
 
2.6 Conclusions 
This chapter uses provincial data for China to examine whether the foreign investment is 
more or less likely to be attracted to provinces with stringent environmental regulations.  
We employ three proxies of the stringency of environmental regulations across provinces. 
They are the share of industrial pollution treatment investment in innovation investment in 
each province, the normalised administrative punishment cases and the normalised 
pollution emission charge. We also use two measures of FDI inflows, FDI divided by 
regional GDP and FDI divided by regional population. The regression results from FGLS 
estimator indicate that industrial pollution treatment investment and administrative 
punishment cases have significant negative effects on both measures of FDI inflows, while 
the impact of pollution emission charge is also negative although less significant. That is to 
say FDI prefers to locate into regions with weaker environmental regulations. Thus, to a 
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certain extent we find evidence to support the existence of intra-country pollution havens 
within China. These results are robust for data in logs rather than in levels. The results for 
random effects estimators are somewhat weaker.  
The results also find other independent variables are significant determinants of investment. 
Income level has a strong positive impact on the amount of FDI inflows. FDI is also 
found to be attracted to provinces with low manufacturing wages, good infrastructure, and 
a low educational level. FDI is found to prefer to locate into regions with low population 
density when we include pollution charge to proxy environmental regulations. It shows the 
importance of reliable infrastructure and factors of production in the investment location 
decision. Our results for income, wage and infrastructure are consistent with most previous 
studies; however, the results for population density and quality of labour force are different 
from others.  
Our findings provide some policy implications. Three decades’ of fast economic growth 
under the present growth mode has made China one of the largest pollution producers in 
the world, with, probably, the dirtiest air and increasingly polluted water resources. In this 
growth process, FDI has played an important role. It is regarded as an engine or catalyst 
for economic growth, a carrier of advanced technological and managerial knowledge that 
can drive the technological upgrading of the economy. Evidence from this chapter suggests 
that FDI is not always unalloyed blessing. Foreign investors may seek institutional voids in 
the developing countries and attempt to location in “pollution havens” where 
environmental regulation is not stringent. If a fast economic development is endurable, a 
sustainable development policy is needed that requires a rethinking about the location of 
population centres and types of investment, including the type and sector of foreign direct 
investment. Policies include encouraging more environmental friendly knowledge and 
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human capital intensive FDI and controlling FDI in high energy consumption and high 
pollution sectors. The negative effect of environmental stringency on FDI can be offset by 
the improvement of some factors that are attractive to FDI, for example the quality of 
infrastructure. 
One limitation in this chapter is that the data do not allow us to disaggregate FDI from 
different sources and/or into different industry sectors. Therefore, we cannot examine 
whether certain types of FDI from certain countries in certain industrial sectors would like 
to locate in regions with weak environmental regulations. 
The second limitation is that we do not consider some other factors related to government 
characteristics which may have impact on FDI, such as the provincial difference in 
corruption. Corruption, as a detriment of FDI inflows, has recently been considered in 
cross national FDI location choice models. China has been widely recognised as a country 
with a serious corruption problem, but still attracts a large share of FDI inflows. The next 
question we wish to ask therefore is whether the difference in provincial level of corruption 
and governance quality encourage/deter FDI inflows in China. 
Another limitation in this chapter is that we assume environmental stringency to be strictly 
exogenous, although we take one-year lag for all the explanatory variables to control for 
their endogeneity.  
In this chapter we only consider the impact of environmental regulations on FDI inflows 
into China. However, the overall environmental impact of FDI is a mix of positive and 
negative effects. In some cases, FDI helps the improvement of China’s environment. In 
other cases, FDI damages the environment and increases environmental risks. 
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Simultaneously, some other provincial differences, such as income level, also have impact 
on the environmental status and regulations.  
To consider the impact of corruption and bureaucracy and the endogeneity of 
environmental regulations, therefore becomes our major work in Chapters three and four. 
And Chapter five investigates the overall environmental effects of economic development 
and FDI.  
In sum, this chapter has addressed a number of limitations in PHH empirical studies. We 
provide the first study to examine the impacts of regional differences in environmental 
stringency on the amount of FDI inflows in China. 
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Appendix 2.1 Variables Definitions and Data Sources 
Variable Definition/Source 
FDI/GDP FDI divided by regional GDP (yuan per 10000 yuan). Source: China 
Statistical Yearbook. 
FDI/POP 
FDI divided by regional population (yuan per capita at 1990 price). 
Source: as above; GDP deflator data from Econ Stats, 
http://www.econstats.com  
EI1 
Investment in industrial pollution treatment project divided by total 
innovation investment (yuan per 10000 yuan). Source: China 
Environment Yearbook; Innovation investment data as FDI. 
Punish 
Total number of administrative punishment cases filed by the regional 
environmental authorities divided by the number of enterprises (cases 
per 1000 enterprises). Source: China Environment Yearbook; number 
of enterprises as FDI. 
Charge 
Pollution emission charge divided by the number of organisations paid 
the charge (yuan per enterprise, at 1990 price). Source: China 
Environment Yearbook. 
GRP per capita Gross regional product per capita (yuan at 1990 price). Source: as FDI.  
Wage Average wage of staff and workers in manufacturing (yuan at 1990). 
Source: as above. 
GIP Regional gross industrial output value (100 million yuan at 1990 price). 
Source: as above. 
Pop. Density Regional population density (persons per km
2). Source: as above; area 
data from http://www.usacn.com   
Road Density Regional highway density (km per 10000 km2). Source: as above. 
Rail Density Regional railway density (km per 10000 km2). Source: as above. 
Illiterate Rate 
Regional illiterate rate and semi-illiterate rate aged at 15 and above; 
values for 2000 are calculated as the average of the values in 1999 and 
2001. Source: as FDI. 
Productivity 
Overall labour productivity for all foreign funded industrial enterprises 
(yuan per person per year, at 1990 price); values for 1998 are the average 
of those for 1997 and 1999. Source: China Industrial Economy 
Statistical Yearbooks. 
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Appendix 2.2 Normalisation of the Share of the Environmental 
Investment and the FGLS Regression Results for Log Data with EI2 
and EI3  
A2.2.1 Alternative Normalisation Methods of EI1 
The sources of industrial pollution treatment investment are state budgetary appropriations, 
special fund for environmental protection (which is mainly from the pollution emission 
charge), and other funds like domestic loans, foreign investment and enterprise 
fundraising.  
The investment monies are spent on construction and installation projects, and purchasing 
of equipment and instruments required in the pollution harnessing projects for the 
treatments of wastewater, waste gas, solid wastes, noise pollution and other pollution. 
All of these investment monies should be accounted to investment in innovation, which 
refers in general to the technological innovation of the original facilities (including renewal 
of fixed assets) by the enterprises and institutions as well as the corresponding 
supplementary projects for production or welfare facilities and the related activities. It 
includes the investment in all the projects, arranged both in the plan of innovation and in 
the plan of capital construction, of moving the whole factory to a new site so as to meet 
the requirements of urban environmental protection or safe production; and the projects 
in the state-owned units, listed neither in the plan of capital construction nor in the plan of 
innovation, of moving the whole factory to a new site so as to meet the requirements of 
urban environmental protection or safe production (China Statistical Yearbook).  
95 
 
Therefore, we normalise the industrial pollution treatment investment by the investment in 
innovation, i.e. the variable we used in the main text, EI1. But considering a small fraction 
of the industrial pollution treatment investment comes from state budget in capital 
construction, we also construct another two alternative variables for the share of 
environmental investment. EI2 is normalised by the sum of investment in innovation and 
capital construction; and EI3 is normalised by the total investment in fixed assets. Total 
investment in fixed assets is classified into four parts: investment in capital construction, 
investment in innovation, investment in real estates development and other investment in 
fixed assets.  
Although the coefficients of EI2 and EI3 are less significant than that of EI1, the results 
reported in the following tables are roughly consistent with our main results. 
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A2.2.2 FGLS Regression Results for Log Data with EI2 and EI3 
Table A2.2.1 FGLS Regression Results on FDI/GDP for Log Data with EI2 
FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EI2† 
-0.062 -0.079 -0.078 -0.075 -0.098 -0.099 -0.051 -0.057 -0.052 -0.057 
(-1.77)* (-2.47)** (-2.39)** (-2.09)** (-2.64)*** (-2.66)*** (-1.50) (-1.80)* (-1.49) (-1.77)* 
GRP per capita 
 2.67 2.62 2.87 3.26 3.56 3.45 3.39 3.47 3.47 
 (4.79)*** (4.13)*** (4.03)*** (4.30)*** (4.66)*** (5.00)*** (4.99)*** (4.81)*** (4.85)*** 
Wage 
  -0.021 5.51 5.53 2.86 5.27 5.34 6.36 6.43 
  (-0.06) (1.45) (1.50) (0.71) (1.41) (1.41) (1.65)* (1.64) 
Wage2 
   -0.33 -0.33 -0.18 -0.33 -0.34 -0.39 -0.40 
   (-1.44) (-1.47) (-0.75) (-1.44) (-1.49) (-1.66)* (-1.71)* 
GIP 
    -0.51 -0.61 -0.24 -0.14 -0.22 -0.16 
    (-1.66)* (-1.92)* (-0.76) (-0.43) (-0.68) (-0.47) 
Pop. Density 
     -1.16 -1.03 -1.08 -1.09 -1.15 
     (-1.53) (-1.54) (-1.62) (-1.65)* (-1.73)* 
Rail Density 
      -0.22 -0.25 -0.23 -0.26 
      (-2.12)** (-2.35)** (-2.18)** (-2.43)** 
Road Density 
      0.42 0.45 0.42 0.45 
      (4.26)*** (5.17)*** (4.39)*** (5.47)*** 
Illiterate Rate 
       0.29  0.29 
       (2.55)**  (2.48)** 
Productivity 
        -0.16 -0.18 
        (-1.32) (-1.44) 
Constant 
6.70 -17.91 -17.28 -42.54 -42.92 -25.16 -40.18 -39.92 -43.18 -42.94 
(37.58)*** (-3.47)*** (-3.30)*** (-2.32)** (-2.39)** (-1.17) (-2.06)** (-2.02)** (-2.20)** (-2.15)** 
Wald χ2 4929.07 6149.83 6106.43 4892.73 5063.15 5277.91 6985.84 7401.54 6478.25 7111.56 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and 
time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.2.2 FGLS Regression Results on FDI/POP for Log Data with EI2 
FDI/POP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EI2† 
-0.077 -0.087 -0.085 -0.087 -0.098 -0.099 -0.053 -0.059 -0.052 -0.058 
(-2.21)** (-2.51)** (-2.49)** (-2.33)** (-2.58)*** (-2.57)** (-1.51) (-1.78)* (-1.47) (-1.72)* 
GRP per capita 
 3.31 3.10 3.48 3.76 4.03 4.06 3.97 4.03 3.99 
 (5.99)*** (5.00)*** (4.95)*** (5.04)*** (5.42)*** (6.08)*** (6.03)*** (5.72)*** (5.73)*** 
Wage 
  0.15 7.68 7.57 5.23 7.40 7.46 8.46 8.48 
  (0.39) (2.12)** (2.12)** (1.31) (1.99)** (1.98)** (2.21)** (2.18)** 
Wage2 
   -0.45 -0.45 -0.32 -0.45 -0.47 -0.51 -0.52 
   (-2.06)** (-2.04)** (-1.32) (-1.99)** (-2.04)** (-2.20)** (-2.23)** 
GIP 
    -0.35 -0.42 -0.050 0.073 -0.031 0.057 
    (-1.09) (-1.28) (-0.15) (0.22) (-0.09) (0.17) 
Pop. Density 
     -0.95 -0.88 -0.93 -0.87 -0.92 
     (-1.23) (-1.22) (-1.28) (-1.22) (-1.30) 
Rail Density 
      -0.17 -0.20 -0.17 -0.21 
      (-1.53) (-1.81)* (-1.58) (-1.87)* 
Road Density 
      0.45 0.47 0.45 0.48 
      (4.58)*** (5.28)*** (4.72)*** (5.60)*** 
Illiterate Rate 
       0.29  0.28 
       (2.46)**  (2.35)** 
Productivity 
        -0.15 -0.16 
        (-1.21) (-1.30) 
Constant 
6.69 -23.90 -23.29 -57.82 -57.60 -42.74 -57.81 -57.45 -60.92 -60.44 
(38.85)*** (-4.66)*** (-4.49)*** (-3.28)*** (-3.29)*** (-2.00)** (-2.92)*** (-2.89)*** (-3.07)*** (-3.01)*** 
Wald χ2 8253.71 9871.67 9920.83 8554.96 8743.28 8915.09 12553.26 13243.52 12242.10 13426.99 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and 
time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.2.3 FGLS Regression Results on FDI/GDP for Log Data with EI3 
FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EI3† 
-0.047 -0.071 -0.070 -0.066 -0.084 -0.087 -0.042 -0.048 -0.044 -0.049 
(-1.31) (-2.12)** (-2.06)** (-1.76)* (-2.19)** (-2.27)** (-1.22) (-1.49) (-1.22) (-1.49) 
GRP per capita 
 2.69 2.62 2.88 3.22 3.52 3.41 3.35 3.45 3.45 
 (4.74)*** (4.08)*** (4.02)*** (4.21)*** (4.57)*** (4.93)*** (4.92)*** (4.76)*** (4.80)*** 
Wage 
  0.0027 5.89 6.06 3.25 5.59 5.64 6.65 6.70 
  (0.01) (1.52) (1.61) (0.79) (1.48) (1.47) (1.72)* (1.69)* 
Wage2 
   -0.35 -0.36 -0.20 -0.34 -0.36 -0.40 -0.42 
   (-1.51) (-1.57) (-0.83) (-1.50) (-1.54) (-1.72)* (-1.75)* 
GIP 
    -0.44 -0.54 -0.19 -0.091 -0.19 -0.12 
    (-1.42) (-1.71)* (-0.62) (-0.28) (-0.57) (-0.36) 
Pop. Density 
     -1.20 -1.04 -1.10 -1.11 -1.17 
     (-1.57) (-1.58) (-1.65)* (-1.69)* (-1.77)* 
Rail Density 
      -0.23 -0.25 -0.23 -0.26 
      (-2.17)** (-2.38)** (-2.20)** (-2.43)** 
Road Density 
      0.43 0.46 0.43 0.46 
      (4.44)*** (5.35)*** (4.58)*** (5.67)*** 
Illiterate Rate 
       0.28  0.28 
       (2.50)**  (2.45)** 
Productivity 
        -0.16 -0.17 
        (-1.30) (-1.40) 
Constant 
6.59 -18.23 -17.62 -44.30 -45.39 -26.78 -41.62 -41.33 -44.67 -44.36 
(41.91)*** (-3.47)*** (-3.29)*** (-2.37)** (-2.47)** (-1.23) (-2.13)** (-2.09)** (-2.28)** (-2.22)** 
Wald χ2 4824.69 5696.37 5691.95 4709.51 4819.03 5111.18 7015.82 7375.20 6514.12 7123.89 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and 
time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.2.4 FGLS Regression Results on FDI/POP for Log Data with EI3 
FDI/POP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EI3† 
-0.063 -0.076 -0.075 -0.076 -0.085 -0.086 -0.044 -0.050 -0.044 -0.050 
(-1.79)* (-2.11)** (-2.11)** (-1.97)** (-2.15)** (-2.16)** (-1.22) (-1.46) (-1.21) (-1.44) 
GRP per capita 
 3.35 3.12 3.48 3.71 3.99 4.03 3.94 4.01 3.97 
 (5.96)*** (4.95)*** (4.93)*** (4.94)*** (5.31)*** (6.01)*** (5.95)*** (5.68)*** (5.68)*** 
Wage 
  0.16 8.14 8.10 5.61 7.71 7.76 8.74 8.74 
  (0.43) (2.20)** (2.22)** (1.38) (2.05)** (2.04)** (2.26)** (2.23)** 
Wage2 
   -0.48 -0.48 -0.34 -0.47 -0.48 -0.52 -0.54 
   (-2.13)** (-2.14)** (-1.39) (-2.05)** (-2.09)** (-2.24)** (-2.26)** 
GIP 
    -0.28 -0.36 -0.0027 0.12 0.0067 0.095 
    (-0.89) (-1.09) (-0.01) (0.36) (0.02) (0.27) 
Pop. Density 
     -0.97 -0.89 -0.93 -0.88 -0.93 
     (-1.25) (-1.24) (-1.30) (-1.24) (-1.31) 
Rail Density 
      -0.17 -0.20 -0.18 -0.20 
      (-1.57) (-1.82)* (-1.59) (-1.86)* 
Road Density 
      0.46 0.48 0.46 0.49 
      (4.76)*** (5.43)*** (4.91)*** (5.77)*** 
Illiterate Rate 
       0.28  0.28 
       (2.40)**  (2.30)** 
Productivity 
        -0.15 -0.16 
        (-1.18) (-1.26) 
Constant 
6.58 -24.35 -23.74 -59.94 -60.04 -44.36 -59.38 -58.98 -62.45 -61.89 
(43.52)*** (-4.67)*** (-4.48)*** (-3.35)*** (-3.38)*** (-2.05)** (-2.99)*** (-2.95)*** (-3.14)*** (-3.07)*** 
Wald χ2 7957.08 9294.05 9373.60 8243.57 8391.45 8635.95 12577.41 13130.56 12305.90 13367.50 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and 
time dummies are included.
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Appendix 2.3 FGLS Regression Results for Level Data  
Table A2.3.1 FGLS Regression Results on FDI/GDP for Level Data with EI1  
FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EI1 
-0.041 -0.040 -0.038 -0.037 -0.033 -0.034 -0.044 -0.045 -0.044 -0.045 
(-2.20)** (-2.23)** (-1.99)** (-1.79)* (-1.59) (-1.72)* (-1.98)** (-2.04)** (-1.96)** (-2.03)** 
GRP per capita 
 0.0078 0.0071 0.013 0.0020 -0.0031 0.039 0.042 0.039 0.043 
 (0.72) (0.59) (0.87) (0.12) (-0.19) (1.85)* (1.97)** (1.83)* (1.97)** 
Wage 
  0.0018 0.044 0.043 0.045 0.078 0.079 0.079 0.081 
  (0.10) (1.10) (1.08) (1.14) (1.49) (1.51) (1.52) (1.54) 
Wage2 
   -2.59e-06 -2.11e-06 -2.36e-06 -8.10e-06 -8.30e-06 -8.15e-06 -8.39e-06 
   (-0.95) (-0.78) (-0.86) (-2.22)** (-2.27)** (-2.21)** (-2.27)** 
GIP 
    0.023 0.021 0.030 0.028 0.030 0.027 
    (1.08) (0.98) (1.49) (1.34) (1.48) (1.32) 
Pop. Density 
     0.22 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.18 
     (0.67) (0.58) (0.52) (0.57) (0.52) 
Rail Density 
      -1.31 -1.29 -1.32 -1.29 
      (-3.40)*** (-3.32)*** (-3.40)*** (-3.30)*** 
Road Density 
      0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 
      (2.63)*** (2.70)*** (2.62)*** (2.70)*** 
Illiterate Rate 
       -1.51  -1.59 
       (-0.75)  (-0.79) 
Productivity 
        0.000039 0.000011 
        (0.12) (0.03) 
Constant 
579.59 484.84 480.00 260.99 345.01 231.09 526.58 493.89 522.12 483.67 
(13.28)*** (3.57)*** (3.17)*** (1.08) (1.40) (0.68) (1.10) (1.03) (1.08) (1.00) 
Wald χ2 1814.28 1776.79 1806.09 1746.66 1671.93 1802.93 2077.01 2077.02 2079.73 2079.84 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included.
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Table A2.3.2 FGLS Regression Results on FDI/POP for Level Data with EI1  
FDI/POP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EI1 
-0.020 -0.017 -0.018 -0.016 -0.0099 -0.0098 -0.013 -0.016 -0.012 -0.015 
(-1.36) (-1.39) (-1.44) (-1.4) (-0.87) (-1.04) (-1.69)* (-2.00)** (-1.50) (-1.73)* 
GRP per capita 
 0.045 0.042 0.039 0.021 0.012 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.026 
 (4.47)*** (4.13)*** (3.87)*** (1.90)* (1.21) (1.97)** (2.07)** (1.90)* (1.96)** 
Wage 
  0.0098 -0.022 -0.023 -0.020 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 
  (1.06) (-0.93) (-0.95) (-0.84) (-0.39) (-0.38) (-0.42) (-0.39) 
Wage2 
   2.50e-06 3.01e-06 2.68e-06 8.44e-07 6.74e-07 1.02e-06 8.66e-07 
   (1.38) (1.68)* (1.52) (0.37) (0.30) (0.45) (0.38) 
GIP 
    0.047 0.047 0.058 0.056 0.058 0.057 
    (3.34)*** (3.59)*** (4.79)*** (4.74)*** (4.84)*** (4.81)*** 
Pop. Density 
     0.40 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.42 
     (1.66)* (1.67)* (1.67)* (1.64) (1.65)* 
Rail Density 
      -0.64 -0.62 -0.66 -0.64 
      (-2.93)*** (-2.79)*** (-2.99)*** (-2.87)*** 
Road Density 
      0.0095 0.011 0.095 0.010 
      (1.83)* (1.99)** (1.83)* (1.94)* 
Illiterate Rate 
       -1.05  -0.85 
       (-1.09)  (-0.85) 
Productivity 
        0.00014 0.00013 
        (0.93) (0.91) 
Constant 
605.00 72.43 36.01 162.54 285.64 74.13 282.72 258.76 296.25 276.16 
(19.34)*** (0.56) (0.27) (1.05) (1.81)* (0.31) (0.96) (0.88) (1.00) (0.94) 
Wald χ2 1561.23 1935.00 2057.03 1935.39 2185.31 2565.05 2935.79 2964.59 2937.39 2965.54 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.3.3 FGLS Regression Results on FDI/GDP for Level Data with Punish  
FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Punish 
-0.0014 -0.0017 -0.00075 -0.0016 0.00084 0.0017 -0.0076 -0.0079 -0.0078 -0.0082 
(-0.24) (-0.29) (-0.13) (-0.27) (0.14) (0.29) (-1.07) (-1.11) (-1.09) (-1.14) 
GRP per capita 
 0.0020 -0.0020 0.0069 -0.013 -0.024 0.042 0.047 0.044 0.049 
 (0.17) (-0.15) (0.41) (-0.60) (-1.15) (1.75)* (1.88)* (1.80)* (1.96)** 
Wage 
  0.013 0.058 0.053 0.056 0.085 0.083 0.096 0.091 
  (0.64) (1.31) (1.21) (1.26) (1.51) (1.46) (1.74)* (1.62) 
Wage2 
   -2.94e-06 -1.80e-06 -2.01e-06 -9.07e-06 -9.11e-06 -9.62e-06 -9.58e-06 
   (-0.96) (-0.58) (-0.65) (-2.26)** (-2.27)** (-2.40)** (-2.39)** 
GIP 
    0.035 0.035 0.033 0.030 0.032 0.028 
    (1.48) (1.49) (1.62) (1.42) (1.56) (1.34) 
Pop. Density 
     0.36 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.17 
     (1.07) (0.57) (0.51) (0.55) (0.49) 
Rail Density 
      -1.37 -1.34 -1.39 -1.34 
      (-3.41)*** (-3.30)*** (-3.45)*** (-3.29)*** 
Road Density 
      0.025 0.025 0.025 0.026 
      (2.44)** (2.51)** (2.46)** (2.54)** 
Illiterate Rate 
       -1.81  -2.08 
       (-0.82)  (-0.97) 
Productivity 
        0.00013 0.000078 
        (0.40) (0.24) 
Constant 
568.72 543.63 502.00 243.06 405.60 246.81 500.82 479.03 446.96 428.34 
(13.74)*** (3.74)*** (3.17)*** (0.88) (1.39) (0.67) (1.01) (0.97) (0.90) (0.86) 
Wald χ2 1606.60 1579.33 1617.78 1626.47 1596.89 1685.29 2145.62 2146.11 2155.22 2156.02 
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 
z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.3.4 FGLS Regression Results on FDI/POP for Level Data with Punish  
FDI/POP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Punish 
-0.00092 -0.0049 -0.0040 -0.0037 -0.00021 -0.000037 -0.0037 -0.0040 -0.0038 -0.0040 
(-0.19) (-1.03) (-0.84) (-0.75) (-0.04) (-0.01) (-0.72) (-0.78) (-0.73) (-0.77) 
GRP per capita 
 0.044 0.040 0.036 0.012 0.0052 0.032 0.034 0.033 0.034 
 (4.25)*** (3.83)*** (3.39)*** (0.98) (0.45) (2.23)** (2.35)** (2.30)** (2.39)** 
Wage 
  0.0096 -0.014 -0.019 -0.017 0.0055 0.0039 0.011 0.0083 
  (1.04) (-0.58) (-0.76) (-0.68) (0.17) (0.12) (0.36) (0.27) 
Wage2 
   1.90e-06 3.10e-06 2.84e-06 -4.35e-07 -4.77e-07 -6.77e-07 -6.83e-07 
   (0.98) (1.54) (1.51) (-0.18) (-0.19) (-0.28) (-0.28) 
GIP 
    0.052 0.050 0.056 0.053 0.056 0.054 
    (3.57)*** (3.66)*** (4.59)*** (4.44)*** (4.58)*** (4.45)*** 
Pop. Density 
     0.45 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.40 
     (1.84)* (1.54) (1.51) (1.51) (1.51) 
Rail Density 
      -0.56 -0.53 -0.58 -0.54 
      (-2.51)** (-2.34)** (-2.58)*** (-2.37)** 
Road Density 
      0.012 0.014 0.013 0.014 
      (2.10)** (2.25)** (2.16)** (2.31)** 
Illiterate Rate 
       -1.15  -1.12 
       (-1.08)  (-1.06) 
Productivity 
        0.00012 0.000086 
        (0.81) (0.64) 
Constant 
599.07 82.85 56.15 169.37 356.76 88.89 100.22 77.00 73.52 54.51 
(19.34)*** (0.62) (0.41) (1.05) (2.03)** (0.36) (0.32) (0.25) (0.24) (0.18) 
Wald χ2 1571.09 2058.29 2179.97 2046.20 2454.30 2897.49 2840.85 2865.64 2852.37 2875.18 
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 
z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.3.5 FGLS Regression Results on FDI/GDP for Level Data with Charge  
FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Charge 
0.0021 0.0016 0.00083 -0.00071 -0.00054 0.00027 -0.0031 -0.0028 -0.0033 -0.0028 
(0.46) (0.27) (0.14) (-0.10) (-0.08) (0.04) (-0.43) (-0.38) (-0.45) (-0.38) 
GRP per capita 
 0.00080 0.00061 0.0066 -0.0045 -0.0099 0.033 0.036 0.034 0.038 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.42) (-0.26) (-0.60) (1.46) (1.56) (1.50) (1.62) 
Wage 
  0.0038 0.050 0.048 0.048 0.074 0.073 0.082 0.079 
  (0.22) (1.23) (1.17) (1.18) (1.35) (1.33) (1.52) (1.47) 
Wage2 
   -2.61e-06 -2.08e-06 -2.37e-06 -7.88e-06 -7.97e-06 -8.25e-06 -8.31e-06 
   (-0.93) (-0.74) (-0.82) (-2.07)** (-2.09)** (-2.16)** (-2.18)** 
GIP 
    0.028 0.027 0.037 0.035 0.037 0.034 
    (1.39) (1.34) (1.95)* (1.77)* (1.91)* (1.71)* 
Pop. Density 
     0.22 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.22 
     (0.67) (0.70) (0.65) (0.68) (0.62) 
Rail Density 
      -1.32 -1.28 -1.33 -1.28 
      (-3.33)*** (-3.21)*** (-3.37)*** (-3.20)*** 
Road Density 
      0.025 0.026 0.025 0.026 
      (2.70)*** (2.76)*** (2.70)*** (2.78)*** 
Illiterate Rate 
       -1.49  -1.75 
       (-0.69)  (-0.83) 
Productivity 
        0.00013 0.000094 
        (0.41) (0.28) 
Constant 
553.59 545.32 526.71 287.05 375.62 271.43 565.99 540.56 527.95 500.04 
(10.28)*** (4.12)*** (3.44)*** (1.14) (1.46) (0.77) (1.16) (1.11) (1.08) (1.02) 
Wald χ2 1791.45 1710.22 1722.41 1727.51 1716.63 1768.76 2258.26 2258.22 2265.39 2265.33 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.3.6 FGLS Regression Results on FDI/POP for Level Data with Charge  
FDI/POP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Charge 
0.0066 -0.00011 -0.00032 0.000098 -0.00040 0.0011 0.00014 0.00053 -0.00024 0.00025 
(1.43) (-0.03) (-0.08) (0.03) (-0.10) (0.32) (-0.04) (0.15) (-0.07) (0.07) 
GRP per capita 
 0.041 0.039 0.035 0.015 0.0069 0.026 0.028 0.027 0.028 
 (4.00)*** (3.78)*** (3.38)*** (1.30) (0.67) (1.94)* (2.04)** (1.99)** (2.06)** 
Wage 
  0.0094 -0.016 -0.018 -0.021 -0.0025 -0.0040 0.0015 -0.00078 
  (0.99) (-0.66) (-0.76) (-0.88) (-0.08) (-0.13) (0.05) (-0.03) 
Wage2 
   2.08e-06 3.02e-06 2.92e-06 4.13e-07 4.08e-07 2.84e-07 3.03e-07 
   (1.13) (1.57) (1.58) (0.17) (0.17) (0.12) (0.13) 
GIP 
    0.052 0.052 0.060 0.057 0.060 0.058 
    (4.05)*** (4.40)*** (5.39)*** (5.24)*** (5.39)*** (5.24)*** 
Pop. Density 
     0.41 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.38 
     (1.73)* (1.52) (1.48) (1.50) (1.48) 
Rail Density 
      -0.55 -0.51 -0.56 -0.52 
      (-2.52)** (-2.31)** (-2.59)*** (-2.34)** 
Road Density 
      0.012 0.013 0.012 0.013 
      (2.16)** (2.30)** (2.18)** (2.31)** 
Illiterate Rate 
       -1.10  -1.07 
       (-1.04)  (-1.01) 
Productivity 
        0.00012 0.000093 
        (0.81) (0.66) 
Constant 
554.97 108.24 67.60 169.75 319.77 106.36 174.58 153.61 155.62 138.55 
(11.39)*** (0.85) (0.50) (1.09) (1.94)* (0.45) (0.58) (0.51) (0.52) (0.46) 
Wald χ2 1961.15 2221.08 2262.99 2219.06 2657.54 3130.58 3023.00 3054.15 3029.88 3058.95 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.3.7 FGLS Regression Results on FDI/GDP for Level Data with EI2  
FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EI2 
-0.17 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.13 -0.13 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 
(-1.89)* (-1.85)* (-1.66)* (-1.60) (-1.44) (-1.49) (-2.02)** (-2.00)** (-1.99)** (-1.98)** 
GRP per capita 
 0.0093 0.0093 0.015 0.0046 -0.00053 0.043 0.046 0.043 0.046 
 (0.85) (0.76) (1.03) (0.28) (-0.03) (2.08)** (2.18)** (2.05)** (2.16)** 
Wage 
  -0.0011 0.044 0.043 0.045 0.080 0.079 0.079 0.079 
  (-0.06) (1.11) (1.09) (1.13) (1.53) (1.52) (1.51) (1.52) 
Wage2 
   -2.70e-06 -2.25e-06 -2.42e-06 -8.31e-06 -8.42e-06 -8.26e-06 -8.42e-06 
   (-1.00) (-0.85) (-0.89) (-2.29)** (-2.31)** (-2.24)** (-2.28)** 
GIP 
    0.023 0.021 0.028 0.026 0.028 0.026 
    (1.07) (1.00) (1.38) (1.26) (1.39) (1.25) 
Pop. Density 
     0.19 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.15 
     (0.59) (0.49) (0.44) (0.48) (0.43) 
Rail Density 
      -1.34 -1.31 -1.34 -1.31 
      (-3.50)*** (-3.39)*** (-3.49)*** (-3.37)*** 
Road Density 
      0.024 0.025 0.024 0.025 
      (2.61)*** (2.68)*** (2.60)*** (2.67)*** 
Illiterate Rate 
       -1.43  -1.44 
       (-0.72)  (-0.72) 
Productivity 
        0.000032 5.69e-06 
        (0.10) (0.02) 
Constant 
583.05 469.73 476.84 244.21 325.50 230.06 523.13 495.67 529.32 495.40 
(13.09)*** (3.43)*** (3.13)*** (1.02) (1.34) (0.68) (1.10) (1.03) (1.10) (1.02) 
Wald χ2 1821.42 1768.21 1790.55 1763.69 1694.14 1820.48 2112.93 2112.16 2112.94 2112.51 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.3.8 FGLS Regression Results on FDI/GDP for Level Data with EI2  
FDI/POP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EI2 
-0.086 -0.096 -0.097 -0.087 -0.059 -0.055 -0.068 -0.075 -0.061 -0.066 
(-1.32) (-1.93)* (-1.96)** (-1.79) (-1.26) (-1.36) (-1.77)* (-1.90)* (-1.57) (-1.64) 
GRP per capita 
 0.043 0.041 0.039 0.023 0.016 0.027 0.028 0.026 0.027 
 (4.61)*** (4.33)*** (4.20)*** (2.17)** (1.67)* (2.06)** (2.18)** (1.97)** (2.04)** 
Wage 
  0.0091 -0.023 -0.025 -0.021 -0.0039 -0.0015 -0.0061 -0.0032 
  (1.07) (-1.03) (-1.08) (-0.95) (-0.14) (-0.06) (-0.22) (-0.12) 
Wage2 
   2.51e-06 3.03e-06 2.66e-06 2.44e-07 1.44e-08 5.29e-07 3.00e-07 
   (-1.51) (-1.80)* (-1.63) (0.11) (0.01) (0.24) (0.13) 
GIP 
    0.046 0.046 0.058 0.057 0.059 0.058 
    (3.41)*** (3.67)*** (4.85)*** (4.80)*** (4.91)*** (4.88)*** 
Pop. Density 
     0.38 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.44 
     (1.55) (1.77)* (1.76)* (1.74)* (1.73)* 
Rail Density 
      -0.63 -0.58 -0.64 -0.61 
      (-2.87)*** (-2.61)*** (-2.94)*** (-2.71)*** 
Road Density 
      0.010 0.012 0.010 0.011 
      (2.01)** (2.17)** (1.98)** (2.08)** 
Illiterate Rate 
       -0.91  -0.66 
       (-0.98)  (-0.69) 
Productivity 
        0.00015 0.00013 
        (1.01) (0.94) 
Constant 
606.85 92.27 52.56 170.49 284.45 67.30 215.57 167.54 240.50 197.09 
(19.18)*** (0.75) (0.41) (1.19) (1.91)* (0.29) (0.74) (0.57) (0.82) (0.67) 
Wald χ2 1626.06 2007.55 2073.35 1994.59 2230.49 2655.82 2974.92 2967.06 2975.91 2966.74 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.3.9 FGLS Regression Results on FDI/GDP for Level Data with EI3 
FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EI3 
-0.16 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 -0.13 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 
(-1.25) (-1.25) (-1.11) (-1.12) (-1.01) (-1.00) (-1.63) (-1.62) (-1.61) (-1.61) 
GRP per capita 
 0.0081 0.0076 0.014 0.0027 -0.0032 0.040 0.043 0.040 0.044 
 (0.75) (0.62) (0.95) (0.16) (-0.20) (1.90)* (2.00)** (1.90)* (2.03)** 
Wage 
  0.00025 0.044 0.041 0.044 0.078 0.078 0.083 0.082 
  (0.01) (1.10) (1.05) (1.10) (1.48) (1.47) (1.56) (1.54) 
Wage2 
   -2.63e-06 -2.10e-06 -2.31e-06 -8.32e-06 -8.41e-06 -8.53e-06 -8.64e-06 
   (-0.97) (-0.78) (-0.84) (-2.24)** (-2.26)** (-2.27)** (-2.30)** 
GIP 
    0.025 0.023 0.032 0.030 0.032 0.029 
    (1.19) (1.12) (1.62) (1.49) (1.59) (1.44) 
Pop. Density 
     0.20 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.16 
     (0.61) (0.53) (0.48) (0.53) (0.48) 
Rail Density 
      -1.34 -1.31 -1.34 -1.30 
      (-3.46)*** (-3.36)*** (-3.46)*** (-3.34)*** 
Road Density 
      0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 
      (2.71)*** (2.76)*** (2.71)*** (2.77)*** 
Illiterate Rate 
       -1.45  -1.61 
       (-0.71)  (-0.80) 
Productivity 
        0.000046 0.000015 
        (0.14) (0.04) 
Constant 
574.48 475.67 480.07 251.34 342.83 244.67 532.64 507.74 512.11 482.008 
(12.95)*** (3.49)*** (3.15)*** (1.05) (1.42) (0.71) (1.10) (1.05) (1.05) (0.99) 
Wald χ2 1782.78 1739.80 1768.59 1742.83 1691.10 1800.75 2144.50 2144.69 2149.51 2149.79 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.3.10 FGLS Regression Results on FDI/GDP for Level Data with EI3 
FDI/POP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EI3 
-0.088 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.072 -0.071 -0.085 -0.092 -0.078 -0.086 
(-0.94) (-1.67)* (-1.67)* (-1.55) (-1.09) (-1.29) (-1.25) (-1.33) (-1.12) (-1.20) 
GRP per capita 
 0.042 0.040 0.036 0.020 0.013 0.027 0.029 0.027 0.028 
 (4.48)*** (4.20)*** (3.98)*** (1.95)* (1.45) (2.05)** (2.17)** (2.06)** (2.15)** 
Wage 
  0.0094 -0.022 -0.026 -0.022 -0.0013 -0.00070 0.0017 0.0018 
  (1.08) (-0.97) (-1.12) (-1.00) (-0.05) (-0.02) (0.06) (0.06) 
Wage2 
   2.45e-06 3.13e-06 2.72e-06 1.76e-07 4.97e-08 1.11e-07 -6.67e-09 
   (1.44) (1.82) (1.64) (0.08) (0.02) (0.05) (-0.00) 
GIP 
    0.048 0.048 0.058 0.056 0.058 0.057 
    (3.61)*** (3.96)*** (4.91)*** (4.83)*** (4.93)*** (4.83)*** 
Pop. Density 
     0.38 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.43 
     (1.58) (1.68)* (1.66)* (1.66)* (1.65)* 
Rail Density 
      -0.57 -0.53 -0.59 -0.54 
      (-2.60)*** (-2.36)** (-2.66)*** (-2.40)** 
Road Density 
      0.011 0.012 0.011 0.012 
      (2.06)** (2.23)** (2.07)** (2.23)** 
Illiterate Rate 
       -1.07  -1.04 
       (-1.08)  (-1.03) 
Productivity 
        0.00011 0.000083 
        (0.77) (0.60) 
Constant 
602.80 107.48 68.73 188.38 314.97 98.18 163.66 124.69 154.04 117.51 
(19.04)*** (0.87) (0.54) (1.32) (2.13)** (0.42) (0.55) (0.42) (0.51) (0.39) 
Wald χ2 1599.17 2016.04 2089.63 1999.46 2296.55 2728.50 2865.43 2876.50 2872.31 2883.08 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included.
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Appendix 2.4 Hausman Specification Test  
For random effects estimator (GLS estimator) we assume that the error (
itε ) is uncorrelated 
with the independent variables ( itX ), i.e. 0)( =itit XE ε . In the case 0)( ≠itit XE ε  the 
GLS estimator GLSβˆ  becomes biased and inconsistent for β . However, the within 
estimator Withinβ
~
 is always unbiased and consistent for β  because the within 
transformation wipes out the individual effects. So we undertake the Hausman specification 
test to find out whether GLSβˆ is BLUE (best linear unbiased estimator), consistent and 
asymptotically efficient under the null hypothesis H0: 0)( =itit XE ε .  
The Hausman statistic is distributed as 2χ and is computed as  
)ˆ
~
()()'ˆ
~
( 1 GLSWithinGLSWithinGLSWithin VVH ββββ −−−=
−  
where 
Withinβ
~
 is the coefficient vector from the within estimator; 
GLSβˆ  is the coefficient vector from the GLS estimator; 
WithinV  is the covariance matrix of the coefficients from the within estimator; and 
GLSV  is the covariance matrix of the coefficients for the GLS estimator. 
If H0 is not rejected, there is no systematic difference between these two estimators, hence 
GLS estimator GLSβˆ  is efficient (Baltagi, 2005). We reject the GLS estimator only if the 
p-value is less than 0.05, which means in these cases, random effects specification is not 
appropriate. The results below show that GLS estimator produces efficient results in most 
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specifications except 2 cases for level data. Therefore, we also estimate equation (2.4.5) using 
GLS estimator (see results in Appendix 2.5).  
Table A2.4.1 Hausman Specification Test Results 
 
 
 
Levels  
EI1 Punish Charge EI2 EI3 
FDI/ 
GDP 
FDI/ 
POP 
FDI/ 
GDP 
FDI/ 
POP 
FDI/ 
GDP 
FDI/ 
POP 
FDI/ 
GDP 
FDI/ 
POP 
FDI/ 
GDP 
FDI/ 
POP 
2χ  Statistics 5.71 10.30 21.66  10.53 13.56 19.28 16.05 14.00 7.99 14.62 
p-value 0.839 0.415 0.006    0.395    0.094 0.037    0.098 0.233 0.630 0.201 
 
 
 
Logs  
EI1 Punish Charge EI2 EI3 
FDI/ 
GDP 
FDI/ 
POP 
FDI/ 
GDP 
FDI/ 
POP 
FDI/ 
GDP 
FDI/ 
POP 
FDI/ 
GDP 
FDI/ 
POP 
FDI/ 
GDP 
FDI/ 
POP 
2χ  Statistics 7.36 10.34 8.58 8.16  10.50 9.05  9.30 8.13 4.21 8.44 
p-value 0.920 0.737    0.857 0.881    0.725  0.828    0.811 0.882 0.994 0.865 
 
 
Appendix 2.5 Random Effects Regression Results  
The results of random effects regressions are reported in Tables A2.5.1-A2.5.20. The results 
of log specifications are consistent with those of our fixed effects results. The level 
specification results are mixed. However, the significant coefficients are robust and none of 
the unstable coefficients are statistically significant.   
The results of random effects models are comparatively weaker than FGLS estimator due to 
its failure in controlling for autocorrelation. It then leads us to just focus on the FGLS 
estimator results in the main text. 
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Table A2.5.1 Random Effects Estimation Results on FDI/GDP for Level Data with EI1 
FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EI1 
-0.082 -0.072 -0.072 -0.080 -0.073 -0.072 -0.061 -0.061 -0.064 -0.063 
(-2.00)** (-1.64)* (-1.65)* (-1.87)* (-1.73)* (-1.73)* (-1.36) (-1.34) (-1.37) (-1.35) 
GRP per capita 
 0.029 0.025 0.037 0.031 0.027 0.059 0.057 0.060 0.057 
 (3.99)*** (1.78)* (2.27)** (1.59) (1.41) (2.40)** (2.22)** (2.38)** (2.21)** 
Wage 
  0.012 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
  (0.33) (2.66)*** (2.72)*** (2.64)*** (3.37)*** (3.40)*** (3.37)*** (3.39)*** 
Wage2 
   -0.000013 -0.000012 -0.000012 -0.000017 -0.000016 -0.000017 -0.000016 
   (-2.58)*** (-2.54)** (-2.47)** (-3.34)*** (-3.22)*** (-3.33)*** (-3.21)*** 
GIP 
    0.023 0.023 0.0069 0.0054 0.0062 0.0046 
    (0.87) (0.84) (0.29) (0.22) (0.26) (0.19) 
Pop. Density 
     0.032 -0.068 -0.062 -0.065 -0.059 
     (0.26) (-0.51) (-0.46) (-0.48) (-0.44) 
Rail Density 
      -0.86 -0.91 -0.87 -0.92 
      (-1.96)** (-2.12)** (-1.95)* (-2.11)** 
Road Density 
      0.053 0.051 0.052 0.050 
      (1.74)* (1.68)* (1.70)* (1.64) 
Illiterate Rate 
       -4.40  -4.44 
       (-1.65)*  (-1.62) 
Productivity 
        -0.00019 -0.00021 
        (-0.41) (-0.47) 
Constant 
316.92 196.42 171.108 -364.54 -374.69 -368.31 -472.69 -373.17 -467.92 -366.71 
(5.06)*** (3.33)*** (1.85) (-1.97)** (-2.07)** (-1.98)** (-2.86)*** (-2.17)** (-2.76)*** (-2.09)** 
R2 0.015 0.41 0.41 0.50 0.56 0.55 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.5.2 Random Effects Estimation Results on FDI/POP for Level Data with EI1 
FDI/POP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EI1 
-0.085 -0.065 -0.064 -0.067 -0.062 -0.057 -0.052 -0.051 -0.054 -0.054 
(-2.70)*** (-2.11)** (-2.12)** (-2.24)** (-2.14)** (-2.05)** (-1.70)* (-1.70)* (-1.77)* (-1.77)* 
GRP per capita 
 0.066 0.058 0.061 0.054 0.041 0.054 0.053 0.055 0.054 
 (9.16)*** (6.69)*** (6.52)*** (4.64)*** (3.53)*** (3.34)*** (3.16)*** (3.34)*** (3.16)*** 
Wage 
  0.021 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.080 0.078 0.081 0.079 
  (1.04) (1.51) (1.55) (1.54) (1.75)* (1.72)* (1.75)* (1.72)* 
Wage2 
   -3.91e-06 -3.65e-06 -3.18e-06 -4.99e-06 -4.74e-06 -5.04e-06 -4.78e-06 
   (-1.05) (-0.97) (-0.84) (-1.36) (-1.29) (-1.37) (-1.30) 
GIP 
    0.023 0.023 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.012 
    (1.32) (1.38) (0.73) (0.70) (0.69) (0.65) 
Pop. Density 
     0.10 0.069 0.073 0.069 0.073 
     (1.36) (0.76) (0.79) (0.77) (0.79) 
Rail Density 
      -0.41 -0.43 -0.41 -0.43 
      (-1.36) (-1.44) (-1.34) (-1.42) 
Road Density 
      0.027 0.026 0.027 0.026 
      (1.34) (1.29) (1.31) (1.27) 
Illiterate Rate 
       -1.35  -1.39 
       (-0.82)  (-0.83) 
Productivity 
        -0.00023 -0.00024 
        (-0.82) (-0.78) 
Constant 
200.71 -69.18 -118.56 -272.52 -279.67 -271.59 -308.90 -277.08 -303.48 -270.32 
(3.67)*** (-2.00)** (-1.96)** (-2.12)** (-2.25)** (-2.15)** (-2.51)** (-2.19)** (-2.45)** (-2.12)** 
R2 0.017 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.5.3 Random Effects Estimation Results on FDI/GDP for Log Data with EI1 
FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EI1† 
-0.072 -0.064 -0.064 -0.076 -0.075 -0.077 -0.061 -0.060 -0.058 -0.057 
(-0.79) (-0.73) (-0.71) (-0.84) (-0.83) (-0.90) (-0.71) (-0.70) (-0.67) (-0.66) 
GRP per capita 
 1.50 1.49 1.57 1.39 1.29 1.49 1.52 1.46 1.50 
 (6.32)*** (4.46)*** (4.59)*** (3.05)*** (3.39)*** (4.12)*** (3.65)*** (3.97)*** (3.56)*** 
Wage 
  0.052 6.87 6.81 8.69 8.94 9.16 7.98 8.22 
  (0.06) (1.18) (1.18) (1.39) (1.50) (1.51) (1.30) (1.31) 
Wage2 
   -0.41 -0.40 -0.53 -0.57 -0.58 -0.51 -0.53 
   (-1.20) (-1.19) (-1.45) (-1.62) (-1.62) (-1.42) (-1.42) 
GIP 
    0.12 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 
    (0.54) (-0.99) (-1.15) (-1.13) (-1.10) (-1.08) 
Pop. Density 
     0.46 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 
     (2.73)*** (1.17) (1.16) (1.15) (1.14) 
Rail Density 
      -0.31 -0.29 -0.31 -0.29 
      (-2.60)*** (-2.40)** (-2.55)** (-2.34)** 
Road Density 
      0.51 0.51 0.53 0.52 
      (2.23)** (2.22)** (2.33)** (2.32)** 
Illiterate Rate 
       0.088  0.097 
       (0.33)  (0.37) 
Productivity 
        0.15 0.15 
        (0.63) (0.64) 
Constant 
5.488 -6.78 -7.08 -36.26 -35.76 -42.10 -44.80 -46.24 -42.02 -43.61 
(8.63)*** (-3.05)*** (-1.27) (-1.41) (-1.41) (-1.55) (-1.73)* (-1.75)* (-1.60) (-1.61) 
R2 0.011 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.66 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province 
and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.5.4 Random Effects Estimation Results on FDI/POP for Log Data with EI1 
FDI/POP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EI1† 
-0.070 -0.060 -0.060 -0.076 -0.075 -0.077 -0.061 -0.061 -0.059 -0.058 
(-0.76) (-0.68) (-0.67) (-0.84) (-0.84) (-0.89) (-0.72) (-0.71) (-0.68) (-0.67) 
GRP per capita 
 2.43 2.44 2.55 2.33 2.25 2.44 2.48 2.41 2.45 
 (9.97)*** (7.29)*** (7.48)*** (5.20)*** (5.97)*** (6.75)*** (5.92)*** (6.57)*** (5.83)*** 
Wage 
  -0.020 9.10 9.03 10.89 11.16 11.39 10.10 10.35 
  (-0.02) (1.62) (1.62) (1.81)* (1.94)* (1.95)* (1.70)* (1.70)* 
Wage2 
   -0.54 -0.53 -0.66 -0.70 -0.72 -0.64 -0.66 
   (-1.66)* (-1.65)* (-1.88)* (-2.07)** (-2.07)** (-1.83)* (-1.83)* 
GIP 
    0.15 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 
    (0.66) (-0.79) (-0.89) (-0.87) (-0.84) (-0.82) 
Pop. Density 
     0.44 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.25 
     (2.60)*** (1.06) (1.05) (1.03) (1.02) 
Rail Density 
      -0.29 -0.27 -0.28 -0.27 
      (-2.41)** (-2.20)** (-2.35)** (-2.13)** 
Road Density 
      0.51 0.50 0.52 0.52 
      (2.18)** (2.17)** (2.29)** (2.28)** 
Illiterate Rate 
       0.091  0.10 
       (0.34)  (0.39) 
Productivity 
        0.16 0.17 
        (0.71) (0.72) 
Constant 
4.46 -15.37 -15.27 -54.29 -53.71 -60.05 -62.88 -64.37 -59.78 -61.42 
(6.42)*** (-6.79)*** (-2.70)*** (-2.19)** (-2.20)** (-2.30)** (-2.52)** (-2.53)** (-2.36)** (-2.35)** 
R2 0.0051 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.81 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province 
and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.5.5 Random Effects Estimation Results on FDI/GDP for Level Data with Punish 
FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Punish 
0.014 0.013 0.014 0.0083 0.010 0.011 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.012 
(0.95) (0.91) (0.98) (0.63) (0.80) (0.90) (0.90) (0.80) (0.89) (0.79) 
GRP per capita 
 0.030 0.024 0.036 0.029 0.022 0.055 0.053 0.055 0.053 
 (4.11)*** (1.62) (2.13)** (1.42) (1.07) (2.10)** (1.97)** (2.06)** (1.94)* 
Wage 
  0.017 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
  (0.46) (2.64)*** (2.69)*** (2.60)*** (3.36)*** (3.38)*** (3.35)*** (3.36)*** 
Wage2 
   -0.000012 -0.000012 -0.000012 -0.000016 -0.000016 -0.000016 -0.000016 
   (-2.51)** (-2.46)** (-2.34)** (-3.22)*** (-3.10)*** (-3.19)*** (-3.08)*** 
GIP 
    0.025 0.025 0.0085 0.0070 0.0080 0.0065 
    (0.91) (0.89) (0.35) (0.28) (0.33) (0.26) 
Pop. Density 
     0.056 -0.050 -0.046 -0.046 -0.042 
     (0.44) (-0.37) (-0.33) (-0.33) (-0.30) 
Rail Density 
      -0.87 -0.92 -0.88 -0.93 
      (-1.94)* (-2.09)** (-1.94)* (-2.09)** 
Road Density 
      0.054 0.053 0.054 0.052 
      (1.74)* (1.68)* (1.70)* (1.64) 
Illiterate Rate 
       -4.34  -4.36 
       (-1.63)  (-1.62) 
Productivity 
        -0.000033 -0.000062 
        (-0.08) (-0.14) 
Constant 
292.24 170.45 133.69 -388.48 -398.20 -387.64 -496.07 -396.56 -493.99 -393.05 
(4.88)*** (3.18)*** (1.42) (-2.07)** (-2.16)** (-2.04)** (-2.99)*** (-2.31)** (-2.91)*** (-2.25)** 
R2 0.0009 0.40 0.41 0.50 0.55 0.55 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.5.6 Random Effects Estimation Results on FDI/POP for Level Data with Punish 
FDI/POP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Punish 
0.0026 -0.00022 0.0017 -0.00038 0.0016 0.0045 0.0066 0.0063 0.0065 0.0062 
(0.24) (-0.02) (0.17) (-0.04) (0.19) (0.53) (0.71) (0.66) (0.70) (0.65) 
GRP per capita 
 0.067 0.058 0.061 0.054 0.039 0.052 0.051 0.052 0.051 
 (9.41)*** (6.37)*** (6.25)*** (4.42)*** (3.11)*** (3.02)*** (2.87)*** (2.98)*** (2.84)*** 
Wage 
  0.023 0.075 0.075 0.074 0.080 0.077 0.080 0.077 
  (1.06) (1.48) (1.52) (1.50) (1.73)* (1.69)* (1.71)* (1.68)* 
Wage2 
   -3.78e-06 -3.46e-06 -2.87e-06 -4.77e-06 -4.52e-06 -4.77e-06 -4.51e-06 
   (-1.01) (-0.91) (-0.75) (-1.28) (-1.21) (-1.27) (-1.20) 
GIP 
    0.024 0.024 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.013 
    (1.36) (1.41) (0.77) (0.74) (0.75) (0.71) 
Pop. Density 
     0.116 0.080 0.083 0.082 0.085 
     (1.49) (0.86) (0.88) (0.86) (0.89) 
Rail Density 
      -0.42 -0.44 -0.43 -0.45 
      (-1.37) (-1.45) (-1.37) (-1.45) 
Road Density 
      0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 
      (1.35) (1.31) (1.33) (1.28) 
Illiterate Rate 
       -1.36  -1.41 
       (-0.80)  (-0.82) 
Productivity 
        -0.00011 -0.00012 
        (-0.39) (-0.39) 
Constant 
178.40 -88.59 -140.89 -288.67 -294.20 -284.19 -323.65 -290.67 -320.01 -285.60 
(3.38)*** (-2.87)*** (-2.33)** (-2.22)** (-2.34)** (-2.21)** (-2.61)*** (-2.30)** (-2.56)** (-2.24)** 
R2 0.0024 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.5.7 Random Effects Estimation Results on FDI/GDP for Log Data with Punish 
FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Punish† 
-0.083 -0.070 -0.070 -0.066 -0.066 -0.061 -0.058 -0.056 -0.053 -0.050 
(-1.21) (-1.05) (-1.04) (-0.98) (-0.97) (-0.92) (-0.87) (-0.83) (-0.80) (-0.76) 
GRP per capita 
 1.50 1.48 1.55 1.38 1.28 1.50 1.52 1.47 1.50 
 (6.17)*** (4.34)*** (4.38)*** (2.96)*** (3.31)*** (4.10)*** (3.67)*** (3.97)*** (3.59)*** 
Wage 
  0.039 5.65 5.60 7.43 7.99 8.15 7.17 7.37 
  (0.05) (0.90) (0.90) (1.13) (1.27) (1.28) (1.13) (1.14) 
Wage2 
   -0.33 -0.32 -0.46 -0.52 -0.52 -0.47 -0.48 
   (-0.92) (-0.91) (-1.18) (-1.40) (-1.41) (-1.26) (-1.27) 
GIP 
    0.12 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 
    (0.54) (-0.95) (-1.16) (-1.14) (-1.11) (-1.10) 
Pop. Density 
     0.46 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 
     (2.74)*** (1.18) (1.17) (1.16) (1.15) 
Rail Density 
      -0.32 -0.31 -0.32 -0.31 
      (-2.66)*** (-2.51)** (-2.61)*** (-2.44)** 
Road Density 
      0.52 0.51 0.53 0.53 
      (2.18)** (2.17)** (2.29)** (2.28)** 
Illiterate Rate 
       0.063  0.074 
       (0.23)  (0.28) 
Productivity 
        0.14 0.14 
        (0.61) (0.63) 
Constant 
5.54 -6.70 -6.92 -31.05 -30.57 -36.71 -40.65 -41.69 -38.39 -39.70 
(12.57)*** (-3.20)*** (-1.31) (-1.12) (-1.12) (-1.28) (-1.49) (-1.50) (-1.40) (-1.41) 
R2 0.023 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.65 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province 
and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.5.8 Random Effects Estimation Results on FDI/POP for Log Data with Punish 
FDI/POP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Punish† 
-0.083 -0.071 -0.071 -0.066 -0.065 -0.061 -0.058 -0.055 -0.051 -0.048 
(-1.17) (-1.06) (-1.05) (-0.97) (-0.96) (-0.91) (-0.86) (-0.82) (-0.79) (-0.73) 
GRP per capita 
 2.42 2.44 2.53 2.32 2.24 2.45 2.48 2.42 2.45 
 (9.78)*** (7.12)*** (7.20)*** (5.07)*** (5.86)*** (6.74)*** (5.99)*** (6.58)*** (5.91)*** 
Wage 
  -0.035 7.91 7.85 9.67 10.26 10.42 9.34 9.54 
  (-0.04) (1.30) (1.30) (1.51) (1.68)* (1.69)* (1.52) (1.52) 
Wage2 
   -0.47 -0.46 -0.59 -0.65 -0.66 -0.60 -0.61 
   (-1.34) (-1.33) (-1.59) (-1.82)* (-1.83)* (-1.66)* (-1.66) 
GIP 
    0.15 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 
    (0.66) (-0.77) (-0.91) (-0.89) (-0.87) (-0.84) 
Pop. Density 
     0.44 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.25 
     (2.61)*** (1.06) (1.05) (1.04) (1.03) 
Rail Density 
      -0.30 -0.29 -0.30 -0.29 
      (-2.49)** (-2.33)** (-2.43)** (-2.26)** 
Road Density 
      0.51 0.51 0.53 0.53 
      (2.16)** (2.14)** (2.27)** (2.26)** 
Illiterate Rate 
       0.065  0.078 
       (0.24)  (0.30) 
Productivity 
        0.15 0.16 
        (0.69) (0.71) 
Constant 
4.52 -15.25 -15.07 -49.21 -48.65 -54.81 -58.92 -59.98 -56.39 -57.74 
(9.20)*** (-7.14)*** (-2.83)*** (-1.83)* (-1.83)* (-1.97)** (-2.22)** (-2.23)** (-2.12)** (-2.12)** 
R2 0.019 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.81 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province 
and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.5.9 Random Effects Estimation Results on FDI/GDP for Level Data with Charge 
FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Charge 
0.011 -0.0076 -0.0078 0.0095 0.0088 0.0081 0.0070 0.0078 0.0072 0.0080 
(1.19) (-0.63) (-0.63) (0.63) (0.60) (0.54) (0.56) (0.60) (0.57) (0.61) 
GRP per capita 
 0.036 0.031 0.034 0.027 0.026 0.058 0.054 0.058 0.055 
 (2.99)*** (2.02)** (1.92)* (1.39) (1.34) (2.30)** (2.10)** (2.27)** (2.09)** 
Wage 
  0.015 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 
  (0.40) (2.71)*** (2.76)*** (2.67)*** (3.25)*** (3.31)*** (3.26)*** (3.31)*** 
Wage2 
   -0.000013 -0.000013 -0.000013 -0.000018 -0.000017 -0.000018 -0.000017 
   (-2.48)** (-2.42)** (-2.38)** (-3.13)*** (-3.07)*** (-3.13)*** (-3.07)*** 
GIP 
    0.025 0.026 0.0079 0.0064 0.0075 0.0060 
    (0.95) (0.98) (0.34) (0.27) (0.32) (0.25) 
Pop. Density 
     0.013 -0.084 -0.080 -0.081 -0.078 
     (0.11) (-0.65) (-0.62) (-0.62) (-0.60) 
Rail Density 
      -0.86 -0.91 -0.87 -0.91 
      (-1.96)** (-2.12)** (-1.96)** (-2.12)** 
Road Density 
      0.054 0.052 0.054 0.052 
      (1.82)* (1.76)* (1.79)* (1.73)* 
Illiterate Rate 
       -4.55  -4.57 
       (-1.71)*  (-1.70)* 
Productivity 
        -0.000067 -0.000096 
        (-0.16) (-0.21) 
Constant 
250.55 181.90 150.03 -439.78 -446.35 -441.15 -535.81 -438.58 -534.84 -436.22 
(3.40)*** (3.26)*** (1.69)* (-2.12)** (-2.19)** (-2.10)** (-2.86)*** (-2.37)** (-2.80)*** (-2.32)** 
R2 0.077 0.43 0.44 0.49 0.54 0.54 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.67 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.5.10 Random Effects Estimation Results on FDI/POP for Level Data with Charge 
FDI/POP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Charge 
0.033 0.00033 -0.00024 0.0059 0.0052 0.00054 0.0023 0.0027 0.0024 0.0028 
(2.39)** (0.03) (-0.02) (0.55) (0.51) (0.05) (0.23) (0.26) (0.24) (0.27) 
GRP per capita 
 0.066 0.059 0.058 0.052 0.040 0.053 0.052 0.053 0.052 
 (6.71)*** (5.66)*** (5.44)*** (4.22)*** (3.47)*** (3.24)*** (3.04)*** (3.23)*** (3.03)*** 
Wage 
  0.022 0.084 0.083 0.077 0.084 0.082 0.084 0.083 
  (1.05) (1.74)* (1.77)* (1.63) (1.87)* (1.86)* (1.88)* (1.87)* 
Wage2 
   -4.48e-06 -4.14e-06 -3.18e-06 -5.24e-06 -5.04e-06 -5.27e-06 -5.06e-06 
   (-1.23) (-1.11) (-0.84) (-1.40) (-1.36) (-1.41) (-1.36) 
GIP 
    0.024 0.024 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
    (1.36) (1.45) (0.77) (0.74) (0.75) (0.72) 
Pop. Density 
     0.11 0.065 0.067 0.065 0.067 
     (1.31) (0.70) (0.71) (0.69) (0.71) 
Rail Density 
      -0.41 -0.43 -0.41 -0.43 
      (-1.37) (-1.45) (-1.36) (-1.44) 
Road Density 
      0.028 0.028 0.028 0.027 
      (1.41) (1.36) (1.40) (1.35) 
Illiterate Rate 
       -1.38  -1.40 
       (-0.80)  (-0.82) 
Productivity 
        -0.00013 -0.00013 
        (-0.45) (-0.43) 
Constant 
40.41 -88.68 -139.11 -324.09 -325.69 -292.26 -339.11 -309.37 -336.96 -306.40 
(0.56) (-2.29)** (-2.31)** (-2.63)*** (-2.73)*** (-2.39)** (-2.86)*** (-2.65)*** (-2.81)*** (-2.60)*** 
R2 0.36 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.5.11 Random Effects Estimation Results on FDI/GDP for Log Data with Charge 
FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Charge† 
0.020 -0.16 -0.17 -0.13 -0.16 -0.28 -0.24 -0.24 -0.25 -0.25 
(0.10) (-0.93) (-0.94) (-0.71) (-0.80) (-1.50) (-1.23) (-1.23) (-1.25) (-1.26) 
GRP per capita 
 1.58 1.53 1.58 1.37 1.25 1.48 1.52 1.45 1.49 
 (6.28)*** (4.53)*** (4.54)*** (3.04)*** (3.51)*** (4.18)*** (3.76)*** (4.06)*** (3.68)*** 
Wage 
  0.14 5.09 4.84 5.98 6.40 6.65 5.29 5.56 
  (0.18) (0.83) (0.80) (0.93) (1.03) (1.06) (0.84) (0.86) 
Wage2 
   -0.29 -0.27 -0.36 -0.41 -0.43 -0.35 -0.37 
   (-0.83) (-0.78) (-0.95) (-1.13) (-1.15) (-0.93) (-0.96) 
GIP 
    0.15 -0.14 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 
    (0.64) (-0.88) (-1.10) (-1.07) (-1.04) (-1.02) 
Pop. Density 
     0.50 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.35 
     (3.15)*** (1.45) (1.43) (1.44) (1.43) 
Rail Density 
      -0.33 -0.31 -0.33 -0.31 
      (-2.83)*** (-2.61)*** (-2.78)*** (-2.54)** 
Road Density 
      0.47 0.47 0.49 0.49 
      (1.98)** (1.97)** (2.09)** (2.08)** 
Illiterate Rate 
       0.097  0.11 
       (0.38)  (0.42) 
Productivity 
        0.16 0.17 
        (0.76) (0.77) 
Constant 
4.93 -6.37 -7.14 -28.53 -27.05 -29.17 -32.82 -34.45 -29.46 -31.22 
(2.75)*** (-3.03)*** (-1.41) (-1.05) (-1.02) (-1.04) (-1.21) (-1.25) (-1.07) (-1.11) 
R2 0.011 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.68 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province 
and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.5.12 Random Effects Estimation Results on FDI/POP for Log Data with Charge 
FDI/POP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Charge† 
0.031 -0.18 -0.18 -0.13 -0.16 -0.28 -0.24 -0.24 -0.25 -0.25 
(0.13) (-1.00) (-0.99) (-0.67) (-0.79) (-1.46) (-1.19) (-1.19) (-1.21) (-1.22) 
GRP per capita 
 2.51 2.49 2.56 2.31 2.22 2.43 2.47 2.39 2.44 
 (9.83)*** (7.36)*** (7.39)*** (5.22)*** (6.26)*** (6.91)*** (6.14)*** (6.76)*** (6.08)*** 
Wage 
  0.074 7.34 7.05 8.15 8.64 8.90 7.42 7.69 
  (0.09) (1.23) (1.21) (1.32) (1.43) (1.46) (1.21) (1.23) 
Wage2 
   -0.43 -0.41 -0.49 -0.55 -0.56 -0.48 -0.49 
   (-1.25) (-1.20) (-1.36) (-1.54) (-1.57) (-1.31) (-1.33) 
GIP 
    0.1 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 
    (0.75) (-0.69) (-0.85) (-0.82) (-0.80) (-0.77) 
Pop. Density 
     0.48 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.33 
     (3.01)*** (1.33) (1.32) (1.32) (1.30) 
Rail Density 
      -0.31 -0.29 -0.31 -0.29 
      (-2.65)*** (-2.43)** (-2.60)*** (-2.36)** 
Road Density 
      0.47 0.46 0.49 0.48 
      (1.94)* (1.93)* (2.05)** (2.04)** 
Illiterate Rate 
       0.10  0.11 
       (0.39)  (0.44) 
Productivity 
        0.18 0.19 
        (0.84) (0.85) 
Constant 
3.83 -14.86 -15.26 -46.68 -44.94 -47.22 -50.98 -52.66 -47.26 -49.09 
(1.87)* (-7.00)*** (-2.99)*** (-1.76)* (-1.75)* (-1.74)* (-1.93)* (-1.96)** (-1.76)* (-1.79)* 
R2 0.011 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.82 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province 
and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.5.13 Random Effects Estimation Results on FDI/GDP for Level Data with EI2 
FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EI2 
-0.34 -0.31 -0.30 -0.35 -0.34 -0.34 -0.26 -0.25 -0.27 -0.26 
(-1.76)* (-1.50) (-1.49) (-1.80)* (-1.81)* (-1.81)* (-1.24) (-1.20) (-1.23) (-1.21) 
GRP per capita 
 0.030 0.027 0.040 0.033 0.030 0.060 0.057 0.060 0.058 
 (4.06)*** (1.96)** (2.43)** (1.71)* (1.64)* (2.46)** (2.27)** (2.44)** (2.27)** 
Wage 
  0.0072 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.20 
  (0.20) (2.64)*** (2.72)*** (2.66)*** (3.33)*** (3.36)*** (3.33)*** (3.35)*** 
Wage2 
   -0.000013 -0.000013 -0.000012 -0.000017 -0.000016 -0.000017 -0.000016 
   (-2.60)*** (-2.56)** (-2.52)** (-3.33)*** (-3.21)*** (-3.32)*** (-3.20)*** 
GIP 
    0.026 0.025 0.0083 0.0067 0.0075 0.0058 
    (1.00) (0.96) (0.35) (0.27) (0.31) (0.24) 
Pop. Density 
     0.023 -0.068 -0.061 -0.066 -0.059 
     (0.19) (-0.51) (-0.46) (-0.49) (-0.44) 
Rail Density 
      -0.84 -0.89 -0.85 -0.90 
      (-1.89)* (-2.05)** (-1.88)* (-2.04)** 
Road Density 
      0.052 0.051 0.052 0.050 
      (1.73)* (1.67)* (1.70)* (1.63) 
Illiterate Rate 
       -4.32  -4.36 
       (-1.64)  (-1.61) 
Productivity 
        -0.00021 -0.00023 
        (-0.46) (-0.51) 
Constant 
320.09 198.44 183.26 -354.97 -366.78 -361.95 -464.45 -367.22 -458.92 -360.04 
(4.97)*** (3.26)*** (1.92)* (1.94)* (-2.06)** (-1.98)** (-2.80)*** (-2.12)** (-2.69)*** (-2.03)** 
R2 0.0095 0.41 0.41 0.51 0.57 0.56 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.5.14 Random Effects Estimation Results on FDI/POP for Level Data with EI2 
FDI/POP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EI2 
-0.33 -0.26 -0.25 -0.27 -0.26 -0.25 -0.20 -0.20 -0.21 -0.21 
(-2.16)** (-1.84)* (-1.77)* (-1.92)* (-2.08)** (-2.01)** (-1.41) (-1.41) (-1.47) (-1.46) 
GRP per capita 
 0.066 0.060 0.062 0.055 0.043 0.055 0.054 0.055 0.054 
 (9.32)*** (6.85)*** (6.59)*** (4.77)*** (3.73)*** (3.39)*** (3.21)*** (3.40)*** (3.22)*** 
Wage 
  0.018 0.073 0.074 0.073 0.078 0.076 0.078 0.076 
  (0.85) (1.45) (1.52) (1.51) (1.70)* (1.67)* (1.70)* (1.67)* 
Wage2 
   -3.97e-06 -3.74e-06 -3.28e-06 -4.97e-06 -4.73e-06 -5.02e-06 -4.77e-06 
   (-1.06) (-0.99) (-0.87) (-1.35) (-1.28) (-1.35) (-1.29) 
GIP 
    0.024 0.024 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.013 
    (1.39) (1.44) (0.78) (0.74) (0.74) (0.71) 
Pop. Density 
     0.10 0.070 0.074 0.071 0.074 
     (1.36) (0.78) (0.80) (0.78) (0.81) 
Rail Density 
      -0.40 -0.42 -0.39 -0.41 
      (-1.29) (-1.37) (-1.27) (-1.35) 
Road Density 
      0.027 0.026 0.026 0.026 
      (1.31) (1.27) (1.29) (1.24) 
Illiterate Rate 
       -1.29  -1.33 
       (-0.80)  (-0.81) 
Productivity 
        -0.00024 -0.00024 
        (-0.86) (-0.82) 
Constant 
202.72 -68.55 -110.15 -265.76 -273.23 -265.88 -303.33 -272.94 -297.37 -265.72 
(3.58)*** (-1.96)** (-1.76)* (-2.06)** (-2.20)** (-2.11)** (-2.44)** (-2.14)** (-2.38)** (-2.06)** 
R2 0.0057 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.5.15 Random Effects Estimation Results on FDI/GDP for Log Data with EI2 
FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EI2† 
-0.062 -0.063 -0.063 -0.075 -0.082 -0.10 -0.070 -0.069 -0.067 -0.065 
(-0.65) (-0.67) (-0.64) (-0.75) (-0.87) (-1.14) (-0.80) (-0.79) (-0.75) (-0.74) 
GRP per capita 
 1.51 1.50 1.59 1.38 1.28 1.47 1.51 1.45 1.49 
 (6.49)*** (4.50)*** (4.59)*** (3.10)*** (3.49)*** (4.19)*** (3.70)*** (4.05)*** (3.61)*** 
Wage 
  0.016 6.79 6.82 8.96 8.97 9.16 8.032 8.23 
  (0.02) (1.16) (1.17) (1.43) (1.50) (1.51) (1.31) (1.31) 
Wage2 
   -0.40 -0.40 -0.55 -0.57 -0.58 -0.52 -0.53 
   (-1.19) (-1.19) (-1.50) (-1.62) (-1.62) (-1.43) (-1.43) 
GIP 
    0.14 -0.14 -0.15 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 
    (0.68) (-0.89) (-1.06) (-1.04) (-1.02) (-1.00) 
Pop. Density 
     0.46 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 
     (2.83)*** (1.16) (1.15) (1.15) (1.14) 
Rail Density 
      -0.29 -0.28 -0.29 -0.28 
      (-2.44)** (-2.23)** (-2.40)** (-2.18)** 
Road Density 
      0.51 0.50 0.53 0.52 
      (2.22)** (2.21)** (2.32)** (2.31)** 
Illiterate Rate 
       0.085  0.094 
       (0.32)  (0.36) 
Productivity 
        0.14 0.15 
        (0.62) (0.64) 
Constant 
5.36 -6.92 -7.01 -36.01 -35.78 -43.13 -44.97 -46.26 -42.23 -43.65 
(9.82)*** (-3.27)*** (-1.25) (-1.40) (-1.40) (-1.58) (-1.73)* (-1.74)* (-1.61) (-1.61) 
R2 0.0069 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province 
and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.5.16 Random Effects Estimation Results on FDI/POP for Log Data with EI2 
FDI/POP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EI2† 
-0.063 -0.059 -0.059 -0.075 -0.084 -0.10 -0.074 -0.072 -0.070 -0.068 
(-0.65) (-0.62) (-0.60) (-0.76) (-0.89) (-1.16) (-0.84) (-0.82) (-0.79) (-0.77) 
GRP per capita 
 2.44 2.46 2.57 2.33 2.25 2.42 2.46 2.39 2.43 
 (10.20)*** (7.31)*** (7.46)*** (5.30)*** (6.15)*** (6.90)*** (6.03)*** (6.72)*** (5.94)*** 
Wage 
  -0.055 9.02 9.06 11.16 11.22 11.41 10.17 10.38 
  (-0.06) (1.59) (1.62) (1.86)* (1.95)* (1.95)* (1.72)* (1.71)* 
Wage2 
   -0.54 -0.54 -0.68 -0.71 -0.72 -0.65 -0.66 
   (-1.64) (-1.65)* (-1.94)* (-2.08)** (-2.08)** (-1.85)* (-1.83)* 
GIP 
    0.17 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 
    (0.80) (-0.70) (-0.80) (-0.78) (-0.76) (-0.73) 
Pop. Density 
     0.45 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.25 
     (2.69)*** (1.05) (1.04) (1.03) (1.02) 
Rail Density 
      -0.27 -0.26 -0.27 -0.26 
      (-2.25)** (-2.03)** (-2.19)** (-1.98)** 
Road Density 
      0.50 0.50 0.52 0.52 
      (2.17)** (2.16)** (2.28)** (2.27)** 
Illiterate Rate 
       0.088  0.098 
       (0.33)  (0.37) 
Productivity 
        0.16 0.17 
        (0.70) (0.72) 
Constant 
4.34 -15.50 -15.20 -54.06 -53.82 -61.12 -63.12 -64.46 -60.06 -61.54 
(7.22)*** (-7.18)*** (-2.69)*** (-2.17)** (-2.19)** (-2.34)** (-2.52)** (-2.53)** (-2.37)** (-2.35)** 
R2 0.0012 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.82 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province 
and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.5.17 Random Effects Estimation Results on FDI/GDP for Level Data with EI3 
FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EI3 
-0.45 -0.40 -0.39 -0.52 -0.50 -0.49 -0.38 -0.37 -0.39 -0.39 
(-1.54) (-1.26) (-1.25) (-1.73)* (-1.73)* (-1.72)* (-1.26) (-1.24) (-1.25) (-1.25) 
GRP per capita 
 0.030 0.027 0.040 0.032 0.029 0.060 0.057 0.060 0.057 
 (4.09)*** (1.96)** (2.41)** (1.67)* (1.58) (2.41)** (2.24)** (2.39)** (2.23)** 
Wage 
  0.0083 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.20 
  (0.23) (2.64)*** (2.70)*** (2.63)*** (3.31)*** (3.34)*** (3.31)*** (3.33)*** 
Wage2 
   -0.000013 -0.000013 -0.000012 -0.000017 -0.000016 -0.000017 -0.000016 
   (-2.59)*** (-2.54)** (-2.49)** (-3.31)*** (-3.19)*** (-3.29)*** (-3.18)*** 
GIP 
    0.025 0.025 0.0076 0.0061 0.0068 0.0053 
    (0.95) (0.92) (0.32) (0.25) (0.28) (0.22) 
Pop. Density 
     0.025 -0.066 -0.061 -0.063 -0.059 
     (0.21) (-0.50) (-0.45) (-0.47) (-0.43) 
Rail Density 
      -0.85 -0.90 -0.86 -0.90 
      (-1.90)* (-2.05)** (-1.89)* (-2.04)** 
Road Density 
      0.052 0.050 0.051 0.050 
      (1.72)* (1.66)* (1.68)* (1.62) 
Illiterate Rate 
       -4.41  -4.45 
       (-1.65)*  (-1.63) 
Productivity 
        -0.00019 -0.00021 
        (-0.41) (0.47) 
Constant 
314.98 191.56 174.02 -359.16 -368.17 -363.08 -465.89 -366.31 -460.83 -359.50 
(5.07)*** (3.21)*** (1.84)* (-1.95)* (-2.04)** (-1.97)** (-2.78)*** (-2.09)** (-2.67)*** (-2.01)** 
R2 0.028 0.42 0.42 0.51 0.57 0.57 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.5.18 Random Effects Estimation Results on FDI/POP for Level Data with EI3 
FDI/POP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EI3 
-0.43 -0.30 -0.27 -0.31 -0.29 -0.25 -0.18 -0.17 -0.19 -0.19 
(-1.78)* (-1.32) (-1.25) (-1.44) (-1.44) (-1.30) (-0.83) (-0.83) (-0.89) (-0.89) 
GRP per capita 
 0.066 0.059 0.062 0.055 0.042 0.054 0.053 0.054 0.054 
 (9.28)*** (6.79)*** (6.59)*** (4.68)*** (3.55)*** (3.32)*** (3.13)*** (3.31)*** (3.13)*** 
Wage 
  0.020 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.078 0.076 0.079 0.077 
  (0.95) (1.47) (1.50) (1.49) (1.71)* (1.68)* (1.70)* (1.67)* 
Wage2 
   -3.93e-06 -3.64e-06 -3.15e-06 -4.93e-06 -4.68e-06 -4.96e-06 -4.70e-06 
   (-1.05) (-0.96) (-0.83) (-1.33) (-1.27) (-1.33) (-1.27) 
GIP 
    0.023 0.024 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
    (1.35) (1.40) (0.76) (0.73) (0.73) (0.69) 
Pop. Density 
     0.11 0.072 0.075 0.073 0.076 
     (1.37) (0.79) (0.81) (0.79) (0.82) 
Rail Density 
      -0.41 -0.43 -0.41 -0.43 
      (-1.32) (-1.39) (-1.30) (-1.38) 
Road Density 
      0.027 0.027 0.027 0.026 
      (1.32) (1.28) (1.30) (1.26) 
Illiterate Rate 
       -1.37  -1.41 
       (-0.82)  (-0.84) 
Productivity 
        -0.00019 -0.00019 
        (-0.66) (-0.63) 
Constant 
197.17 -74.24 -120.01 -272.53 -278.59 -270.87 -311.00 -278.60 -305.80 -272.39 
(3.58)*** (2.15)** (1.97)** (2.11)** (2.22)** (2.12)** (2.49)** (2.17)** (2.43)** (2.10)** 
R2 0.019 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.5.19 Random Effects Estimation Results on FDI/GDP for Log Data with EI3 
FDI/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EI3† 
-0.069 -0.062 -0.062 -0.082 -0.086 -0.10 -0.070 -0.067 -0.066 -0.064 
(-0.70) (-0.65) (-0.63) (-0.80) (-0.88) (-1.10) (-0.76) (-0.74) (-0.72) (-0.70) 
GRP per capita 
 1.50 1.49 1.58 1.38 1.28 1.47 1.50 1.44 1.48 
 (6.45)*** (4.60)*** (4.70)*** (3.14)*** (3.49)*** (4.20)*** (3.71)*** (4.06)*** (3.62)*** 
Wage 
  0.014 7.30 7.31 9.43 9.29 9.45 8.32 8.50 
  (0.02) (1.22) (1.23) (1.48) (1.53) (1.53) (1.33) (1.33)  
Wage2 
   -0.43 -0.43 -0.57 -0.59 -0.60 -0.53 -0.55 
   (-1.24) (-1.23) (-1.54) (-1.64)* (-1.64) (-1.44) (-1.43) 
GIP 
    0.14 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 
    (0.65) (-0.94) (-1.09) (-1.07) (-1.04) (-1.02) 
Pop. Density 
     0.46 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.27 
     (2.78)*** (1.12) (1.11) (1.10) (1.09) 
Rail Density 
      -0.29 -0.28 -0.29 -0.27 
      (-2.37)** (-2.16)** (-2.32)** (-2.12)** 
Road Density 
      0.51 0.51 0.53 0.52 
      (2.24)** (2.22)** (2.34)** (2.33)** 
Illiterate Rate 
       0.081  0.091 
       (0.31)  (0.35) 
Productivity 
        0.15 0.15 
        (0.63) (0.65) 
Constant 
5.35 -6.85 -6.93 -38.07 -37.81 -45.15 -46.32 -47.50 -43.49 -44.80 
(10.73)*** (-3.25)*** (-1.27) (-1.46) (-1.46) (-1.64) (-1.77)* (-1.77)* (-1.63) (-1.62) 
R2 0.021 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province 
and time dummies are included. 
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Table A2.5.20 Random Effects Estimation Results on FDI/POP for Log Data with EI3 
FDI/POP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EI3† 
-0.065 -0.056 -0.056 -0.082 -0.087 -0.10 -0.073 -0.071 -0.070 -0.067 
(-0.65) (-0.58) (-0.57) (-0.81) (-0.89) (-1.11) (-0.79) (-0.78) (-0.75) (-0.73) 
GRP per capita 
 2.43 2.44 2.56 2.32 2.25 2.42 2.45 2.39 2.43 
 (10.17)*** (7.51)*** (7.65)*** (5.37)*** (6.15)*** (6.92)*** (6.06)*** (6.74)*** (5.96)*** 
Wage 
  -0.058 9.54 9.56 11.64 11.55 11.72 10.48 10.66 
  (-0.07) (1.65)* (1.67)* (1.90)* (1.97)** (1.97)** (1.73)* (1.72)* 
Wage2 
   -0.57 -0.57 -0.71 -0.72 -0.74 -0.66 -0.68 
   (-1.69)* (-1.69)* (-1.97)** (-2.09)** (-2.08)** (-1.85)* (-1.83)* 
GIP 
    0.16 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 
    (0.77) (-0.74) (-0.83) (-0.80) (-0.78) (-0.76) 
Pop. Density 
     0.44 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.24 
     (2.65)*** (1.01) (1.00) (0.99) (0.98) 
Rail Density 
      -0.26 -0.25 -0.26 -0.25 
      (-2.17)** (-1.96)** (-2.12)** (-1.91)* 
Road Density 
      0.50 0.50 0.52 0.52 
      (2.19)** (2.17)** (2.30)** (2.29)** 
Illiterate Rate 
       0.084  0.095 
       (0.32)  (0.36) 
Productivity 
        0.16 0.17 
        (0.71) (0.72) 
Constant 
4.31 -15.45 -15.14 -56.15 -55.88 -63.15 -64.56 -65.77 -61.40 -62.75 
(7.74)*** (-7.19)*** (-2.74)*** (-2.22)** (-2.24)** (-2.38)** (-2.55)** (-2.54)** (-2.38)** (-2.35)** 
R2 0.011 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.82 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province 
and time dummies are included.
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CHAPTER THREE 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS, 
CORRUPTION, GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY 
AND FDI LOCATION IN CHINA:  
A PROVINCE-LEVEL ANALYSIS 
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3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter two, we investigate whether there is an intra-country pollution haven effect in 
China using provincial data from 1999 to 2003. We employed three measures of 
environmental regulations and find that, ceteris paribus, FDI is attracted by relatively weak 
environmental standards, that is, a pollution haven effect exists within China.  
The traditional determinants of FDI are all included, such as income level, labour costs, 
labour quality, infrastructure, and agglomeration effect. We find that income, labour cost, 
road density, and education level are important to foreign investors when making the 
location choice decision.  
Corruption level and government quality may also play important roles in attracting the 
FDI inflows in China. These government characteristics are usually omitted in the majority 
of previous FDI literature, especially in intra-country FDI location choice studies, due to 
the unavailability of data. Therefore, in chapter two we treat these government 
characteristics as unobservable and use panel data estimation methods to control for the 
unobserved heterogeneities. Due to the lack of data, we construct two indices to measure 
the government effort in fighting against corruption and government quality using 
complicated methodologies and comprehensive available data. In this chapter, we extend 
the model in Chapter two and revisit the intra-country pollution haven hypothesis issue in 
China by allowing provincial government anti-corruption effort and governance quality to 
have impacts on FDI inflows.  
From the 1990s, the disparity in international investment location leads some studies to 
examine the structural determinants of FDI inflows. Except the studies that explore the 
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effect of environmental regulations, another line of research examines the impact of 
corruption on cross-country pattern of FDI, such as Wheeler and Mody (1992), Hines 
(1995) and Wei (2000). These studies employ cross-country perception based corruption 
index in FDI location decision models assuming that corruption has a negative effect on 
FDI into a country. Additionally, some researchers examine the role of governance in 
foreign capital flows, such as Globerman and Shapiro (2002, 2003) and Globerman et al. 
(2006), suggesting that investment in governance infrastructure helps to attract foreign 
investment.   
A deficiency in empirical studies that examine the effect of environmental regulations is 
that government corruption and/or governance are rarely modelled. An exception is 
Smarzynska-Javorcik and Wei (2005), which take into account corruption in a host country 
as a possible deterrent of FDI when examining the inter-country pollution haven effects in 
24 transition economies.  
A deficiency in empirical studies focusing on corruption or governance is that most of 
them examine whether differences in corruption and/or governance across countries have 
an impact on FDI inflows, but few of them consider the difference in corruption within a 
country. A recent paper, Kao et al. (2005) investigate the relationship between 
inter-province governance efficiency and FDI in China and find that, after controlling 
other variables, FDI is attracted to provinces with more effective governments.  
Within the existing literature, only Fredriksson et al. (2003) investigate the impacts of 
inter-state environmental regulations and corruption on inbound US FDI. They use the 
normalised number of convictions of public officials to measure bureaucratic corruption of 
each state in their empirical model. However, so far no study has considered whether the 
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differences in inter-province environmental regulations, government corruption and/or 
governance have an impact on FDI location choice in China.  
In this chapter, we include the impacts of provincial corruption and governance quality on 
FDI inflows. The lack of an obvious index of provincial government corruption meant we 
had to develop our own measure of corruption similar to that of Fredriksson et al. (2003). 
In China, the procuratorates only report the number of registered cases under their direct 
investigation which could be used to proxy provincial corruption. However, corruption is 
much more serious in China than in the US so that this measure, to a higher degree, is 
appropriate to proxy the extent to which provincial governments fight corruption. 
Therefore, we modify our objective to find out whether there are intra-country pollution 
havens in China by allowing provincial control for corruption and governance quality to 
influence FDI inflows.  
We use the normalised number of registered cases related to corruption and dereliction of 
duty under the direct investigation of procuratorates to proxy the provincial control of 
corruption. Following the methodology in two papers, Tang and Tang (2004a and 2004b), 
we construct a government efficiency index to measure provincial governance quality.  
Following Chapter two, we employ three measures of environmental stringency (EI1, 
Punish and Charge) and include all the other control variables to capture the provincial 
income level, labour costs and quality, infrastructure, agglomeration, and population 
density, which are known determinants of FDI inflows.  
Consistent with the results in Chapter two, we find evidence to support the existence of an 
intra-country pollution haven effect in China. Additionally, the results suggest the foreign 
investment prefers to locate into regions where the government has made more effort to 
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fight corruption. The results also indicate that foreign investment is attracted to provinces 
where the local government is more efficient. 
In this chapter, section 3.2 presents the measurements of corruption and the previous 
literature on corruption/governance and FDI. Section 3.3 describes the corruption 
problem and anti-corruption performance in China. Section 3.4 provides the methodology 
and the construction processes of anti-corruption measurement and government efficiency 
index. Section 3.5 reports our main results and the final section concludes.  
 
3.2 Literature on Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment 
Modelling FDI is complicated because so many explanatory variables impact on it. Among 
these determinants, one factor that has recently attracted more attention by researchers is 
corruption in the host countries. Wei (2000) argues that the “popular press and policy 
circles seem to believe that corruption does reduce inward FDI, as suggested by the 
opening quote from James D. Wolfensohn”, ninth president of the World Bank.34  
‘‘We need to deal with the cancer of corruption… We can give advice, 
encouragement, and support to governments that wish to fight corruption – 
and it is these governments that, over time, will attract the larger volume of 
investment.’’(Emphasis added). 
James D. Wolfensohn35  
                                                
34 Wei (2000), pp.1.  
35 Wei (2000), pp.1, cited in Transition, 7(9-10), pp. 9, Sep. /Oct., 1996.  
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However, corruption does not always seem to deter FDI. Some countries, for example, 
China, Indonesia and Thailand, attract a large amount of FDI in spite of their perceived 
high levels of corruption and motivate empirical studies focusing on cross-country analysis. 
Studies in the 1990s have not found a consistent negative correlation between corruption 
and FDI (e.g. Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Hines, 1995). However, some recent analyses have 
reported a statistically significant negative impact of corruption on FDI (e.g. Wei, 2000; 
Smarzynska and Wei, 2000).  
This section is organised as follows. It starts with a brief review of the definition of 
corruption and the measurement of corruption. It then describes the relationship between 
corruption and governance before laying out the empirical evidence on 
corruption/governance and FDI and evidence on the pollution haven hypothesis allowing 
for the impact of corruption on FDI inflows. 
3.2.1 What Is Corruption? 
Svensson (2005) adopts the common definition that corruption is “the misuse of public 
office for private gains”. This is legalistic definition because misuse involves legal norms. 
Some other authors, however, for example, He (2000), employ the definition that 
corruption is “the use of public power and public resources for private interests”. This is a 
strict definition as it includes all behaviour utilising public power for private benefits.  
In this paper, we prefer the former definition, which captures bribes, sale of government 
property, embezzlement of government funds, abuse of public power, etc.  
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3.2.2 Measurements of Corruption 
Picci (2005) defines three types of corruption assessment: judicial assessment, societal 
assessment and corruption indices. Since the extent to which corruption crimes are 
successfully prosecuted by the judiciary depends on many factors, judicial data are rarely 
used. Social assessment “may follow personal experience, hearsay or the observation of 
indirect effects of corruption. … Such a social assessment of corruption is facilitated by the 
presence of a free press, that processes and gives visibility to information that individual 
citizens would otherwise obtain with difficulty, particularly regarding grand corruption 
cases.” 36  Corruption indices are the summary of some phenomena correlated with 
corruption, such as public honesty or measures of the quality of governance. Most 
corruption indices are subjective, being based on the perception of the phenomena. They 
are created through questionnaires, surveys, interviews, or data analysis.  
Kaufmann et al. (2006) outline three broad ways to measure corruption:  
1) By gathering the informed views of relevant stakeholders. These include surveys of 
firms, public officials and individuals, and views of outside observers in 
non-governmental organisations, multilateral donors, and the private sector.  
These are the only available data currently used for large scale cross-country 
comparisons and monitoring of corruption over time.  
2) By tracking countries’ institutional features. This provides information on 
opportunities and/or incentives for corruption, such as procurement practices and 
budget transparency. They do not measure actual corruption but indicate the 
                                                
36 Picci (2005), pp.3. 
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possibility of corruption. These are not developed for large scale countries and yet 
have no time dimension. 
3) By careful audits of specific projects. These provide information about malfeasance 
in specific projects but not about country-wide corruption and tend to be one-off. 
They are not suitable for cross-country comparison or monitoring over time.  
Survey-based corruption indices are therefore well developed and widely used in 
cross-country analyses. Well known indices include Transparency International’s (TI) 
Corruption Perception Index, The World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index, 
International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) index of the Political Risk Services Inc., the 
corruption index in the World Competitiveness Yearbook of the Institute for Management 
Development (IMD), and the corruption index in the Global Competitiveness Report of 
the World Economic Forum. The TI and ICRG indices are the most widely applied in 
cross-country studies of FDI and corruption. 
Golden and Picci (2005) discuss the weaknesses of these survey-based measures. The main 
concern is that the real degree of reliability of the survey information is unknown. For 
example, respondents involved in corrupt activity may underreport their involvement, 
while those not involved lack accurate information. TI attempts to solve this problem by 
aggregating information from multiple surveys, but such aggregation effort may be less 
successful.37  There is also a concern that the reliability of a corruption index may 
deteriorate over time. There is a danger that the survey respondents report what they 
believe based on the highly publicised results of the most recent corruption index, rather 
                                                
37 Golden and Picci (2005) argue that for countries where the information from all surveys are available, the 
scoring is likely to be more reliable than the countries scored on the basis minimum number of available 
surveys. It also generates systematic biases in the dataset, making the index more reliable for developed 
countries than for less developed countries.  
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than the “real” corruption exists. The measures may well become endogenous to the index 
itself.   
As a result of their concerns, Golden and Picci (2005) develop an objective measure of 
corruption for Italian regions for the mid-1990s which compared the difference between a 
measure of the total amount of investment in infrastructure over time and a measure of the 
physical quantity of public infrastructure, for example, km of roads and railways, the 
number and size of public buildings, etc. Regions with large differences between these two 
measures suggest that money has been siphoned off due to mismanagement, fraud, bribes, 
kickbacks, and embezzlement, and hence are perceived as having a higher corruption level. 
However, this measurement is based on the assumption that the regional corruption levels 
are unlikely to demonstrate much year-to-year variation. This is similar to Kaufmann et al. 
(2006) measurement of corruption by audit. 
Within the limited intra-country corruption literature, Fridriksson et al. (2003) use the 
number of convictions of public officials per 1000 public employees as a measure of 
corruption for US states, known as “judicial assessment” in Picci (2005). 
However, no measure of corruption can be 100% reliable. Kaufmann et al. (2006) argue 
that all efforts to measure corruption using any kind of data (subjective or objective) 
involve an irreducible element of uncertainty. There is always imprecision in specific 
measures and specific measures of corruption are imperfectly related to overall corruption.  
3.2.3 Governance and Corruption  
Corruption cannot be considered in isolation. The quality of government is strongly 
correlated with levels of corruption. The World Bank states: “bad governance is associated 
 141
with corruption, distortion of government budgets, in equitable growth, social exclusion, 
lack of trust in authorities.”38 
Picci (2005) discusses the relationship between corruption, governance efficiency and 
effectiveness. Picci (2005) argues that corruption may cause inefficiency, because a corrupt 
official aims to extract a valuable rent, for example, from a project, and hence is interested 
in keeping this project running for a long period, resulting in the efficiency of the 
bureaucracy being reduced. This inefficiency may then lead to further corruption. In terms 
of the relationship between corruption and effectiveness, a corrupt official may be tempted 
to spend more on public projects which are easier to extract unlawful rents. Examples are 
“white elephant” projects.  
However, Aidt (2003) analyses the existence of a category of corruption – efficient 
corruption, based on second-best reasoning. The notion is that given the unavoidable 
distortions created by various government procedures or policies, corruption can promote 
allocative efficiency by allowing agents to circumvent these procedures or polices. 
Corruption enhances allocative efficiency through two channels: 1) corruption speeds up 
bureaucratic procedures and 2) corruption causes competition for government resources 
which result in more efficient services. However, this argument is based on a number of 
problematic assumptions and the most fundamental weakness is the assumption that the 
government failure that corruption attempts to correct is exogenous when such failure in 
itself is unrelated and may well have been put in place and maintained by the corrupt 
official in the first place. 
                                                
38 World Bank, Corruption and Governance, Available online: - http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/ 
Sectors/ECSPE/ E9AC26BAE82D37D685256A940073F4E9?OpenDocument [Accessed 15/August/2006]. 
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Previous research (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002, and Globerman et al., 2006) suggests 
“good” governance is characterised by economic freedom, secure property rights, a 
minimum cost of complying with regulations and restrictions on trade, honest government 
officials, efficient civil services, and a transparent legal system. Good governance promotes 
successful performance and hence encourages FDI by increasing the scope for profitable 
business activities (Globerman et al., 2006). 
The measures of governance vary across study but the typical measure is risk rankings 
provided by some international organisations. Some studies directly use corruption as the 
measure of governance. In Globerman and Shapiro (2002) and Globerman et al. (2006) a 
broad composite index is employed which includes measures of political instability, rule of 
law, graft, regulatory burden, voice and political freedom, and government effectiveness. 
This governance index is developed by Kaufmann et al. (1999a and 1999b) and recently 
updated by Kaufmann et al. (2003). Governance is therefore a broader measure of 
corruption than that employed in most empirical studies.  
3.2.4 Empirical Evidence  
3.2.4.1 Empirical Evidence on Corruption and FDI 
There are many papers analysing the consequences and causes of corruption, but only a 
few of them look at the relationship between FDI and corruption. Wheeler and Mody 
(1992), Hines (1995), Wei (2000), Smarzynska and Wei (2000), and Habib and Zurawicki 
(2002) are the only papers we are aware of that examine the effects of corruption on FDI. 
These studies have failed to find a consistently negative relationship between corruption 
and FDI. 
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Wheeler and Mody (1992) develop and estimate a non-linear capital expenditure model for 
US multinationals. The model includes measures of agglomeration economies and RISK, 
which is a combined measure of risk extracted from Business International (BI, now a 
subsidiary of the Economist Intelligence Unit) that includes indicators of political stability, 
inequality, corruption, red tape, quality of the legal system, cultural compatibility, attitude 
toward foreign capital, and general expatriate comfort (including the risk of terrorism). 
They focus on US manufacturing investment and electronics investment in 42 countries in 
the 1980s and fail to find a significant correlation between the size of FDI and the host 
country’s risk level. The results also suggest that agglomeration economies are the 
dominant influence on foreign investment and short-run incentives have a limited impact 
on location choice. 
Hines (1995) analyses the US outward investment activities after the passage of Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977, which prohibits American individuals and 
corporations from bribing foreign government officials. The FCPA may lead US 
multinational firms to avoid joint ventures in more corrupt countries. Hines (1995) 
investigates four indicators of US business activities in bribe-prone countries: FDI, 
capital/labour ratios, joint venture activity, and aircraft exports. The BI index is used to 
measure the country corruption levels. Controlling for the growth of the host country 
GDP, the results suggests that corruption negatively affected the growth of US-controlled 
FDI from 1977 to 1982, as well as other three indicators. However, considering the 
influence of FCPA on total FDI from US and non-US investors, Hines (1995) fails to find 
a significantly negative correlation between total inward FDI and the corruption level in the 
host countries. 
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Wei (2000) studies whether corruption has a negative effect on FDI and how big this effect 
is relative to the host countries’ tax on foreign corporations. This paper uses a modified 
Tobit specification to estimate bilateral investment from 12 source countries and 45 host 
countries. It employs three measures of corruption, the BI index, the ICRG corruption 
rating and the TI index. It is found that either an increase in the corruption level in a host 
country or an increase in tax rate will reduce inward foreign investment. An increase in the 
corruption level from that of Singapore to that of Mexico would have the same effect on 
inward FDI as raising the tax rate by 18 to 50 per cent point depending on the specification. 
It is also found that American investors are averse to corruption in host countries, but not 
necessarily more so than other investors, despite of the FCPA of 1977. 
Smarzynska and Wei (2000) is the first paper that uses firm-level data to estimate the 
impact of corruption in a host country on foreign investors’ choice between a joint venture 
and full ownership. It presents a simple model of foreign investor’s choice of entry mode 
that is affected by the extent of corruption in the host country. On one hand, having a local 
partner lowers the transaction cost of dealing with the local corrupt officials; on the other 
hand, sharing ownership may lead to technology leakage. The hypothesis is that conditional 
on foreign investment taking place, the foreign investor with sophisticated technology 
prefers a wholly-owned form, but holding the constant technological level, the higher the 
corruption (up to a limit), the more inclined the foreign investor will to be choose a joint 
venture. Two corruption indexes are adopted: the TI index and the WDR index (which is 
based on a survey undertaken in 1996 by the Word Bank in preparation of the Word 
Development Report 1997). The empirical tests suggest that host country corruption 
reduces inward FDI and shifts the ownership towards joint ventures. Technologically more 
advanced firms are found to be less likely to engage in joint ventures. Additionally, US 
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firms are more averse to joint ventures in more corruption countries than others, which 
may due to the FCPA of 1977.  
Habib and Zurawicki (2002) adopted a dual approach to examine the impact of corruption 
on FDI: the effect of corruption in the host country, and the effect of the absolute 
difference in corruption levels between the host and home country. This study employs the 
data of bilateral FDI flows from 7 home countries to 89 host countries for three years 
(1996-1998). The TI index is used to measure corruption. The empirical results provide 
support for the negative effects of corruption on FDI for both OLS and Probit model 
specifications. Foreign investors, as a whole, do not support corruption because it is 
difficult to manage, risky and costly, and can create operational inefficiencies.  
3.2.4.2 Empirical Evidence on Governance and FDI 
In terms of the relationship between FDI and governance quality, Globerman and his 
co-authors contribute greatly to the empirical literature. Their results generally suggest that 
good governance is particularly important for promoting FDI in developing countries. 
Globerman and Shapiro (2002) use their own composite index to examine the effects of 
governance infrastructure on both FDI inflows and outflows for a broad sample of 
developed and developing countries from 1995 to 1997. They also control for human 
capital and the environment regulations. The results indicate that governance infrastructure 
is an important determinant of both FDI inflows and outflows. Investment in governance 
infrastructure not only attracts capital but also creates the conditions under which domestic 
MNCs emerge and subsequently invest abroad. Investment in governance infrastructure is 
however subject to diminishing returns, so that FDI inflows are promoted most 
successfully for smaller and developing countries. In terms of environmental regulations, 
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environmental protection and remediation encourage inward FDI. The results reject the 
“race-to-the-bottom” hypotheses and suggest that weakening environmental protection 
regimes are more likely to discourage FDI.  
Globerman and Shapiro (2003) examine the importance of governance for US FDI using 
the same measure of governance. They adopt a two-stage estimation procedure. The first 
stage estimates the probability that a country is an FDI recipient and the results suggest 
that countries that fail to achieve a minimum threshold of effective governance are unlikely 
to receive any US FDI. The second stage focuses on the countries that receive US FDI 
inflows and the results indicate that governance infrastructure is an important determinant 
of the amount received.  
Using the similar measure, Globerman et al. (2006) examine the role of governance 
infrastructure in determining inward and outward FDI for twenty emerging and transition 
economies in Europe between 1995 and 2001. The results again demonstrate that 
governance is an important determinant for both capital outflows and inflows for all 
countries.  
The empirical studies mentioned above have made a great contribution to the literature 
about the impact of corruption/governance on FDI, although they have produced mixed 
results. What these studies have in common is the fact that they rely on perception-based 
measures of corruption/governance. However, reliable objective indices of 
corruption/governance are difficult to generate using hard data. Therefore, Kao et al. (2005) 
alternatively use objective data to construct a governance efficiency index based on the 
definitions of governance efficiency by IMD and the methodology in Tang and Tang 
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(2004b).39 Kao et al. (2005) is the first paper to investigate the relationship between 
governance efficiency and FDI in China using a panel data for Chinese provinces from 
2000 to 2004. They assume that the fewer bureaucratic practices of government officials, 
the more effective of the government. They find that more effective governments attract 
more FDI. In addition, other variables such as wage, infrastructure, level of free trade, 
income, etc. are also important determinants of FDI for Chinese provinces. 
3.2.4.3 Empirical Evidence on Pollution Haven Hypothesis Including Corruption 
One deficiency in the abovementioned studies is that the stringency of environmental 
regulations is rarely modelled, or equivalently, corruption is rarely modelled in the studies 
focusing on the pollution haven hypothesis issue. Smarzynska-Javorcik and Wei (2005), 
which is also mentioned in Chapter two, do include corruption as a possible deterrent to 
FDI in a pollution haven hypothesis model. They find that local corruption deters FDI and 
with this improvement they find some support for the pollution haven hypothesis but the 
overall evidence of pollution havens is relatively weak and not robust to sensitivity checks. 
Few of the previous studies consider cross-state/province analysis. Fredriksson et al. (2003) 
address these two shortages by estimating the impacts of state-level bureaucratic corruption 
and environmental policy on inbound US FDI. They develop a theoretical model 
presuming that corruption affects FDI via two channels: the impact on the supply of public 
goods and the effect on environmental stringency. They use state-level panel data for four 
industry sectors from 1977 to 1987. The results suggest that environmental policy and 
corruption are both important for the spatial allocation of inbound US FDI, and the 
estimated effect of environmental policy is quite sensitive to the exogeneity assumption.   
                                                
39 The construction of the government efficiency variable is discussed later in Section 4.  
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Fredriksson et al. (2003) motivates us to re-examine the intra-country pollution haven effect 
in China controlling for the impact of provincial corruption and governance quality on FDI 
inflows.  
 
3.3 Corruption, Anti-corruption and FDI in China 
Corruption has been a significant social and political problem in China since 1978 when 
economic reforms started. It has been a “social pollution”, contributing to problems such 
as environmental degradation, social and political stability, and decreased credibility of 
government officials. From the early 1990s, the Chinese government began to give priority 
to anti-corruption work and to enhance anti-corruption efforts. However, corruption 
remains socially widespread and results in large economic losses (Hu, 2001). Corruption is 
considered as the second greatest public concern behind unemployment (He, 2000).  
This section summarises the four stages of corruption that China has experienced since the 
early 1980s, including the social and economic background and the characteristics of 
corruption. Section 3.3.2 describes the types of corruption in China and the corresponding 
economic losses. The development of anti-corruption activities in China is then expounded. 
Finally we discuss the relationship between corruption and FDI inflows.  
3.3.1 The Extent of Corruption in China 
Corruption in China increased gradually in the 1980s, but rose more sharply in the 1990s. 
After 1998, corruption became relatively stable. The extent of this stabilisation is 
demonstrated by the corruption perception index (CPI) provided by Transparency 
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International in Table 3.3.1. The score has decreased since 1980s and reached its lowest 
level in the mid-1990s. Due to increased anti-corruption effort, there was slight 
improvement but corruption is still widespread in China.  
Table 3.3.1 Corruption Perception Index for China 
Year Rank Score* No. of Survey 
No. of Countries 
Ranked 
1980-1985 N/A 5.13 N/A N/A 
1988-1992 N/A 4.73 N/A N/A 
1995 40 2.16 4 41 
1996 50 2.43 9 54 
1997 41 2.88 6 52 
1998 52 3.5 10 85 
1999 58 3.4 11 99 
2000 63 3.1 11 90 
2001 57 3.5 10 91 
2002 59 3.5 11 102 
2003 66 3.4 13 133 
2004 71 3.4 16 146 
2005 78 3.2 14 159 
2006 70 3.3 9 163 
*Note: CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and 
country analysts and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). 
Source: Transparency International (http://ww1.transparency.org/ [Accessed 11/June/2006]). 
 
Ni and Wang (2003) examine the changes in the number of corruption cases, the money 
involved, the number of people involved, and the number of committed officials above 
division director/county administrator level. They divide the extent of corruption into four 
stages. 
The first stage is 1980-1988. When economic reform began around 1980, the distribution 
of income between different strata of the population was not significant. Corruption was 
rare. Along with the economic reform, the economies of coastal regions grew quickly. 
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However the earnings of government officials remained at a lower level. The income 
difference caused increasing individual corruption that peaked in 1986 and then decreased 
due to greater concern about corruption in society and government. The forms of 
corruption in this period are related to bribes to support smuggling, absorbing foreign 
investment and importing overseas advanced technology and equipment.  
The second stage was after 1989 and was due to the co-existence of dual-track economic 
systems during the transition period which provided incentives and opportunities for 
corruption.40 Some government officials abused their power and engaged in fraudulent 
buying and selling of resources. Such officials were called “Guandao” in Chinese, i.e. 
official/bureaucratic profiteers. The second peak of corruption was reached in 1989. After 
the 1989 Tiananmen Square Event, the government strengthened anti-corruption efforts so 
that corruption was contained.41 This stage finished in 1992. The money involved in the 
first and second stages was still relatively small. 
The third stage is from 1993 to 1998. In the 1990s economic reform extended to the factor 
market. Some new forms of corruption appeared in the fields of finance, security, and the 
transfer of property rights. The money involved in these kinds of corruption increased 
dramatically. Meanwhile, the loopholes and weakness of regulation and the lack of 
experience and technology in the anti-corruption agencies dealing with new forms of 
corruption made this stage the most serious period of corruption in China. Group and 
gang cases increased including many officials at different administrative levels. These 
corruption cases directly affected the people’s daily life and made a bad impression on the 
                                                
40 A dual-track economy involves the co-existence of central planning with a market mechanism for the 
allocation of the resources. Local officials play a critical role in coordinating production and exchange.  
41 From 1989, it is the era of the “third generation” political leaders. The new Chinese leaders gave priority to 
the anti-corruption works and hence corruption was controlled effectively around 1990s.  
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people. The peak occurred in 1997. After that the government paid more attention to the 
enforcement of regulations, rather than only investigating the large/key corruption cases.42 
This change led to a sharp decrease in corruption in 1998. 
From 1999 corruption entered a fourth stage. In recent years, the growth rate of corruption 
has been slow. The anti-corruption activities have become more systematic and the 
regulatory framework has improved. There was a decrease in the total number of 
corruption cases. The number of large/key cases, involving money and number of officials 
above division director/county administrator, however, have significantly increased relative 
to previous stages. It illustrates that corruption involving a great amount of money, and 
high officials has become a serious problem.  
3.3.2 Types of Corruption and the Economic Losses to Corruption 
Referring to Hu (2001), the main types of corruption in China are tax evasion; rent-seeking 
behaviour, involvement in the underground economy, where the management of the goods 
is legal, but the income is illegal; involvement in the underground economy, where the 
management of the goods is illegal; and the abuse of public investment and public 
expenditure.  
The economic loss to corruption published by the government is 49.13 billion RMB yuan 
(about $5.94 billion) from 1983 to 2002. 43 But this amount of money is based on the 
economic loss that has been investigated. Ni and Wang (2004) predict this investigation 
rate is only 10%, which means that the real corruption is ten times the amount the 
                                                
42 Large case refers to the case involves a bribery of over 50,000 yuan, or a misappropriation of over 100,000 
yuan, or other cases involving 500,000 yuan. Key case refers to a case committed by government officials 
with a ranking of division director or county administrator.  
43 Exchange rate in this chapter (if not specified) is the middle rate of RMB yuan against US Dollars in 2003: 
$1= RMB 8.277. 
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government published. Hence the real economic loss from 1983 to 2002 is 500 billion 
RMB yuan (about $60 billion), in average 25 billion RMB yuan (about $3 billion) a year.  
However, this prediction is conservative according to other researchers. Hu (2001) predicts 
the annual economic loss in the late 1990s is about 987.5 -1257.0 billion RMB yuan (about 
$119.3 – 151.9 billion), accounting for 13.2 – 16.8% of GDP. Tax evasion is the largest 
economic loss to corruption, which accounts for 7.6-9.1% of GDP. Illegal management of 
public investment monies and public expenditures has been the second largest loss to 
corruption, accounting for 3.4-4.5% of GDP. Rent-seeking behaviour leads to a loss of 
about 1.7-2.7% of GDP. Income from the underground economy in illegal goods (e.g. 
smuggling, drugs, and trafficking) is the fourth largest loss to corruption, accounting for 
0.4-0.5% of GDP.  
3.3.3 Anti-Corruption in China 
In December 1978, the Communist Party of China (CPC) established the 1st CPC Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection, which is in charge of rooting out corruption and 
malfeasance among CPC cadres. Since 1989 anti-corruption work has been placed high on 
the agenda of the Chinese government. On 15th August 1989, China’s Supreme People’s 
Court and China’s Supreme People’s Procuratorate (CSPP) together released a Circular, 
which declared the central government’s determination to severely punish corrupt 
officials.44 It set off an upsurge in the fight against corruption.  
Following the example of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in 
Hong Kong, People’s Procuratorate of Guangdong Province firstly established an 
                                                
44 The Circular announced that criminals related to corruption, bribe, fraudulent buying and selling etc. must 
surrender themselves to the police or judicial department within the fixed time.  
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anti-corruption bureau in 1989. In 1995 CSPP established an anti-corruption general 
bureau, and from then on anti-corruption units were established at four levels of the 
procuratorate throughout the country. Except the general bureau, anti-corruption offices 
are set up under the provincial people’s procuratorates, municipal people’s procuratorates, 
and county people’s procuratorates. At present, there are more than 40,000 procurators 
from various procuratorates in China taking part in the fight against corruption. The 
anti-corruption offices are in charge of the investigation and preliminary hearing of the 
cases involving corruption, bribe, misappropriation, unstated sources of large properties, 
disguised overseas savings deposits, illegal possession of public funds, illegal possession of 
confiscated properties, etc.  
During the first stage of corruption, ideological education was the major method for 
fighting corruption, which stressed the need to maintain the revolutionary tradition of CPC 
and maintain sharp vigilance of hedonism (i.e. pleasure-seeking). The corrupt officials were 
given disciplinary punishment within the Party. From the second stage, in addition to 
ideological education and disciplinary punishment, corrupt officials would be punished 
according to law. The people’s procurator office, in accordance with laws and relevant facts, 
could decide arrest and approve the arrest of the suspect(s) of corruption cases that are 
proposed by the public security departments, state security departments or authority of 
prisons. Then the people’s procurators office institutes proceedings to the people’s court 
against the suspects.  
The anti-corruption bureau has made a contribution towards the work of fighting 
corruption. CSPP reported that from 1998 to 2003, the anti-corruption offices had 
investigated 203,880 corruption cases involving 225,624 persons (including 13,854 
government officials with a ranking of division director or county administrator) and 
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helped to retrieve a great amount of economic loss for about 26.3 billion RMB yuan (about 
$3.18 billion). About half of these cases (123,295 cases involving 141,413 persons), were 
taken legal proceedings. In 2004, 43,757 government employees were probed by 
prosecutors for corruption and dereliction of duty, of which 30,788 were brought to court. 
About 4.56 billion RMB yuan ($0.55 billion) were retrieved. However, the rate of 
investigation is still low, according to the predictions of researchers on corruption. 
Moreover, the punishment/penalty of corruption is light. Hence the risks of engaging in 
corrupt activities are very low. Anti-corruption work seems to be a long-term fight. 
3.3.5 Corruption and FDI 
In the past ten years, the procurator’s offices have investigated at least 500,000 corruption 
cases, and 64 per cent of them are related to international trade and foreign enterprises 
(Takung Pao, 19/09/2006). Bribes to the local officials given by foreign investors tended 
to increase in recent years. It has destroyed the fair competition in the markets and warped 
the resources allocation.   
Some investors feel that the investment environment in China is different from that of 
their home country. They know corruption is a widespread social problem and consider 
that bribery is a “latent rule” in the Chinese economy. They take bribes to win the 
competition and to avoid some unfavourable regulations and polices.    
China is still at the stage of transition to a market economy and the government has power 
to control the allocation of some resources. Multinational firms, sometimes, cannot gain 
the opportunity of market entrance just because of their advantages in capital, technology 
and management. In order to get higher profits, some multinational enterprises would like 
to pay the costs in giving bribes to the local officials.  
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Seeking high profits is therefore the intrinsic motivation of foreign investors to give bribes, 
and the weakness in anti-corruption (anti-bribe) and regulations also provides external 
condition for bribes.  
However, corruption does not encourage foreign investment. Most foreign investors are 
worried, or fearful about the corruption of local government. Pei (2007) argues that 
“corruption endangers FDI because illicit behaviour by local officials could expose 
Western firms to potentially vast environmental, human rights and financial liabilities. 
Corruption creates serious obstacles for Western companies facing rivals who engage in 
illegal practices in order to win business in China. Corruption puts Western firms’ 
intellectual property particularly at risk because unscrupulous local officials routinely 
protect Chinese counterfeiters in exchange for bribes.”45  
Although in short term they could get the market entrance or some other preferential 
policies by taking bribes, multinational firms would like to locate in place where the 
corruption level is low considering long-run benefits.  
Figure 3.3.1 plots the relationship between Corruption Perception Index (CPI) score and 
FDI inflows from 1995 to 2004 (the correlation between this two indices is 0.60). FDI 
increased from 1995 to 1998 when the CPI score raised up, i.e. when the country became 
less corrupt; FDI dropped significantly in 1999 and stagnated in 2000 when China was 
perceived to be more corrupted. In recent years, the score remained relatively stable and 
FDI shows a relatively stable growth rate. It suggests that a clean government promotes 
foreign investment in current China.  
 
                                                
45 Pei (2007), pp. 6. 
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Figure 3.3.1 CPI Score and Actually Used FDI in China 1995 -2004 
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Source: CPI from Transparency International; FDI from China Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
 
Corruption has been openly recognised as an emerging challenge to China’s economy and 
social reforms. Fighting corruption requires increasing transparency of government affairs 
and improving related laws and regulations. Some legal experts suggest revising the current 
Anti-Unfair Competition Law and drawing up Anti-Corruption Law and Anti-Commercial 
Bribery Law. Chinese President Hu Jintao has declared the fight against corruption a 
priority on the political agenda of the government. On 25th October, 2006, the 
International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (IAACA) was officially 
established in order to promote the United Nations (UN) Convention Against Corruption 
and Jia Chunwang, procurator-general of the CSPP, was elected as president. The new 
political leaders seem to have strengthened anti-corruption activities in recent years and, 
hopefully, the situation will improve. 
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3.4 Methodology 
The methodology in this chapter follows that in Chapter two. We extend our estimation 
equation in Chapter two by adding control variables to capture provincial bureaucracy 
characteristics. We use the same estimators (FGLS) in this chapter and the similar dataset.  
Since there is not any existing perception index for provincial bureaucracy characteristics 
across time, we use two objective variables to proxy the provincial difference in 
anti-corruption effort level and governance quality.  
This section firstly lays out our planned empirical model and expectations. It then explains 
how we construct the variables to capture the provincial government characteristics. 
Simultaneously, it describes two new variables – anti-corruption effort and government 
efficiency index. It then expresses the modified empirical model and estimation techniques. 
Finally, it describes all variables.    
3.4.1 Planned Empirical Model 
Following the previous empirical literature, we supplement our previous empirical model, 
Equation 2.4.2, by adding another two variables to proxy provincial government corruption 
and governance quality.  
)( γ η, X, ,Governance ,Corruption ER,fFDI =            (3.4.1) 
where 
FDI is the amount of FDI inflow into region i in time period t; 
ER is the vector of measures to capture environmental stringency; 
Corruption is the regional corruption level; 
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Governance is the regional governance quality; 
X is the set of other regional characteristics that may affect FDI; 
η is time-invariant regional effects; and 
γ is location-invariant time effects. 
The expectation of the coefficient on environmental regulation stringency remains negative 
indicating that FDI is attracted to provinces with lax regulatory stringency. Following 
previous studies, we expect that provinces that have more corruption will have reduced 
FDI inflows, and provinces that have better governance will attract more FDI.  
However, a difficulty with our analysis is finding proxies for provincial corruption levels 
and provincial governance quality. There is not an organisation in China or elsewhere that 
have made a comprehensive survey of the perceived view of provincial corruption and/or 
governance quality from firms, government officials, individuals, etc. for any period of time. 
This leads us to find out whether or not there are any objective data which could help us 
construct such measures. 
3.4.2 Provincial Anti-Corruption Effort Level and Government 
Efficiency in China  
3.4.2.1 Provincial Anti-Corruption Effort 
Fredriksson et al. (2003) use the number of convictions of public officials per 1000 public 
employees to measure bureaucratic corruption. The data is from a 1987 US Department of 
Justice report and has been used in Goel and Nelson (1998) and Fisman and Gatti (1999) 
to measure state-level corruption in the US.  
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Fredriksson et al. (2003) and Goel and Nelson (1998) have discussed the shortcomings of 
this measurement of corruption. “First, convictions are only recorded if the corrupt 
bureaucrats are caught and evidence of their guilt is obtained. Second, the data treat all 
corruption convictions homogeneously. […] Finally, the data of conviction provides no 
indication of when corrupt activity actually occurred. We attempt to circumvent this final 
problem by using the number of convictions in year t +1 to proxy for corruption in year t. 
Despite these caveats, it remains the best available measure of corruption.”46 
Since we lack a subjective state-level corruption index, such a measure of corruption seems 
to be the only feasible method. The Procuratorial Yearbook of China (various years) 
provides the annual reports of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and local people’s 
procutatorates which include similar data. However, whilst all the procuratorates report the 
number of registered cases under their direct investigation, a number of provinces do not 
report the number of persons involved in these cases. When focusing on the provinces that 
provide the data including both cases and persons and the whole country, we find the 
correlation between the number of cases and number of persons is 0.99.47 Therefore, we 
use registered cases under the direct investigation by procurator’s offices to proxy the 
corruption level of each province.  
Registered cases include those on corruption, bribery, misappropriation of public funds, 
collective illegal possession of public funds, unstated source of large property, abuse of 
power, dereliction of duty, fraudulent practices and others. Since those involved in these 
cases may not only include public officials but also the persons working in other sectors we 
normalise the number of cases by the provincial population. 
                                                
46 Fredriksson et al. (2003), footnote 12, pp.1416. 
47 One case is corresponding to at least one person.  
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Another issue to note is that corruption cases under investigation could be interpreted in 
two different ways, real corruption level or anti-corruption effort. However, China is very 
different from the US. According to the CPI score provided by TI, the average score of the 
US was above 7.5 in the past 10 years, while that of China was around 3.5. The corruption 
level in China is much higher than that in the US. Such high corruption level in China is 
compounded by the low investigation rate (at about 10% or less as discussed in Section 
3.3.2). Therefore, the investigated corruption cases cannot reflect the real corruption level 
in Chinese provinces and hence to copy the method of Fredriksson et al. (2003) is not ideal. 
However, if we assume that inherent corruption levels are equal across provinces, which 
could be the case if individuals were equally susceptible to temptation, then investigated 
corruption cases scaled by population can be considered as a good proxy for the level of 
effort that a province expends fighting corruption. Given the high levels of corruption and 
the very public fight against it in China, we believe that it is more appropriate to think of 
the number of corruption cases under investigation as an indicator of how seriously a 
province takes the fight against corruption. The CSPP also treats these data as the 
anti-corruption achievement of supreme and local procuratorates of the year. In addition, 
the consistent positive coefficient on this variable in the results (see section 3.5) suggests 
that this measure should be interpreted as anti-corruption effort.  
Since we consider the impact of tackling corruption on FDI inflows, we do not have the 
final problem of Fredriksson et al. (2003). The difference in provincial anti-corruption 
efforts is reported in Table 3.4.1.   
Most provinces remain stable in terms of their number of normalised cases. We find some 
provinces have a significant increase during our investigation period, like Tianjin, Liaoning, 
and Jiangxi; some have a jump in specific years and return to previous level in the following 
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years, such as Shandong and Ningxia; and few provinces have significant decrease in the 
value of normalised cases. 
Compared with other provinces, the ranking shows that some provinces have always made 
more effort in tackling corruption, such as Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, 
Heilongjiang, and Shandong; and some provinces have made less effort such as 
Guangdong, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, and Gansu. We also find that the conditions of 
some provinces became worse, such as Shanghai, Hainan and Yunnan, and some provinces 
became better, such as Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Henan, and Guangxi.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 162
Table 3.4.1 Provincial Anti-Corruption Efforts and Ranks 
Province 
1998  1999  2000 
Cases/ 
100 000 
persons 
Rank  
Cases/ 
100 000 
persons 
Rank  
Cases/ 
100 000 
persons 
Rank 
1. Beijing 2.17 25  2.77 18  3.27 15 
2. Tianjin 3.21 12  4.26 3  6.15 1 
3. Hebei 3.60 5  4.06 5  4.30 6 
4. Shanxi* 3.76 4  4.05 6  4.98 5 
5. Inner Mongolia** 2.52 20  2.41 25  3.14 19 
6. Liaoning 3.28 10  4.14 4  5.43 3 
7. Jilin* 4.53 1  5.08 1  5.40 4 
8. Heilongjiang* 4.40 2  4.60 2  5.87 2 
9. Shanghai 3.39 8  3.11 12  3.03 24 
10. Jiangsu 2.33 22  2.57 23  3.26 16 
11. Zhejiang 2.76 16  3.06 14  3.11 20 
12. Anhui* 2.00 28  2.53 24  3.11 21 
13. Fujian 3.50 6  3.51 9  3.85 8 
14. Jiangxi* 2.59 19  3.27 10  3.31 14 
15. Shandong 3.42 7  3.58 8  2.47 27 
16. Henan* 2.33 23  3.04 16  3.90 7 
17. Hubei* 3.19 13  3.23 11  3.37 11 
18. Hunan* 2.52 21  2.75 20  3.03 23 
19. Guangdong 2.08 26  2.15 28  2.20 30 
20. Guangxi** 1.82 30  2.25 27  2.78 26 
21. Hainan 3.15 14  2.74 21  3.18 17 
22. Chongqing** 2.25 24  2.76 19  3.03 25 
23. Sichuan** 1.89 29  2.30 26  3.04 22 
24. Guizhou** 2.71 17  2.69 22  3.15 18 
25. Yunnan** 2.93 15  3.06 15  3.37 12 
27.a Shaanxi** 3.23 11  3.02 17  3.60 9 
28. Gansu** 2.04 27  2.12 29  2.33 28 
29. Qinghai** 3.32 9  3.10 13  3.38 10 
30. Ningxia** 2.70 18  2.03 30  2.28 29 
31. Xinjiang** 4.09 3  3.82 7  3.32 13 
 163
Table 3.4.1 Provincial Anti-Corruption Efforts and Ranks (Continued) 
Province 
2001  2002  2003 
Cases/ 
100 000 
persons 
Rank  
Cases/ 
100 000 
persons 
Rank  
Cases/ 
100 000 
persons 
Rank 
1. Beijing 2.95 22  3.08 21  2.30 25 
2. Tianjin 7.03 1  6.88 1  5.24 2 
3. Hebei 4.27 7  4.49 7  3.74 6 
4. Shanxi* 4.50 6  3.93 8  3.56 7 
5. Inner Mongolia** 2.92 24  3.25 16  2.94 17 
6. Liaoning 5.05 4  5.41 4  4.62 4 
7. Jilin* 5.12 3  4.72 6  4.25 5 
8. Heilongjiang* 5.65 2  5.92 3  6.10 1 
9. Shanghai 3.22 17  3.00 23  2.18 27 
10. Jiangsu 3.31 15  3.30 13  3.03 14 
11. Zhejiang 3.16 18  3.12 19  2.98 15 
12. Anhui* 3.03 19  3.61 11  2.38 23 
13. Fujian 3.67 11  3.28 15  3.42 8 
14. Jiangxi* 3.85 10  4.91 5  4.82 3 
15. Shandong 4.50 5  6.09 2  3.06 13 
16. Henan* 3.86 9  3.76 10  3.34 10 
17. Hubei* 3.49 13  3.29 14  2.81 18 
18. Hunan* 2.59 28  3.11 20  2.09 28 
19. Guangdong 2.28 29  2.32 29  1.99 29 
20. Guangxi** 3.02 20  2.83 24  2.80 19 
21. Hainan 2.88 25  2.76 25  2.33 24 
22. Chongqing** 2.72 26  2.56 28  2.42 21 
23. Sichuan** 2.67 27  2.61 27  2.42 22 
24. Guizhou** 2.97 21  3.05 22  2.95 16 
25. Yunnan** 3.66 12  2.76 26  2.29 26 
27.a Shaanxi** 3.35 14  3.19 18  3.17 12 
28. Gansu** 2.00 30  1.74 30  1.90 30 
29. Qinghai** 3.31 16  3.31 12  3.39 9 
30. Ningxia** 2.93 23  3.79 9  2.53 20 
31. Xinjiang** 4.03 8  3.21 17  3.33 11 
Note: * indicates central provinces and ** western provinces. a No. 26 indicates Tibet. 
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3.4.2.2 The Measure of Provincial Government Efficiency 
Tang and Tang (2004a and 2004b) create a system of indices to measure the provincial 
government efficiency of China following the methodology and analysis principles of IMD 
World Competitiveness Yearbook. The system contains 47 indices in four factors such as 
public services, public goods, government scale and national welfare. Then they calculated 
the standardised value (STD) of 37 indices with the help of Standard Derivation Method 
according to the data in 2001. Then the aggregated STD of each province is worked out 
using the weighted arithmetic mean method, and hence the rank of STD value. The STD is 
used to measure the efficiency of 31 provincial governments in 2002. This method is 
adopted in Kao et al. (2005) to create an index measuring the governance quality in each 
province. In this study, we follow this method and improve on Tang and Tang (2004b) and 
Kao et al. (2005) by adding more indices (from 37 to 40) and for a longer period of six years 
(1998-2003) across 30 provinces. We assume that a province with a higher level of 
government efficiency is an indicator that it has good local bureaucrats.  
Table 3.4.2 lists the 47 indices in each of the four factors. The government services factor 
includes four sub-factors: 1) education, science and technology, culture, and public health 
services (11 indices), with a weight of 0.55 in the first factor; 2) public security services (8 
indices) with a weight of 0.15; 3) meteorological services (2 indices) with a weight of 0.15; 
and 4) social security services (3 indices) with a weight of 0.15. Government public goods 
factor has two sub-factors, social infrastructure (6 indices) and city infrastructure (5 indices) 
with equal weights. Government scale factor has 5 indices and national welfare factor 7 
indices in total. The weights of the four factors are 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, and 0.1 respectively, 
according to their importance. The indices in bold type are the seven indices that are not 
available.  
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Table 3.4.2 Government Efficiency Indices 
Factors Sub Factors Indices 
Government 
Public 
Services 
(24 indices) 
(weight = 0.4) 
Education, 
Science & 
Technology, 
Culture, and 
Public Health 
Services 
(11 indices) 
(weight = 0.55) 
1. Per Capita Government Budgetary Expenditures 
for Scientific and Technology Promotion (yuan) 
2. Rate of Products with Excellent Quality (%) 
3. Three Types of Patent (Inventions, Utility Models 
and Designs) Applications Granted (item/100 000 
persons) 
4.Per Capita Transaction value in Technical Market 
(yuan) 
5. Student-Teacher Ratio of Primary Schools  
6. Student-Teacher Ratio of Secondary Schools 
7. Illiterate and Semi-illiterate Rate (%) 
8. The Share of Government Appropriation for 
Education in GDP (%)  
9. Institutions for Culture and Art (unit/100 000 
persons)  
10. Beds in Health Institutions (unit/100 000 
persons)  
11. Employed Persons in Health Institutions 
(person/ 100 000 persons) 
Public Security 
Services 
(8 indices) 
(weight = 0.15) 
12. Three Accidents (Traffic Accidents, Fires and Pollution 
Accidents) (case/100000 persons) 
13. Losses in Three Accidents (yuan) 
14. Legislations (New Legislations, Revised Old 
Legislations, Including Laws， Regulations, 
etc.)(case) 
15. First Trial Cases Accepted by Courts (case) 
16. First Trial Cases Settled by Courts (case) 
17. Arrests of Criminal Suspects by Procurator’s 
Offices (person)  
18. Criminal Cases Cracked and/or Registered in 
Public Security Organs (case) 
19.Criminal Cases (case/ 100 000 persons) 
Meteorological 
Services 
(2 indices) 
(weight = 0.15) 
20. Agro-Meteorological Services Stations (unit/100 
000 persons) 
21. Earthquake Monitoring Stations (unit/100 000 
persons) 
Social Security 
Services 
(3 indices) 
(weight = 0.15) 
22. Number of Careers Service at the end of year 
(unit/100 000 persons) 
23. Number of Urban Community Welfare Facilities 
(unit/100 000 persons)  
24.Rural Social Security Network (unit/100 000 
person) 
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Table 3.4.2 Government Efficiency Indices (Continued) 
Factors Sub Factors Indices 
Government 
Public Goods 
(11 indices) 
(weight = 0.3) 
Social 
Infrastructure 
(6 indices) 
(weight = 0.5) 
25. State Budgetary Appropriation in Capital 
Construction and Innovation (100 million yuan) 
26. Local –Central Government Projects Ratio of 
Investment in Capital Construction and Innovation 
(%) 
27. Ratio of Projects Completed and Put into Use in 
Capital Construction and Innovation (%) 
28.Treatment Efficiency of Industrial Wastewater, 
Waste Gas and Solid Wastes 
29. Reservoir Volume (100 million cubic metres/ 
10 000 persons)  
30. Ratio of Area of Nature Reserves and Provincial 
Area (%)  
City 
Infrastructure 
(5 indices) 
(weight =0.5) 
31. Rate of Access to Gas (%) 
32. Numbers Public Transportation Vehicles per 10 
000 persons in Cities (unit) 
33. Per Capita Area of Paved Roads (sq.m) 
34. Per Capita Green Area (sq.m)  
35.Number of Public Toilet per 10 000 persons (unit) 
Government 
Scale 
(5 indices) 
(weight = 0.2) 
 
36. Ratio of Staff and Workers in Government Agencies and 
Total Population (person/10 000 persons)  
37. Ratio of Staff and Workers in Government Agencies and 
Total Employed Persons (%) 
38. Ratio of Government Consumption and Final 
Consumption (%) 
39. Ratio of Government Expenditures and GDP (%) 
40. The Share of Penalty and Confiscatory Income and 
Income from Administrative Fees in Total Government 
Revenue 
National 
Welfare 
(7 indices) 
(weight = 0.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41. Per Capita Annual Net Income of Rural 
Households (yuan) 
42. Per Capita Annual Disposable Income of Urban 
Households (yuan) 
43. Engle Coefficient of Rural Households (%) 
44. Engle Coefficient of Urban Households (%) 
45. Consumer price index (preceding year = 100) 
46.GDP per capita (yuan) 
47. Ratio of Expenditure on Policy-related Subsidies 
and Government Expenditure (%) 
Note: The indices in italic are inverse criteria. The indices in bold type are unavailable.  
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The measure of provincial government efficiency is developed in five steps as follows: 
1) Construction of the primary measures for Chinese provinces. The primary measures are 
constructed by the available data for a type of the provincial characteristics. For 
example, numbers of students and teachers in specialised and regularly secondary 
schools; total number and losses of traffic accidents, fire accidents and pollution 
accidents; central government and local government investments in capital 
construction and innovation, etc. Data are recorded in the form in which they are 
provided in China Statistical Yearbook and China Environment Yearbook.  
2) Normalisation of the primary measures. In addition to the losses of three accidents, and 
the state budget investment in capital construction and innovation, each of the 
primary measures are either in the form of a ratio (e.g. student-teacher ratio, 
local-central government projects ratio of investment in capital construction and 
innovation, and Engle coefficients) or normalised either by present population or 
by the dimension (square kilometres) of the provincial area, depending on the 
features of the indices (but some data are already normalised in the yearbooks).  
The results are in the types as: per capita green area in the city, ratio of area of 
nature reserves and provincial area. Definitions of the 40 indices are reported in 
Appendix 3.1. 
3) Standardisation of the normalised measures. The output of the normalisation is a set of 
indices that are presented in different units. They are not directly comparable. Each 
index is standardised using the following formula. 
jjjiji SXXSTD /)( ., −=                     (3.4.2) 
where  
STDi,j is the standardised value of index j in region i;  
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Xi,j is the original value of the index j in region i; 
X  is the mean value of X; and 
S is standard error defined as ∑
=
−=
n
i
jjij
n
XXS
1
2
,
1
)( .
48 
4) Aggregation into the sub-factors. The arithmetic mean is used to average the STD values 
for each region within each sub-factor. In most cases, a higher value is better, for 
example, per capita income; the province with the highest standardised value is 
ranked first while the one with the lowest is last. However, with some criteria (in 
italic in Table 3.4.2), the lowest value is the most efficient, for example, Engle 
coefficients. In these cases, a reverse ranking is used: the province with the highest 
standardised value is ranked last and the one with the lowest is first. According to 
the principles of IMD World Competitive Yearbook, in the aggregation of the 
statistics, all missing values are replaced with a STD value equal to zero. The 
resulting STD value for each sub-factor are then again averaged arithmetically, 
standardised and normalised.  
5) Aggregation of the sub factors and four factors. The weighted mean is then used to 
aggregate these sub factors, and after that the four factors. The weight of each 
sub-factor and factor is following that in Tang and Tang (2004b). Finally we get the 
aggregated STD values and corresponding ranks of 30 provinces for 6 years.  
Results are provided in Table 3.4.3. 
Table 3.4.3 shows that eight provinces, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Jiangsu, Jilin, 
Liaoning, Zhejiang and Heilongjiang, have relatively high STD values from 1998 to 2003. 
These provinces are located in eastern regions or regions on the border, where the 
                                                
48 n is number of provincial governments. 
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economy grows quickly and national welfare is high thanks to the geographical advantages 
and favourable policies. In contrary, some inland provinces, for example, Shanxi, Jiangxi, 
Henan, Hunan, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunan and Gansu, remain 
relatively low or negative STD values indicating low government efficiencies. The 
difference in government efficiencies among Chinese provinces is consistent with the 
disparity of regional economic development. 
Table 3.4.3 Government Efficiency STD Value Results and Ranks 
Province 
1998  1999  2000 
STD 
Value 
Rank  
STD 
Value 
Rank  
STD 
Value 
Rank 
1. Beijing 0.38 2  0.40 2  0.49 1 
2. Tianjin 0.37 3  0.24 5  0.25 5 
3. Hebei 0.01 12  0.09 10  -0.01 16 
4. Shanxi* -0.12 21  -0.24 26  -0.21 26 
5. Inner Mongolia** -0.04 16  0.00 16  0.07 10 
6. Liaoning 0.15 8  0.18 7  0.17 8 
7. Jilin* 0.33 4  0.32 4  0.25 4 
8. Heilongjiang* 0.15 9  0.22 6  0.20 6 
9. Shanghai 0.48 1  0.52 1  0.41 2 
10. Jiangsu 0.32 5  0.35 3  0.25 3 
11. Zhejiang 0.21 7  0.13 9  0.17 7 
12. Anhui* -0.02 14  -0.05 18  -0.07 20 
13. Fujian -0.07 19  -0.04 17  0.03 13 
14. Jiangxi* -0.32 28  -0.36 29  -0.33 29 
15. Shandong -0.06 17  0.02 15  0.07 12 
16. Henan* -0.14 22  -0.22 24  -0.20 25 
17. Hubei* 0.10 11  0.07 13  0.08 9 
18. Hunan* -0.33 29  -0.35 28  -0.31 28 
19. Guangdong 0.00 13  0.08 11  -0.03 18 
20. Guangxi** -0.26 26  -0.24 25  -0.30 27 
21. Hainan 0.21 6  0.15 8  0.07 11 
22. Chongqing** -0.28 27  -0.29 27  -0.09 21 
23. Sichuan** -0.10 20  -0.12 21  -0.07 19 
24. Guizhou** -0.43 30  -0.43 30  -0.40 30 
25. Yunnan** -0.07 18  -0.11 20  -0.18 24 
27.a Shaanxi** -0.25 25  -0.20 23  -0.14 22 
28. Gansu** -0.14 23  -0.13 22  -0.16 23 
29. Qinghai** -0.16 24  -0.10 19  0.02 14 
30. Ningxia** -0.03 15  0.03 14  0.02 15 
31. Xinjiang** 0.10 10  0.08 12  -0.02 17 
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Table 3.4.3 Government Efficiency STD Value Results and Ranks (Continued) 
Province 
2001  2002  2003 
STD 
Value 
Rank  
STD 
Value 
Rank  
STD 
Value 
Rank 
1. Beijing 0.62 1  0.81 1  0.86 1 
2. Tianjin 0.26 4  0.29 3  0.34 4 
3. Hebei 0.09 9  0.15 10  0.02 12 
4. Shanxi* -0.15 19  -0.09 19  -0.13 20 
5. Inner Mongolia** 0.08 11  0.24 5  0.28 6 
6. Liaoning 0.18 6  0.23 6  0.24 8 
7. Jilin* 0.12 8  0.16 9  0.19 9 
8. Heilongjiang* 0.15 7  0.22 7  0.36 3 
9. Shanghai 0.53 2  0.55 2  0.76 2 
10. Jiangsu 0.32 3  0.25 4  0.31 5 
11. Zhejiang 0.24 5  0.21 8  0.24 7 
12. Anhui* -0.02 16  -0.06 17  -0.13 19 
13. Fujian 0.08 10  0.01 13  0.01 14 
14. Jiangxi* -0.24 26  -0.29 27  -0.25 24 
15. Shandong -0.03 17  -0.06 18  -0.11 18 
16. Henan* -0.21 25  -0.23 24  -0.27 25 
17. Hubei* 0.02 15  -0.11 20  -0.11 16 
18. Hunan* -0.27 28  -0.32 28  -0.41 28 
19. Guangdong 0.07 13  0.01 12  -0.14 21 
20. Guangxi** -0.31 29  -0.35 29  -0.49 29 
21. Hainan 0.08 12  -0.06 16  -0.11 17 
22. Chongqing** -0.21 24  -0.23 26  -0.31 26 
23. Sichuan** -0.19 23  -0.22 23  -0.17 22 
24. Guizhou** -0.49 30  -0.50 30  -0.64 30 
25. Yunnan** -0.18 22  -0.20 22  -0.33 27 
27.a Shaanxi** -0.04 18  -0.01 14  0.05 11 
28. Gansu** -0.25 27  -0.18 21  -0.08 15 
29. Qinghai** 0.05 14  -0.02 15  0.01 13 
30. Ningxia** -0.17 21  -0.23 25  -0.19 23 
31. Xinjiang** -0.15 20  0.05 11  0.19 10 
Note: * indicates central provinces and ** western provinces. a No. 26 indicates Tibet. 
 
In terms of the trend over time, the ranks of the provinces, such as Beijing, Shanxi, Inner 
Mongolia, Heilongjiang, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai and Xinjiang, have increased. The ranks 
of Shanghai and Liaoning remains relatively stable but the STD values have considerably 
increased. However, the situations for those provinces like Shandong, Jilin, Hubei, 
Guangdong, Hainan, Yunan and Ningxia are worsen from 1998 to 2003. The STD values 
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and ranks of other provinces stay relatively stable. The trend of the ranks illustrates on one 
hand that some provinces in which their economic development is fast, for instance, 
Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Liaoning and Fujian, retain their advantages in government 
efficiency; and on the other hand that eastern regions generally have better governance 
than central and western regions.  
Finally, the difference between the highest and the lowest scoring provinces has increased, 
for example, the difference between Beijing and Guizhou has increased from 0.81 in 1998 
to 1.50 in 2003. This rise in the standard deviation means that provincial inequalities are 
widening which may further impact future growth and FDI prospects for these laggard 
provinces.   
3.4.3 Modified Model and Estimation Equation 
We now return to Equation 3.4.1 that we now write as: 
)( γ η, X,  STD,,Corruption-Anti ER,fFDI =            (3.4.3) 
where 
FDI is the amount of FDI inflow into region i in time period t; 
ER is the vector of measures to capture environmental stringency; 
Anti-Corruption is the regional effort on tackling corruption; 
STD is the index of regional government efficiency; 
X is the set of other regional characteristics that may affect FDI; 
η is time-invariant regional effects; and 
γ is location-invariant time effects. 
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We now estimate whether or not the governments that fight corruption will attract the 
larger volume of investment over time. The expected sign of Anti-Corruption is positive. We 
also expect provinces that have good bureaucrats to attract more FDI so that the sign on 
STD is expected to be positive.  
Similarly to Chapter two, we include two measurements of FDI inflows, i.e. FDI divided by 
regional GDP (FDI/GDP) and FDI divided by regional population (FDI/POP). We 
include our three variables of environmental regulation stringency, the share of regional 
anti-industrial pollution investment in innovation investment (EI1), the number of 
administrative punishment cases normalised by the number of enterprises (Punish), and the 
number of pollution emission charge normalised by the number of charged organisations 
(Charge). In terms of other control variables X, we use those from Chapter two to capture 
factor prices, income, infrastructure and agglomeration effects: per capita gross regional 
product (GRP per capita), manufacturing wage and wage squared, regional gross industrial 
product (GIP), population density, railway density, road density, rate of illiteracy and labour 
productivity.  
The estimating equation in this chapter is as following: 
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(3.4.4) 
where i refers to province t refers to year. 
Similar to Chapter two, we lag all independent variables to minimise the potential causality 
links from FDI to all the independent variables.  
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We do not take natural log to STD because it is an index with positive and negative values. 
The expected signs of the coefficients are: 
Coefficients β 1 β 2 β 3 β 4 β 5 β 6 β 7 β 8 β 9 β 1 0 β 11 β 1 2 
Expected Signs - + + - + -/+ + + -/+ -/+ + + 
 
 
Since pollution emission charge is more visible to polluters than the other two measures of 
environmental stringency, we expect that Charge has the strongest negative effect on FDI 
inflows rather than Punish and EI1.  
We use fixed and random effects estimators. We apply a Hausman specification test to find 
out whether the random effects model is appropriate. The results (See Appendix 3.2) show 
that the random effects estimator is rejected in half of the cases. Therefore, we concentrate 
on the fixed effects results.  
Since we use the similar dataset and the estimating equation based on that in Chapter two, 
the autocorrelation problem still exists. There is AR(1) autocorrelation within panels for log 
specification. The autocorrelation test results are reported in Appendix 3.3. Due to the 
existence of autocorrelation, neither the within estimator nor random effects estimator 
could produce efficient results. Therefore we continue to adopt the FGLS estimator, which 
can control for both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity to specify unobserved regional 
effects and time effects.  
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3.4.4 Data Description 
The Procuratorial Yearbook of China, the China Statistical Yearbook and the China 
Environment Yearbook provide the data for constructing the two government 
characteristic variables. Other data sources are as the same as those in Chapter two.  
Table 3.4.4 provides the descriptive statistics table developed from Table 2.4.4 by adding 
the statistics of the two new variables, Anti-Corruption and STD. Similarly, Table 3.4.5 
shows the correlations of all variables developed from Table 2.4.3. All the control variables 
are one-year lagged.  
The correlation rank shows that FDI inflows are positively correlated with STD value, i.e. 
provinces that have high level of government efficiencies also have high FDI inflows. 
However, there is not significant correlation between FDI inflows and the anti-corruption 
effort. The correlation coefficient between anti-corruption effort and government 
efficiency is positive but the magnitude is small (0.263).  
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Table 3.4.4 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Medium Max 
FDI/GDP (FDI in RMB yuan per 10 000 RMB yuan GDP) 149 265.80 271.11 6.76 140.66 1140.13 
FDI/POP (FDI in RMB yuan per capita) 149 188.62 276.04 3.19 42.89 1395.25 
EI1 (yuan per 10 000 RMB yuan  innovation investment) 150 342.20 216.12 31.65 289.32 1163.74 
EI2 (yuan per 10 000 RMB yuan Inno.Inv.+Capital Construction Inv.) 150 92.63 57.22 6.19 80.43 285.53 
EI3 (yuan per 10 000 RMB yuan total investment in fixed assets) 150 55.04 35.78 4.46 44.71 185.08 
Punish (Cases per 1000 enterprises) 148 452.34 701.53 29.18 267.30 5877.36 
Charge (RMB yuan per organisation) 150 4319.00 2363.26 1467.24 3679.30 17649.92 
GRP per capita (RMB yuan) 150 4765.65 3591.10 1255.09 3376.21 21876.21 
Wage (RMB yuan at 1990 price) 150 4720.76 1549.53 2614.68 4399.02 11885.36 
GIP (100 million RMB yuan at 1990 price) 150 1556.23 1713.53 79.41 912.00 8815.18 
Pop. Density (persons per km2) 150 376.11 460.55 6.99 251.56 2700.00 
Rail Density (km/ 10 000 km2) 150 151.39 145.08 8.38 109.65 690.83 
Road Density (km/ 10 000 km2) 150 3341.10 2110.37 204.76 3053.05 10138.71 
Illiterate Rate (%) 150 13.13 6.46 4.36 12.11 42.92 
Productivity (RMB yuan/person at 1990 price) 150 41039.37 18996.94 9276.10 35999.46 156645.80 
Anti-Corruption (Cases/100 000 persons) 150 3.37 1.01 1.74 3.18 7.03 
STD  150 0.00 0.24 -0.50 -0.02 0.81 
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Table 3.4.5 Correlations of the Variables  
 
 FDI/GDP FDI/POP EI1 Punish Charge 
GRP per 
capita 
Wage (Wage)2 GIP 
Pop. 
Density 
Rail 
Density 
Road 
Density 
Illiterate 
Rate 
Productivity 
Anti- 
Corruption 
STD 
FDI/GDP 1.000                
FDI/POP 0.859 1.000               
EI1. -0.095 -0.120 1.000              
Punish -0.108 -0.113 0.154 1.000             
Charge 0.294 0.601 0.060 -0.014 1.000            
GRP per capita 0.617 0.904 -0.084 -0.029 0.700 1.000           
Wage 0.511 0.781 -0.108 -0.062 0.568 0.862 1.000          
(Wage)2 0.475 0.791 -0.134 -0.108 -0.162 -0.083 0.654 1.000         
GIP 0.544 0.553 0.019 -0.027 0.409 0.488 0.433 0.409 1.000        
Pop. Density 0.502 0.807 -0.143 -0.157 0.801 0.865 0.674 0.742 0.429 1.000       
Rail Density 0.393 0.616 -0.010 0.007 0.465 0.723 0.555 0.571 0.120 0.606 1.000      
Road Density 0.697 0.798 -0.098 -0.173 0.538 0.771 0.695 0.701 0.456 0.729 0.723 1.000     
Illiterate Rate -0.321 -0.353 0.004 -0.229 -0.150 -0.421 -0.345 -0.322 -0.266 -0.279 -0.451 -0.430 1.000    
Productivity 0.007 0.148 -0.114 0.054 0.114 0.253 0.359 0.334 -0.002 0.181 0.251 0.159 -0.147 1.000   
Anti-Corruption 0.035 0.081 0.152 0.357 -0.019 0.169 0.039 0.011 0.009 0.022 0.323 0.117 -0.410 0.209 1.000  
STD 0.520 0.662 0.039 0.093 0.407 0.766 0.565 0.571 0.375 0.528 0.595 0.492 -0.370 0.316 0.263 1.000 
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3.5 Empirical Results 
As in Chapter two, we only report the FGLS estimation results for log specifications in our 
main text, and we compare our main results with level results (in Appendix 3.4) and 
random effects results (in Appendix 3.5). 
3.5.1 Main Results 
Tables 3.5.1-3.5.3 are the results of the impact of environmental regulations on provincial 
FDI inflows when we allow the control for corruption and government efficiency to 
influence FDI location choice. These tables provide the log specification results using 
FGLS estimators. Each table includes two parts, depending on the two measures of FDI 
inflows, FDI/GDP on the left-hand-side and FDI/POP on the other. We start the 
estimations from the final regression (column 10) in Chapter two, then respectively add 
Anti-Corruption and STD and finally include both of them.  
Table 3.5.1 reports the results including the share of anti-industrial pollution investment to 
proxy environmental stringency. It shows that the negative effect of EI1 on provincial FDI 
inflows remains significant, but its absolute value increases slightly from 0.062 to 
approximately 0.070 (for both measures of FDI inflows). FDI is therefore attracted to 
provinces with relatively low environmental investments, i.e. provinces with relatively low 
environmental protection efforts.  
The coefficient on Anti-Corruption is positive and statistically significant, which means the 
province that has tackled more corruption would attract more FDI inflows. Column 13 on 
both sides of the table shows that the marginal effect of tackling corruption is 0.53. A 10 
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per cent increase of the control of corruption in a province would attract 5.3 per cent more 
FDI inflows.      
The coefficient on the government efficiency measure STD is also positive and significant. 
The numerical effect in column 13 on the left-hand-side is that a 0.1 increase in the 
government efficiency level is associated with a 6.2 per cent increase in FDI inflows to 
regional GDP.49 Regional government efficiency is therefore a significant determinant of 
foreign investment location choice.  
The results of other explanatory variables are very similar to those in Chapter two. Income 
still has a strong positive effect on FDI inflows. Manufacturing wage and its square have 
the expected signs. They are less significant when estimating on FDI/GDP but are more 
significant when estimating on FDI/POP. From Colum 13 on the right-hand-side, we find 
the turning point is at approximately 2,228 RMB yuan (approximately $466) which is less 
than the minimum wage level (2614 RMB yuan) in our sample, indicating that FDI prefers 
to locate in regions with low wage levels.50  
GIP, which proxies the regional agglomeration effects, remains insignificant and is not 
stable in signs. The population density coefficient is negative but not statistically different 
from zero. Turning to the two measures of infrastructure, railway density has a negative 
effect on FDI due to the relatively low railway densities in some significant FDI preferred 
provinces such as Guangdong, Jiangsu, Fujian and Zhejiang. The coefficient on road 
density shows that FDI prefers to locate in regions with good road transportation networks. 
                                                
49 [exp (0.60×0.1) – 1] ×100%= 6.18%. 
50 exp [8.48/(2×0.55)] = 2228.52. RMB2,228 is equivalent to $466 according to the middle exchange rate in 
1990 that $1=RMB4.78. 
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The sign and significance of the illiteracy rate and labour quality are also very similar to 
those in Chapter two, indicating that FDI is attracted by relatively low education levels. 
Table 3.5.1 also illustrates that the results of all explanatory variables are constant across all 
regressions no matter whether we normalise FDI inflows by regional GDP or by regional 
population.  
Table 3.5.2 shows the results including normalised administrative punishment cases as the 
measure of environmental regulation standards. The coefficient on Punish remains negative 
and significant and is stable in magnitude. From regression 13 on FDI/GDP, we find a 10 
per cent increase in environment litigiousness reduces the amount of FDI/GDP in a 
province by 0.82 per cent. FDI is demonstrated to be deterred by stringent environmental 
legislation. However, since the coefficient on EI1 is enlarged a little by adding new control 
variables, the difference between the coefficients on EI1 and Punish is not significant, 
especially when we regress on FDI/POP. The results of other control variables are very 
similar to those in Table 3.5.1. 
Table 3.5.3 are the results of the effect of normalised pollution emission charge on FDI 
inflows. As expected, Charge has a negative effect on FDI inflows and the effect is greater 
than the other two measures of environmental regulation. From the last column estimating 
on FDI/GDP, the marginal effect of Charge on the share of FDI in GDP is 0.33, i.e. an 
increase of 10 per cent in the pollution emission charge will lead 3.3 per cent reduction in 
the share of FDI to GDP of a province. FDI is therefore reduced by stringent 
implementation of pollution levies. 
The effects of Anti-Corruption and STD remain positive. From the regression on FDI/GDP, 
we find the marginal effect of tacking corruption is 0.60, which is slightly greater than the 
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effects including EI1 and Punish. The coefficient on STD is also greater than in the other 
two tables. The coefficient in column 13 on the left-hand-side is 0.66 and 0.72 on the other 
side, indicating the numerical effect that a 0.1 increase in the government efficiency level 
will increase 6.8 per cent amount of FDI/GDP or 7.5 per cent amount of FDI/POP .51   
The results on manufacturing wage are constant in signs but are not significant any more. 
We find positive and but insignificant coefficient on agglomeration effects variable GIP 
that is consistent with our findings in Chapter two. However, the population density 
coefficient is no longer significant after we add Anti-Corruption and STD to the regressions. 
The results of other control variable are constant across regressions and are similar to the 
other two tables.  
                                                
51 [exp (0.66×0.1) – 1]×100%= 6.82%, [exp (0.72×0.1) – 1]×100%= 7.47%. 
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Table 3.5.1 FGLS Regression Results for Log Data with EI1 
 
FDI/GDP  FDI/POP 
(10) (11) (12) (13)  (10) (11) (12) (13) 
EI1† 
-0.062 -0.069 -0.078 -0.070  -0.062 -0.070 -0.081 -0.073 
(-2.03)** (-2.30)** (-2.44)** (-2.17)**  (-1.96)** (-2.28)** (-2.47)** (-2.21)** 
GRP per capita 
3.44 3.46 3.34 3.45  3.98 3.97 3.74 3.88 
(4.86)*** (5.08)*** (4.48)*** (4.54)***  (5.74)*** (5.94)*** (5.12)*** (5.18)*** 
Wage 
6.49 7.01 7.75 7.09  8.54 8.75 9.49 8.48 
(1.68)* (1.81)* (1.78)* (1.59)  (2.22)** (2.26)** (2.17)** (1.88)* 
Wage2 
-0.40 -0.44 -0.48 -0.48  -0.52 -0.54 -0.58 -0.55 
(-1.71)* (-1.89)* (-1.84)* (-1.77)*  (-2.24)** (-2.29)** (-2.21)** (-2.02)** 
GIP 
-0.16 -0.042 -0.27 -0.21  0.045 0.17 -0.030 0.0096 
(-0.50) (-0.13) (-0.79) (-0.62)  (0.13) (0.54) (-0.09) (0.03) 
Pop. Density 
-1.13 -0.91 -0.61 -0.31  -0.92 -0.73 -0.33 0.021 
(-1.68)* (-1.33) (-0.93) (-0.47)  (-1.28) (-1.01) (-0.46) (0.03) 
Rail Density 
-0.25 -0.27 -0.23 -0.26  -0.20 -0.23 -0.19 -0.23 
(-2.32)** (-2.56)*** (-2.12)** (-2.45)**  (-1.78)** (-2.08)** (-1.66)* (-1.98)** 
Road Density 
0.45 0.34 0.46 0.37  0.47 0.35 0.48 0.37 
(5.30)*** (3.59)*** (4.93)*** (4.04)***  (5.47)*** (3.64)*** (4.80)*** (3.77)*** 
Illiterate Rate 
0.27 0.32 0.28 0.36  0.27 0.31 0.27 0.33 
(2.34)** (2.69)*** (2.38)** (2.94)***  (2.23)** (2.55)** (2.21)** (2.59)*** 
Productivity 
-0.18 -0.21 -0.16 -0.17  -0.17 -0.20 -0.17 -0.15 
(-1.47) (-1.85)* (-1.29) (-1.36)  (-1.34) (-1.77)* (-1.35) (-1.24) 
Anti-Corruption 
 0.43  0.53   0.42  0.53 
 (3.36)***  (3.87)***   (3.21)***  (3.84)*** 
STD 
  0.47 0.60    0.54 0.65 
  (1.92)* (2.59)***    (2.19)** (2.74)*** 
Constant 
-43.51 -46.22 -50.70 -48.44  -60.91 -62.13 -66.20 -63.07 
(-2.20)*** (-2.36)** (-2.32)** (-2.21)**  (-3.05)*** (-3.14)*** (-2.98)*** (-2.82)*** 
Wald χ2 7071.95 7950.17 6764.13 6977.84  13239.35 13662.04 11396.04 11187.17 
Observations 149 149 149 149  149 149 149 149 
z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs except STD; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time 
dummies are included. 
 182
Table 3.5.2 FGLS Regression Results for Log Data with Punish 
 
FDI/GDP  FDI/POP 
(10) (11) (12) (13)  (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Punish† 
-0.076 -0.087 -0.079 -0.082  -0.070 -0.079 -0.070 -0.074 
(-2.85)*** (-3.19)*** (-2.68)*** (-2.74)***  (-2.38)** (-2.64)*** (-2.26)** (-2.39)** 
GRP per capita 
3.85 3.95 3.74 3.78  4.36 4.42 4.02 4.11 
(5.75)*** (6.00)*** (4.98)*** (5.01)***  (6.58)*** (6.79)*** (5.37)*** (5.46)*** 
Wage 
5.73 6.15 7.04 6.34  7.67 7.92 8.62 7.78 
(-1.42) (1.51) (1.59) (1.40)  (1.91)* (1.94)* (1.93)* (1.69)* 
Wage2 
-0.36 -0.40 -0.44 -0.42  -0.47 -0.49 -0.53 -0.49 
(-1.48) (-1.62) (-1.66)* (-1.53)  (-1.94)* (-1.99)** (-1.98)** (-1.78)* 
GIP 
-0.36 -0.33 -0.40 -0.36  -0.13 -0.057 -0.14 -0.099 
(-1.17) (-1.07) (-1.23) (-1.06)  (-0.39) (-0.17) (-0.43) (-0.29) 
Pop. Density 
-1.02 -0.75 -0.60 -0.18  -0.77 -0.55 -0.19 0.23 
(-1.63) (-1.15) (-0.98) (-0.29)  (-1.13) (-0.79) (-0.28) (0.32) 
Rail Density 
-0.31 -0.34 -0.32 -0.33  -0.26 -0.29 -0.28 -0.29 
(-2.90)*** (-3.11)*** (-2.94)*** (-3.02)***  (-2.28)** (-2.56)** (-2.35)** (-2.46)** 
Road Density 
0.46 0.37 0.46 0.38  0.48 0.39 0.48 0.38 
(5.28)*** (4.11)*** (4.39)*** (3.79)***  (5.43)*** (4.17)*** (4.30)*** (3.59)*** 
Illiterate Rate 
0.21 0.27 0.24 0.30  0.20 0.24 0.23 0.26 
(1.83)* (2.21)** (1.86)* (2.28)**  (1.68)* (1.96)** (1.75)* (1.94)* 
Productivity 
-0.16 -0.19 -0.16 -0.20  -0.14 -0.17 -0.15 -0.16 
(-1.32) (-1.61) (-1.27) (-1.57)  (-1.14) (-1.45) (-1.15) (-1.28) 
Anti-Corruption 
 0.40  0.52   0.39  0.51 
 (3.06)***  (3.60)***   (2.87)***  (3.48)*** 
STD 
  0.42 0.56    0.49 0.62 
  (1.73)* (2.32)**    (1.98)** (2.48)** 
Constant 
-42.58 -45.50 -49.48 -48.18  -59.97 -61.98 -64.51 -63.26 
(-2.10)** (-2.26)** (-2.23)** (-2.17)**  (-2.92)*** (-3.03)*** (-2.85)*** (-2.78)*** 
Wald χ2 8466.13 8626.65 7454.09 7708.80  13589.33 14425.05 10759.08 11218.06 
Observations 147 147 147 147  147 147 147 147 
z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs except STD; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time 
dummies are included. 
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Table 3.5.3 FGLS Regression Results for Log Data with Charge 
 
FDI/GDP  FDI/POP 
(10) (11) (12) (13)  (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Charge† 
-0.18 -0.24 -0.27 -0.33  -0.17 -0.25 -0.26 -0.34 
(-1.54) (-2.23)** (-2.31)** (-2.78)***  (-1.50) (-2.25)** (-2.15)** (-2.86)*** 
GRP per capita 
3.47 3.39 3.12 3.16  4.02 3.88 3.54 3.57 
(4.80)*** (4.90)*** (4.02)*** (4.11)***  (5.77)*** (5.84)*** (4.65)*** (4.73)*** 
Wage 
3.26 3.48 3.71 2.79  5.47 5.21 5.38 3.85 
(0.77) (0.82) (0.79) (0.59)  (1.29) (1.23) (1.13) (0.80) 
Wage2 
-0.20 -0.22 -0.23 -0.19  -0.33 -0.31 -0.32 -0.25 
(-0.78) (-0.85) (-0.79) (-0.67)  (-1.28) (-1.20) (-1.12) (-0.85) 
GIP 
0.14 0.38 0.065 0.18  0.34 0.60 0.28 0.41 
(0.42) (1.16) (0.18) (0.50)  (0.97) (1.78)* (0.78) (1.15) 
Pop. Density 
-1.61 -1.42 -1.15 -0.74  -1.41 -1.25 -0.91 -0.44 
(-2.34)** (-2.08)** (-1.63) (-1.09)  (-1.92)* (-1.72)* (-1.17) (-0.59) 
Rail Density 
-0.37 -0.42 -0.42 -0.46  -0.31 -0.37 -0.38 -0.43 
(-3.34)*** (-3.99)*** (-3.74)*** (-4.17)***  (-2.68)*** (-3.41)*** (-3.12)*** (-3.69)*** 
Road Density 
0.44 0.33 0.45 0.33  0.46 0.34 0.45 0.31 
(4.46)*** (3.36)*** (3.62)*** (2.80)***  (4.57)*** (3.36)*** (3.53)*** (2.56)** 
Illiterate Rate 
0.22 0.27 0.18 0.22  0.21 0.26 0.19 0.20 
(1.68)* (2.21)** (1.23) (1.49)  (1.58) (2.09)** (1.26) (1.40) 
Productivity 
-0.16 -0.20 -0.18 -0.19  -0.16 -0.20 -0.19 -0.19 
(-1.32) (-1.76)* (-1.46) (-1.58)  (-1.25) (-1.72)* (-1.49) (-1.56) 
Anti-Corruption 
 0.45  0.60   0.45  0.61 
 (3.37)***  (4.19)***   (3.27)***  (4.26)*** 
STD 
  0.55 0.66    0.62 0.72 
  (2.19)** (2.81)***    (2.41)** (3.03)*** 
Constant 
-27.59 -28.47 -27.94 -25.02  -45.52 -44.21 -42.57 -37.42 
(-1.29) (-1.35) (-1.18) (-1.06)  (-2.09)** (-2.06)** (-1.75)* (-1.56) 
Wald χ2 6817.20 8440.52 7155.16 7966.66  12082.78 14087.79 11036.52 11985.42 
Observations 149 149 149 149  149 149 149 149 
z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs except STD; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time 
dummies are included.
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3.5.3 Level Data Results and Random Effects Results 
Appendix 3.4  
The level data results are relatively weaker than log models. The signs on the three 
environmental regulation variables remain negative, although they are not statistically 
different from zero. Income and wage variables are neither significant nor stable in signs. 
We find positively significant coefficients on GIP and population density which are 
consistent with our initial expectations. Railway density and road density have the same 
signs to our main results and remain significant across regressions. Neither of illiterate rate 
and productivity is significant or constant in signs. Anti-Corruption and STD have significant 
positive effects on FDI inflows which are consistent with our main results. 
The possible explanation of the weak level results is the positive skewness of variables and 
that the error term in level model is less homoskedestic than the log models.  
Appendix 3.5 
From the Hausman specification test results we find that most of the level data regressions 
are not efficient, therefore we only focus on the log specification results using GLS 
estimator. The log model results are roughly consistent with our main results but with less 
significance possibly because GLS estimator could not control for the autocorrelation 
within panels.   
 
 
 185
3.6 Conclusions  
In this chapter, we use Chinese provincial data to re-examine whether FDI is attracted by 
lax environmental regulations by allowing government anti-corruption effort and 
government efficiency to have impacts on FDI location choice.  
The methodology is very similar to that in Chapter two. We extend the estimating model 
by adding two variables to proxy the provincial government effort in fighting corruption 
and the provincial government efficiency. Other dependent and independent variables are 
the same as those in Chapter two. The log model results from FGLS estimator are 
consistent with our findings in Chapter two that environmental regulations have significant 
negative effect on FDI inflows. Additionally, we find that FDI is attracted to provinces that 
have tackled more corruption cases and that have higher grade of government efficiencies.  
Therefore, this chapter provides a clear guidance for the local governments which aims to 
alleviate environmental problems and at the same time, attract more FDI and retain the 
rapid economic growth. Although the enforcement of environmental regulations has 
negative effects on the investment in pollution-intensive sectors and hence may decrease 
the total investment in a region, the improvement of governance will largely increase the 
total foreign investment inflows. Policies include the enhancement in anti-corruption effort, 
increase in the supply of public goods, public services, and the improvement in national 
welfare. 
In this paper, we firstly construct data to proxy provincial government anti-corruption 
effort and update an index to measure cross-province government efficiency for six years. 
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We also firstly consider the impacts of provincial differences in environmental stringency 
and the government bureaucracy characteristics on the FDI inflows in China. 
However, we still do not consider the endogeneity of environmental regulations. 
Government anti-corruption effort and efficiency may influence FDI inflows through their 
impacts on environmental regulation stringency. Treating environmental stringency as 
endogenous becomes our main task in the next chapter.  
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Appendix 3.1 Explanations of the Government Efficient Indices 
1. Per Capita Government Budgetary Expenditures for Scientific and Technology 
Promotion: It refers to the expenses appropriated from the government budget for the 
scientific technological expenditure, including new products development expenditure, 
expenditure for intermediate trial and subsidies on important scientific researches.  
2. Rate of Products with Excellent Quality: It reflects the quality of products. Sampling 
data is collected from 73 main industrial cities in different regions. There are missing 
values for some regions.  
3. Three Types of Patent Applications Granted: Patent rights are granted for inventions, 
utility models and designs. This indicator reflects the achievements of science and 
technology and design with independent intellectual property.  
4. Per Capita Transaction value in Technical Market: It indicates the regional ability of 
transfer of scientific and technological achievements.  
5. Student-Teacher Ratio of Primary Schools: Student refers to the number of student 
enrolment and teacher refers to the number of teachers and staff in schools.  
6. Student-Teacher Ratio of Secondary Schools: Secondary schools refer to regular junior 
secondary schools, regular senior secondary schools, specialised secondary schools, and 
vocational secondary schools.  
7. Illiterate and Semi-illiterate Rate: Illiterate and semi-illiterate population refers to the 
population aged 15 and over, who are unable or very difficult to read. Data are 
obtained from the sample survey.  
8. The Share of Government Appropriation for Education in GDP: Education expenses 
refer to the expenses appropriated from the government budget for the expenditures 
on salaries and operational expenditure of the causes of education. 
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9. Institutions for Culture and Art: The institutions include art performance troupes, art 
performance places, cultural centres, public libraries, and museums.  
10. Beds in Health Institutions: Health institutions include hospital, health centre, clinic, 
centres for disease control (including epidemic prevention station), maternity and child 
care centre and other health institutions.  
11. Employed Persons in Health Institutions: Employed persons refer to all medical 
technical personnel (including doctors, assistant nurses, pharmacists, and laboratory 
technicians) and other employed persons working in health institutions.   
12. Three Accidents: These refer to the number of traffic accidents, fire accidents and 
pollution and destruction accidents.  
13. Losses in Three Accidents: These refer to the direct economic losses of three accidents 
converted into cash. 
20. Agro-Meteorological Services Stations: The stations include agro-meteorological 
observation stations, agro-meteorological stations, and agro-meteorological information 
services stations.  
21. Earthquake Monitoring Stations: The earthquake stations include fiducial stations, basic 
stations, provincial stations, city and county stations, and enterprises managing stations. 
22. Number of Careers Service. 
23. Number of Urban Community Welfare Facilities: The number of places, buildings and 
equipment used for urban community activities and services.  
24. Rural Social Security Network: The number of established rural social security network. 
25. State Budgetary Appropriation in Capital Construction and Innovation: Investment in 
capital construction and innovation from state budget consists of budgetary 
appropriations and loans from state budget. 
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26. Local – Central Government Projects Ratio of Investment in Capital Construction and 
Innovation: It reflects the administrative relationship of the fund sources in capital 
construction and innovation. Capital construction refers to the new construction 
projects or extension projects and related activities of the enterprises, institutions, or 
administrative units mainly for the purpose of expanding production capacity, covering 
only projects each with a total investment of 500,000 RMB yuan (about $60,459) and 
over. Innovation refers to the technological innovation of original facilities by the 
enterprises and institutions as well as the corresponding supplementary projects for 
production or welfare facilities and the related activities, covering only projects each 
with a total investment of 500,000 RMB yuan and over. 
27. Ratio of Projects Completed and Put into Use in Capital Construction and Innovation: 
It refers to the ratio of the number of projects completed and put into use in certain 
period of time to the number of projects under construction in the same period.  
28. Treatment Efficiency of Industrial Wastewater, Waste Gas and Solid Wastes: The 
average ratio of treated pollutants to the discharged pollutants. Industrial wastewater 
treatment efficiency refers to the ratio of the volume of industrial wastewater up to the 
discharged standards to the total volume of discharged wastewater. Waste gas treatment 
efficiency refers to the ratio of the volume of removed waste gas to the volume of 
waste gas emissions: for 1998-2000, it equals to the ratio of the removed soot and dust 
plus waste gas purified to the total waste gas emission; and for 2001-2003, it equals to 
the removed SO2 to the total SO2 emission. Solid wastes treatment efficiency refers to 
the ratio of the volume of industrial solid wastes utilised in a comprehensive way to the 
total solid wastes produced. 
30. Ratio of Area of Nature Reserves and Provincial Area: Nature reserves refer to certain 
areas of land, waters or sea that are representative in natural ecological systems, or are 
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natural habitats for rare or endangered wild animals or plants, or water conservation 
zones, or the location of important natural or historic relics, which are demarked by law 
and put under special protection and management. Nature reserves are designated by 
the formal approval of governments at and above county level. 
31. Rate of Access to Gas: It refers to the ratio of the urban population with access to gas 
to the total urban population at the end of reference period. 
32. Numbers Public Transportation Vehicles per 10 000 persons in Cities: Public 
transportation vehicles include bus, trolley, vehicles with tracks (metro, light railway, 
tram, ropeway and cable car), taxi, and public ferry. The standardised set = ∑ sets of 
each type of vehicle × corresponding coefficient. 
33. Per Capita Area of Paved Roads: paved road refers to paved roads with a width of 3.5 
meters and over (including roads in open-ended factory compounds and residential 
quarters) and paved surface including square bridges and tunnels connected with roads. 
34. Per Capita Green Area: Green area refers to those to the public such as municipal, 
community and neighbourhood parks and roadside parks, including waters within 
parks. Neighbourhood parks should occupy an area larger than 10,000 square meters, 
and the roadside parks should occupy an area larger than 400 square meters, with a 
width of more than 8 meters.   
35. Number of Public Toilet per 10 000 persons. 
36. Ratio of Staff and Workers in Government Agencies and Total Population: It refers to 
the ratio of the number of persons working in government agencies, party agencies, 
public management and social organisations to the number of total population. 
37. Ratio of Staff and Workers in Government Agencies and Total Employed Persons. 
38. Ratio of Government Consumption and Final Consumption: Government 
consumption refers to the expenditure on the consumption of the public services 
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provided by the government to the whole society and the net expenditure on the goods 
and services provided by the government to the households free of charge or at low 
prices. Final consumption refers to the total expenditure of resident units of purchases 
of goods and services from domestic economic territory and abroad to meet the 
requirements of materials, cultural and spiritual life. The final consumption consists of 
household consumption and government consumption.  
39. Ratio of Government Expenditures and GDP. 
40. The Share of Penalty and Confiscatory Income and Income from Administrative Fees 
in Total Government Revenue: Penalty and confiscatory income refers to the fines and 
converted income of confiscated properties collected by the government agencies, 
institutions and social organisations which have the rights to impose fines and 
confiscate delegated in accordance with laws, rules and regulations. Administrative fees 
refers to the fund not covered by the regular government budgetary management, 
which is collected by government agencies, institutions and social organisations while 
performing duties delegated to them or on behalf of the government in accordance 
with laws, rules and regulations.  
41. Per Capita Annual Net Income of Rural Households: It reflects the average income 
level of rural households in a given area. Net income refers to the total income of rural 
households from all sources minus all corresponding expenses, including household 
operation expenses, taxes and fees, depreciation of fixed assets for production, subsidy 
for participating in household survey, and gifts to non-rural relatives. Net income is 
mainly used as input for reproduction and as consumption expenditure of the year, and 
also used for savings and non-compulsory expenses of various forms.  
42. Per Capita Annual Disposable Income of Urban Households: Disposable income 
refers to the actual income at the disposal of members of the households which can be 
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used for final consumption, other non-compulsory expenditure and savings. It equals 
to total income minus income tax, personal contribution to social security and sample 
household subsidy for keeping diaries. 
43. Engle Coefficient of Rural Households: Engle coefficient refers to the percentage of 
expenditure on food in the total consumption expenditure. 
44. Engle Coefficient of Urban Households. 
45. Consumer price index: it reflects the trend and degree of changes in prices of consumer 
goods and services purchased by urban and rural residents, and is composite indices 
derived from the urban consumer price indices and the rural consumer price indices.  
46. GDP per capita. 
47. Ratio of Expenditure on Policy-related Subsidies and Government Expenditure: 
expenditure on policy-related subsidy refers to the expenditure appropriated, with the 
approval of the government, from the state budget for price subsidies on such products 
as grain, cotton and edible oil.  
 
Appendix 3.2 Hausman Specification Test 
We undertake the Hausman specification test to find out whether GLS estimator is BLUE, 
consistent and asymptotically efficient under the null hypothesis H0: 0)( =itit XE ε .The 
results below show that GLS estimator does not always produce efficient results especially 
for level data. Therefore we focus on fixed effect models but we also estimate equation 
(3.4.5) using GLS estimator for sensitivity check. 
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Table A3.2.1 Hausman Specification Test Results 
 Levels  
 
EI1  Punish  Charge 
FDI/GDP FDI/POP  FDI/GDP FDI/POP  FDI/GDP FDI/POP 
2χ  Statistics 12.74 26.57  19.97 38.44  17.05 27.98 
p-value 0.311 0.005 0.046    0.000 0.106 0.003    
 Logs  
 
EI1  Punish  Charge 
FDI/GDP FDI/POP  FDI/GDP FDI/POP  FDI/GDP FDI/POP 
2χ  Statistics 2.58 6.39  4.03 5.20  51.66 1.32  
p-value 0.011 0.983 0.999 0.995 0.000    1.000    
 
Appendix 3.3 Autocorrelation Test 
We apply the dynamic model, Ttititit ,,2,1 K=+= − νρεε  to the final regression equation 
(column 13 in results tables). The null hypothesis is H0: ρ  = 0. The t statistics show that 
we reject the null hypothesis for all log specifications. Therefore AR(1) autocorrelation 
exists within panels in our log specifications. 
Table A3.3.1 Autocorrelation Test Results 
 Levels  
 
EI1  Punish  Charge 
FDI/GDP FDI/POP  FDI/GDP FDI/POP  FDI/GDP FDI/POP 
ρˆ  0.039   -0.143   0.058  -0.123  0.061   -0.135   
t Statistics 0.42 -1.46  0.63  -1.24  0.66 -1.37 
p-value 0.678 0.147 0.532    0.217 0.513 0.174    
 Logs  
 
EI1  Punish  Charge 
FDI/GDP FDI/POP  FDI/GDP FDI/POP  FDI/GDP FDI/POP 
ρˆ  0.228   0.223  0.240   0.236  0.173   0.171   
t Statistics 2.58 2.52  2.73 2.67  2.01 1.98  
p-value 0.011 0.013 0.007 0.009 0.046    0.050    
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Appendix 3.4 FGLS Regression Results for Level Data 
Table A3.4.1 FGLS Regression Results for Level Data with EI1  
 
FDI/GDP  FDI/POP 
(10) (11) (12) (13)  (10) (11) (12) (13) 
EI1 
-0.045 -0.053 -0.037 -0.041  -0.015 -0.019 -0.013 -0.015 
(-2.03)** (-2.01)** (-1.70)* (-1.80)*  (-1.73)* (-1.35) (-1.26) (-1.15) 
GRP per capita 
0.043 0.025 0.032 -0.015  0.026 0.029 0.026 0.018 
(1.97)** (0.93) (1.50) (-0.52)  (1.96)** (1.87)* (1.91)* (1.13) 
Wage 
0.081 0.076 0.10 0.087  -0.011 0.00062 -0.0031 -0.0050 
(1.54) (1.30) (2.06)** (1.51)  (-0.39) (0.02) (-0.11) (-0.15) 
Wage2 
-8.39e-06 -6.94e-06 -9.01e-06 -5.04e-06  8.66e-07 9.42e-08 4.68e-07 9.12e-07 
(-2.27)** (-1.69)* (-2.44)** (-1.19)  (0.38) (0.04) (0.20) (0.34) 
GIP 
0.027 0.035 0.025 0.050  0.057 0.048 0.055 0.050 
(1.32) (1.55) (1.22) (2.29)**  (4.81)*** (3.65)*** (4.43)*** (3.94)*** 
Pop. Density 
0.18 0.30 0.23 0.45  0.42 0.49 0.43 0.55 
(0.52) (0.90) (0.66) (1.27)  (1.65)* (1.89)* (1.65)* (2.06)** 
Rail Density 
-1.29 -1.29 -1.29 -1.48  -0.64 -0.57 -0.54 -0.68 
(-3.30)*** (-2.95)*** (-3.46)*** (-3.41)***  (-2.87)*** (-2.34)** (-2.30)** (-2.77)*** 
Road Density 
0.025 0.018 0.029 0.014  0.010 0.012 0.012 0.013 
(2.70)*** (1.76)* (3.12)*** (1.38)  (1.94)* (2.00)** (2.15)** (2.10)** 
Illiterate Rate 
-1.59 -1.50 -0.90 0.54  -0.85 -1.16 -1.23 -0.77 
(-0.79) (-0.64) (-0.48) (0.26)  (-0.85) (-0.94) (-1.23) (-0.66) 
Productivity 
0.000011 -0.00012 -0.000075 -0.000025  0.00013 -0.000034 0.000091 -0.000037 
(0.03) (-0.33) (-0.25) (-0.08)  (0.91) (-0.19) (0.68) (-0.23) 
Anti-Corruption 
 13.40  33.94   7.95  12.61 
 (1.38)  (3.71)***   (1.62)  (2.65)*** 
STD 
  117.83 174.85    4.47 68.95 
  (2.49)** (3.01)***    (0.19) (2.21)** 
Constant 
483.67 575.46 340.59 713.77  276.16 85.37 155.17 169.99 
(1.00) (1.15) (0.71) (1.38)  (0.94) (0.26) (0.49) (0.51) 
Wald χ2 1814.28 1702.59 2424.43 1916.29  2965.54 2849.85 2865.97 2963.13 
Observations 149 149 149 149  149 149 149 149 
z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
 195
Table A3.4.2 FGLS Regression Results for Level Data with Punish  
 
FDI/GDP  FDI/POP 
(10) (11) (12) (13)  (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Punish 
-0.0082 -0.0042 -0.0064 -0.0049  -0.0040 -0.0023 -0.0032 -0.0020 
(-1.14) (-0.55) (-0.93) (-0.66)  (-0.77) (-0.42) (-0.65) (-0.39) 
GRP per capita 
0.049 0.025 0.032 -0.025  0.034 0.026 0.028 0.0094 
(1.96)** (0.86) (1.22) (-0.81)  (2.39)** (1.65)* (1.91)* (0.57) 
Wage 
0.091 0.081 0.11 0.081  0.0083 0.0062 0.0080 -0.0053 
(1.62) (1.35) (2.00)** (1.38)  (0.27) (0.18) (0.26) (-0.16) 
Wage2 
-9.58e-06 -7.64e-06 -9.59e-06 -4.73e-06  -6.83e-07 -1.83e-07 -4.31e-07 1.23e-06 
(-2.39)** (-1.76)* (2.38)** (-1.07)  (-0.28) (-0.07) (-0.17) (0.45) 
GIP 
0.028 0.039 0.031 0.058  0.054 0.051 0.055 0.055 
(1.34) (1.75)* (1.46) (2.63)***  (4.45)*** (3.90)*** (4.48)*** (4.36)*** 
Pop. Density 
0.17 0.30 0.26 0.52  0.40 0.52 0.44 0.61 
(0.49) (0.87) (0.71) (1.39)  (1.51) (1.95)* (1.64) (2.26)** 
Rail Density 
-1.34 -1.27 -1.39 -1.54  -0.54 -0.56 -0.56 -0.68 
(-3.29)*** (-2.84)*** (-3.49)*** (-3.45)***  (-2.37)** (-2.32)** (-2.39)** (-2.82)*** 
Road Density 
0.026 0.020 0.030 0.017  0.014 0.012 0.015 0.013 
(2.54)** (1.83)* (3.01)*** (1.55)  (2.31)** (1.83)* (2.33)** (1.91)* 
Illiterate Rate 
-2.08 -2.19 -0.98 0.066  -1.12 -1.08 -1.07 -0.66 
(-0.97) (-0.91) (-0.50) (0.03)  (-1.06) (-0.88) (-1.09) (-0.59) 
Productivity 
0.000078 -0.000029 -2.13e-06 2.10e-06  0.000086 0.000033 0.00010 0.000022 
(0.24) (-0.08) (-0.01) (0.01)  (0.64) (0.20) (0.83) (0.16) 
Anti-Corruption 
 7.31  30.85   7.06  13.37 
 (0.67)  (3.09)***   (1.37)  (2.74)*** 
STD 
  143.11 226.58    18.78 85.41 
  (2.73)*** (3.83)***    (0.81) (2.68)*** 
Constant 
428.34 539.94 364.80 786.02  54.51 52.00 84.01 190.56 
(0.86) (1.06) (0.73) (1.49)  (0.18) (0.16) (0.26) (0.57) 
Wald χ2 2156.02 1750.57 2504.41 1988.63  2875.18 2895.56 2923.34 3097.32 
Observations 147 147 147 147  147 147 147 147 
z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Table A3.4.3 FGLS Regression Results for Level Data with Charge 
 
FDI/GDP  FDI/POP 
(10) (11) (12) (13)  (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Charge 
-0.0028 -0.00047 -0.0073 -0.0053  0.00025 -0.00022 -0.00020 -0.0021 
(-0.38) (-0.06) (-1.03) (-0.75)  (0.07) (-0.06) (-0.06) (-0.56) 
GRP per capita 
0.038 0.021 0.027 -0.023  0.028 0.024 0.023 0.011 
(1.62) (0.79) (1.14) (-0.82)  (2.06)** (1.55) (1.65)* (0.67) 
Wage 
0.079 0.078 0.096 0.077  -0.00078 0.0038 -0.0016 -0.0059 
(1.47) (1.32) (1.82)* (1.34)  (-0.03) (0.12) (-0.05) (-0.18) 
Wage2 
-8.31e-06 -7.41e-06 -8.20e-06 -4.35e-06  3.03e-07 1.14e-07 5.51e-07 1.35e-06 
(-2.18)** (-1.76)* (2.15)** (-1.01)  (0.13) (0.04) (0.23) (0.51) 
GIP 
0.034 0.042 0.036 0.061  0.058 0.053 0.059 0.056 
(1.71)* (1.95)* (1.81)* (2.87)***  (5.24)*** (4.28)*** (5.20)*** (4.75)*** 
Pop. Density 
0.22 0.31 0.28 0.51  0.38 0.50 0.42 0.58 
(0.62) (0.90) (0.77) (1.40)  (1.48) (1.90)* (1.60) (2.17)** 
Rail Density 
-1.28 -1.27 -1.41 -1.57  -0.52 -0.56 -0.56 -0.71 
(-3.20)*** (-2.89)*** (-3.52)*** (-3.49)***  (-2.34)** (-2.29)** (-2.41)** (-2.83)*** 
Road Density 
0.026 0.021 0.030 0.018  0.013 0.012 0.014 0.013 
(2.78)*** (2.04)** (3.17)*** (1.72)*  (2.31)** (2.01)** (2.39)** (2.12)** 
Illiterate Rate 
-1.75 -1.98 -0.64 0.30  -1.07 -0.99 -1.02 -0.50 
(-0.83) (-0.83) (-0.33) (0.14)  (-1.01) (-0.81) (-1.01) (-0.44) 
Productivity 
0.000094 -0.000028 0.000015 0.000018  0.000093 0.000024 0.000090 0.000018 
(0.28) (-0.08) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.66) (0.14) (0.68) (0.12) 
Anti-corruption 
 6.55  28.83   6.65  12.69 
 (0.62)  (2.89)***   (1.32)  (2.64)*** 
STD 
  146.87 226.74    24.39 84.25 
  (2.80)*** (3.80)***    (1.02) (2.61)*** 
Constant 
500.04 578.31 460.62 814.96  138.55 91.03 172.41 219.20 
(1.02) (1.14) (0.93) (1.55)  (0.46) (0.29) (0.55) (0.67) 
Wald χ2 2265.33 1813.27 2559.56 1989.22  3058.95 3015.52 3051.61 3182.84 
Observations 149 149 149 149  149 149 149 149 
z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Appendix 3.5 Random Effects Results  
Table A3.5.1 Random Effects Results for Level Data with EI1  
 
FDI/GDP  FDI/POP 
(10) (11) (12) (13)  (10) (11) (12) (13) 
EI1 
-0.063 -0.068 -0.060 -0.066  -0.054 -0.056 -0.054 -0.056 
(-1.35) (-1.49) (-1.35) (-1.51)  (-1.77)* (2.00)** (-1.78)* (1.99)** 
GRP per capita 
0.057 0.052 0.040 0.032  0.054 0.051 0.054 0.051 
(2.21)** (2.15)** (1.26) (1.08)  (3.16)*** (3.32)*** (2.66)*** (2.83)*** 
Wage 
0.21 0.212 0.20 0.21  0.079 0.081 0.078 0.080 
(3.39)*** (3.36)*** (3.26)*** (3.26)***  (1.72)* (1.74)* (1.69)* (1.70)* 
Wage2 
-0.000016 -0.000016 -0.000015 -0.000015  -4.78e-06 -4.56e-06 -4.76e-06 -4.51e-06 
(-3.21)*** (-3.15)*** (-2.92)*** (-2.81)***  (-1.30) (-1.23) (-1.26) (-1.19) 
GIP 
0.0046 0.0038 0.0042 0.0036  0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
(0.19) (0.15) (0.17) (0.1)  (0.65) (0.65) (0.64) (0.64) 
Pop. Density 
-0.059 -0.031 -0.0088 0.035  0.073 0.089 0.075 0.093 
(-0.44) (-0.24) (-0.06) (0.22)  (0.79) (0.97) (0.72) (0.90) 
Rail Density 
-0.92 -0.96 -0.95 -1.01  -0.43 -0.45 -0.44 -0.46 
(-2.11)** (-2.04)** (-2.20)** (-2.15)**  (-1.42) (-1.39) (-1.44) (-1.42) 
Road Density 
0.050 0.047 0.053 0.049  0.026 0.025 0.026 0.025 
(1.64) (1.60) (1.86)* (1.77)*  (1.27) (1.25) (1.29) (1.26) 
Illiterate Rate 
-4.44 -4.47 -3.80 -3.74  -1.39 -1.48 -1.45 -1.52 
(-1.62) (-1.59) (-1.44) (-1.36)  (-0.83) (-0.87) (-0.87) (-0.88) 
Productivity 
-0.00021 -0.00022 -0.00038 -0.00039  -0.00024 -0.00024 -0.00023 -0.00024 
(-0.47) (-0.47) (-0.78) (-0.80)  (-0.78) (-0.78) (-0.73) (-0.76) 
Anti-Corruption 
 10.23  15.30   5.89  6.08 
 (0.41)  (0.62)   (0.36)  (0.37) 
STD 
  165.86 180.44    -4.74 1.49 
  (1.46) (1.64)    (-0.07) (0.02) 
Constant 
-366.71 -394.572 -330.00 -369.64  -270.32 -283.17 -268.00 -279.20 
(-2.09)** (-1.81)* (-1.76)* (-1.65)*  (-2.12)** (-1.88)* (-2.00)** (-1.80)* 
R2 0.67 0.65 0.67 0.65  0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 
Observations 149 149 149 149  149 149 149 149 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included.
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Table A3.5.2 Random Effects Results for Log Data with EI1 
 
FDI/GDP  FDI/POP 
(10) (11) (12) (13)  (10) (11) (12) (13) 
EI1† 
-0.057 -0.063 -0.062 -0.070  -0.058 -0.064 -0.063 -0.071 
(-0.66) (-0.69) (-0.76) (-0.81)  (-0.67) (-0.70) (-0.77) (-0.83) 
GRP per capita 
1.50 1.43 1.13 1.03  2.45 2.38 2.06 1.95 
(3.56)*** (3.61)*** (2.43)** (2.31)**  (5.83)*** (5.99)*** (4.46)*** (4.40)*** 
Wage 
8.22 7.85 9.36 8.75  10.35 9.94 11.52 10.88 
(1.31) (1.25) (1.45) (1.34)  (1.70)* (1.64) (1.83)* (1.71)* 
Wage2 
-0.53 -0.50 -0.60 -0.55  -0.66 -0.63 -0.73 -0.68 
(-1.42) (-1.36) (-1.56) (-1.44)  (-1.83)* (-1.75)* (-1.94)* (-1.82)* 
GIP 
-0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.14  -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 
(-1.08) (-1.13) (-1.03) (-1.06)  (-0.82) (-0.86) (-0.76) (-0.78) 
Pop. Density 
0.28 0.31 0.30 0.33  0.25 0.28 0.27 0.31 
(1.14) (1.25) (1.25) (1.40)  (1.02) (1.15) (1.13) (1.29) 
Rail Density 
-0.29 -0.32 -0.34 -0.37  -0.27 -0.29 -0.32 -0.35 
(-2.34)** (-2.52)** (-2.73)*** (-2.86)***  (-2.13)** (-2.33)** (-2.52)** (-2.66)*** 
Road Density 
0.52 0.52 0.60 0.59  0.52 0.52 0.60 0.58 
(2.32)** (2.29)** (2.72)*** (2.63)***  (2.28)** (2.24)** (2.71)*** (2.62)*** 
Illiterate Rate 
0.097 0.12 0.11 0.13  0.10 0.12 0.11 0.14 
(0.37) (0.43) (0.43) (0.50)  (0.39) (0.45) (0.45) (0.53) 
Productivity 
0.15 0.14 0.078 0.058  0.17 0.15 0.093 0.073 
(0.64) (0.58) (0.34) (0.25)  (0.72) (0.65) (0.40) (0.31) 
Anti-Corruption 
 0.24  0.30   0.25  0.31 
 (0.90)  (1.13)   (0.92)  (1.15) 
STD 
  0.97 0.99    1.01 1.04 
  (2.48)** (2.61)***    (2.56)** (2.70)*** 
Constant 
-43.61 -41.92 -45.09 -42.28  -61.42 -59.61 -62.93 -59.98 
(-1.61) (-1.54) (-1.63) (-1.51)  (-2.35)** (-2.27)** (-2.34)** (-2.20)** 
R2 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.71  0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 
Observations 149 149 149 149  149 149 149 149 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs except STD; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province 
and time dummies are included. 
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Table A3.5.3 Random Effect Results for Level Data with Punish  
 
FDI/GDP  FDI/POP 
(10) (11) (12) (13)  (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Punish 
0.012 0.011 0.011 0.0095  0.0062 0.0058 0.0062 0.0058 
(0.79) (0.72) (0.76) (0.64)  (0.65) (0.60) (0.64) (0.59) 
GRP per capita 
0.053 0.051 0.036 0.031  0.051 0.050 0.051 0.050 
(1.94)* (1.97)** (1.08) (0.98)  (2.84)*** (3.06)*** (2.39)** (2.62)*** 
Wage 
0.21 0.21 0.20 0.21  0.077 0.077 0.077 0.076 
(3.36)*** (3.29)*** (3.21)*** (3.18)***  (1.68)* (1.66)* (1.64) (1.62) 
Wage2 
-0.000016 -0.000016 -0.000015 -0.000015  -4.51e-06 -4.39e-06 -4.48e-06 -4.32e-06 
(-3.08)*** (-3.04)*** (-2.78)*** (-2.70)***  (-1.20) (-1.16) (-1.17) (-1.12) 
GIP 
0.0065 0.0059 0.0062 0.00657  0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
(0.26) (0.23) (0.24) (0.22)  (0.71) (0.71) (0.70) (0.70) 
Pop. Density 
-0.042 -0.024 0.010 0.044  0.085 0.095 0.088 0.10 
(-0.30) (-0.18) (-0.06) (-0.27)  (0.89) (1.00) (0.81) (0.93) 
Rail Density 
-0.93 -0.96 -0.96 -1.01  -0.45 -0.47 -0.45 -0.48 
(-2.09)** (2.00)** (2.19)** (2.10)**  (-1.45) (-1.40) (-1.47) (-1.42) 
Road Density 
0.052 0.049 0.055 0.052  0.028 0.027 0.027 0.027 
(1.64) (1.65)* (1.86)* (1.81)*  (1.28) (1.30) (1.32) (1.32) 
Illiterate Rate 
-4.36 -4.38 -3.70 -3.66  -1.41 -1.49 -1.45 -1.53 
(-1.62) (-1.60) (-1.42) (-1.36)  (-0.82) (-0.86) (-0.85) (-0.87) 
Productivity 
-0.000062 -0.000059 -0.00024 -0.00024  -0.00012 -0.00011 -0.00011 -0.00012 
(-0.14) (-0.13) (-0.51) (-0.51)  (-0.39) (-0.37) (-0.37) (-0.37) 
Anti-Corruption 
 5.65  11.00   2.44  2.65 
 (0.22)  (0.43)   (0.14)  (0.15) 
STD 
  171.34 182.63    0.26 3.79 
  (1.50) (1.66)*    (0.00) (0.06) 
Constant 
-393.05 -406.79 -352.34 -379.27  -285.60 -287.04 -282.25 -282.68 
(-2.25)** (-1.87)* (-1.87)* (-1.68)*  (-2.24)** (-1.91)* (2.10)** (-1.81)* 
R2 0.67 0.66 0.67 0.65  0.88 0.87 0.88 0.87 
Observations 147 147 147 147  147 147 147 147 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Table A3.5.4 Random Effects Results for Log Data with Punish 
 
FDI/GDP  FDI/POP 
(10) (11) (12) (13)  (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Punish† 
-0.050 -0.054 -0.047 -0.053  -0.048 -0.053 -0.046 -0.052 
(-0.76) (-0.82) (-0.72) (-0.81)  (-0.73) (-0.81) (-0.70) (-0.80) 
GRP per capita 
1.50 1.42 1.14 1.026  2.45 2.37 2.07 1.96 
(3.59)*** (3.52)*** (2.48)** (2.27)**  (5.91)*** (5.89)*** (4.54)*** (4.35)*** 
Wage 
7.37 6.68 8.45 7.55  9.54 8.83 10.65 9.73 
(1.14) (1.02) (1.27) (1.11)  (1.52) (1.39) (1.63) (1.46) 
Wage2 
-0.48 -0.43 -0.55 -0.49  -0.61 -0.56 -0.68 -0.62 
(-1.27) (-1.13) (-1.39) (-1.21)  (-1.66) (-1.51) (-1.77)* (-1.57) 
GIP 
-0.16 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15  -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 
(-1.10) (-1.10) (-1.06) (-1.05)  (-0.84) (-0.85) (-0.79) (-0.77) 
Pop. Density 
0.28 0.32 0.30 0.34  0.25 0.29 0.27 0.32 
(1.15) (1.27) (1.27) (1.42)  (1.03) (1.15) (1.14) (1.30) 
Rail Density 
-0.31 -0.33 -0.36 -0.38  -0.29 -0.31 -0.34 -0.36 
(-2.44)** (-2.56)** (-2.85)*** (-2.89)***  (-2.26)** (-2.38)** (-2.65)*** (-2.70)*** 
Road Density 
0.53 0.51 0.60 0.58  0.53 0.51 0.61 0.58 
(2.28)** (2.18)** (2.65)*** (2.51)**  (2.26)** (2.16)** (2.66)*** (2.52)** 
Illiterate Rate 
0.074 0.096 0.087 0.11  0.078 0.10 0.091 0.12 
(0.28) (0.35) (0.34) (0.43)  (0.30) (0.37) (0.35) (0.45) 
Productivity 
0.14 0.13 0.069 0.051  0.16 0.14 0.084 0.066 
(0.63) (0.56) (0.31) (0.22)  (0.71) (0.64) (0.38) (0.29) 
Anti-Corruption 
 0.26  0.31   0.26  0.31 
 (0.96)  (1.16)   (0.96)  (1.18) 
STD 
  0.96 0.99    1.00 1.03 
  (2.47)** (2.60)***    (2.54)** (2.67)*** 
Constant 
-39.70 -36.70 -41.01 -36.99  -57.74 -54.64 -59.06 -54.92 
(-1.41) (-1.29) (-1.43) (-1.25)  (-2.12)** (-1.97)** (-2.10)** (-1.90)* 
R2 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.70  0.84 0.84 0.84 0.83 
Observations 147 147 147 147  147 147 147 147 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs except STD; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province 
and time dummies are included. 
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Table A3.5.5 Random Effect Results for Level Data with Charge 
 
FDI/GDP  FDI/POP 
(10) (11) (12) (13)  (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Charge 
0.0080 0.0082 0.0060 0.0059  0.0028 0.0030 0.0029 0.0031 
(0.61) (0.61) (0.46) (0.43)  (0.27) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) 
GRP per capita 
0.055 0.052 0.039 0.032  0.052 0.051 0.053 0.051 
(2.09)** (2.10)** (1.19) (1.06)  (3.03)*** (3.27)*** (2.55)** (2.79)*** 
Wage 
0.22 0.22 0.21 0.22  0.083 0.084 0.083 0.083 
(3.31)*** (3.33)*** (3.17)*** (3.18)***  (1.87)* (1.92)* (1.85)* (1.89)* 
Wage2 
-0.000017 -0.000017 -0.000016 -0.000016  -5.06e-06 -4.94e-06 -5.08e-06 -4.93e-06 
(-3.07)*** (-3.01)*** (-2.77)*** (-2.66)***  (-1.36) (-1.30) (-1.34) (-1.27) 
GIP 
0.0060 0.0058 0.0057 0.0055  0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
(0.25) (0.23) (0.24) (0.22)  (0.72) (0.72) (0.71) (0.71) 
Pop. Density 
-0.078 -0.058 -0.022 0.015  0.067 0.077 0.067 0.079 
(-0.60) (-0.46) (-0.14) (-0.10)  (0.71) (0.81) (0.63) (0.73) 
Rail Density 
-0.91 -0.94 -0.945 -0.99  -0.43 -0.45 -0.43 -0.45 
(-2.12)** (-2.02)** (-2.22)** (-2.12)**  (-1.44) (-1.39) (-1.46) (-1.40) 
Road Density 
0.052 0.049 0.055 0.051  0.027 0.027 0.027 0.026 
(1.73)* (1.73)* (1.93)* (1.87)*  (1.35) (1.36) (1.38) (1.37) 
Illiterate Rate 
-4.57 -4.58 -3.91 -3.84  -1.40 -1.48 -1.46 -1.52 
(-1.70)* (-1.67)* (-1.50) (-1.41)  (-0.82) (-0.84) (-0.85) (-0.86) 
Productivity 
-0.000096 -0.000094 -0.00026 -0.00026  -0.00013 -0.00013 -0.00013 -0.00013 
(-0.21) (-0.21) (-0.55) (-0.55)  (-0.43) (-0.43) (-0.40) (-0.40) 
Anti-corruption 
 6.71  11.80   3.29  3.34 
 (0.26)  (0.47)   (0.19)  (0.20) 
STD 
  162.87 175.20    -5.35 -1.48 
  (1.47) (1.64)    (-0.08) (-0.02) 
Constant 
-436.22 -455.90 -386.22 -416.68  -306.40 -313.40 -306.28 -311.59 
(-2.32)** (-2.10)** (-1.93)* (-1.85)*  (-2.60)*** (-2.38)** (-2.48)** (-2.27)** 
R2 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.65  0.88 0.88 0.88 0.87 
Observations 149 149 149 149  149 149 149 149 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Table A3.5.6 Random Effects Results for Log Data with Charge 
 
FDI/GDP  FDI/POP 
(10) (11) (12) (13)  (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Charge† 
-0.25 -0.27 -0.31 -0.33  -0.25 -0.27 -0.31 -0.33 
(-1.26) (-1.38) (-1.57) (-1.70)  (-1.22) (-1.34) (-1.54) (-1.67) 
GRP per capita 
1.49 1.41 1.09 0.97  2.44 2.36 2.01 1.90 
(3.68)*** (3.68)*** (2.43)** (2.24)**  (6.08)*** (6.17)*** (4.56)*** (4.42)*** 
Wage 
5.56 4.86 6.27 5.30  7.69 6.98 8.42 7.43 
(0.86) (0.74) (0.97) (0.80)  (1.23) (1.10) (1.33) (1.14) 
Wage2 
-0.37 -0.32 -0.41 -0.34  -0.49 -0.45 -0.54 -0.47 
(-0.96) (-0.82) (-1.06) (-0.87)  (-1.33) (-1.19) (-1.43) (-1.22) 
GIP 
-0.15 -0.15 -0.13 -0.13  -0.11 -0.11 -0.097 -0.096 
(-1.02) (-1.06) (-0.96) (-0.98)  (-0.77) (-0.80) (-0.68) (-0.70) 
Pop. Density 
0.35 0.39 0.39 0.44  0.33 0.36 0.36 0.41 
(1.43) (1.57) (1.64) (1.82)  (1.30) (1.46) (1.52) (1.71) 
Rail Density 
-0.31 -0.33 -0.37 -0.40  -0.29 -0.31 -0.35 -0.38 
(-2.54)** (-2.68)*** (-3.00)*** (-3.06)***  (-2.36)** (-2.51)** (-2.81)*** (-2.89)*** 
Road Density 
0.49 0.47 0.56 0.53  0.48 0.47 0.55 0.53 
(2.08)** (2.01)** (2.47)** (2.34)**  (2.04)** (1.97)** (2.46)** (2.32)** 
Illiterate Rate 
0.11 0.13 0.12 0.15  0.11 0.14 0.12 0.15 
(0.42) (0.51) (0.49) (0.59)  (0.44) (0.52) (0.51) (0.61) 
Productivity 
0.17 0.16 0.094 0.075  0.19 0.17 0.11 0.090 
(0.77) (0.71) (0.43) (0.34)  (0.85) (0.78) (0.51) (0.41) 
Anti-Corruption 
 0.25  0.32   0.26  0.32 
 (0.95)  (1.19)   (0.96)  (1.21) 
STD 
  1.06 1.09    1.10 1.13 
  (2.84)*** (2.96)***    (2.92)*** (3.05)*** 
Constant 
-31.22 -28.09 -30.25 -25.86  -49.09 -45.90 -48.02 -43.54 
(-1.11) (-0.98) (-1.07) (-0.89)  (-1.79)* (-1.65)* (-1.75)* (-1.54) 
R2 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.72  0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 
Observations 149 149 149 149  149 149 149 149 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; † all the independent variables are in logs except STD; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Province 
and time dummies are included.
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4.1 Introduction 
In previous chapters, we find the evidence for the existence of pollution haven behaviour 
of FDI within China, i.e. FDI is attracted to regions with weak environmental regulations. 
However, environmental policy may be influenced by local government behaviour. Local 
authorities sometimes tolerate environmental violations, driven by the need to boost 
economic growth. For example, in 2006 the two serious pollution incidents in Gansu and 
Hunan Provinces were both caused by negligence and malpractice of the local government 
and environmental departments, which ignored people’s health in favour of economic 
growth.52 The relationship between polluting industries and local officials may therefore 
weaken the level of environmental enforcement. Governments’ failure to fulfil their 
environmental responsibilities and interference in environmental law enforcement are the 
main reasons for some of China’s persistent environmental problems. Therefore, it is 
possible that local government may reduce the environmental regulations in low FDI 
regions in order to attract more investment. Hence, government behaviour may impact on 
FDI inflows through their impact on environmental regulations. 
In this chapter, we use the same dataset that we use in Chapters two and three to revisit the 
pollution haven debate but this time we treat our three measures of environmental 
                                                
52 Huixian County Non-Ferrous Metal Smelter Co Ltd, which produced about 5,000 tons of lead a year, had 
never operated anti-pollution equipment, despite being upgraded in 2004, and was guilty of illegal waste 
discharges ever since it began operations in 1996. The factory continued to operate secretly after being told to 
stop production in early 2006. The lead poisoning resulted in the hospitalisation of 250 children under age 14 
and left hundreds of others with excessive amounts of lead in the blood, at Huixian County in Gansu 
Province. The chairman of the polluting smelter, and other 19 officials (mostly county-level officials and city 
environmental authorities) received various punishments for their roles in the lead contamination scandal. 
The other serious pollution incident was caused by two factories in Yueyang County in Hunan Province that 
released wastewater with high concentrations of an arsenic compound into the Xinqiang River, affecting the 
water supply for 80,000 residents in the lower reaches. The head and a deputy head of the local 
environmental protection bureau were fired and other five officials were given warning and other penalties. 
The two plants were closed and the managers of the two companies have been arrested, facing criminal 
charges and prosecution (China View, 2006a, 2006b and 2007).  
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regulations as endogenous. First, we examine whether environmental regulations have a 
negative effect on FDI inflows across Chinese provinces, and second, we examine the role 
of government characteristics (anti-corruption effort and government efficiency) play in the 
determination of environmental stringency.  
Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004) summarise two issues that complicate empirical tests of 
the pollution haven hypothesis: unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity. The first issue 
has been addressed in previous chapters by using panel data and incorporating regional 
fixed effects. The second issue is that both environmental regulations and FDI may be 
endogenous. On one hand, Henderson and Millimet (2007) argue that regulatory stringency 
may be related to bureaucratic corruption (Fredriksson et al. 2003), political climate, or the 
presence of industry subsidies used to offset the costs of pollution abatement (Eliste and 
Fredriksson, 2002). On the other hand, there are causal relationships between FDI and 
environmental regulations running in both directions, i.e. environmental regulations could 
be a function of FDI (Brunnermeier and Levinson, 2004).53 The solution of the second 
issue is to employ an instrumental variable approach to account for the endogeneity of 
environmental stringency.   
Within the pollution haven literature some studies focusing on trade and environmental 
regulations have found more robust evidence of a moderate pollution haven effect, for 
instance, Ederington and Minier (2003) and Levinson and Taylor (2008). They find that 
pollution abatement costs and expenditures (PACE) have no impact on US exports when 
the PACE are treated as exogenous, but have significant impact when PACE are treated as 
endogenous.  
                                                
53 For example, if higher FDI leads to higher income, and higher income leads to greater demand for 
environmental quality, then environmental regulations could be a function of FDI (Brunnermeier and 
Levinson, 2004). 
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Evidence is also provided by empirical studies focusing on FDI and environmental 
stringency. Xing and Kolstad (2002) is the first study to take into account the endogeneity 
of environmental regulations. Due to a lack of regulation data, the stringency of 
environmental regulations is expressed as an inverse function of pollution emissions (SO2), 
i.e. environmental stringency is determined by SO2 emissions and other variables. Then 
they substitute this function for environmental regulations in the FDI model. They employ 
instruments for SO2 emissions and investigate outbound US FDI to 22 countries in six 
manufacturing sectors. The cross-section estimation suggests positive significant 
coefficients on SO2 emissions for the two most pollution intensive industries, chemicals 
and primary metals only, i.e. FDI is an increasing function of lax environmental regulations 
for these two sectors. In general, the results indicate that lax environmental policy in a 
foreign host country tends to attract more FDI from the US for pollution intensive 
industries.   
Another paper that considers the endogeniety of environmental policy is Fredriksson et al. 
(2003) when examining the intra-country pollution haven effects of US inbound FDI. In 
this paper, they also allow for the impact of differences in regional corruption levels. In a 
model of international capital flows, capital flows have a positive relationship with the 
pollution emission levels, i.e. capital flows are reduced by stringent environmental 
standards. When considering the effect of corruption, the model suggests that corruption 
influences capital flows through two channels. First, corruption influences the level of 
capital stock through its effect on environmental policy, and this effect is positive (negative) 
if an increase in corruption results in greater capital inflows (outflows). Second, corruption 
influences capital flows through its impact on public goods, and this effect is negative 
because the theft of public funds reduces the expenditure on productivity enhancing public 
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goods and thus lowers the productivity of capital. Therefore, conditional on environmental 
regulation and public goods, corruption has no measurable effect on FDI inflows.  
Fredriksson et al. (2003) use state-level panel data from 1977 to 1987 to test the predictions 
of their model. The first stage results confirm their theory that corruption has a significant 
effect on environmental stringency and the supply of public goods. From the second stage 
results, they find public expenditure and environmental stringency to have an impact upon 
FDI in some sectors; while conditional on environmental policy and supply of public 
goods, they do not find a remaining influence of corruption on FDI inflows. Additionally, 
the effects of environmental stringency are found to be sensitive to the exogeneity 
assumption, which explains the significant effect of environmental regulations compared 
with the previous literature. 
The majority of previous theoretical and empirical papers in this area investigate the effects 
of differences in the stringency of environmental regulations on FDI. The influence of FDI 
on environmental policy is ignored. Cole el al. (2006) firstly address this weakness and 
develop a political economy model of local environmental policymaking. The model 
assumes an imperfectly competitive local goods market containing both local and foreign 
firms, which jointly lobby the local government for a favourable pollution tax. The impact 
of FDI on environmental stringency is conditional on the government’s degree of 
corruptibility. If the degree of corruptibility is low (high), FDI leads to more (less) stringent 
environmental policy. Using panel data containing 33 developed and developing countries 
from 1982 to 1992, the empirical results are consistent with their predictions of the model. 
The results also suggest that the overall effect of corruption on environmental stringency is 
negative at the mean level of FDI stock, however, positive at the mean level of FDI flows.    
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In this chapter, we control for the endogeneity of environmental regulations to investigate 
whether or not intra-country pollution haven effects exist within China. The results show 
that two of our measures of environmental stringency, Punish and Charge, are exogenous in 
our estimation, i.e. only EI1 is endogenous. After controlling for endogeneity, we find EI1 
has a negative effect on FDI inflows and the magnitude of this effect is much larger than 
that in Chapter three, indicating that the previous estimation involving EI1 is biased 
downwards. Such an effect is generally robust using different measures of FDI and a 
fixed-effects estimator; however, it is not robust using different instrumental variables and 
random-effects estimator. 
The organisation of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 describes the empirical model 
and the variables. Section 4.3 reports the results and Section 4.4 concludes. 
 
4.2 Empirical Model and Variables 
To consider the endogeneity of environmental regulations, the model of Fredriksson et al. 
(2003) suggests that corruption plays an important role in the determination of 
environmental regulations, but has no remaining effect on FDI conditional on 
environmental policy and the supply of public goods. Therefore, corruption is excluded in 
their main model and included as a determinant of FDI for the robustness checks. 
However, in the case of China, we cannot find any reliable index to measure the regional 
government corruption level. Following Chapter three, we examine the impact of 
government anti-corruption effort and government efficiency on environmental regulations. 
In addition, we have illustrated that government anti-corruption effort and government 
 209
efficiency do have effects on inter-province FDI location choice in China. Therefore, these 
two government characteristic variables are also included in our main model.  
The following empirical model is the same as that in Chapter three. 
ittiititititit STDCorruptionAntiXERFDI εγηββββα ++++−+++= −−−− 14131211  
(4.2.1) 
where 
FDI is the amount of FDI inflow into region i in time period t; 
ER is the vector of measures to capture environmental stringency; 
X is the set of other regional characteristics that may affect FDI; 
Anti-Corruption is the regional effort on tackling corruption; 
STD is the index of regional government efficiency; 
η is a time-invariant regional effect; 
γ is a location-invariant time fixed effect; and 
ε is the idiosyncratic error term.   
As before, we focus on the log specification. We retain the same two continuous 
measurements of FDI (FDI/GDP and FDI/POP), and the same set of explanatory and 
control variables on the right-hand-side of the equation, i.e. environmental stringency (ER), 
government bureaucracy characteristics (Anti-Corruption and STD) and X. ER is captured 
by three different measures, EI1, Punish and Charge. X includes all the control variables 
used in previous chapters: income, manufacturing wage, agglomeration effects, population 
density, infrastructure, education level and labour productivity. As in previous chapters, we 
expect negative β1 and positive β3 and β4. 
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We still take one year lags of all the explanatory variables partly because the impact of these 
variables on FDI is unlikely to be immediate; and partly because taking lags help to 
minimise any potential causality links from FDI to all the control variables. In this case, we 
only consider the impact of the control variables and others on the environmental 
regulations. Taking lags for all the independent variables including the endogenous 
variables has been used in previous empirical studies, such as Cole et al., 2006.  
To allow for the potential endogeneity of environmental regulations, we apply an 
instrumental variable approach. The main econometric problem is to find appropriate 
instruments for environmental regulations (ER). To be suitable for use as an instrument, 
the variable must be correlated with the stringency of environmental regulations, yet have 
no correlation with FDI inflows. We employ instruments similar to those employed by 
Fredriksson et al. (2003). One is the share of government expenditure on public security 
agencies, the procuratorial agency and court of justice in regional GDP (labelled as Legalsh). 
The expenditure on the legal system “may explain the differential enforcement of 
environmental legislation across states by affecting the resources devoted to enforcing 
regulations (or, conversely, protecting firms from enforcement)”.54 By similar reasoning, 
we also include regional government employment (Gov.Employment) and the interaction 
term between Gov.Employment and Legalsh as instruments.  
For a sensitivity check, we employ another set of instrumental variables. Xing and Kolstad 
(2002) choose two external exogenous variables as instruments, infant mortality rate and 
population density. They argue that the infant mortality rate indicates “a general level of 
social consciousness …, which is likely to accompany strict environmental regulations”; 
and “population density is an indicator of congestion and the ability of pollutants to 
                                                
54 Fredriksson et al. (2003), pp. 1416. 
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naturally disperse away from population centres”.55 Thus, as a second set of instruments, 
we include the rate of surviving children to the live births (Mortality) and population density 
(Pop.Density). 56  Population density has been used as a control variable in the main 
estimation equation in the previous chapters. However, it does not have a constant and 
significant affect on FDI inflows. For a sensitivity check, we thus drop population density 
from the main estimating equation and use it as one of the excluded instrumental variables. 
Finally, other exogenous variables in Equation 4.2.1 are also used to instrument 
environmental regulations.57 Since these variables are lagged in the second-stage regression, 
they also enter the first-stage regressions in lagged form. Data that were used to construct 
Legalsh, Gov.Employment, and Mortality are collected from the China Statistical Yearbook 
(various years). Appendix 4.1 provides a table of the descriptive statistics of these 
instruments.  
We report estimates based on instrumental variables estimations with fixed effects. To be 
consistent with previous chapters, we apply the FGLS estimator (IV-FGLS) to the 
two-stage estimations. Since the model treating environmental stringency endogenously is 
over-identified, we provide results of a Sargan test of the over-identifying restrictions to 
assess the validity of our instruments. We also present Davidson-MacKinnon test results 
to examine whether our three measures of environmental regulations can be treated as 
exogenous.  
                                                
55 Xing and Kolstad (2002), pp. 11. 
56 Live births refer to the births when babies had shown any vital phenomena regardless of the length of 
pregnancy.  
57 We test the endogeneity of lagged Anti-Corruption and STD. The results do not reject the exogeneity 
hypothesis of these two variables. 
 212
We employ the two-stage estimations manually. Hence the estimated standard errors in the 
second-stage regressions need to be modified. To find the true standard errors, we 
multiply the estimated standard errors by a correction factor. The formula of the 
correction factor is given in Appendix 4.2. We also employ a fixed-effects estimator 
(IV-Within) and random-effects estimator (IV-RE) for comparison (see results tables in 
Appendix 4.3). 
 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Results for EI1 
Table 4.3.1 reports our main FGLS results based on both measures of FDI (FDI/GDP and 
FDI/POP) when using EI1 to proxy environmental stringency. Models (1) and (4) report 
the results that we have reported in Chapter three, Models (2) and (5) report estimates 
using the first set of instrumental variables, and Models (3) and (6) reports the estimates 
using the alternative instruments for sensitivity checks.  
For all the models that employed instrumental variables, the Davidson-MacKinnon (DM in 
tables) test rejects the hypothesis that EI1 can be treated as exogenous, so that the results 
reported in Chapter three (Models 1 and 4 in Table 4.3.1) are inconsistent. A Sargan test of 
over-identification restrictions shows that the exogeneity of the instruments is not rejected, 
i.e. the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, and the excluded instruments are 
correctly excluded from the estimated equation (in short, the instruments are valid).  
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The first-stage results (See Table A4.4.1 in Appendix 4.4) show that EI1 is only 
significantly affected by a few variables. An increase in government size will reduce the 
pollution treatment investment. The impacts of industrial agglomeration (GIP) and road 
density on EI1 are also negative. Neither of our government bureaucracy variables has 
significant effect on environmental regulations. This result is inconsistent with the model 
and findings in Fredriksson et al. (2003). One reason may be that the Chinese government 
only began to pay more attention to the fight against the government-backed 
environmental violations in recent years. The central government has announced that 
environmental protection would be an important index for assessing local governments’ 
performance starting from 2007. Therefore, few corruption and malpractice cases relating 
to the environment have been investigated by the procuratorates. Moreover government 
protection is not included when calculating the government efficiency index.58 This could 
be a possible explanation for the insignificant results on Ant-Corruption and STD. However, 
each specification in the first stage is significant at the 1% (P=0.000) level indicating that 
our estimations have significant explanatory power.59 
In terms of the results using the first set of instrumental variables in Table 4.3.1, we find 
EI1 has a significant negative effect on FDI inflows in Models (2) and (5), which is 
consistent with the pollution haven hypothesis that FDI is attracted by lax environmental 
regulations. In Model (2), when using FGLS estimator in the two-stage estimation, we find 
that the marginal effect of EI1 is -0.72, indicating that a 10% increase in local industrial 
pollution treatment investment will reduce the share of FDI to GDP in this region by 7.2%. 
                                                
58 STD index considers the treatment efficiency of industrial wastewater, waste gas and solid waste, which 
relate to environment. But the weight of the efficiency is only 0.03 (=0.2×0.5×0.3).  
59 EI1 in Table A4.2.1 is lagged for one year as well as all the control variables and instrumental variables. 
However, the impact of the explanatory variables on EI1 is unlikely to be immediate. It is a possible 
explanation for the less significant first-stage results. 
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This impact is approximately ten times that in Model (1) without the control for 
endogeneity. It suggests that the estimation in Model (1) is biased downwards. Similar 
results are also found when we use the alternative normalisation of FDI in Models (4) and 
(5). These results suggest the stringent environmental regulations decrease the inflows of 
FDI in all regions in China.  
With regard to our government bureaucratic variables, we find positive coefficients on 
Anti-Corruption. The magnitude of the effect is broadly consistent across specifications. FDI 
is therefore attracted to regions that have put more effort on fighting against corruption. In 
terms of STD, we fail to find significant results when controlling for the endogeneity of 
EI1.  
Turning to other control variables, only income (GRP per capita) always yields a significant 
positive relationship with FDI inflows. In Models (2), we find negative agglomeration 
effects (GIP) on FDI/GDP at 10% significant level, but the impact is not constantly 
significant across models.  
We do not find constant and significant results for our other control variables when we 
instrument EI1 using Legalsh, Gov.Empoyment and the product of them. Models (2) and (5) 
in Table 4.3.1 show broadly similar results for different measures of FDI. 
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Table 4.3.1 FGLS Regression Results for Log Data with EI1 
 
(1) 
FDI/GDP 
 
(2) 
FDI/GDP 
IV 
(3) 
FDI/GDP 
Alt. IV 
(4) 
 FDI/POP 
 
(5) 
FDI/POP 
IV 
(6) 
FDI/POP 
Alt. IV 
EI1† 
-0.070 -0.72 0.55 -0.073 -0.68 0.93 
(-2.17)** (-2.92)*** (0.93) (-2.21)** (-2.97)*** (1.08) 
GRP per  
capita 
3.45 3.28 2.59 3.88 3.83 2.69 
(4.54)*** (2.46)** (1.90)* (5.18)*** (3.05)*** (1.26) 
Wage 
7.09 5.33 9.21 8.48 6.70 11.79 
(1.59) (0.74) (1.32) (1.88)* (0.99) (1.07) 
Wage2 
-0.48 -0.36 -0.58 -0.55 -0.45 -0.72 
(-1.77)* (-0.85) (-1.39) (-2.02)** (-1.12) (-1.08) 
GIP 
-0.21 -1.47 0.94 0.0096 -1.19 1.82 
(-0.62) (-1.82)* (0.80) (0.03) (-1.56) (1.03) 
Pop.  
Density 
-0.31 -0.031  0.021 0.37  
(-0.47) (-0.027)  (0.03) (0.31)  
Rail  
Density 
-0.26 -0.29 -0.32 -0.23 -0.24 -0.31 
(-2.45)** (-1.59) (-1.83)* (-1.98)** (-1.27) (-1.18) 
Road  
Density 
0.37 0.0095 0.63 0.37 0.040 0.78 
(4.04)*** (0.048) (2.21)** (3.77)*** (0.21) (1.74)* 
Illiterate  
Rate 
0.36 0.17 0.42 0.33 0.17 0.41 
(2.94)*** (0.78) (1.82)* (2.59)*** (0.76) (1.06) 
Productivity 
-0.17 -0.020 -0.25 -0.15 0.017 -0.27 
(-1.36) (-0.083) (-1.18) (-1.24) (0.072) (-0.77) 
Anti- 
Corruption 
0.53 0.58 0.52 0.53 0.61 0.45 
(3.87)*** (2.41)** (2.32)** (3.84)*** (2.64)*** (1.23) 
STD 
0.60 0.48 0.59 0.65 0.49 0.64 
(2.59)*** (1.16) (1.53) (2.74)*** (1.21) (1.00) 
Constant 
-48.44 -27.35 -65.34 -63.07 -43.60 -87.82 
(-2.21)** (-0.72) (-1.90)* (-2.82)*** (-1.21) (-1.63) 
Wald χ2 6977.84 7553.28 6528.47 11187.17 13281.53 11780.47 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 
Sargan test  P=0.659 P=0.771  P=0.654 P=0.885 
DM test  P=0.000 P=0.001  P=0.000 P=0.001 
t-statistics (for within estimator) and z-statistics (for FGLS estimator) in parentheses; † all the 
independent variables are in logs except STD; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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4.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
Table 4.3.1 also reports the results employing an alternative set of instrumental variables 
(mortality and population density) in the first stage estimations. Model (3) scales FDI by 
GDP while Model (6) scales FDI by population. The Davidson-MacKinnon test and 
Sargan test results suggest that EI1 is endogenous and the instrumental variables are valid. 
However, we no longer find a negative significant effect of EI1 on FDI inflows. EI1 has a 
positive coefficient although it is not statistically different from zero.  
For other variables in Model (3), we find that income, road density, rate of illiteracy and 
anti-corruption effort have positive and significant effects on FDI inflows, whilst the 
impact of railway density is negative and significant. These results are broadly consistent 
with those in Model (1). In Model (6), only road density is found to have a significant 
coefficient at 10% level, although other variables coefficients are similar to those in Model 
(3) in sign and magnitude.     
As another check on the robustness of our results, we use the within estimator and 
random-effects estimator. Results are reported in Appendix 4.3. The within estimator 
results are broadly similar to those in Table 4.3.1.60  When we use the first set of 
instruments (Models 2 and 5), we find significant negative coefficient on EI1, and the 
marginal effect of EI1 is even larger (almost double that in Table 4.3.1). Government 
efficiency is found to have a significant influence on FDI inflows. We also find a positive 
effect of income and a non-linear relationship between manufacturing wage and FDI in 
                                                
60 FGLS and within estimator both consider the fixed effects.  
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Models (2) and (5).61 The results using alternative IVs are similar to those using the FGLS 
estimator.  
Hausman specification test results (in Table A4.3.2) suggest that the random-effect 
estimator is always efficient when controlling for the endogeneity of environmental 
stringency variable EI1. However, for the random-effects results we no longer find any 
evidence to support the negative effect of environmental regulations on FDI inflows. 
Moreover, we find insignificant negative coefficient on Anti-Corruption which is contrary to 
all the fixed-effects regression results. The coefficient of government efficiency (STD) is 
positive but not statistically different from zero. The results for other control variables are 
roughly similar to those using within estimator.  
4.3.3 Results for Punish and Charge 
In terms of the other two measures of environmental regulations Punish and Charge, the 
Davidson-MacKinnon test suggests that they both can be treated as exogenous in all 
models. Therefore, the results in the previous chapters are consistent. Nevertheless, we 
include the results controlling for the endogeneity of Punish and Charge in Appendix 3.4. 
The Sargan test suggests the instrumental variables are valid. The effect of these two 
measures of environmental regulations remains negative but insignificant. The results of 
the other control variables are broadly similar to those in Table 4.3.1.  
We do not report the sensitivity check results when we using Punish and Charge to proxy 
environmental regulation stringency, because the Davidson-MacKinnon test still suggest 
                                                
61 The turning points in Models (2) and (5) in Table A4.3.1 are both around RMB 4140 (about $ 866). In our 
sample, 60% of the observations are located on the down sloping part of the inverted-U curve. And all the 
provinces have passed the turning point at the wage level in 2002.  
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that they both can be treated as exogenous when we adopt the alternative set of 
instrumental variables. They both remain negative and insignificant.  
 
4.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we address the endogeneity issue of environmental regulations to 
re-examine the intra-country pollution havens within China. We apply an instrumental 
variable approach to our base models in Chapters two and three. We find that the first 
measure of our environmental regulations, EI1, is endogenous, while the other two 
measures, Punish and Charge, can be treated as exogenous. After controlling for endogeneity, 
EI1 still has a significant and negative effect on FDI. It confirms that there are 
inter-province pollution haven effects of FDI inflows in China. We also find that such an 
impact is larger than those found in Chapter three, suggesting that the impact of EI1 is 
biased downwards in Chapter three. However, the effect of environmental regulations on 
FDI does not pass all of the sensitivity checks when we use a different set of instrumental 
variables and random-effects estimator.  
We do not find any measurable effects of government bureaucratic characteristics on 
environmental regulations during our investigation period. However, we find significant 
and positive effects of anti-corruption effort on FDI inflows.  
One deficiency of this chapter is that the selected instrumental variables are relatively weak, 
which leads to weak results in the first-stage estimation. However, the difficulty in 
searching for the valid instrumental variables makes them be the best available choice. 
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Appendix 4.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Instruments 
Variable Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Medium Max 
Legalsh. (%) 149 0.87 0.30 0.33 0.83 1.99 
Gov. Employment (10 000 persons) 149 36.54 19.43 6.10 34.78 82.64 
Mortality (%) 150 2.08 3.28 0.44 1.27 34.50 
 
Appendix 4.2 Correction Factor 
We construct the correction factor using the method introduced in Gujarati (1995). For 
simplicity, suppose we estimate the following regression: 
ttt
XY εββ ++= 10                         (A4.2.1) 
where Xt is endogenous. 
In stage 1, we regress Xt on all instrumental variables Zt.  
ttt
ZX µˆˆˆ 10 +Π+Π=                        (A4.2.2) 
Then, we obtain 
tt
ZX 10
ˆˆˆ Π+Π=                          (A4.2.3) 
where 
t
Xˆ  is an estimated mean value of X conditional on the fixed Z’s. Then Equation 
(A4.2.2) can be expressed as 
ttt
XX µˆˆ +=                            (A4.2.4) 
Then Equation (A4.2.1) in stage 2 can now be written as  
∗++=
+++=
+++=
++=
tt
ttt
ttt
ttt
X
X
X
XY
εββ
µβεββ
εµββ
εββ
ˆ
)ˆ(ˆ
)ˆˆ(
10
110
10
10
                  (A4.2.5) 
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where 
ttt
µβεε ˆ1+=
∗ . 
When we run regression (A4.2.5), the standard error of, say, 1βˆ  is obtained from the 
following equation: 
∑
=
2
2
*
1
ˆ
ˆ
)ˆvar(
t
x
εσβ                        (A4.2.6) 
where  
2
)ˆˆˆ(
2
)ˆ(
ˆ
2
10
2
2
* −
−−
=
−
= ∑∑
∗
n
XY
n
ttt
ββε
σ ε              (A4.2.7) 
However, 2*ˆεσ  is not the same as 
2ˆ εσ (the unbiased estimate of true variance of εt, To 
obtain the true 2ˆ εσ , we get 
ttt
XY 10
ˆˆˆ ββε −−=                       (A4.2.8) 
Hence, 
2
)ˆˆ(
ˆ
2
102
−
−−
= ∑
n
XY tt ββσ ε                  (A4.2.9) 
Note that the difference between (A4.2.7) and (A4.2.9) is that in the latter equation we use 
the actual X rather than the estimated X from the first-stage regression.  
Finally, we get the correction factor 
22 ˆˆ
∗= εε σσθ  
Then correct standard errors are obtained by multiplying θ to the standard errors of 
coefficients estimated in the second-stage regression; and hence the correct t-statistics are 
obtained using the coefficients divided by the correct standard errors.  
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Appendix 4.3 Fixed and Random Effects Results for Log Data with EI1 
Table A4.3.1 Fixed Effects (Within-estimator) Regression Results for Log Data with 
EI1 
 
(1) 
FDI/GDP 
 
(2) 
FDI/GDP 
IV 
(3) 
FDI/GDP 
Alt. IV 
(4) 
 
FDI/POP 
 
(5) 
FDI/POP 
IV 
(6) 
FDI/POP 
Alt. IV 
EI1† 
-0.072 -1.36 0.94 -0.071 -1.34 1.06 
(-0.82) (-2.43)** (1.08) (-0.82) (-2.39)** (1.18) 
GRP per  
capita 
2.65 3.85 1.62 3.16 4.34 2.06 
(-1.80)* (2.40)** (1.06) (2.20)** (2.76)*** (1.38) 
Wage 
7.21 14.33 2.53 9.26 16.32 3.44 
(0.89) (1.87)* (0.33) (1.16) (2.13)** (0.45) 
Wage2 
-0.44 -0.86 -0.16 -0.56 -0.98 -0.22 
(-0.96) (-1.98)** (-0.35) (-1.24) (-2.25)** (-0.48) 
GIP 
-0.053 -1.84 1.35 0.10 -1.67 1.68 
(-0.07) (-1.73)* (1.44) (0.13) (-1.54) (1.74)* 
Pop.  
Density 
-0.86 -1.28  -0.62 -1.04  
(-0.63) (-0.94)  (-0.45) (-0.75)  
Rail  
Density 
-0.33 0.043 -0.61 -0.27 0.092 -0.60 
(-1.59) (0.17) (-2.50)** (-1.30) (0.36) (-2.39)** 
Road  
Density 
0.40 -0.041 0.75 0.41 -0.032 0.80 
(1.61) (-0.13) (2.26)** (1.65) (-0.10) (2.41)** 
Illiterate  
Rate 
0.23 0.011 0.40 0.21 -0.0022 0.40 
(0.77) (0.032) (1.30) (0.71) (0.007) (1.29) 
Productivity 
0.055 0.070 0.045 0.078 0.093 0.066 
(0.16) (0.21) (0.14) (0.23) (0.28) (0.20) 
Anti- 
Corruption 
0.40 0.71 0.18 0.43 0.73 0.16 
(1.28) (2.20)** (0.50) (1.36) (2.26)** (0.46) 
STD 
1.04 1.10 1.01 1.11 1.17 1.06 
(2.14)** (2.34)** (2.14)** (2.26)** (2.47)** (2.25)** 
Constant 
-43.90 -60.78 -36.74 -60.48 -77.20 -48.57 
(-1.03) (-1.51) (-0.99) (-1.43) (-1.92)* (-1.33) 
R2 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.28 0.27 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 
Sargan Test  P=0.894 P=0.804  P=0.881 P=0.969 
DM test  P=0.015 P=0.036  P=0.016 P=0.021 
t-statistics (for within estimator) and z-statistics (for FGLS estimator) in parentheses; † all the 
independent variables are in logs except STD; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Table A4.3.2 Random Effects Regression Results for Log Data with EI1 
 
(1) 
FDI/GDP 
 
(2) 
FDI/GDP 
IV 
(3) 
FDI/GDP 
Alt. IV 
(4) 
 FDI/POP 
 
(5) 
FDI/POP 
IV 
(6) 
FDI/POP 
Alt. IV 
EI1† 
-0.070 0.37 0.62 -0.071 0.42 0.69 
(-0.81) (0.49) (0.99) (-0.83) (0.54) (1.09) 
GRP per 
capita 
1.03 1.36 1.26 1.95 2.33 2.27 
(2.31)** (3.48)*** (2.85)*** (4.40)*** (5.78)*** (5.04)*** 
Wage 
8.75 7.23 2.74 10.88 8.74 4.42 
(1.34) (0.56) (0.24) (1.71)* (0.66) (0.37) 
Wage2 
-0.55 -0.48 -0.20 -0.68 -0.57 -0.31 
(-1.44) (-0.62) (-0.29) (-1.82)* (-0.73) (-0.43) 
GIP 
-0.14 -0.23 -0.14 -0.11 -0.22 -0.13 
(-1.06) (-1.38) (-1.03) (-0.78) (-1.24) (-0.97) 
Pop.  
Density 
0.33 0.30  0.31 0.30  
(1.40) (1.07)  (1.29) (1.06)  
Rail  
Density 
-0.37 -0.47 -0.38 -0.35 -0.48 -0.40 
(-2.86)*** (-1.86)* (-2.01)** (-2.66)*** (-1.86)* (-2.06)** 
Road  
Density 
0.59 0.76 1.01 0.58 0.74 1.01 
(2.63)*** (3.12)*** (5.52)*** (2.62)*** (3.00)*** (5.45)*** 
Illiterate  
Rate 
0.13 0.010 0.071 0.14 0.027 0.069 
(0.50) (0.05) (0.29) (0.53) (0.12) (0.28) 
Productivity 
0.058 0.12 0.17 0.073 0.14 0.20 
(0.25) (0.57) (0.80) (0.31) (0.62) (0.87) 
Anti- 
Corruption 
0.30 -0.016 -0.054 0.31 -0.0026 -0.079 
(1.13) (-0.06) (-0.18) (1.15) (-0.01) (-0.25) 
STD 
0.99 0.49 0.49 1.04 0.52 0.44 
(2.61)*** (0.85) (0.84) (2.70)*** (0.88) (0.71) 
Constant 
-42.28 -39.91 -24.53 -59.98 -55.32 -41.00 
(-1.51) (-0.79) (-0.54) (-2.20)** (-1.07) (-0.87) 
R2 0.71 0.70 0.63 0.84 0.83 0.79 
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 
Hausman 
(p-value) 
0.011 0.986 0.906 0.983 0.989 0.943 
t-statistics (for within estimator) and z-statistics (for FGLS estimator) in parentheses; † all the 
independent variables are in logs except STD; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Appendix 4.4 First Stage Regression Results: EI1 
Table A4.4.1 First-stage Regression Results: EI1 
 
(2) and (5) 
FGLS 
 (3) and (6) 
FGLS 
(2) and (5) 
Within 
(3) and (6) 
Within 
(2) and (5) 
RE 
(3) and (6) 
RE 
Legalsh† 
1.87  0.88  0.58  
(1.51)  (0.49)  (0.53)  
Gov. 
Employment 
-2.57  -1.22  -0.32  
(-3.10)***  (-0.79)  (-1.16)  
(Legalsh×Gov. 
Employment) 
-0.52  -0.27  -0.22  
(-1.58)  (-0.54)  (-0.72)  
Mortality 
 -0.10  -0.15  -0.14 
 (-1.82)*  (-1.83)*  (-1.63) 
GRP  
per capita 
0.82 1.03 1.07 1.19 -0.51 -0.23 
(0.86) (1.07) (0.63) (0.70) (-1.21) (-0.64) 
Wage 
3.90 -2.22 8.00 5.82 13.14 13.00 
(0.58) (-0.34) (0.68) (0.48) (1.83)* (1.89)* 
Wage2 
-0.24 0.12 -0.46 -0.34 -0.78 -0.80 
(-0.61) (0.30) (-0.66) (-0.47) (-1.83)* (-1.90)* 
GIP 
-1.78 -1.79 -1.33 -1.48 0.37 0.14 
(-3.22)*** (-3.23)*** (-1.40) (-1.63) (1.60) (1.16) 
Pop.  
Density 
0.76 -0.26 -0.63 -0.67 -0.40 -0.19 
(0.52) (-0.18) (-0.33) (-0.34) (-1.82)* (-0.96) 
Rail  
Density 
0.16 0.0031 0.34 0.22 0.31 0.16 
(0.63) (-0.01) (0.95) (0.63) (2.02)** (0.99) 
Road  
Density 
-0.45 -0.38 -0.30 -0.30 0.20 0.066 
(-1.75)* (-1.48) (-0.91) (-0.91) (0.95) (0.31) 
Illiterate  
Rate 
-0.21 -0.12 -0.21 -0.20 -0.098 0.025 
(-0.83) (-0.48) (-0.58) (-0.55) (-0.45) (0.13) 
Productivity 
0.057 0.10 -0.034 -0.013 -0.19 -0.17 
(0.37) (0.66) (-0.17) (-0.07) (-1.18) (-1.05) 
Anti- 
Corruption 
0.11 0.051 0.18 0.22 0.031 0.14 
(0.53) (0.26) (0.55) (0.67) (0.01) (0.58) 
STD 
-0.41 0.0028 -0.093 0.064 0.33 0.30 
(-0.94) (-0.01) (-0.14) (0.10) (0.73) (0.66) 
Constant 
1.21 23.22 -19.92 -13.52 -46.04 -46.77 
(0.03) (0.65) (-0.34) (-0.23) (-1.49) (-1.59) 
Wald χ2 888.29 721.50   85 82 
R2   0.43 0.43   
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 
Province and 
Time Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model 
Significance 
P=0.000 P=0.000 P=0.000 P=0.000 P=0.000 P=0.000 
t-statistics (for within estimator) and z-statistics (for FGLS estimator) in parentheses; † all the 
independent variables are in logs except STD; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Appendix 4.5 Regression Results: Punish and Charge 
Table A4.5.1 Regression Results for Log Data with Punish 
 
(1) 
FDI/GDP 
FGLS 
(2) 
FDI/GDP 
IV-FGLS 
(4) 
 FDI/POP 
FGLS 
(5) 
FDI/POP 
IV-FGLS 
Punish† 
-0.082 -0.18 -0.074 -0.26 
(-2.74)*** (-0.73) (-2.39)** (-0.99) 
GRP per capita 
3.78 3.62 4.11 4.08 
(5.01)*** (4.20)*** (5.46)*** (4.61)*** 
Wage 
6.34 5.00 7.78 4.83 
(1.40) (0.89) (1.69)* (0.81) 
Wage2 
-0.42 -0.33 -0.49 -0.30 
(-1.53) (-0.93) (-1.78)* (-0.80) 
GIP 
-0.36 -0.26 -0.099 -0.14 
(-1.06) (-0.45) (-0.29) (-0.23) 
Pop. Density 
-0.18 -0.37 0.23 0.035 
(-0.29) (-0.55) (0.32) (0.05) 
Rail Density 
-0.33 -0.36 -0.29 -0.35 
(-3.02)*** (-2.87)*** (-2.46)** (-2.54)** 
Road Density 
0.38 0.35 0.38 0.33 
(3.79)*** (3.35)*** (3.59)*** (2.85)*** 
Illiterate Rate 
0.30 0.29 0.26 0.22 
(2.28)** (1.78)* (1.94)* (1.25) 
Productivity 
-0.20 -0.22 -0.16 -0.24 
(-1.57) (-1.47) (-1.28) (-1.45) 
Anti-Corruption 
0.52 0.51 0.51 0.50 
(3.60)*** (3.55)*** (3.48)*** (3.30)*** 
STD 
0.56 0.57 0.62 0.63 
(2.32)** (2.23)** (2.48)** (2.30)** 
Constant 
-48.18 -27.35 -63.26 -47.64 
(-2.17)** (-1.52) (-2.78)*** (-1.66)* 
Wald χ2 7708.80 6869.78 11218.06 11256.36 
Observations 147 149 147 149 
Sargan test  P=0.386  P=0.355 
DM test  P=0.317  P=0.211 
t-statistics (for within estimator) and z-statistics (for FGLS estimator) in parentheses; † all the 
independent variables are in logs except STD; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Table A4.5.2 Regression Results for Log Data with Charge 
 
(1) 
FDI/GDP 
FGLS 
(2) 
FDI/GDP 
IV-FGLS 
(4) 
 FDI/POP 
FGLS 
(5) 
FDI/POP 
IV-FGLS 
Charge† 
-0.33 -0.87 -0.34 -0.98 
(-2.78)*** (-1.47) (-2.86)*** (-1.55) 
GRP per capita 
3.16 3.76 3.57 4.22 
(4.11)*** (4.53)*** (4.73)*** (4.91)*** 
Wage 
2.79 -0.87 3.85 -0.63 
(0.59) (-0.12) (0.80) (-0.08) 
Wage2 
-0.19 0.0066 -0.25 -0.0025 
(-0.67) (0.02) (-0.85) (0.00) 
GIP 
0.18 0.18 0.41 0.44 
(0.50) (0.46) (1.15) (1.08) 
Pop. Density 
-0.74 -1.18 -0.44 -0.92 
(-1.09) (-1.37) (-0.59) (-0.96) 
Rail Density 
-0.46 -0.60 -0.43 -0.60 
(-4.17)*** (-2.48)** (-3.69)*** (-2.33)** 
Road Density 
0.33 0.35 0.31 0.35 
(2.80)*** (3.57)*** (2.56)** (3.14)*** 
Illiterate Rate 
0.22 0.29 0.20 0.25 
(1.49) (2.15)** (1.40) (1.75)* 
Productivity 
-0.19 -0.12 -0.19 -0.088 
(-1.58) (-0.88) (-1.56) (-0.63) 
Anti-Corruption 
0.60 0.53 0.61 0.54 
(4.19)*** (3.46)*** (4.26)*** (3.37)*** 
STD 
0.66 0.67 0.72 0.73 
(2.81)*** (2.33)** (3.03)*** (2.44)** 
Constant 
-25.02 -6.53 -37.42 -15.01 
(-1.06) (-0.17) (-1.56) (-0.37) 
Wald χ2 7966.66 6969.60 11985.42 11041.23 
Observations 149 149 149 149 
Sargan test  P=0.210  P=0.258 
DM test  P=0.191  P=0.167 
t-statistics (for within estimator) and z-statistics (for FGLS estimator) in parentheses; † all the 
independent variables are in logs except STD; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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Table A4.5.3 First-stage Regression Results: Punish and Charge  
 
Punish  Charge 
Models  
(2) and (5) FGLS 
 
 
 
Models  
(2) and (5) FGLS 
Legalsh† 
2.92  -0.45 
(3.09)***  (-1.01) 
Gov. Employment 
0.23  -0.34 
(0.40)  (-1.49) 
(Legalsh×Gov. Employment) 
-0.84  0.061 
(-2.93)***  (0.55) 
GRP per capita 
0.99  0.29 
(0.84)  (0.81) 
Wage 
-10.42  -9.15 
(-2.00)**  (-4.22)*** 
Wage2 
0.73  0.55 
(2.44)**  (4.24)*** 
GIP 
-1.56  0.23 
(-2.87)***  (1.42) 
Pop. Density 
0.95  -0.92 
(1.04)  (-3.31)*** 
Rail Density 
-0.13  -0.34 
(-0.83)  (-6.29)*** 
Road Density 
-0.20  -0.030 
(-1.42)  (-0.38) 
Illiterate Rate 
-0.38  -0.042 
(-2.03)**  (-0.54) 
Productivity 
-0.35  0.022 
(-2.14)**  (0.42) 
Anti-Corruption 
-0.040  0.039 
(-0.28)  (0.59) 
STD 
-0.017  0.18 
(-0.05)  (1.47) 
Constant 
41.42  51.62 
(1.43)  (4.72) 
Wald χ2 1339.18  3404.53 
Observations 147  149 
Province and Time Effects Yes  Yes 
Model Significance P=0.000  P=0.000 
t-statistics (for within estimator) and z-statistics (for FGLS estimator) in parentheses; † all the 
independent variables are in logs except STD; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. Province and time dummies are included. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
ECONOMIC GROWTH, FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT:                    
EVIDENCE FROM CHINESE CITIES 
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5.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, we investigate the environmental effects of economic growth and foreign 
investment using Chinese city-level data.  
The relationship between economic growth and the environment was first observed by 
Grossman and Krueger (1991) in their investigation of the environmental impacts of a 
North American Free Trade Agreement. They find the relationship between economic 
growth and environmental quality “may change sign from positive to negative when a 
country reaches a level of income at which people demand and afford more efficient 
infrastructure and a cleaner environment”.62 Such an inverted-U relationship between 
environmental degradation and economic growth is known as the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve (EKC), analogous to the income-inequality relationship hypothesised by Kuznets 
(1955).  
Since 1992, a considerable amount of empirical and theoretical research has examined the 
relationship between economic growth and various indicators of environmental 
degradation, with mixed results. Generally there are two different schools of thought in the 
EKC literature: optimists, who support the EKC implication that economic growth is 
ultimately good for the environment (e.g. Beckerman, 1992; Shafik and Bandyopadhyay, 
1992, Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Lomborg, 2001); and critics, who point out a number 
of methodological flaws in deriving the EKC or advocate caution in interpreting its causes 
and implications (e.g. Arrow et al., 1995; Stern et al., 1996; Ekins, 1997; Stern, 1998; Suri 
and Chapman, 1998; Rothman, 1998; Stern and Comman, 2001; and Cole, 2003 and 2004).  
                                                
62 Panayotou (2003), pp. 2.  
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One of the most damaging criticisms is related to the occurrence of foreign direct 
investment and international trade. “The argument asserts that the downturn in emissions 
at higher levels of PCI (per capita income) can be explained, at least to some extent, by the 
relocation of ‘dirty’ industries from developed to developing countries, and the tendency 
among developed countries to import pollution-intensive goods from developing countries 
rather than produce them at home.”63  
The past approach of empirical work on trade/FDI patterns and the EKC is to test the 
pollution haven hypothesis (Tobey, 1990; Birdsall and Wheeler, 1993; Jaffe et al., 1995; 
Rothman, 1998; Antweiler et al., 2001; Levinson, 1996a and 1996b; Xing and Kolstad, 2002; 
Eskeland and Harrison, 2003; and Smarzynska-Javorcik and Wei, 2005). These studies find 
little evidence that environmental stringency impacts on trade/investment flows. However, 
it does not mean that trade and FDI flows do not explain the environmental Kuznets 
curve. 
Grossman and Krueger (1991) describe three possible sources of environmental impact 
from a greater openness to trade and foreign investment: a scale effect, a technique effect 
and a composition effect. Such points of view are usually used in the following studies on 
FDI and the environment. 
The scale effect relates to the impact on the environment as a result of an increase in 
economic output due to the expansion of investment. The composition effect refers to 
investment that will change the industrial structure of an economy. The technique effect 
states that investment on one hand drives a more rapid rate of technology development, 
diffusion and transfer, and on the other hand increases income and hence the demand for a 
                                                
63 Nahman and Antrobus (2005), pp.112 
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cleaner environment. All these changes can influence the pollution level in different 
directions. In general, the scale effect is expected to be negative, and technique effect is 
expected to be positive, while composition effect is ambiguous. Therefore, the real 
relationship between FDI and the environment cannot be explained simply as positive or 
negative. Previous studies (e.g. Jha, 1999; and Zarsky, 1999) show that the effects of FDI 
on host counties’ environment can be positive, negative, or neutral.  
Although many empirical studies have been devoted to the impact of environmental 
stringency on FDI inflows, studies on the “net effect” of FDI on the environment are 
rather scarce. One reason for the scarcity is that it is difficult to clearly separate the 
environmental effects of domestic economic activity from the effects from activities of 
foreign affiliates.  
In this chapter, we investigate the relationship between economic growth and industrial 
pollution emissions in China using data for 112 major cities from 2001 to 2004. We also 
compare the environmental effects of domestic firms with those of foreign firms. Foreign 
firms are split into two groups: affiliates from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and 
affiliates from other foreign economies. We choose four industrial water pollution 
indicators (wastewater, chemical oxygen demand, hexavalent chromium compounds, and 
petroleum-like matter) and four industrial air pollution indicators (waste gas, sulphur 
dioxide, soot and dust).  
Our random-effects results suggest that most air and water pollution emissions rise with 
the increase of economic growth at the current income levels. Domestic firms have a 
strong and positive impact on all pollution emissions. The impact of firms from Hong 
Kong, Macao and Taiwan is positive for all pollution emissions but only significant for the 
231 
 
first three industrial water pollution emissions; while the impact of firms from other 
foreign economies is only positive and significant for petroleum-like matter, and neutral for 
other pollutants.  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section two describes the theoretical and empirical 
research on the EKC and FDI-environment relationship. Section three introduces the 
related background information. Section four provides the model specification and data 
description. Section five describes the empirical results and section six draws the 
conclusions and policy implications.  
 
5.2 Literature Review  
This section commences with the theoretical and empirical studies on economic growth 
and the environment, then introduces the literature on the environmental effects of FDI, 
and finally provides a brief summary including the contributions of the present study.  
5.2.1 Economic Growth and the Environment 
5.2.1.1 Theoretical Principles 
The basic Environmental Kuznets Curve is the hypothesis that as an economy’s per capita 
income increases, the total amount of environmental impact of economic activities initially 
grows, reaches a maximum and then falls. The hypothesis is illustrated in Figure 5.2.1. 
Grossman and Krueger (1991) explain that the improvement in environmental quality at 
higher levels of per capita income due to factors such as changes in the composition of 
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output, the introduction of cleaner production technology, and the greater demand for 
improved environmental quality, leading to more stringent environmental regulations. 
Grossman and Krueger (1995) add another possible explanation for the downward sloping 
part of the EKC: as countries develop, they stop producing the pollution-intensive goods 
and instead import them from developing countries with weaker environmental standards. 
However, they argue that it does not mean the differences in environmental stringency are 
an important determinant of the pattern of international trade, because “the volume of 
such trade is probably too small to account for the reduced pollution that has been 
observed to accompany episodes of economic growth”.64 
 
Figure 5.2.1 Environmental Kuznets Curve 
 
 
Numerous theoretical and empirical papers have considered the relationship between 
economic growth and environmental quality. Theoretical studies have concentrated on 
deriving the path of environmental quality and development under alternative assumptions 
                                                
64 Grossman and Krueger (1995), pp. 372. 
Environmental 
impact 
per capita income 
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about social welfare functions, pollution damage, the cost of abatement, and the 
productivity of capital (Dasgupta et al. 2002).  
Lopez (1994) uses a model to show that if producers pay the social marginal cost of 
pollution, the relationship between pollution and income depends on the properties of 
both technology and preferences. If the preferences are homothetic, pollution levels will 
increase with economic growth. If the preferences are non-homothetic, the relationship 
between income and pollution depends on the elasticity of substitution between pollution 
and other inputs and on the marginal utility of income. The higher the elasticity of 
substitution and marginal utility, the less pollution will increase with income. Then the 
inverted-U relationship between pollution and income is obtained.   
Selden and Song (1995) use the neoclassical environmental growth model of Forster (1973) 
to derive an inverted-U curve for optimal pollution, assuming the optimal abatement is 
zero until a critical level of development but increases at an increasing rate thereafter.   
McConnell (1997) focuses on the role of preferences and, in particular, the income 
elasticity of demand for environmental quality using a simple static model. He finds that 
higher income elasticity results in slower increases or faster declines in pollution, and there 
is no special role of income elasticity equal to one. Pollution can decline even with zero or 
negative income elasticity when pollution causes a reduction in output (for example 
forestry reduction and material damage due to acid rain and health effects to labour force 
due to air and water pollution). He also provides microeconomic evidence to support a 
major role for the income responsiveness of preferences in the EKC models.  
Lopez and Mitra (2000) suggest that corruption may not preclude the existence of an 
inverted-U shaped EKC. The results show that for any level of per capita income the 
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pollution levels corresponding to corruption behaviour are always above the social optimal 
level. In addition, the turning point of the EKC takes place at income and pollution levels 
above those corresponding to the social optimum. 
5.2.1.2 Empirical Studies  
A great number of empirical studies have been devoted to the relationship between 
economic growth and the environment. The empirical models are usually the reduced form 
single-equation specifications relating an environmental quality indicator to a measure of 
income per capita. The indicators of environmental quality include certain water and air 
pollutants (e.g. oxygen, heavy metals, SO2, CO2 and particulates), deforestation rate, energy 
consumption, solid wastes, traffic volume, and environmental R&D. Recent analysis 
considers a far wider range of environmental problems, for example, hazardous wastes, 
greenhouse gas emissions and biodiversity loss. Water and air pollutants are widely used in 
empirical studies, in the forms of emissions per capita and concentration of pollutants as 
recorded by monitoring stations.   
The common dependant variable is income per capita, but some studies use income data 
converted into purchasing power parity (PPP), while others use incomes at market 
exchange rates. Different studies use different control variables, such as openness to trade, 
population density, income distribution, geographical variables and political freedom.  
The functional specification is usually quadratic, log quadratic or cubic in income. They are 
estimated econometrically using cross-section or panel data. Some test for country and 
time-fixed-effects and some test for random-effects.  
The first set of empirical studies appeared independently in three working papers: 
Grossman and Krueger (1991); Shafik and Bandyopadhya (1992); and Panayotou (1993). 
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They find turning points for several pollutants (the concentrations of SO2, NOx and 
suspended particulate matter (SPM)) in a similar income range of $3,000 – $5,000 per 
capita. The results of some studies before mid-1990s also confirm the basic EKC pattern 
for certain pollutants (e.g. Selden and Song, 1994; and Grossman and Krueger, 1995). 
However, the turning points for the emissions of SO2, NOx, SPM, and CO in Selden and 
Song (1994) are much higher than those found by Grossman and Krueger (1993). The 
difference is explained as the reduction of emissions lagging behind the reduction in 
ambient concentrations. Additionally, the results from Shafik (1994) are ambiguous, 
suggesting that the EKC does not hold at all times and for all pollutants (e.g. the linear 
downward relationship between income and some pollution indicators such as lack of safe 
water, dissolved oxygen in water, municipal waste, and carbon emission.). 
Since the mid-1990s, the EKC has been attacked on both empirical and methodological 
grounds, a trend that has continued in recent years, and the results have been far more 
ambiguous (Nahman and Antrobus, 2005). 
Cole et al. (1997) estimate the EKC for many environmental indicators, including total 
energy use, transport emissions of SO2, SPM and NO2, nitrates in water, traffic volumes, 
chlorofluorocarbons emissions and methane. They find a meaningful EKC exits only for 
local air pollutants whereas indicators with a more global, more indirect, environmental 
impact either increase monotonically with income or else have turning points at high 
income levels with large standard errors. They also confirm that the concentration of local 
pollutants peak at a lower income level than total emissions per capita. Hilton and 
Levinson (1998) find the EKC for automotive lead emissions, but the peak of the curve is 
sensitive to both the functional form estimated and the time period considered. Kaufmann 
et al. (1998) find a U-relationship between income and atmospheric concentration of SO2 
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and an inverted-U relationship between the spatial intensity of economic activity 
(GDP/Area) and SO2 concentration. The trade-off between the effects of income gains 
and the spatial intensity of economic activity on the concentration of SO2 is consistent with 
the notion that some environmental problems can be improved by slowing population 
growth and increasing income levels.  
Hettige et al. (2000) reject the EKC hypothesis for industrial water pollution: i.e. industrial 
water pollution rises rapidly through middle-income status and remains roughly constant 
thereafter. Stern and Common (2001) estimate the EKC for sulphur emissions using a 
larger and more globally sample than previous studies. They find the emissions-income 
relationship is monotonic for the global sample because the estimated turning point is far 
above all countries’ income levels; whilst the relation is an inverted-U shape for the sample 
of high-income countries. The model estimated in first differences suggests the 
income-emissions relation is monotonically increasing in income in both high-income and 
global samples. They conclude that reductions in emissions are time-related rather than 
income-related. Harbaugh et al. (2002) use the updated and revised panel data on ambient 
air pollution in cities worldwide to re-examine the robustness of the evidence for the 
existence of the EKC studied by Grossman and Krueger (1995). They test the sensitivity of 
the pollution-income relationship to function forms and econometric specification used, 
including additional covariates and changes in the nations, cities and years sampled. They 
conclude that there is little evidence to support an inverted-U shaped relationship between 
several important air pollutants and national income in these data.  
There have been some studies that attempt to decompose the EKC relationship into its 
constituent scale, composition and abatement effects. Such studies include Panayotou 
(1997) and De Bruyn et al. (1998).  
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Panayotou (1997) argues that the determinants of environmental quality include: 1) the 
scale of economic activity (scale effects); 2) the composition of economic activity 
(composition effects); and 3) the effect of income on the demand and supply of pollution 
abatement efforts (pure income effects). The scale effect is expected to be a monotonically 
increasing function of income while the income effect is monotonically decreasing function 
of income, all else equal. The composition effect is likely to be a non-monotonic 
(inverted-U) function of income. Panayotou (1997) specified a cubic function form for all 
decomposition effects, and other variables including population density, the rate of 
economic growth and the quality of institutions. The results on ambient SO2 levels confirm 
the expectation of the three effects, and also suggest that policies and institutions can help 
flatten the EKC and reduce the environmental price of economic growth.  
De Bruyn et al. (1998) adopt a dynamic model and estimate for three types of emissions 
(CO2, NOx and SO2) in four separate developed countries (Netherlands, UK, US and 
Western Germany). It is found that these emissions correlate positively with economic 
growth and that emissions may decline over time probably due to structural and 
technological changes.   
There are a few studies focusing on individual countries. For example, Vincent et al. (1997) 
find that SPM and chemical oxygen demand (COD) are increasing with income, while 
biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) is decreasing with income in Malaysia; Carson et al. 
(1997) find all major air pollutants decline with increasing levels of income across 50 US 
states.   
In terms of the empirical studies on China, Shen (2006) uses a simultaneous equations 
model to examine the existence of the EKC relationship between per capita income and 
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per capita pollution emissions. Shen (2006) tests two air pollutants (SO2 and Dust Fall) and 
three water pollutants (COD, Arsenic and Cadmium) from 1993 to 2002 in 31 Chinese 
provinces and municipalities. The results suggest an EKC relationship for all water 
pollutants. Meanwhile, SO2 shows a U-shaped relationship with income levels and Dust 
Fall has no significant relationship with income levels. In addition, government expenditure 
on pollution abatement has a significant and negative effect on pollution; and the net 
effects of the secondary industry share on pollution emissions are all positive and 
significant. Therefore, environmental policy and industrial structure both play important 
roles in determining the water and air pollution levels in China. 
5.2.1.3 Critiques of the EKC  
Nahman and Antrobus (2005) summarise that “in some cases the data does give rise to an 
EKC-type relationship, in other cases it does not, whilst in many cases the emergence of an 
EKC-type relationship depends on the variables included in and the functional form 
attached to the statistical model, or on the type of model used”.65 Therefore, there has 
been decline in theoretical explanations of the EKC patterns and a rise in empirical 
explanations, especially in studies that criticise previous empirical studies. Cole (2003) 
divides these critiques of the EKC into two categories: the EKC methodology and the 
interpretation of the EKC results.  
In terms of the EKC methodology, there are following five kinds of critiques. First, EKC 
is no more than a methodology artefact due to the omission of certain important variables, 
such as the price of energy, the distribution of income and the demand for and supply of 
environmental quality, or education (e.g. Chapman and Agras, 1999; Magnani, 2000; 
                                                
65 Nahman and Antrobus (2005), pp. 110. 
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Heerink et al., 2001; Lekakis and Koukis, 2001; and Hill and Magnani, 2002). In addition, 
some argue that the basic EKC is determined by changing trade and investment patterns 
rather than growth-induced pollution abatement, and these trade/investment patterns have 
been omitted in the EKC studies. EKC might arise by the relocation of “dirty” industries 
from developed countries to developing countries to take the advantages of less stringent 
environmental regulations (e.g. Stern et al. 1996; Stern, 1998; Suri and Chapman, 1998; 
Rothman, 1998; and Cole, 2003 and 2004). This argument led to a research on the 
well-known pollution haven hypothesis related to international trade and foreign direct 
investment, with mixed and relatively weak results.66 However, weak evidence in support 
of the pollution haven hypothesis does not imply that trade/investment flows do not 
explain the environmental Kuznets curve. Pollution-intensive industries might relocate to 
developing countries for reasons other than weaker environmental regulations. For 
example, the strong incentive of access to the source of raw materials leads many 
traditionally energy- and pollution-intensive activities to migrate to developing countries 
(Rothman, 1998). 
Second, the EKC assumes unidirectional causality from income to emissions and does not 
allow environmental degradation to have an impact on income levels. Therefore, “least 
square estimation in the presence of such simultaneity will provide biased and inconsistent 
estimates”.67   
                                                
66 The pollution haven hypothesis studies related to trade include Tobey, 1990; Birdsall and Wheeler, 1993; 
Jaffe et al., 1995; Rothman, 1998; Antweiler et al., 2001; Ederington and Miner (2003) and Levinson and 
Taylor (2008); and to foreign direct investment include Levinson, 1996a and 1996b; Xing and Kolstad, 2002; 
Eskeland and Harrison, 2003; Fredriksson et al. (2003); and Smarzynska-Javorcik and Wei, 2005. Some studies 
avoid the issues of environmental regulations, for example, Cole (2004) examines the pollution-intensity of 
trade inflows between developed and developing counties. Some other studies began to examine the 
relationship between consumption, rather than production, of pollution-intensive goods and economic 
growth. 
67 Cole (2003), pp. 561. 
240 
 
Third, Stern and Common (2001) and Perman and Stern (1999) provides two econometric 
issues that 1) the estimated turning points using data for the world are at higher income 
levels than using only OECD data because the developing countries are experiencing 
increasing emissions of local air pollutants such as SO2; and 2) the non-stationarity of 
income and emissions are usually neglected by the EKC studies. 
Next, there are some other econometric issues, for example, Stern et al. (1996) concern that 
many EKC studies ignore the issue of heteroskedasticity that may be present in 
cross-section data; cubic relationship between income and pollution should be considered 
in case emissions begin to increase again at high income levels; the pattern of the EKC 
depends on the datasets, particular function form used or covariates included in the model 
(e.g. Ekins, 1997; List and Gallet, 1999; Spangenberg, 2001; Harbaugh et al., 2002; Perman 
and Stern, 2003; and Millimet, et al., 2003).  
Finally, Stern (1998) argues that “EKC regressions that allow levels of pollution to become 
zero or negative as being incompatible with the laws of thermodynamics, since all resource 
use inevitably produces wastes”.68  
Regarding the interpretation of the EKC results, first, the EKC relationship may not exist 
for all environmental indicators (Arrow et al. 1995). Second, EKCs do not indicate that 
economic growth automatically solves environmental problems without any attention to 
the environment. Emissions could be reduced through investment and regulations, neither 
of which are automatic consequences of economic growth. Finally, “although many EKC 
estimate turning points around the current world mean per capita income level, this does 
not mean that, globally, emissions are about to decline. Global income distribution is 
                                                
68 op. cit. 
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skewed with far more people below the mean than above it”.69 Therefore, median income 
levels are worth to be considered rather than mean income levels.  
In this chapter we address many of these criticisms (see details in section 5.4).  
5.2.2 Effects of FDI on the Environment 
5.2.2.1 Theoretical Analysis 
Grossman and Krueger (1991) distinguish three separate mechanisms by which a change in 
trade and foreign investment policy can affect the level of pollution and the depletion rate 
of scare environmental resources. The three mechanisms are scale effects, composition 
effects and technique effects. It has been the standard approach to analyse the 
FDI-environment nexus.   
Scale Effect 
The scale effect refers to the expansion of economic activity as a result of an increase in 
foreign investment. If the nature of the economic activity remains unchanged, the total 
amount of pollution generated must increase, as well as the use of natural resources. “Even 
if the foreign firms are relatively less polluting across all emissions and/or more concerned 
about sustainable resource harvesting, the overall quantity of pollution and level of 
resource degradation increases with a greater level of investment. In addition to pollution, a 
larger increase in the scale of investment without a larger ‘sustainable development’ land 
and resource use planning framework is likely to undermine biodiversity and degrade 
                                                
69 op. cit. pp. 562 
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common access resources such as river and coastlines.”70 Ceteris paribus, the scale effect on 
the environmental quality is expected to be negative.  
Composition Effect  
The composition effect (or structural effect) means that FDI may have an impact on the 
environment by changing the industrial structure. Traditional trade theory suggests that 
countries will specialise in those sectors in which they have competitive advantage. Foreign 
investment, to a greater extent, is attracted by such competitive advantage. “If competitive 
advantage derives largely from differences in environmental regulation, then the 
composition effect […] will be damaging to the environment. […] On the other hand, if 
the sources of international comparative advantage are more traditional ones, namely 
cross-country differences in factor abundance and technology, then the implications of the 
composition effect for the state of environment are ambiguous. […] The net effect of this 
on the level of pollution in each location will depend upon whether pollution-intensive 
activities expand or contract in the country that on average has the more stringent 
pollution controls.”71 
However, some research (e.g. OECD, 2002) believes that structural effects are expected to 
be positive because trade and investment liberalisation promote allocative efficiency among 
economies. A report from UNCTAD in 1999 shows that FDI destined to primary sectors 
has declined from 8.6 per cent to 4.5 per cent between 1988 and 1997 in developed and 
developing countries, while the services sector has a corresponding increase in both 
categories of countries in the same period. Some analysis suggests that this structural shift 
                                                
70 Zarsky, (1999), pp.3. 
71 Grossman and Krueger (1991), pp.4.  
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toward service FDI generally has a positive effect on the environment (Gentry, 1998; 
UNCTAD, 1999; and OECD, 2001).  
Technique Effect 
Grossman and Krueger (1991) provide two reasons that pollution per unit of output might 
fall, especially in developing countries. First, foreign investors may bring newer and better 
technologies and such technologies tend to be less polluting and use fewer resources. In 
addition to the technology transfer, FDI may also create other positive technological 
spillovers to national firms through imitation, employment turnover, and supply chain 
requirements (OECD, 2002). Second, FDI may increase resident’s income and then people 
may have more demand for environmental quality. Thus, there will be more pressure on 
the government to implement more stringent environmental regulations and stricter 
enforcement of exiting laws. Some researchers decompose the second point from 
technique effect and call it an income effect (e.g. Zarsky, 1999).   
However, the technology effect may be negative in some cases (OECD, 2002). 
Multinationals may apply relatively more damaging technologies in regions with weak 
environmental regulations. In addition, some evidence suggests that overseas multinational 
R&D is concentrated in only a few developed countries (Freeman and Hagedoorn, 1994; 
and UNCTAD, 1999).  
5.2.2.2 Empirical Studies 
From an analytical perspective, research on the net outcome of these three effects is 
relevant. However, identifying the “net effects” of FDI on the environment is complex. 
OECD (2002) presents two limitations that might explain the difficulties in addressing the 
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net environmental effects of FDI flows. First, it is difficult to separate clearly the 
environmental effects of domestic economic activity from the effects of activities of 
foreign affiliates. Second, FDI does not occur in a vacuum so that the environmental 
effects cannot be analysed in isolation from other related factors, for example, trade 
influences the potential market opportunities in a country.  
These limitations lead to some pragmatic studies on foreign investment and the 
environment, for example, the reports from UNCATD/CBS (Copenhagen Business 
School) projects on ‘Cross Border Environmental Management in Transnational 
Corporations’ which includes case studies on China (Xian et al., 1999), India (Jha, 1999) and 
Malaysia (Rasiah, 1999). These reports provide many examples of positive and negative 
environmental effects of transnational corporations.  
Wheeler (2001) provides a simple statistical test of the race-to-the-bottom model using data 
on FDI and urban air quality (measured by concentrations of fine particulate matter less 
than 10 microns in diameter, PM10, or SPM) in three developing countries, China, Brazil 
and Mexico. The race-to-the-bottom model indicates that after decades of increasing 
capital and economic liberalisation, pollution should increase everywhere: pollution 
increases in poor countries because they are pollution havens, and in rich countries because 
they are relaxing environmental standards to remain cost-competitive. These three 
developing countries received 60 per cent of the total FDI for developing countries in 1998. 
If the race-to-the-bottom model is correct, then air pollution should increase in all three 
countries. At the same time, the air quality in US cities should decline because US industrial 
imports from these three countries have been expanding for decades. However, the figures 
show that the urban air qualities in these four countries have all improved. The result 
strongly contradicts the race-to-the-bottom model. 
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There has been scarce empirical evidence on the cross-country study of the environmental 
effects from foreign investment in 1990s. Recently, some studies have begun to investigate 
the extent to which different forms of environmental degradation within less developed 
countries are a function of transnational organisation of production (e.g. Grimes and 
Kentor, 2003; Jorgenson, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Kentor and Grimes, 2006). These 
studies are based on the context of foreign investment dependence theory.72  
Grimes and Kentor (2003) observe the impact of foreign investment dependence on 
carbon dioxide emissions between 1980 and 1996 using a cross-country panel data for 66 
less developed countries. They find that foreign capital penetration in 1980 has a significant 
positive effect on the growth of CO2 emissions between 1980 and 1996.  
Jorgenson (2007c) investigates the extent to which the transnational organisation of 
production affects the environment in 37 less developed countries from 1975 to 2000. It 
tests the hypotheses that foreign investment dependence in the manufacturing sector is, 
respectively, positively associated with carbon dioxide emissions and organic water 
pollutants (BOD) in less developed countries. In addition to the key determinant variable, 
the secondary sector FDI stock as percentage of total GDP, other control variables include 
population size, level of economic development (GDP per capita), domestic investment, 
relative size of manufacturing sector, urbanisation, and export intensity. The findings from 
fixed effect estimations confirm the hypotheses and provide support for the theory of 
foreign investment dependence. The other studies of Jorgenson use a similar methodology 
                                                
72 “In general, the theory of foreign investment dependence asserts that the accumulated stocks of foreign 
investment make a less developed country more vulnerable to different global political-economic conditions, 
often leading to negative consequences for domestic populations within investment-dependent nations. 
These structural process and outcome are partly maintained and reproduced by the stratified interstate 
system” (Jorgenson, 2007c, pp. 138).  
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and get the consistent results that foreign investment increases pollution emissions in less 
developed countries. 
5.2.2.3 Empirical Studies Related to China 
Two papers have examined the environmental impact of FDI in China. A working paper 
Liang (2006) uses city level data (more than 260 cities) in the late 1990s to examine the 
relationship between local SO2 emissions and the scale of foreign direct investment, 
industry composition and income. This paper tests two hypotheses: 1) that the pollution 
level in China’s cities increases with per capita income, but decreases with the square of per 
capita GDP (i.e. pollution-income nexus is of an EKC-type); and 2) everything else being 
equal, the pollution intensity in China’s cities decreases with the scale of foreign direct 
investment. The scale of FDI is measured by net assets or employment by foreign firms in 
each city, and is instrumented by geographic location, trade policy and local population. 
The major conclusion is that there is a negative correlation between FDI and SO2 
emissions, indicating that the overall effect of FDI is beneficial to the environment. The 
results also support the EKC hypothesis. A turning point of around $1,200 is found, 
suggesting that 30% or more cities have passed this level in 2000 and the proportion 
increases by about 4% each year. This interpretation is optimistic and much lower than the 
official prediction of the SEPA in April 2006 ($3,000).  
He (2006) constructs a five-equation simultaneous system to study the FDI-emission nexus 
and gets different results from Liang (2006). The system includes the FDI location decision 
with respect to host country’s environmental regulation stringency and the impact of FDI 
on pollution through the scale, composition and technique effects. The simultaneous 
system is estimated on a dynamic panel of 29 Chinese provinces’ SO2 emissions during the 
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period from 1994 to 2001. A Generalised Method of Moment (GMM) estimator is used to 
correct potential first-order serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. The results show that 
the total impact of FDI on industrial SO2 emissions is very small. A 1 per cent increase in 
FDI capital stock contributes a 0.098 per cent increase in industrial SO2 emission, 
indicating that the emission increase caused by the impact of FDI on economic growth and 
composition transformation cancels out the emission reduction resulting from the impact 
of FDI on reinforcing environmental regulations. Furthermore, the FDI entry decision 
equation (that depends on the previous period’s economic growth and environmental 
regulation stringency) in the simultaneous system provides convincing evidence for the 
pollution haven hypothesis. Although the overall effect of FDI on industrial SO2 emission 
is relatively weak and the foreign funded enterprises in China generally produce with higher 
efficiency, the increase in environmental stringency does have a modest deterrent effect on 
FDI inflows.  
5.2.3 Summary 
There have been numerous theoretical and empirical studies that examine the relationship 
between economic growth and the environment based on the theory of the environmental 
Kuznets curve since it was found in early 1990s. The results of empirical evidence are 
mixed and show that the EKC does not hold at all the time or for all pollutants. Among 
the empirical studies, only a few employ a cross-region analysis for an individual country. 
There are several critiques of the EKC, focusing on the methodology issues and 
interpretation of the results. In this chapter, we address many of these critiques in section 
5.4. 
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To consider the impact of FDI on environment, most analytical studies are pragmatic and 
empirical evidence is rather limited. The most recent cross-country studies on the 
FDI-environment nexus are all focusing on less developed countries and based on the 
foreign investment dependence theory. Of those empirical studies on the cross-region 
FDI-environment relationship for China, Liang (2006) and He (2006) both look at the 
impact of FDI on SO2 industrial emissions but get different results.  
The lack of cross-regional evidence for the EKC for an individual country and the 
contradictory empirical results in the FDI-environment nexus in China provided the 
motivation to examine the net environmental effects of income as well as foreign 
investment in China. We believe that this is the first study to examine these issues using 
Chinese city level data for a range of environmental indicators, in order to check the 
robustness of these two effects. This chapter also represents the first attempt to examine 
the differences between the behaviour of firms from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao, and 
other foreign firms.  
 
5.3 Economic Growth, FDI and the Environment in Chinese 
Cities 
In this section we first outline the economic development, FDI inflows and pollution levels 
in a large number of Chinese cities. We also provide information about the environmental 
indicators that are considered in this chapter.  
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5.3.1 Economic Development and FDI  
Cities are classified into three levels in China according to the administrative divisions: 
county-level cities, prefecture-level cities (including sub-provincial cities) and municipalities. 
County-level cities are usually governed by prefecture level divisions, but a few are 
governed directly by province-level divisions.73 Prefecture-level cities are completely ruled 
by their provinces; sub-provincial cities are ruled by their provinces but are administered 
independently in regard to economy and law, and the mayor of a sub-provincial city is 
equal in status to a vice-governor of a province; and municipalities are independent and 
equivalent to province. City, here, is not a “city in the strict sense”, but an administrative 
unit, including both urban core and surrounding rural areas.  
Since 1978, China has upgraded and reclassified many counties into cities, and many towns 
into counties. The total number of cities increased from 191 in 1978 to 661 in 2004, 
including 374 county-level cities, 283 prefecture-level cities (including 15 sub-provincial 
cities) and 4 central municipalities.  
Similar to the development across provinces, the development is quite uneven across cities. 
Table 5.3.1 compares the population, income and FDI in some key cities in China in 2004. 
Cities in coastal provinces generally have higher income levels than inland cities (15 of the 
17 cities with per capita income above $3,000 are located in eastern regions), especially in 
some southeast coastal provinces, for example, Zhuhai, Shenzhen and Guangzhou in 
Guangdong province; Xiamen in Fujian province; and Ningbo and Hangzhou in Zhejiang 
province. In terms of the per capita GDP growth, some inland cities have higher rates than 
                                                
73 Most county-level cities are created in the 1980s and 1990s, by replacing counties. This process was halted 
in 1997.  
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the eastern cities, possibly thanks to the recent Western Development Programme. 
However, the gap between east and west is still large.74 
 
Table 5.3.1 Population, Income and FDI for Some Cities in China, 2004 
City 
Population 
(million) 
GDP per 
capita 
($) 
GDP per capita 
growth rate 
(2003-2004) 
(%) 
FDI 
(million $) 
FDI/GDP 
(%) 
Zhuhai 0.86 7848 3.32 510 7.73 
Shenzhen 1.65 7161 1.62 3612 8.73 
Guangzhou  7.38 6799 8.82 2401 4.83 
Shanghai  13.52 6682 11.21 6541 7.27 
Xiamen  1.47 4850 5.60 570 5.34 
Ningbo  5.53 4733 12.84 2103 8.07 
Hangzhou  6.52 4695 11.10 1410 4.64 
Beijing  11.63 4477 8.64 3084 5.96 
Dalian  5.62 4226 12.72 2203 9.30 
Nanjing  5.84 3993 11.73 2566 11.12 
Tianjin  9.33 3812 11.86 2472 6.98 
Qingdao  7.31 3401 12.66 3799 14.53 
Jinan  5.90 3336 10.09 483 2.47 
Shenyang  6.94 3321 10.72 2423 10.55 
Huhhot* 2.15 3180 18.12 239 3.87 
Yantai 6.47 3043 16.37 1857 9.42 
Wuhan* 7.86 3016 10.01 1520 6.43 
Fuzhou  6.09 2832 7.25 1360 7.27 
Urumuchi* 1.86 2757 8.81 15 0.26 
Changchun* 7.24 2572 7.03 902 4.86 
Zhengzhou* 6.71 2565 15.79 242 1.45 
Chengdu* 10.60 2510 8.28 332 1.26 
Wenzhou  7.46 2277 6.99 209 1.23 
Taiyuan* 3.32 2272 15.20 143 1.84 
Kunming* 5.03 2268 8.65 62 0.55 
Changsha* 6.10 2179 13.11 501 3.66 
Haikou  1.43 2166 1.15 320 10.47 
                                                
74 For example, the poorest city, Xining (in Table 5.3.1), would have to spend 24 years to catch up to the 
income level of the richest city, Zhuhai, if both of them remain at their current income growth paths 
(ln(7848/1025)/ln[(100+12.37)/(100+3.32)]= 24). 
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Shijiazhuang  9.18 2159 10.63 352 1.78 
Yinchuan* 1.38 2135 9.42 64 2.79 
Harbin* 9.70 2110 9.87 405 1.99 
Nanchang* 4.61 2083 10.58 730 7.85 
Qinhuangdao  2.76 1995 9.17 202 3.68 
Lanzhou* 3.08 1991 6.53 - - 
Nantong  7.74 1910 15.10 1104 7.46 
Xi’an * 7.25 1701 8.18 276 2.08 
Hefei* 4.45 1616 17.42 316 4.43 
Guiyang* 3.48 1532 8.60 78 1.46 
Shantou  4.88 1501 7.11 78 1.07 
Beihai* 1.48 1328 7.83 20 1.01 
Zhanjiang  7.16 1176 9.48 71 0.97 
Chongqing* 31.44 1161 10.88 405 1.26 
Nanning* 6.49 1103 4.40 78 1.09 
Lianyungang  4.69 1074 13.29 247 4.90 
Xining* 2.07 1025 12.37 9 0.44 
Note: Cities reported in this table include:  
1) 4  municipalities: Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing; 
2) 26 province capital cities: Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, Huhhot, Shenyang, Changchun, Harbin, 
Nanjing, Hangzhou, Hefei, Fuzhou, Nanchang, Jinan, Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Changsha, 
Guangzhou, Nanning, Haikou, Chengdu, Guiyang, Kunming, Xi’an, Lanzhou, Xining, 
Yinchuan, and Urumuchi (Lasa is not included due to lack of data) 
3) 15 sub-provincial cities:  Shenyang, Dalian, Changchun, Harbin, Nanjing, Hangzhou, 
Ningbo, Xiamen, Jinan, Qingdao, Wuhan, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Chengdu, and Xi’an; 
4) 5 special economic zones: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen, Hainan; and 
5) 14 coastal open cities: Tianjin, Shanghai, Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Yantai, Qingdao, 
Lianyungang, Nantong, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and Beihai.   
Some cities appear in several categories, for example, Guangzhou, the capital of Guangdong 
province, is also a sub-provincial city and a coastal open city. * indicates cities in inland provinces.  
Source: China City Statistical Yearbook, 2004, 2005. 
 
The geographical distribution of FDI is also unbalanced. In terms of the total amount of 
FDI inflows, Shanghai, Qingdao, Shenzhen and Beijing are the four largest magnates for 
foreign capital. These four cities together attracted more than 28 per cent of FDI inflows in 
China in 2004. Among the cities with the total FDI inflows above $1,000 million, only 
Wuhan, the capital of Hubei province, is located in central China; others are all eastern 
cities. Similarly, among the cities with the share of FDI over GDP above 5 per cent, the 
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majority are located in eastern regions, except Wuhan and Nanchang (the capital of Jiangxi 
province). 
5.3.2 Environmental Quality in Chinese Cities 
The World Bank reported that 20 of the world’s 30 most polluted cities are located in 
China, largely due to high coal use and motorization. As shown in Figure 5.3.1, of the total 
energy consumption in China in 2004, around 67.7% was coal, 22.7% was oil, 2.6% was 
natural gas and 7.0% was hydro-power. Although the percentages of consumption of oil 
and hydro-power increased to some extent, coal is still widely used as the major source of 
energy.  
 
Figure 5.3.1 Energy Consumption Composition in China, 1978-2004 
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Note: the coefficient for conversion of electric power into SCE (standard coal equivalent) is 
calculated on the basic of the data on the average coal consumption in generating electric power in 
the same year. 
Source: China Compendium of Statistics, 1949-2004. 
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The combustion of coal generates several air pollutants, such as SO2, NOx and dust, which 
are harmful to human health, especially to the respiratory system. The World Bank report 
estimates that 300,000 people a year die prematurely from respiratory diseases in China. 
The main reason is that around 70% of China’s energy needs are supplied by coal-fired 
power stations. Additionally, China has the world’s highest emission of sulphur dioxide and 
one third of the country endures acid rain. The World Bank announced that pollution is 
costing China an annual 8-12% of GDP (about $110-170 billion) in direct damage, such as 
the impact on crops by acid rain, medical bills, lost work from illness, money spent on 
disaster relief following floods and the implied costs of resource depletion (The Economist, 
21/08/2004). 
To monitor the environmental quality, since 1980 China has established 2389 
environmental monitoring stations, including 1 general station, 41 provincial central 
stations, 401 prefecture-level stations, 1914 county-level stations and 32 nuclear monitoring 
stations. The environmental monitoring stations are responsible for monitoring the 
conditions of water, air, ecology, aquatic bios, soil, noise, sea, and radiation. In this chapter 
we focus on water and air quality. 
5.3.2.1 Water Pollution 
Table 5.3.2 provides general information about city drinking water quality, the groundwater 
quality and groundwater level in recent years. In terms of the number reaching drinking 
water quality standard, the proportion reaching 80% and above has decreased from 83% 
(55%+28%) in 2002 to 70% (53%+17%) in 2004, while correspondingly, the proportion in 
the less than 60% group increased from 2% to 23%, illustrating the deterioration of 
drinking water quality. Turning to the groundwater level, the number of cities in the 
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“Drop” group decreased significantly. However, the groundwater quality is becoming 
worse in more than half of the monitored cities in 2004. SEPA reported that the 
groundwater quality was mainly affected by human activities. The major pollutants in the 
groundwater are nitrate, nitrite, nitrogen-ammonia, and chloride.  
 
Table 5.3.2 Drinking Water Quality, Groundwater Level and Quality in Cities 
Rate of Reaching Drinking Water Quality Standard 
 100% 99.9% ~ 80% 79.9% ~ 60% 59.9% ~ 0 Total 
2002 26 (55%) 13 (28%) 7 (15%) 1 (2%) 47 
2003 22 (47%) 9 (19%) 8 (17%) 8 (17%) 47 
2004 25 (53%) 8 (17%) 3 (6%) 11 (23%) 47 
Groundwater Level 
 Raise  Stable Drop Total 
2001 63 (34%) 8 (4%) 115 (62%) 186 
2002 75 (34%) 34 (16%) 109 (50%) 218 
2003 61 (31%) 73 (38%) 60 (31%) 194 
2004 53 (28%) 78 (41%) 61 (32%) 192 
Groundwater Quality 
 Improve Stable Worsen Total 
2004 39 (21%) 52 (28%) 96 (51%) 187 
Note: # of cities reported in the table; and proportion in brackets. 
Source：China Environment Yearbook, 2002-2005.  
Domestic sewage is the major source of water pollution. SEPA reported industrial sectors 
discharged 44.9% of the total wastewater in 2004, and the shares of the pollutants, for 
example, COD and nitrogen-ammonia, are respectively 35.8% and 32.7%. 
5.3.2.2 Air Pollution 
Monitoring stations observe the concentrations of SO2, NO2 and PM10 every day in a 
number of key cities. Tables 5.3.3 – 5.3.6 present 20 the most polluted cities and 20 the 
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cleanest cities, respectively, according to the annual average concentrations of SO2, NO2, 
PM10 and the air pollution comprehensive index in 2004.
75 In terms of SO2 and PM10, the 
most polluted cities are mostly located in northern and central regions, for example, Linfen, 
Yangquan, Datong, Changzhi, and Taiyuan in Shanxi province; Jiaozuo, Kaifeng, Anyang, 
Luoyang, Sanmenxia and Pingdingshan in Henan province; Chifeng and Baotou in Inner 
Mongolia; Zhuzhou and Xiangtan in Hunan province; and Yibin, Panzhihua, and Zigong 
in Sichuan province. The major industry sectors in these cities are mining and washing of 
coal, mining and procession of ores, processing of coking, and smelting of ferrous and 
non-ferrous metals, etc. These cities are mostly reported in Table 5.3.6 because their SO2 
and PM10 pollutions contribute a great weight to the comprehensive index. However, in 
terms of NO2, some eastern cities enter the most polluted group, such as Beijing, 
Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Shanghai, Wenzhou and Ningbo. However, the overall level of 
NO2 pollution is lower than SO2 and PM10, therefore does not significantly affect the 
comprehensive index.  
Table 5.3.6 shows the cleanest cities in China are generally coastal cities, for example Beihai, 
Haikou, Rizhao, Zhanjiang, Zhuhai, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Shantou and Lianyungang; or those 
inland cities without heavy polluting industries such as Lasa, Guilin, Yuxi, Qiqiharr and 
Karamay. 
However, it is worth noting that such indices reflect the ambient concentrations of 
pollutants in urban area of a city, but cannot reflect the total industrial pollution emissions 
of the city. 
                                                
75 The index is calculated from ∑∑
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 where Ci is the concentration of pollutant i, and Cio is the 
limit value of Ci. The limit value is the annual average concentration level according to the national ambient 
air quality standard II. The annual average limit values for SO2, NO2 and PM10 are respectively 0.06, 0.08 and 
0.10 (mg/m3). 
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Table 5.3.3 Annual Average SO2 Concentration in Some Cities in China, 2004 
The Most Polluted 
Cities 
SO2 Concentration 
(mg/m3) 
The Cleanest Cities 
SO2 Concentration 
(mg/m3) 
Yangquan 0.231 Lasa 0.003 
Linfen 0.224 Beihai 0.005 
Jinchang 0.198 Haikou 0.007 
Yibin 0.155 Karamay 0.007 
Datong 0.149 Fuzhou 0.010 
Zunyi 0.135 Zhanjiang 0.012 
Sanmenxia 0.132 Changchun 0.013 
Jiaozuo 0.127 Hefei 0.013 
Zhuzhou 0.123 Wuhu 0.017 
Handan 0.121 Qiqiharr 0.019 
Yichang 0.120 Maanshan 0.019 
Chongqing 0.113 Shenzhen 0.023 
Liuzhou 0.109 Zhuhai 0.024 
Urumuchi 0.102 Changzhou 0.024 
Chifeng 0.099 Xining 0.024 
Anyang 0.094 Rizhao 0.024 
Guiyang 0.094 Quanzhou 0.025 
Changzhi 0.093 Xiamen 0.025 
Luoyang 0.093 Huzhou 0.026 
Shizuishan 0.090 Mudanjiang 0.027 
Source: China Environment Yearbook, 2005. 
Table 5.3.4 Annual Average NO2 Concentration in Some Cities in China, 2004 
The Most Polluted 
Cities 
NO2 Concentration 
(mg/m3) 
The Cleanest Cities 
NO2 Concentration 
(mg/m3) 
Guangzhou 0.073 Beihai 0.007 
Shenzhen 0.072 Yuxi 0.011 
Beijing 0.071 Zhanjiang 0.012 
Chongqing 0.067 Haikou 0.013 
Shanghai 0.062 Hefei 0.017 
Wenzhou 0.062 Quanzhou 0.018 
Ningbo 0.060 Lasa 0.020 
Harbin 0.060 Jinchang 0.020 
Urumuchi 0.058 Lianyungang 0.020 
Jiaozhuo 0.056 Taiyuan 0.022 
Changzhi 0.056 Qinhuangdao 0.023 
Yangquan 0.055 Qujing 0.023 
Linfen 0.055 Deyang 0.023 
Nanjing 0.055 Changde 0.023 
Hangzhou 0.055 Guiyang 0.024 
Huzhou 0.054 Zhangjiajie 0.024 
Wuhan 0.054 Maanshan 0.024 
Tianjin 0.052 Qingdao 0.024 
Suzhou 0.051 Mianyang 0.025 
Datong 0.050 Luzhou 0.025 
Source: China Environment Yearbook, 2005. 
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Table 5.3.5 Annual Average PM10 Concentration in Some Cities in China, 2004 
The Most Polluted 
Cities 
PM10 Concentration 
(mg/m3) 
The Cleanest Cities 
PM10 Concentration 
(mg/m3) 
Panzhihua 0.256 Haikou 0.033 
Linfen 0.219 Beihai 0.043 
Kaifeng 0.198 Guilin 0.046 
Baotou 0.186 Zhuhai 0.046 
Datong 0.180 Zhanjiang 0.050 
Weinan 0.175 Lasa 0.052 
Taiyuan 0.175 Rizhao 0.058 
Pingdingshan 0.174 Karamay 0.059 
Changzhi 0.173 Shantou 0.059 
Lanzhou 0.172 Xiamen 0.063 
Zhuzhou 0.171 Wenzhou 0.068 
Luoyang 0.165 Yantai 0.068 
Yangquan 0.162 Shaoxing 0.072 
Fushun 0.162 Fuzhou 0.074 
Xuzhou 0.158 Mianyang 0.075 
Xiangtan 0.153 Shenzhen 0.076 
Zigong 0.151 Qinhuangdao 0.076 
Tongchuan 0.151 Nanning 0.078 
Beijing 0.149 Ningbo 0.079 
Jinan 0.149 Huhhot 0.080 
Source: China Environment Yearbook, 2005. 
Table 5.3.6 Air Pollution Comprehensive Index in Some Cities in China, 2004 
The Most Polluted 
Cities 
Index The Cleanest Cities Index 
Linfen 6.61 Beihai 0.60 
Yangquan 6.16 Haikou 0.61 
Datong 4.91 Zhanjiang 0.85 
Jinchang 4.61 Karamay 1.03 
Yibin 4.49 Zhuhai 1.29 
Zhuzhou 4.20 Rizhao 1.31 
Chongqing 4.14 Guilin 1.38 
Jiaozuo 4.13 Fuzhou 1.42 
Changzhi 3.98 Quanzhou 1.45 
Panzhihua 3.91 Changchun 1.50 
Yichang 3.88 Xiameng 1.52 
Sanmenxia 3.85 Yuxi 1.52 
Kaifeng 3.81 Hefei 1.53 
Zunyi 3.73 Wuhu 1.54 
Luoyang 3.66 Maanshan 1.55 
Baotou 3.65 Qiqiharr 1.61 
Weinan 3.64 Shantou 1.63 
Anyang 3.61 Lasa 1.64 
Urumuchi 3.56 Lianyungang 1.90 
Pingdingshan 3.51 Changzhou 1.92 
Source: China Environment Yearbook, 2005. 
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SEPA also reported that 132 of 342 monitored cities (38.6% of total) arrived at the national 
ambient air quality standard II (living standard), 141 (41.2%) at standard III and 69 (20.2%) 
lower than standard III. Additionally, air quality in large cities is worse than that in middle 
and small cities. 66.1% of citizens were living in the cities under the air quality standard II. 
Industrial waste gas is the major source of the serious air pollution. For instance, in 2004, 
industrial SO2 and soot accounted for 86.7% and 81.4% of the total emissions in cities. 
Acid rain is another serious problem. Table 5.3.7 compares the frequency and the pH value 
of city acid rain in recent years. We find that the proportion of cities without acid rain 
decreased from 49.7% in 2002 to 43.5% in 2004, i.e. the number of cities suffered from 
acid rain increased. The proportion of cities with frequency of acid rain more than 40% 
moved up as well, from 24.0 % to 30.1%. Of those cities suffering the acid rain, the 
proportion with rainwater pH value less than 5.6 increased from 36.9% in 2001 to 41.4% in 
2004.  
 
Table 5.3.7 City Acid Rain pH Value and Frequency 
Frequency of Acid Rain 
 0 0 ~ 20 20 ~ 40 40 ~ 60 60 ~ 80 80 ~ 100 Sub total > 40 
2001 41.2 23.7 10.9 8.0 9.1 6.9 24.0 
2002 49.7 18.6 10.5 5.8 7.7 7.7 21.2 
2003 45.6 18.7 7.4 6.8 11.1 10.5 28.4 
2004 43.5 18.2 8.2 8.5 9.5 12.1 30.1 
Average pH Value of Acid Rain 
 ≤ 4.5 4.5 ~ 5.0 5.0 ~ 5.6 5.6 ~ 7.0 > 7.0 Sub total < 5.6 
2001 3.3 18.3 15.3 63.1 - 36.9 
2002 6.0 12.4 14.2 50.5 16.9 32.6 
2003 8.8 15.6 12.9 48.9 13.8 37.3 
2004 10.8 17.5 13.1 44.2 14.4 41.4 
Note: proportion of cities reported in the table. 
Sauce: China Environment Yearbook, 2002-2005. 
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Figure 5.3.2 provides the distribution of acid rains in China in 2004. South China suffers 
the most from serious acid rain due to the presence of low hills, abundant rainfall and wet 
climate, mixed with increasing waste gas emissions. Some northern cities in Liaoning, 
Hebei, and Shaanxi provinces also suffered from acid rain because of the heavy industrial 
air pollution.  
 
Figure 5.3.2 Acid Rain Distribution in 2004 
 
 
Source: China Environment Bulletin, 2004.  
 
Although to some extent a geographical unbalance exists in the distribution of income and 
FDI among regions in China, we do not find a consistent geographical imbalance for all 
pollutants. For example the regional concentration of the most polluted cities in terms of 
SO2 is different from that in terms of NO2. Therefore, we infer that the relationship 
between income and the environment, as well as FDI and the environment, might depend 
on the pollutants we choose.  
Average PH Value 
<= 5.0 
5.0 to 5.6 
> 5.6 
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5.3.3 Industrial Water and Air Pollution 
In this chapter, we focus on industrial water and air pollution. For industrial water 
pollution, we examine discharges of total wastewater, and specific water pollutants, 
including chemical oxygen demand (COD), hexavalent chromium compounds (CrVI), and 
petroleum-like matter. For industrial air pollution, we observe the emissions of total waste 
gas, and specific air pollutants, including sulphur dioxide (SO2), soot and dust.  
Wastewater refers to all the industrial wastewater discharged to the outside of the industrial 
factory, including wastewater from production process, direct cooling water, mine 
groundwater that is in excess of the discharge standard, and the domestic sewage mixed 
within the industrial wastewater (indirect cooling water not included).  
 
Figure 5.3.3 Industrial Wastewater Discharge by Sectors in China, 2004 
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Source: China Environment Yearbook, 2005. 
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Figure 5.3.3 shows the sectoral distribution of wastewater discharges in 2004 for 70,462 
investigated firms in China. The heavy wastewater polluting sectors are located in chemical 
products, paper products, electric and heat power supply, smelting and pressing of ferrous 
metals, and textiles. Within the electric and heat power supply sector, coal-fired power 
station is the major source of wastewater. 
 
Figure 5.3.4 Industrial COD Discharge by Sectors in China, 2004 
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Source: China EnvironmentYearbook, 2005. 
 
The specific pollutants in wastewater refer to the net weights of the pollutants, which is 
equal to the average concentration of the pollutants multiplied by the total weight of 
wastewater in the reported period. The COD test is commonly used to indirectly measure 
the amount of organic compounds in water. It is a useful wastewater quality indicator. The 
COD test determines whether or not wastewater will have significant adverse effect upon 
fish or upon aquatic plant life. Figure 5.3.4 illustrates that COD is high in the wastewater 
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discharged from the factories of paper products, food products, chemical products, and 
textiles. 
 
Figure 5.3.5 Industrial CrVI Discharge by Sectors in China, 2004 
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Source: China Environment Yearbook 2005. 
 
The second specific pollutant is CrVI compounds, which are toxic if ingested or inhaled. 
CrVI is an established human carcinogen. Chronic exposure to CrVI compounds may 
cause permanent eye injury and can increase risk of lung cancer. CrVI compounds are 
widely used as pigments for photography, and in pyrotechnics, dyes, paints inks and 
plastics. They can also be used for stainless steel production, textile dyes, wood 
preservation, leather tanning, and as anti-corrosion and conversion coatings. Figure 5.3.5 
shows the major sources of CrVI: smelting and pressing of non-ferrous metals, metal 
263 
 
products, leather products, electronic equipment, smelting and pressing of ferrous metals 
and chemical products.    
 
Figure 5.3.6 Industrial Petroleum-like Matter Discharge by Sectors in China, 2004  
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Source: China Environment Yearbook, 2005. 
 
Petroleum-like matter refers to various kinds of hydrocarbon compounds. They float on 
the surface of the water and prevent gas exchange, thus lead to the deterioration of water 
quality. They can cause the death of fish and aquatic plants and hence affect the life of 
aquatic birds, and have a negative effect on the aquatic products industry. Figure 5.3.6 
shows that about 70% petroleum-like matter come from four sectors, smelting and 
pressing of ferrous metals, chemical products, extraction of petroleum and the processing 
of petroleum.  
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Industrial waste gas is the main source of air pollution. It refers to the volume of total 
emitted gas comprising of pollutants caused through fuel combustion and industrial 
production processes such as smelting and processing of metals, chemical materials 
production, and paper production. The volume of waste gas is worked out under the 
standard conditions for temperature and pressure, i.e. 273 K (0 °C) and 101.325 kPa (1 
atmosphere of absolute pressure). Figure 5.3.7 shows that the most 
waste-gas-pollution-intensive industrial sectors are production and distribution of electric 
power and heat power, non-metallic mineral products, and smelting and processing of 
ferrous metals. It is noticeable that within the power supply sector and non-metallic 
mineral products sector, coal-fired power stations and cement manufacture respectively 
contribute 91% and 81% of the waste gas emissions from each sector. 
 
Figure 5.3.7 Industrial Waste Gas Emissions by Sectors in China, 2004 
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Source: China Environment Yearbook, 2005. 
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Sulphur dioxide measures the weight of SO2 generated through fuel combustion, especially 
the burning of coal and oil; and production processes like smelting of non-ferrous ores. 
According to the annual reports of SEPA, in recent years 85% of SO2 comes from fuel 
combustion, and 15% from industrial processes. China’s SO2 emissions have been the 
highest in the world, and half of them are attributed to burning of coal. Sulphur dioxide is 
widely employed in previous research as an important indicator of air pollution. Excess 
SO2 emissions will cause severe damage to human health, especially to the respiratory 
system. Excess SO2 emissions can also result in acid rain. Figure 5.3.8 illustrates that the 
majority of industrial SO2 emissions are from the production and distribution of electric 
power and heat power. SEPA also reported that of the 57.0% emissions of SO2, 93.4% are 
emitted from coal-fired power stations. Other sources of SO2 emissions include 
manufacture of non-metallic mineral products, smelting and processing of ferrous metals, 
and chemical products.  
 
Figure 5.3.8 Industrial SO2 Emissions by Sectors in China, 2004 
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Source: China Environment Yearbook, 2005. 
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The level of SO2 pollution in China is recorded in two ways: ambient concentration (ug/m
3) 
and mass emissions (tons). SO2 ambient concentration, as mentioned in Table 5.3.3, is 
widely used as an air quality indicator. However, it combines all emissions of SO2 from 
industrial, domestic and natural resources, and can be influenced significantly by climate 
factor such as wind-force and wind direction. Mass sulphur dioxide emissions are directly 
collected from factories and estimated by SEPA. The local bureaus of SEPA calculate mass 
emissions from the factories by combining factory self-reported data on fuel consumption 
and industrial process and periodic boiler stack testing data. Although the mass emission 
data is as robust as ambient data, it is more accurate for estimating industrial pollution 
(Liang, 2006). 
Industrial soot and dust are two kinds of suspended particulate matter. Soot refers to the 
weight of suspended particulates in the smoke caused from fuel combustion, especially the 
component of smoke caused by the incomplete burning of carbon-rich organic fuels; while 
dust are those from industrial production processes, for example, refractory dust from iron 
and steel firms, screen dust from coking firms, sintering machine dust, lime kiln dust, and 
cement dust of constrution materials.76 The emissions of dust are caluclated using the 
following equation.  
Industrial dust emissions = Volume of gas from dust exhaust system × Average dust concentration of gas 
at the discharge point of the precipitator × Uptime of dust exhaust system 
A similar equation applies to soot.  
These two types of suspended particulates are considered as dangeous owing to both their 
particulate size and the chemical compounds present. They can stain clothing and can 
                                                
76 The particulates discharged from the power station are counted in industrial soot. 
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possibly cause illness if inhaled. They are hazardous to the lungs and general health when 
the particles are less than 5 micrometres in diameter, as such particles are not filtered out 
by the upper respiratory tract. 
Similar to SO2 emissions, the major sources of industrial soot pollution are the electric and 
heat supply sector, non-metallic mineral products, smelting and processing of ferrous 
metals, chemical products, and processing and coking of fuels (Figure 5.3.9).  
 
Figure 5.3.9 Industrial Soot Emissions by Sectors in China, 2004 
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Source: China Environment Yearbook, 2005. 
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In terms of dust, the non-metallic mineral products sector accounts for more than 70% of 
total emissions. Meanwhile, smelting and processing of ferrous metals is also a major 
source of dust (Figure 5.3.10). 
 
Figure 5.3.10 Industrial Dust Emissions by Sectors in China, 2004 
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Source: China Environment Yearbook, 2005. 
 
China Environment Yearbook has reported several other pollutants in wastewater, such as 
lead, arsenic, nitrogen-ammonia, volatile phenol, and others. These pollutants are not 
considered in this study because a number of cities did not report these data. Therefore, in 
this chapter, we focus on the total volumes of industrial wastewater and waste gas, plus the 
emissions of three specific water pollutants and three specific air pollutants.  
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5.4 Methodology 
In this chapter, we employ a panel data of 112 main cities in China to estimate the 
relationship between income and eight environmental indicators. Then we examine the 
differences in environmental impact between domestic and foreign firms. We split foreign 
firms into two groups, i.e. firms funded from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao, and firms 
funded by other foreign economies. 
In this section, we firstly introduce our model specification and then describe our data and 
discuss the methodology issues.  
5.4.1 Model Specifications 
In the light of previous literature on economic growth and environment we start by 
estimating the following reduced-form equation for the emissions of industrial pollutants.  
ititititittiit GDPGIPYYYEpc εββββθγα +++++++= )/(4
3
3
2
21         (5.4.1) 
where Epc denotes per capita emissions, γ is city-specific intercepts, θ is time-specific 
intercepts, Y represents per capita income, GIP/GDP refers to the gross industrial product 
(GIP) normalised by city GDP, and ε is the error term. Subscripts i and t represent city and 
year, respectively.  
Equation 5.4.1 is estimated for a mixture of the abovementioned eight industrial water and 
air pollution indicators (Wastewater, COD, CrVI, Petroluem, Waste Gas, SO2, Soot and Dust) 
over the period 2001-2004 for a sample of 112 major cities in China (See Appendix 5.1 for 
data definitions and sources, and Appendix 5.2 for the selected cities in the sample).  
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Per capita income indicates the direct scale and technique effects of economic growth. 
Some studies use GDP per km2 to measure scale effects and per capita GDP to capture 
technique effects. “However, this is only appropriate when estimating concentrations of 
pollution. [In this chapter] pollution data are in the form of … emissions per capita and 
hence there seems no obvious way to separate scale and technique effects” (Cole, 2003).  
The share of industrial output in GDP is used to capture the extent to which structural 
change within the economy has affected pollution, i.e. the composition effects of growth. 
The year specific effects are included to pick up any effects that are common to all cities 
but which change over time; and the city specific effects pick up the effects specific to each 
city which do not change over time. 
In order to examine the environmental impacts of foreign affiliates and separate the 
activities of foreign affiliates from those of domestic firms, we decompose GIP into three 
components: industrial output for domestic firms (GIPd), the industrial output for the 
firms from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao (GIPh) (i.e. Chinese-sourced firms), and the 
industrial output for the firms funded by foreign countries (GIPf) (i.e. non-Chinese sourced 
firms). Thus Equation 5.4.1 becomes: 
  
itititit
ititittiit
GDPGIPfGDPGIPhGDPGIPd
YYYEpc
εβββ
βββθγα
++++
+++++=
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3
2
21
 .  (5.4.2) 
In practice, we include per capita income (Y), and then add its quadratic term (Y2) and 
finally the cubic term (Y3). If a linear regression is considered, we expect a positive 
relationship between income and pollution at current economic development levels in 
China. If a quadratic function is estimated, we expect a standard EKC relationship 
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(inverted-U) between income and pollution, i.e. β1>0 and β2<0. Following Grossman and 
Krueger (1995), we expect negative β1 and β3 and a positive β2 in the cubic functions. 
We expect that the greater the industrial output, the higher the industrial pollution 
emissions, i.e. a positive coefficient on GIP/GDP in Equation 5.4.1. There is a common 
view that domestic firms are usually less efficient than foreign affiliates, and hence induce 
more pollution. Thus we expect a positive sign on GIPd/GDP in Equation 5.4.2.  
The previous literature suggests that the “net effects” of foreign investment may be 
positive and negative. Therefore, the signs on GIPh/GDP and GIPf/GDP are ambiguous. 
Furthermore, the signs may also depend on the sectors on which foreign capital have 
concentrated. It is not possible to get data on either foreign industrial output or FDI 
inflows/stocks by sectors; however, the China Industrial Economy Statistical Yearbook 
provides the paid-in capital into detailed industrial sectors. Table 5.4.1 presents the 
distribution of paid-in capital for all industrial sectors sorted by the share of domestic 
paid-in capital. Chinese-sourced capital is relatively high in sectors such as leather, fur, 
feather and related products; textile wearing apparel, footwear and caps; articles for cultural, 
education and sport activity; furniture; plastics; metal products; textiles; chemical fibres; 
and printing, reproduction of recoding media. Non-Chinese-sourced capital is high in 
various kinds of machinery and equipment; foods; metal products; rubber; paper and paper 
products; beverages; processing of food from agricultural products; medicines; and raw 
chemical and chemical products. Since the pollution intensity of these sectors varies 
according to pollution indicators, the environmental effect of Chinese-sourced and 
non-Chinese sourced firms may differ and depend on the pollution emissions estimated.  
272 
 
Table 5.4.1 Paid-In Capital of Industrial Sectors in China, 2003 
Sector 
Domestic 
(%) 
H.T.M 
(%) 
Foreign 
(%) 
Total 
Capital 
Leather, Fur, Feather and Related Products 4.86 60.91 34.23 21.05 
Recycling and Disposal of Waste 6.11 8.78 85.11 0.26 
Textile Wearing Apparel, Footware, and Caps 6.83 52.58 40.59 32.74 
Articles for Culture, Education and Sport Activity 7.90 62.98 29.13 17.17 
Artwork and Other Manufacturing 8.67 53.58 37.75 13.86 
Furniture 12.26 53.40 34.34 10.39 
Plastics 12.89 49.86 37.24 52.97 
Communication Equipment, Computers & Other 
Electronic Equipment 
17.01 24.62 58.38 190.26 
Foods 19.54 25.06 55.40 38.50 
Metal Products 19.71 38.83 41.46 44.47 
Electrical Machinery and Equipment 22.44 24.99 52.58 85.03 
Measuring Instruments and Machinery for  Cultural 
Activity and Office Work  
25.41 29.34 45.25 26.47 
Rubber 26.37 18.39 55.24 21.80 
Processing of Timber, Manufacture of  Wood, 
Bamboo, Rattan, Palm, and Straw Products  
31.03 34.11 34.86 13.12 
Textile 32.06 40.44 27.50 87.47 
Paper and Paper Products 33.34 21.80 44.86 46.62 
Beverages 35.73 23.51 40.76 53.87 
Chemical Fibers 41.12 34.50 24.38 23.63 
Processing of Food from Agricultural Products 41.57 18.82 39.61 43.42 
General Purpose Machinery 43.71 11.33 44.96 76.90 
Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media 48.03 35.93 16.04 25.06 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 48.34 21.80 29.85 90.28 
Medicines 49.99 13.28 36.74 44.74 
Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products 54.57 12.93 32.50 146.88 
Transport Equipment 57.62 9.64 32.74 149.45 
Special Purpose Machinery 62.91 13.94 23.15 52.51 
Smelting and Pressing of Non-ferrous Metals 77.67 9.55 12.78 53.96 
Processing of Petroleum, Coking, Processing of 
Nuclear Fuel 
81.17 9.07 9.76 47.86 
Production and Distribution of Electric Power and 
Heat Power 
87.00 5.66 7.35 330.13 
Production and Distribution of Gas 88.06 3.38 8.56 22.34 
Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals 88.54 5.64 5.81 165.08 
Extraction of Petroleum and Natural Gas 90.64 8.96 0.41 81.39 
Mining and Processing of Nonmetal Ores   93.18 3.01 3.82 12.74 
Production and Distribution of  Water 96.23 1.25 2.52 60.10 
Mining & Processing of Non-Ferrous Metal Ores 97.06 1.71 1.24 7.68 
Mining and Processing of Ferrous Metal Ores 98.90 0.74 0.36 11.38 
Mining of Other Ores 99.11 0.89 0.00 0.56 
Tobacco 99.18 0.42 0.39 34.34 
Mining and Washing of Coal  99.70 0.09 0.21 126.14 
Note: H.T.M. indicates the paid-in capital from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao. Total capital is in billion 
yuan. 
Source: China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook, 2004. 
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In addition, Dean et al. (2005) suppose that FDI from Chinese sources enters China for the 
purpose of producing for export and is expected to be concentrated in relatively more 
unskilled labour-intensive industries; whilst FDI from non-Chinese sources produces for 
the internal Chinese market and is expected to be concentrated in relatively more skilled 
labour-intensive industries. They find Chinese-sourced FDI is significantly attracted by low 
environmental levies, but non-Chinese-sourced FDI is not. These findings give indirect 
evidence that non-Chinese firms use cleaner technology. This conclusion is supported by 
the survey of Brandt and Zhu (2005) that during 1983-1992, of the cumulative value of 
technology import contracts between foreign firms and Shanghai firms, 23.9 per cent was 
from Japan, 20.5 percent from Germany and 15.4 per cent from the United States. And as 
reported by the firms, the origin of imported equipment is mainly from these three 
technologically advanced countries as well. For these reasons, we assume firms funded by 
foreign countries are the cleanest and domestic firms the dirtiest. Additionally, if the signs 
on GIPh/GDP and GIPf/GDP are both positive, we expect that GIPd/GDP will have the 
largest effect on pollution emissions, followed by GIPh/GDP and GIPf/GDP.   
In sum, the estimating results may differ by pollutant. Table 5.4.3 provides the expected 
signs of all the explanatory variables in Equations 5.4.1 and 5.4.2. 
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Table 5.4.2 Expected Signs for the Estimated Coefficient in Equations 5.4.1 and 
5.4.2 
Explanatory Variables Signs 
Y:  per capita GDP +a, +b, -c 
Y2: (per capita GDP)2 -b, +c 
Y3: (per capita GDP)3 -c 
GIP/ GDP  + 
GIPd/GDP: GIP/GDP for domestic firms + 
GIPh/GDP: GIP/GDP for firms invested by Hong Kong etc. -/+ 
GIPf/GDP:  GIP/GDP for firms invested by foreign courtiers -/+ 
Note: a, b, and c indicate the linear function, quadratic function and cubic function. 
 
5.4.2 Data Description 
5.4.2.1 Pollution Emissions 
The data of pollution emissions are collected from China Environment Yearbook.  
The eight measurements of environmental quality are described in Section 5.3.3. We use 
the per capita emissions rather than concentrations. Previous evidence has illustrated that 
the relationship between income and pollution can vary depending on whether the 
pollutants are measured in terms of concentration or emissions.77  
Cole and Elliott (2003) argue that concentrations and emissions data provide different 
information. City-level concentrations provide more information regarding the human 
                                                
77 For example, Selden and Song (1994) find that the turning points for city-level concentrations is at lower 
income levels than for national emissions because the reduction of concentration within a city is reasonably 
easy to achieve.  
275 
 
health impact of a particular pollutant. In contrast, emissions provide more information on 
wider environmental issues and may have a weak relationship with concentrations. For 
instance, if the government plans to tackle the detrimental health impact from air pollution, 
they could execute a policy of heightening the factory chimneys or encouraging firms to 
locate outside the city. These policies would reduce the city-level concentrations but would 
not reduce national emissions. Cole and Elliott (2003) also point out that concentrations 
data tend to be “noisier” than emissions data and require the inclusion of some dummy 
variables to capture site-specific effects, for example, variables to control for the nature of 
the observation site, the measuring equipment, the average temperature, and the level of 
rainfall.  
Comparing the advantages and disadvantages associated with concentrations and emissions 
data, and regarding to our aim to examine the impact of economic growth and foreign 
affiliates on industrial pollutions, we decide to use industrial pollution emissions data to 
represent the environmental quality.  
We choose the pollution indicators following the criteria claimed in Antweiler et al. (2001) 
that useful pollutants should: 1) be a by-product of goods production; 2) be emitted in 
greater intensity in some industries than others; 3) have strong local effects; 4) be subject to 
regulations because of its adverse effects on the population; 5) have well-known abatement 
technologies; 6) have data available from a wide mix of countries.  
As shown in section 5.3.3, the selected eight pollution emissions are all generated from 
industrial production; are emitted in greater quantities in some industries than others; have 
strong local effects; subject to regulations at different degrees; and have available data for a 
wide mix of cities in China. 
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The China Environment Yearbook reports industrial pollution emissions for a number of 
key enterprises investigated by local environmental protection bureaus. The number of 
selected enterprises and the proportion of enterprises vary across cities. Such data cannot 
provide the information of total industrial pollution emissions at city level. Additionally, the 
data are not comparable. We have to convert the available pollution emissions of selected 
enterprises to the emissions of all the enterprises in the city. In addition to pollution 
emissions and treatments, other data reported in the China Environment Yearbook only 
include the number of selected enterprises and their industrial output. The number of 
enterprises is not appropriate to covert the industrial pollution emissions because of the 
difference in firm sizes. In this case, we use the industrial output to adjust the total 
industrial pollution emissions using the following equation.  






×=×=
gip
GIP
e ratiocorrectioneE                    (5.4.3) 
where e and gip are respectively the pollution emissions and gross industrial output from the 
investigated firms; and E and GIP are those for the city. Equation 5.4.3 implies that the 
total industrial emissions equal to the emissions of selected enterprises divided by the share 
of the selected firm’s output to the total industrial output in the city. In this equation, we 
assume that the emissions per industrial product are the same within a city. Although some 
limitations exist for this assumption, it is the only available method to get the total 
industrial pollution emissions in a city.   
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5.4.2.2 Explanatory Variables 
Data for the explanatory variables are all collected from China City Statistical Yearbook.  
All the values (per capita GDP, capital, and industrial output) are adjusted to 1990 prices 
using GDP deflator.  
Tables 5.4.3 and 5.4.4 respectively provide the descriptive statistics of all variables and their 
correlations. The correlations matrix generally supports the sign expectations in Table 
5.4.2.  
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Table 5.4.3 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Medium Max 
Wastewater (tons per person) 424 38.49 32.34 2.03 27.92 168.96 
COD (tons per 10000 persons) 432 81.80 70.72 0.67 62.58 340.88 
CrVI (kg per 10000 persons) 384 1.62 2.46 0.0021 0.50 13.83 
Petroleum (tons per 1000000 persons) 424 46.33 51.17 0.026 25.46 236.16 
Waste Gas (m3 per person) 439 4.70 4.19 0.13 3.34 21.39 
SO2 (tons per 10000 persons) 428 325.39 252.65 4.38 260.84 1355.84 
Soot (tons per 10000 persons) 436 138.54 103.47 0.74 107.83 693.93 
Dust (tons per 10000 persons) 424 118.09 122.58 0.020 71.17 649.65 
Y (1000 yuan) 428 8.55 6.37 1.94 6.56 48.04 
GIP/ GDP (100 yuan per yuan) 427 96.44 42.10 11.89 87.73 277.76 
GIPd/GDP (100 yuan per yuan) 424 75.94 32.14 9.82 72.87 179.99 
GIPh/GDP (100 yuan per yuan) 422 9.00 16.14 0 3.86 119.13 
GIPf/GDP (100 yuan per yuan) 422 11.60 16.86 0 4.80 120.61 
Note: extreme outliers have been removed for all dependent variables’ statistics; the descriptive statistics of the independent variables are those in the sample 
for SO2 without extreme outliers. 
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Table 5.4.4 Correlations of the Variables 
 
Waste- 
water 
COD CrVI 
Petro- 
leum 
Waste 
 Gas 
SO2 Soot Dust Y Y
2 Y3 
GIP/ 
GDP 
GIPd/ 
GDP 
GIPh/ 
GDP 
GIPf/ 
GDP 
Y 0.470 0.111 0.430 0.226 0.551 0.537 0.128 -0.043 1.000       
Y2 0.377 0.076 0.390 0.155 0.502 0.469 0.088 -0.095 0.933 1.000      
Y3 0.288 0.049 0.341 0.098 0.451 0.379 0.060 -0.116 0.789 0.951 1.000     
GIP/ GDP 0.531 0.222 0.421 0.295 0.622 0.645 0.196 0.123 0.679 0.577 0.439 1.000    
GIPd/GDP 0.406 0.188 0.203 0.322 0.561 0.515 0.301 0.329 0.309 0.265 0.234 0.721 1.000   
GIPh/GDP 0.249 0.147 0.409 -0.052 0.214 0.355 -0.056 -0.155 0.507 0.434 0.300 0.553 -0.081 1.000  
GIPf/GDP 0.248 0.032 0.268 0.177 0.271 0.291 -0.021 -0.139 0.630 0.527 0.367 0.598 -0.031 0.579 1.000 
Note: extreme outliers are removed for the correlations between all dependent variables and independent variables; correlations between independent 
variables are those in the sample for SO2 without extreme outliers. 
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5.4.3 Methodological Issues 
Equations 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 are estimated using two alternative functional forms in levels and 
in logs. However, Cole et al. (1997) argue that the quadratic logs function seems to provide 
a more realistic income-environment relationship than the quadratic levels function 
because of the symmetrical nature of the latter. The symmetry of quadratic levels function 
implies, first, that pollution levels will fall at the same rate as they increased and, second, 
that these pollution levels will become negative, probably in a short space of time. In 
contrast, a quadratic log function falls away gradually once it passes the turning point, 
because the curve asymptotically approaches zero. In addition, the distribution of the 
variables in both equations with positive skewness can be easily corrected by taking logs.78 
Therefore, log functions are reported in the main text.  
The second methodological issue concerns the exogeneity of per capita income, in 
response to the claim that the EKC may suffer from simultaneity bias due to causality 
moving from environmental degradation to income. A Davidson-MacKinnon test is 
employed to test the null of exogeneity of current income in fixed-effects regressions for 
Equations 5.4.1 and 5.4.2. Lagged income is used as an instrumental variable. The null 
hypothesis of exogeneity is accepted in the majority cases suggesting that simultaneity bias 
is not present. Per capita income shows to be endogenous in logged models when using 
waste gas and industrial soot as dependent variables; and in level models when using CrVI 
and industrial dust as dependent variables. Therefore, instrumental variable (IV) regression 
is used with lagged income as an instrumental variable when income shows to be 
endogenous.  
                                                
78 After taking logs, the positive skewness of all the dependent and independent variables is significantly 
reduced.  
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Third, we test for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. We employ a Breusch-Pagan test 
for heteroskedasticity. The results reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity in all cases. 
We also estimate the following dynamic model for the residuals to test whether or not 
there is first order autocorrelation.  
Ttititit ,,2,1 K=+= − νρεε                     (5.4.4) 
where 1<ρ  and itν ~ IID(0, )
2
νσ . 
The results show that the estimated ρˆ ’s are significant for a few cases, indicating that there 
is first-order autocorrelations within the panel. ρˆ ’s are not statistically different from zero 
in other regressions. Thus, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation need to be corrected for 
if they are present.79 
The next concern is the non-stationary of the income and emissions data, which has been 
tested in some papers, such as Stern and Common (2001) and Cole (2003). However, all 
the samples in our dataset are extremely short, with only four observations for each city. 
Thus the test of stationary is largely meaningless. It is impossible to take individual 
Augmented Dick-Fuller tests or panel unit root tests with only four time series 
observations.  
The fifth issue is to find the appropriate estimator. Grossman and Krueger (1991and 1995) 
point out that the random-effects estimator is more appropriate than fixed-effects 
                                                
79 For random-effects models, AR(1) presents in CrVI logged models; while for fixed-effects models, AR(1) 
presents in Wastewater level models, SO2 logged models and Soot logged models. We use the Stata command 
xtreg with the robust option to remove the heteroskedasticity and the Stata command xtregar to correct the 
autocorrelation. However, xtregar does not allow a robust option to be applied. Therefore, we employ a 
heteroskedasticity test for the xtregar results. For example, we plot the squared residuals and the fitted values 
of logged CrVI, and do not find significant relationship between them for our random-effects models, 
suggesting homoskedasticity in the residuals. 
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estimator for studies that use unit-specific data. In the model with fixed-effects, all 
unit-specific characteristics that are constant over time are absorbed in the constant term, α. 
Thus, we cannot discriminate between the effects of some variables, such as the province 
dummies of the city, which may influence pollution. If we add these variables as additional 
regressors, these individual-specific effects cannot be estimated in the fixed-effects model 
due to perfect collinearity. To account for this, we estimate Equations 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 by 
Generalised Least Square (GLS). In this case, the error term is the sum of two components, 
the random component and an idiosyncratic error component. In order to check the 
efficiency of random-effects estimator, a Hausman specification test is employed to 
examine whether or not there is some correlation between the explanatory variables and 
the error terms (the strictly exogeniety assumption of the random-effects model). The 
results generally indicate that the random-effects specification is consistent and efficient 
(only 1 rejects the null for logged models). Therefore, random-effects specification results 
are reported in the main text. We add province level dummy variables to capture 
province-specific characteristics which are assumed to be constant over time, such as, 
geographical location, climate, resource endowments, corruptibility of government.  
Finally, according to the current development level in China, we expect that economic 
development will increase environmental pollution levels. We therefore expect most 
Chinese cities to be on the upsloping part of the curve. Therefore, we begin with a simple 
linear model and then move on to quadratic models. A cubic income term is also included 
in order to examine the possibility that pollution will increase again at high income levels. 
However, every cubic relationship necessarily extends to plus or minus infinity, which is 
not realistic. In addition, the cubic term is generally not statistically significant at the 90% 
confidence level. Although the cubic term is found to be significant for some pollutants, 
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such as Petroleum and SO2, the turning point is not found (i.e. the curve is monotonically 
increasing). Therefore, linear and quadratic equations are reported in the main text.  
In sum, linear and quadratic log specifications with random-effects are reported in the main 
text of this chapter. 
 
5.5 Empirical Results 
5.5.1 Main Results 
Tables 5.5.1 - 5.5.4 provide our main results for each of the pollution indicators. Other 
results are presented in Appendices (Cubic log results with random-effects can be found in 
Appendix 5.3, log results with fixed-effects in Appendix 5.4, and all level results in 
Appendix 5.5).     
Wastewater 
Table 5.5.1 starts the results with industrial wastewater and chemical oxygen demand. 
Models 1 and 2 are the linear and quadratic specifications from Equation 5.4.1, while 
Models 3 and 4 are those from Equation 5.4.2. The Davidson-MacKinnon test results of 
exogeneity are provided, suggesting the exogeniety of current income. Hausman 
specification test results indicate that there is no correlation between the explanatory 
variables and the error terms, i.e. random-effects estimator is appropriate. Nevertheless, the 
autocorrelation test also suggests no such correlation within panels. 
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Model 1 for industrial wastewater shows a statistically significant and positive relationship 
between income and the emissions of industrial wastewater. The income elasticity is 
approximately 0.43, indicating a 10 per cent increase in per capita income will increase per 
capita emissions of industrial water by 4.3 per cent. When a quadratic specification is 
considered, we find a statistically significant inverted-U-shaped relationship between per 
capita income and per capita emissions. The estimated turning point is around RMB 35,235 
at 1990 price (about $7,371).80 In our sample, only Karamay city passed this income level 
in 2003 and 2004, demonstrating that most of Chinese cities are on the left side of the 
EKC curve, i.e. economic growth has positive effects on the industrial wastewater 
pollution emissions. The estimated income elasticity in Model 2 is around 0.46 at the mean 
of per capita income and is similar to that for the linear Model 1. The table also reports the 
estimated turning points from the fixed-effects results to enable comparison with the 
random-effects turning points. We find that they are broadly similar.     
Referring to the effects of industrial output, we find that it has a constant significant and 
positive impact on wastewater emissions. Thus, the structural changes within the economy 
are responsible for the pollution levels. The structural changes from traditional agricultural 
economy to current dualistic economy (modern and traditional sectors) have increased the 
pollution emissions. Further structural changes within the modern sectors (from 
manufacturing to service sectors), at higher income levels, may improve the environmental 
quality.  
Models 3 and 4 decompose industrial output according to the ownership of enterprises. 
The results of per capita income are similar to those in Models 1 and 2. However the 
                                                
80 Annual average exchange rate is $1=RMB 4.78 in 1990. RMB 35,235 is equal to about RMB 71,040 in 
2004 prices, which is approximately $ 8,580 at the 2004 exchange rate ($1=RMB 8.28).  
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estimated turning point in Model 4 is higher than that in Model 2.81 No city in our sample 
has passed this income level. It confirms our expectation that economic growth induces 
more wastewater pollution at current income levels for all cities in China.  
Amongst the firms with different ownerships, industrial output of domestic firms is found 
to have the strongest positive impact on wastewater emissions. Firms owned by Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and Macao, are also found to generate more industrial wastewater, but the 
magnitude is small, only ten per cent of that on domestic firms. In contrast, the coefficient 
on the industrial output of foreign invested firms is negative and is not statistically different 
from zero. These results are supported by Table 5.4.1, in which Chinese-sourced firms 
have a significant share in wastewater pollution intensive sectors like textiles and textile 
related products; while foreign-funded firms have a high share in sectors that have 
discharged less wastewater, for example, transport equipment, electrical machinery and 
equipment. Nevertheless, the results support our expectations that foreign invested firms 
are generally the cleanest while domestic firms are the dirtiest.  
The final issue relates to the results for our year dummy variables and province dummy 
variables (not reported here). The year dummies are negative and significant in 2003 and 
2004, with a value around -0.1, indicating a general decline of wastewater emission over 
time. Most of the province dummies are positive, but none of them are significant. 
  
 
 
                                                
81 RMB 57,561 equals to $12,042 at 1990 annual average exchange rate. At the price and exchange rate in 
2004, the corresponding turning point is RMB 116,054 or $14,016.  
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Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) 
With regards to COD, we do not find any significant relationship between per capita 
income and per capita emissions of COD. This result is different from Shen (2006), who 
finds a standard EKC relationship between income and COD emissions using province 
level data, and the turning point is around the sample mean.  
As with wastewater, industrial output has the strongest positive effect on COD discharges, 
indicating the importance of structural changes in determining environmental quality. 
Domestic firms are found to have significant influence on COD emissions only in Model 4, 
at 10% significance level. Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao invested firms significantly 
increase COD pollution. A 10 per cent increase in the output from such firms will rise up 
the COD emissions by 1.1 per cent. Table 5.4.1 illustrates that Chinese-sourced capital 
takes a significant share in several COD intensive sectors, such as paper products, food 
processing, beverage, textiles, and chemical products. Foreign invested firms also have 
positive impact on COD but the influence is not significant.  
Finally, time effects are significant and negative and province-specific effects are broadly 
significant and positive.  
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Table 5.5.1 Linear and Quadratic Log Estimation Results with Random-effects for Industrial Wastewater and COD 
Variables 
Wastewater COD 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Y 
0.43 0.98 0.50 1.00 0.050 -0.60 0.17 -0.48 
(4.29)*** (4.24)*** (5.01)*** (3.92)*** (0.29) (1.00) (0.99) (0.90) 
Y2 
 -0.14  -0.12  0.16  0.16 
 (2.62)***  (2.15)**  (1.20)  (1.32) 
GIP/GDP 
0.52 0.52   0.69 0.68   
(3.91)*** (4.04)***   (2.53)** (2.50)**   
GIPd/GDP 
  0.46 0.44   0.36 0.38 
  (3.82)*** (3.70)***   (1.58) (1.71)* 
GIPh/GDP 
  0.048 0.044   0.11 0.11 
  (1.73)* (1.57)   (2.26)** (2.36)** 
GIPf/GDP 
  -0.014 -0.019   0.030 0.039 
  (0.59) (0.82)   (0.55) (0.72) 
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
-0.12 -0.58 0.15 -0.19 0.15 0.76 1.08 1.57 
(0.13) (0.68) (0.18) (0.24) (0.14) (0.58) (1.12) (1.40) 
R2 (overall) 0.62 0.63 0.65 0.65 0.37 0.36 0.43 0.43 
DM 0.56 0.12 0.09 0.02 1.81 0.82 2.51 1.46 
Hausman  0.36 1.03 5.12 5.74 3.05 0.17 4.33 3.96 
AR(1) No No No No No No No No 
Turning point RE 
(FE) 
 
35,235 
(32,577) 
 
57,561 
(33,913) 
    
Observations 423 423 398 398 431 431 407 407 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Turning point is in RMB at 1990 price.
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Hexavalent Chromium Compounds (CrVI) 
Table 5.5.2 provides the results for hexavalent chromium compounds and petroleum-like 
matter.  
In respect to CrVI, first-order autocorrelation exists within panels. We therefore employ a 
random-effects GLS regression with AR(1) disturbances model. Results suggest positively 
linear relationship between per capita income and emissions of such compounds. The 
income elasticity is relatively high, at around 0.7-0.8 according to Models 1 and 3. Again, 
gross industrial output significantly increases the discharges of CrVI, and domestic firms 
contribute a lot to such effects. Turning to the activities of foreign affiliates, 
Chinese-sourced firms increase the discharge of such compounds with an elasticity of 0.21, 
while non-Chinese-sourced firms decrease the discharges but the effects are not statistically 
significant. CrVI is highly discharged in manufacture of non-ferrous and metal products, 
leather, fur, feather and related products. Comparing the paid-in capitals of Chinese 
investors and non-Chinese investors in Table 5.4.1, the former have invested more in metal 
products, leather, fur feather and related products, and plastics. However, non-Chinese 
investors show considerable shares in chemical products and communication equipment 
products, which are also relatively CrVI polluting industries. Although it is not significant, 
the negative sign of GIPf/GDP is conflicting with the correlation ratio shown in Table 
5.4.3. 
In addition, year dummy for 2004 is negative and significant. Province-specific dummies 
for Zhejiang, Fujian, Hubei, Chongqing, Gansu and Xinjiang are positively significant. A 
possible explanation is that Zhejiang and Fujian are well known for their manufacturing in 
wearing apparel (including leather related products); Chongqing municipality and cities in 
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other three provinces specialise in heavy industries and may concentrate in sectors like 
ferrous and metal products, and transport equipment.  
Petroleum-like Matter (Petroleum) 
As with wastewater, the results for petroleum-like matter provide evidence of a robust 
inverted-U-shaped-relationship between per capita income and emissions. The estimated 
turning point is around RMB 22,089 on average (about $4,621 at the 1990 exchange rate), 
which is lower than Wastewater.82 In our sample, nine cities have passed this income level, 
indicating the scale effects have been overcome by technique effects in these cities. The 
estimated turning points are robust across random-effects and fixed-effects models. 
Additionally, the estimated elasticity at mean of income is 1.0 in Model 2, much higher than 
other pollutants.  
Again, the coefficients on GIP/GDP and GIPd/GDP are both positive and significant. The 
coefficient on GIPh/GDP is not statistically different from zero. The coefficient on 
GIPf/GDP is significant with the magnitude around 0.2, which is higher than that on 
GIPh/GDP. A possible explanation is that foreign funded enterprises have invested a great 
amount in the sectors discharging more petroleum-like matter, e.g. raw chemical materials 
and chemical products, medicines, and transport equipment.  
Time effects are negative and significant in 2003 and 2004. The province dummy for 
Hainan province is significantly negative. Provinces such as Xinjiang and Gansu, which 
have a high share of extraction and processing of petroleum, have positive and significant 
coefficients on their dummies.  
                                                
82 Equivalent to RMB 44,536 ($5,379) at 2004 prices and exchange rate.  
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Table 5.5.2 Linear and Quadratic Log Estimation Results with Random-effects for Industrial CrVI and Petroleum-like matter 
Variables 
CrVI Petroleum 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Y 
0.67 0.23 0.76 -0.16 0.92 2.64 0.73 2.45 
(2.22)** (0.24) (2.50)** (0.16) (3.17)*** (3.01)*** (2.78)*** (2.85)*** 
Y2 
 0.11  0.23  -0.43  -0.42 
 (0.47)  (0.95)  (2.22)**  (2.21)** 
GIP/GDP 
0.71 0.69   0.85 0.87   
(1.71)* (1.64)   (1.95)* (1.95)*   
GIPd/GDP 
  0.69 0.72   0.91 0.83 
  (1.95)* (2.03)**   (2.45)** (2.18)** 
GIPh/GDP 
  0.21 0.22   0.068 0.063 
  (1.88)* (1.93)*   (0.97) (0.93) 
GIPf/GDP 
  -0.12 -0.11   0.22 0.21 
  (1.25) (1.17)   (3.06)*** (3.04)*** 
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
-6.61 -6.15 -6.51 -5.83 -2.61 -4.18 -2.79 -3.95 
(3.20)*** (2.69)*** (3.47)*** (2.91)*** (1.23) (1.78)* (1.47) (1.97)** 
R2 (overall) 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.45 0.47 0.46 0.47 
DM 0.98 1.17 0.93 1.12 0.59 2.04 0.12 0.95 
Hausman  3.85 2.37 6.32 6.05 1.03 3.52 4.12 1.08 
AR(1) Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Turning point RE 
(FE) 
     
22,089 
(21,385) 
 
18,436 
(14,102) 
Observations 383 383 364 364 423 423 403 403 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Turning point is in RMB at 1990 price.  
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Waste Gas  
Considering waste gas, the Davidson-MacKinnon test results reject the null hypothesis that 
per capita income is exogenous in most logged models. Therefore, we employ generalised 
two-stage least square (G2SLS) random-effects IV regression in all logged models. Lagged 
income is used as the instrumental variable. In addition, our random-effects specification is 
rejected in Model 4; however it does not affect our conclusions because only a linear 
relationship is found between income and emissions. The income elasticity is 
approximately 0.6. Total industrial output and the output of domestic firms remain positive 
and significant effects on the total waste gas emissions. The coefficients on GIPh/GDP and 
GIPf/GDP are both positive with similar and small value, but neither of them is significant.  
Contrary to the water pollution indicators, time effects are positive, indicating deterioration 
of air pollution in recent years. The results for province dummies are mixed in sign and 
mostly are not statistically different from zero, except the strong negative coefficient on 
that of Hainan province. 
Sulphur Dioxide (SO2) 
The results of SO2 are broadly similar to those for waste gas. We find that per capita GDP 
has positive effects on SO2 emissions and the income elasticity is approximately 0.53.
83 
Such a linear relationship is different from previous studies on Chinese SO2 emissions, i.e. 
Liang (2006) and Shen (2006). The finding in Liang (2006) is optimistic and conflicting 
                                                
83 Although significant coefficients are found on all income terms in cubic specifications, the function is 
monotonic increasing, i.e. no turning point is found. 
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with the fact that SO2 emissions have continued increasing in recent years. However, our 
results, to some extent, are consistent with the findings in Shen (2006).84  
The coefficient on GIP/GDP is positive and significant, which is consistent with the 
expectation, indicating that the greater industrial output is produced, the more pollution 
will be emitted.  
The results in Models 3 and 4 support our expectation that domestic firms are the most 
pollution-intensive. Although the coefficients are both positive, we do not find any 
significant environmental impact for the firms owned either by Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
Macao or by other foreign economies. A possible explanation is that the SO2 polluting 
sectors (production and distribution of electric and heat powers, smelting and processing 
of ferrous metals) are mostly funded by domestic capital as shown in Table 5.4.1. Such 
neutral effect of output from both foreign groups on SO2 emissions is different from the 
negative effects in Liang (2006) and small positive effects in He (2006).85  
Additionally, year dummies are not significant. Province-specific characteristics generally 
have a positive and significant influence on SO2 emissions, probably due to the large 
consumption of coal across China. Among the 30 observed provinces, only Hainan 
province has a negative coefficient.  
 
 
                                                
84 Shen (2006) finds a U-relationship between per capita income and per capita emissions, and the turning 
point is 3000-5000 RMB, indicating at least 50% provinces are on the increasing side of the curve. 
85 The elasticity in Liang (2006) is -0.6 to -0.7, and that in He (2006) is 0.098.  
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Table 5.5.3 Linear and Quadratic Log Estimation Results with Random-effects for Industrial Waste Gas and SO2 
Variables 
Waste Gas SO2 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Y 
0.55 0.85 0.64 0.97 0.53 0.52 0.56 0.50 
(4.08)*** (2.66)*** (5.00)*** (2.87)*** (4.61)*** (1.89)* (5.49)*** (1.84)* 
Y2 
 -0.070  -0.075  0.0039  0.016 
 (1.02)  (1.03)  (0.06)  (0.27) 
GIP/GDP 
0.72 0.72   0.62 0.62   
(5.85)*** (5.84)***   (4.37)*** (4.37)***   
GIPd/GDP 
  0.58 0.57   0.52 0.52 
  (5.70)*** (5.56)***   (4.46)*** (4.45)*** 
GIPh/GDP 
  0.026 0.024   0.043 0.043 
  (0.88) (0.81)   (1.30) (1.30) 
GIPf/GDP 
  0.027 0.024   0.025 0.026 
  (0.98) (0.84)   (0.80) (0.83) 
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
-3.15 -3.43 -2.60 -2.85 1.09 1.10 1.55 1.60 
(3.76)*** (3.88)*** (3.60)*** (3.74)*** (1.68)* (1.62) (2.83)*** (2.78)*** 
R2 (overall) 0.63 0.63 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.71 0.71 
DM 3.04* 3.71* 2.12 2.74* 0.07 0.06 1.44 1.47 
Hausman  0.19 0.19 7.46 26.79** 1.51 1.73 0.05 1.37 
AR(1) No No No No No No No No 
Turning point         
Observations 438 438 413 413 427 427 407 407 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Turning point is in RMB at 1990 price.  
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Soot 
Table 5.5.4 shows the main results for industrial soot and dust. For soot, we do not find a 
significant coefficient on per capita income in Models 1 and 2. In light of the 
Dickson-MacKinnon test results, current income is endogenous in Models 3 and 4. We 
thus employ G2SLS random-effects IV regression with lagged income as instrumental 
variable. The results show per capita income increases industrial soot pollution.  
With regards to other explanatory variables, results of GIP/GDP and GIPd/GDP confirm 
the evidence that structural changes within the economy are important for the 
environmental quality, and domestic firms are dirtier than foreign affiliates. Coefficient on 
GIPh/GDP is positive and that on GIPf/GDP is negative but neither is significant.  
Nevertheless, the coefficients on our year dummy variables are negative and significant in 
2002. A number of provinces have positive and significant coefficients on their province 
dummy variables, among which Shanxi has the largest impact, due to its endowments of 
coal. A negative and significant provincial-specific effect is found only for Hainan 
province. 
Dust 
Finally, we consider the results for industrial dust. We do not find any significant 
relationship between income and emissions, although the correlation matrix shows that we 
might expect a negative effect. This finding is consistent with Shen (2006). Results of 
industrial output and its three components are similar to those for Soot. We do not find any 
significant year-specific effects. Again, Hainan has a negative and significant 
province-specific effect.  
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Table 5.5.4 Linear and Quadratic Log Estimation Results with Random-effects for Industrial Soot and Dust 
Variables 
Soot Dust 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Y 
0.055 -0.31 0.35 0.070 -0.089 -0.63 0.021 -0.53 
(0.36) (1.02) (2.99)*** (0.20) (0.33) (1.16) (0.08) (0.96) 
Y2 
 0.090  0.065  0.13  0.13 
 (1.40)  (0.88)  (1.03)  (1.02) 
GIP/GDP 
0.71 0.70   0.75 0.73   
(5.35)*** (5.23)***   (3.81)*** (3.66)***   
GIPd/GDP 
  0.45 0.46   0.95 0.96 
  (4.08)*** (4.17)***   (4.83)*** (4.85)*** 
GIPh/GDP 
  0.041 0.042   0.054 0.056 
  (1.20) (1.23)   (1.16) (1.19) 
GIPf/GDP 
  -0.0039 0.00068   -0.022 -0.018 
  (0.13) (0.02)   (0.56) (0.43) 
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
0.76 1.11 1.29 1.50 1.17 1.70 0.39 0.82 
(1.12) (1.57) (1.87)* (2.01)** (0.78) (1.05) (0.25) (0.50) 
R2 (overall) 0.61 0.60 0.62 0.62 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.39 
DM 1.42 0.38 9.11*** 5.96** 0.06 0.05 1.93 0.61 
Hausman  1.90 4.51 5.51 8.16 0.45 1.24 10.78 11.40 
AR(1) No No No No No No No No 
Turning point         
Observations 435 435 415 415 423 423 403 403 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Turning point is in RMB at 1990 price. 
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In sum, our main results for random-effects models show that the standard EKC 
relationship between income and pollution is only found for wastewater and petroleum-like 
matter. The estimated turning points exceed the income level of at least 95% cities. The 
results of other pollution indicators generally show a positive linear income-pollution nexus, 
except COD and industrial dust. Therefore, at current income level, the net effects of 
economic development on environmental quality are negative.  
The results of industrial output are broadly robust across all models for all pollutants, 
confirming that structural changes within the economy play an important role in 
determining water and air pollution levels in China.  
When we decompose industrial output by ownership, domestic firms are shown to be the 
most polluting. The net effects of the firms invested by Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan 
are positive in all models for all pollutants, but only significant for three water pollution 
indicators, i.e. Wastewater, COD and CrVI. It is probably because such investment is 
preferred to produce for export and locate in sectors such as textiles, wearing apparel and 
leather products, which are wastewater polluting. The impact of the activities of foreign 
enterprises is only positive and significant on petroleum-like matter emissions. No 
significant effects are found on other pollutants.  
Year-specific effects are negative for some pollutant, but positive for waste gas. The 
province-specific effect of Hainan province is strongly negative for five pollutants, 
petroleum-like matter, waste gas, SO2, soot and dust.  
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5.5.2 Results in Appendices  
Appendix 5.3 
The cubic term of income is significant in the models of Petroleum and SO2 but turning 
points are not found. The cubic term of income in other regressions is statistically 
insignificant. The results for other explanatory variables are robust to those in linear and 
quadratic models.  
Appendix 5.4 
The results from fixed-effects models are broadly similar to those with random-effects 
models for most of the pollutants. A notable difference is that foreign funded firms are 
found to have positive and significant effects on waste gas emissions and SO2 emissions. 
However, the coefficient of determination R2 appears to be quite low for most of the 
emissions, suggesting that fixed-effects models do not fit well. In addition, models on 
COD, CrVI, and Petroleum fail the F-test on the overall significance of the regression. 
Appendix 5.5 
The level results between random-effects and fixed-effects models are broadly similar. We 
find a few differences between level results and log results. Firstly, the estimated turning 
points for wastewater and petroleum-like matter are lower than those using logged data. 
However, it does not change our conclusion that the majority of cities are located on the 
increasing part of the environmental Kuznets curve. Second, although we find U-shaped 
relationship between per capita income and SO2 emissions for Model 5 in Table 5.5.3, the 
Hausman specification test suggests that the random-effects model is inconsistent and 
inefficient. Third, we find an inverted-U relationship between income and dust emissions. 
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The estimated turning point, again, confirms the positive relationship between growth and 
pollution emissions at current income levels in majority Chinese cities. In addition, we find 
significantly positive relationship between GIPf/GDP and CrVI emissions, which are 
consistent with our expectations. Finally, we find positive and significant impact of 
GIPf/GDP on COD emissions in fixed-effects models. Other results are roughly consistent 
with log results. 
 
5.6 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In this chapter, we use a panel of 112 Chinese cities over four years to examine the 
income-pollution nexus for several water and air pollution indicators. We also compare the 
net environmental effects of economic activities of domestic firms, Chinese-sourced 
affiliates from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao, and non-Chinese-sourced affiliates from 
other foreign economies.   
Our pollution indicators include four industrial water pollution emissions, i.e. wastewater, 
chemical oxygen dioxide, hexavalent chromium compounds, and petroleum-like matter; 
and four industrial air pollution emissions, i.e. waste gas, sulphur dioxide, soot, and dust.      
We find that the linear and quadratic log specifications with random-effects fit the models 
very well. Although the environmental Kuznets curve is found to exist for two pollutants, 
the evidence of the majority pollution emissions (except COD and dust) confirms that at 
current income level in China, economic development (with current technology levels and 
policies) will induce more industrial pollution emissions, i.e. the net effects of economic 
growth on environment quality is negative. We also find that total industrial output has 
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strong positive effects on industrial pollution emissions, and the impacts of industrial 
output differ by ownership. Domestic firms have the strongest positive effects on industrial 
pollution emissions; Chinese-sourced affiliates have moderate positive effects on three of 
the four water pollution emissions, but an insignificant impact on air pollution; and foreign 
invested firms have significant and positive influences on the emissions of petroleum-like 
matter, but neutral impacts on all the other pollutants. 
If the environmental Kuznets curve exits for all the pollution emissions at higher income 
levels in China, it does not suggest that China can outgrow the environmental problems by 
simply emphasising economic growth without the need for special attention to the 
environment itself. Panayotou (2003) argues that government policy can affect the shape 
and height of the EKC through three channels. First, the turning point of the EKC may be 
delayed or advanced, weakened or strengthened by policy intervention. In addition to 
higher incomes, the environment could be improved by the policy responsiveness to the 
growing demand for environmental quality, through the enactment of environmental 
legislation and development of new institutions to protect the environment. Second, since 
it may takes decades for low-income countries to pass the turning point, the accumulated 
damage in the meantime may far exceed the present value of higher future growth and a 
cleaner environment. Therefore, active environmental policy at present may be justified 
and the present cost of prevention may be more cost effective than future treatments. 
Third, the height of the EKC reflects the environmental price of economic growth, which 
depends on income levels, as well as market efficiency and policies. Therefore, to reduce 
the environmental price, it is important to remove environmental harmful subsidies, for 
example on energy and transport; enforce property rights; price resources at full-cost; and 
internalise environmental costs though pollution taxes and tradeable permits.   
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Thus, in order to make environmental improvements and to reduce the environmental 
damage for each increment of income per capita, the Chinese government is recommended 
to enforce their environmental protection at the earlier stages of economic development, 
through the improvement and reinforcement of environmental regulations at every 
administrative level of the country. The Law of Property Rights, which has been executed 
from 1st October 2007, may help to reduce the environmental price of economic growth.   
In 2006, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao pointed out the importance of green development in 
his government work report. “Wen has ordered local governments to establish 
accountability rules for implementing caps on sulphur dioxide and other pollutants, and 
demanded that local officials face inspections for pollution control” (Reuters, 16/08/2006). 
GDP (or economic growth) is not any more the key theme considered by the local policy 
makers, and environmental protection has been a factor to assess the achievement of local 
official in some provinces. Reuters also reported that China will rigorously enforce limits 
on industrial pollution to rein in rampant pollution and cool the frenetic economic growth. 
Zhou Shengxian, head of SEPA, said that the central leadership and State Council are 
treating reductions in energy use and major pollutant emissions as two major hard targets 
and using the reduction of major pollutant emissions as an important means to promote 
coordinated, sustainable development. These two targets are the red lines that cannot be 
crossed. In 2004, Wen Jiabao announced that the green GDP would replace the traditional 
GDP as a measure of economic growth, as well as the performance measure for 
government officials. Green GDP deducts the depreciation costs of environmental damage 
and resource depletion from gross GDP. A recent report indicates that growth of green 
GDP was virtually zero in some provinces in the first half of 2007, suggesting that “true” 
economic growth in China may be significantly lower than it appears once the depreciation 
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of natural capital is taken into account (Shanghai Securities News, 03/08/2007). Although 
there are some technical hitches to implement green GDP as a performance measure of 
local government officials, it at least helps local government to pay more attention on 
environmental problems and increases public concerns of environmental protection. 
Central government should promote the process of wide implementation of green GDP 
index.  
Our results show that structural changes in the economy, especially those of domestic firms, 
to some extent, have important roles in determining pollution levels. Therefore, the future 
structural changes within domestic enterprises at higher income levels, from manufacturing 
to service sectors, are vital to improve environmental quality. Foreign invested firms seem 
to be the most efficient and have better environmental practices. Foreign firms may also 
have technology spillovers to local firms through imitation, employment turnover and 
supply chain requirements. However, the technology transfer does not happen 
automatically. Local institutions are vital to promote the local capacity to assimilate, diffuse 
and retain the technologies (OECD, 2002).  
Since foreign affiliates have a significant impact on the emissions of some pollutants, 
especially Chinese-sourced foreign affiliates, the government is recommended to control 
the investment in high energy consumption and high pollution sectors, but encourage more 
environmental friendly investment. These will be enhanced by the new policies of the 
Chinese government. The National Development and Reform Commission released a new 
and substantially revised “Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Invested Enterprises”, which 
became effective on 1st December, 2007 and replaces the former catalogue adopted in 2004. 
The new catalogue implies that China is going to put emphasis on the “quality” of 
investment, which is opposite to the past emphasis on “quantity”. For example, the 
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catalogue shows that the Chinese government will 1) continue to encourage investment in 
all advanced technology and modern manufacturing, and services business such as modern 
logistics and service outsourcing, but discourage investment in traditional enterprise sectors; 
2) encourage investment in sustainable resources and environmental protection, but restrict 
or prohibit investment in high-resource-use, high-energy-use and high-pollution enterprises, 
as well as mining of certain rare minerals and energy resources; and 3) discourage 
investment in export-oriented enterprises, which is dramatic reverse to the former policy.  
Finally, the major limitation of this chapter is that we use reduced form equations. The 
reduced-form approach gives us the net effects of income and industrial foreign investment 
on pollution but can not explain why the estimated pollution-income and pollution-FDI 
nexus exist. An alternative approach is to model the structural equations relating 
environmental regulations, technology, and industrial composition to GDP and then to link 
the level of pollution to the regulations, technology and industrial composition (Grossman 
and Krueger 1995). However, the unavailability and/or validity of data on pollution 
regulations and technology make the reduced-form approach necessary.
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Appendix 5.1 Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
Variable Definition/Source 
Wastewater 
Per capita emissions of industrial wastewater (tons per person). Source: 
China Environment Yearbook; population data from China City Statistical 
Yearbook. 
COD 
Per capita emissions of industrial chemical oxygen demand (tons per 10 000 
persons). Source: as above.  
CrVI 
Per capita emissions of industrial hexavalent chromium compounds (kg per 
10 000 persons). Source: as above. 
Petroleum 
Per capita emissions of industrial petroleum-like matter (tons per 1 000 000 
persons). Source: as above. 
Waste Gas 
Per capita emissions of industrial waste gas (10 000 m3 per person). Source: 
as above. 
SO2 
Per capita emissions of industrial sulphur dioxide (tons per 10 000 persons). 
Source: as above. 
Soot 
Per capita emissions of industrial soot (tons per 10 000 persons). Source: as 
above. 
Dust 
Per capita emissions of industrial dust (tons per 10 000 persons). Source: as 
above. 
Y 
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (1 000 yuan at 1990 price). 
Source: China City Statistical Yearbook. 
GIP/GDP 
Gross industrial product (GIP) normalised by city GDP (100 yuan per yuan). 
Source: as above. 
GIPd/GDP 
GIP normalised by GDP for the domestic firms (100 yuan per yuan). 
Source: as above. 
GIPh/GDP 
GIP normalised by GDP for Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao invested firms 
(100 yuan per yuan). Such firms refer to all industrial enterprises registered as 
the joint-venture, cooperative, sole investment industrial enterprises and 
limited liability corporations with funds from Hong Kong, Macao and 
Taiwan. Source: as above. 
GIPf/GDP 
GIP normalised by GDP for foreign countries invested firms (100 yuan per 
yuan). Such firms refer to all industrial enterprises registered as the 
joint-venture, cooperative, sole investment industrial enterprises and limited 
liability corporations with foreign funds. Source: as above. 
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Appendix 5.2 Cities in the Sample (number of cities of subgroups in 
brackets) 
East (52) Central (31) West (29) 
Municipalities (3) 
Beijing 
Tianjin 
Shanghai 
Hebei (5) 
Shijiazhuang  
Tangshan 
Qinhuangdao 
Handan 
Baoding 
Liaoning (6) 
Shenyang 
Dalian 
Anshan 
Fushun 
Benxi 
Jinzhou 
Jiangsu (8) 
Nanjing 
Wuxi 
Xuzhou 
Changzhou 
Suzhou 
Nantong 
Lianyungang 
Yangzhou 
Zhejiang (7) 
Hangzhou 
Ningbo 
Wenzhou 
Jiaxing 
Huzhou 
Shaoxing 
Taizhou 
Fujian (3) 
Fuzhou 
Xiamen 
Quanzhou 
Shandong (10) 
Jinan 
Qingdao 
Zibo 
Zaozhuang 
Yantai 
Weifang 
Jining 
Taian 
Weihai 
Rizhao 
Guangdong (8) 
Guangzhou 
Shaoguan 
Shenzhen 
Zhuhai 
Shantou 
Foshan 
Zhanjiang 
Zhongshan 
Hainan (2) 
Haikou  
Sanya 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shanxi (5) 
Taiyuan 
Datong 
Yangquan 
Changzhi 
Linfen 
Jilin (2) 
Changchun 
Jilin 
Heilongjiang (4) 
Harbin 
Qiqiharr 
Daqing 
Mudanjiang 
Anhui (3) 
Hefei 
Wuhu 
Maanshan 
Jiangxi (2) 
Nanchang 
Jiujiang 
Henan (6) 
Zhengzhou 
Kaifeng 
Luoyang 
Pingdingshan 
Anyang 
Jiaozuo  
Hubei (3) 
Wuhan 
Yichang 
Jingzhou 
Hunan (6) 
Changsha 
Zhuzhou 
Xiangtan 
Yueyang 
Changde 
Zhangjiajie 
Municipality (1) 
Chongqing 
Inner Mongolia AR (3) 
Huhhot 
Baotou 
Chifeng 
Guangxi Zhuang AR (4) 
Nanning 
Liuzhou 
Guilin 
Beihai 
Sichuan (5) 
Chengdu 
Panzhihua 
Luzhou 
Mianyang 
Yibin 
Guizhou (2) 
Guiyang 
Zunyin 
Yunan (2) 
Kunming 
Qujing 
Shaanxi (5) 
Xi’an 
Tongchuan 
Baoji 
Xianyang 
Yan’an 
Gansu (2) 
Lanzhou 
Jinchang 
Qinghai (1) 
Xining 
Ningxia Hui AR (2) 
Yinchuan  
Shizuishan 
Xinjiang Uyghur AR (2) 
Urumuchi  
Karamay 
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Appendix 5.3 Cubic Log Results with Random-effects 
Table A5.3.1 Cubic Log Estimation Results with Random-effects for Industrial Water Pollution Emissions 
Variables Wastewater COD CrVI Petroleum 
Y 
1.11 1.06 -2.11 -1.02 2.51 2.33 5.79 6.98 
(2.05)** (1.76)* (1.10) (0.58) (0.79) (0.70) (2.02)** (2.36)** 
Y2 
-0.21 -0.15 0.94 0.43 -1.12 -1.11 -2.09 -2.80 
(0.81) (0.53) (1.07) (0.53) (0.67) (0.64) (1.58) (2.04)** 
Y3 
0.012 0.0048 -0.13 -0.044 0.20 0.22 0.27 0.39 
(0.30) (0.11) (0.98) (0.37) (0.75) (0.78) (1.38) (1.89)* 
GIP/GDP 
0.52  0.68  0.69  0.88  
(4.04)***  (2.55)**  (1.65)*  (1.90)*  
GIPd/GDP 
 0.44  0.38  0.74  0.85 
 (3.68)***  (1.72)*  (2.09)**  (2.13)** 
GIPh/GDP 
 0.045  0.11  0.22  0.067 
 (1.58)  (2.34)**  (1.94)*  (1.01) 
GIPf/GDP 
 -0.019  0.039  -0.12  0.21 
 (0.82)  (0.72)  (1.20)  (3.01)*** 
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
-0.66 -0.22 1.58 1.87 -7.39 -7.28 -5.93 -6.51 
(0.73) (0.26) (0.90) (1.15) (2.62)*** (2.67)*** (1.95)* (2.25)** 
R2 (overall) 0.63 0.65 0.36 0.42 0.48 0.49 0.47 0.46 
DM 0.05 0.06 0.52 0.84 1.67 1.89 2.66 1.65 
Hausman  1.08 5.67 10.02 7.13 8.34 7.51 3.67 2.43 
AR(1) No No No No Yes Yes No No 
Observations 423 398 431 407 383 364 423 403 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
306 
 
Table A5.3.2 Cubic Log Estimation Results with Random-effects for Industrial Air Pollution Emissions 
Variables Waste Gas SO2 Soot Dust 
Y 
0.90 1.26 1.98 2.19 0.0087 0.44 -0.71 0.26 
(0.95) (1.23) (3.05)*** (3.41)*** (0.01) (0.43) (0.52) (0.19) 
Y2 
-0.096 -0.23 -0.76 -0.86 -0.078 -0.12 0.17 -0.28 
(0.21) (0.46) (2.41)** (2.75)*** (0.20) (0.25) (0.23) (0.37) 
Y3 
0.00423 0.025 0.12 0.14 0.027 0.029 -0.0067 0.067 
(0.06) (0.31) (2.56)** (2.96)*** (0.44) (0.39) (0.05) (0.52) 
GIP/GDP 
0.72  0.63  0.71  0.73  
(5.84)***  (4.38)***  (5.25)***  (3.65)***  
GIPd/GDP 
 0.57  0.53  0.46  0.97 
 (5.57)***  (4.36)***  (4.17)***  (4.87)*** 
GIPh/GDP 
 0.025  0.045  0.043  0.057 
 (0.83)  (1.37)  (1.24)  (1.23) 
GIPf/GDP 
 0.023  0.028  0.00059  -0.017 
 (0.82)  (0.91)  (0.02)  (0.43) 
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
-3.46 -3.03 0.25 0.62 0.92 1.27 1.75 0.36 
(3.36)*** (3.20)*** (0.32) (0.89) (1.13) (1.36) (1.00) (0.20) 
R2 (overall) 0.63 0.68 0.70 0.71 0.60 0.62 0.38 0.39 
DM 3.42* 2.40 0.40 1.55 0.35 5.68** 0.06 0.59 
Hausman  0.15 0.73 3.16 1.95 1.35 3.38 1.28 8.20 
AR(1) No No No No No No No No 
Observations 438 413 427 407 435 415 423 403 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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Appendix 5.4 Log Results with Fixed Effects 
Table A5.4.1 Log Results with Fixed-effects for Industrial Wastewater and COD 
Variables 
Wastewater COD 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 
Y 
0.38 0.85 0.92 0.40 0.89 0.77 -0.42 0.53 2.07 -0.18 -1.02 -2.20 
(2.26)** (3.15)*** (1.51) (2.11)** (3.21)*** (1.15) (1.16) (0.72) (1.06) (0.27) (1.12) (1.11) 
Y2 
 -0.12 -0.16  -0.13 -0.063  -0.26 -1.10  0.21 0.83 
 (1.98)** (0.54)  (1.76)* (0.19)  (1.48) (1.10)  (1.40) (0.93) 
Y3 
  0.0059   -0.010   0.14   -0.099 
  (0.13)   (0.20)   (0.86)   (0.78) 
GIP/GDP 
0.48 0.48 0.48    0.28 0.34 0.44    
(2.30)** (2.28)** (2.27)**    (0.85) (1.07) (1.30)    
GIPd/GDP 
   0.31 0.29 0.29    0.14 0.16 0.15 
   (1.66)* (1.52) (1.51)    (0.45) (0.53) (0.52) 
GIPh/GDP 
   0.053 0.051 0.051    0.055 0.060 0.0578 
   (1.63) (1.54) (1.54)    (0.93) (0.99) (0.96) 
GIPf/GDP 
   -0.012 -0.017 -0.017    0.034 0.041 0.040 
   (0.48) (0.66) (0.66)    (0.52) (0.63) (0.61) 
Constant 
0.52 0.14 0.090 1.27 0.95 1.02 -3.05 -2.90 -2.82 3.82 4.47 5.19 
(0.52) (0.14) (0.08) (1.31) (1.02) (1.01) (2.27)** (2.12)** (2.05)** (2.34)** (2.53)** (2.35)** 
R2 (within) 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.04 
End. Of Y No No No No No No No No No No No No 
AR(1) No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Observations 423 423 423 398 398 398 321 321 321 407 407 407 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Year dummy variables are included.  
308 
 
Table A5.4.2 Log Results with Fixed-effects for Industrial CrVI and Petroleum-like matter 
Variables 
CrVI Petroleum 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 
Y 
0.73 1.00 4.79 0.86 1.14 5.05 0.76 2.25 6.08 0.52 2.21 7.43 
(0.79) (0.76) (1.30) (0.74) (0.76) (1.36) (1.39) (2.35)** (2.03)** (0.98) (2.50)** (2.39)** 
Y2 
 -0.073 -2.10  -0.078 -2.17  -0.37 -2.38  -0.42 -3.15 
 (0.26) (1.15)  (0.27) (1.19)  (1.79)* (1.72)*  (1.98)** (2.14)** 
Y3 
  0.34   0.35   0.33   0.44 
  (1.19)   (1.21)   (1.60)   (2.03)** 
GIP/GDP 
-0.19 -0.19 -0.11    0.51 0.52 0.57    
(0.33) (0.33) (0.19)    (0.93) (0.95) (1.02)    
GIPd/GDP 
   -0.22 -0.23 -0.14    0.49 0.42 0.47 
   (0.45) (0.47) (0.30)    (1.09) (0.92) (1.01) 
GIPh/GDP 
   0.19 0.19 0.19    0.074 0.069 0.073 
   (1.40) (1.40) (1.41)    (0.84) (0.81) (0.90) 
GIPf/GDP 
   -0.0821 -0.085 -0.088    0.25 0.23 0.23 
   (0.47) (0.49) (0.52)    (2.48)** (2.67)*** (2.94)*** 
Constant 
-1.30 -1.52 -4.06 -1.58 -1.76 -4.35 -0.56 -1.94 -4.36 -0.36 -1.59 -4.82 
(0.43) (0.51) (1.13) (0.52) (0.58) (1.23) (0.21) (0.72) (1.36) (0.15) (0.71) (1.66)* 
R2 (within) 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.10 
End. Of Y No No No No No No No No No No No No 
AR(1) No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Observations 383 383 383 364 364 364 423 423 423 403 403 403 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Year dummy variables are included.  
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Table A5.4.3 Log Results with Fixed-effects for Industrial Waste Gas and SO2 
Variables 
Waste Gas SO2 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 
Y 
0.68 0.94 0.94 0.77 1.11 1.07 1.09 0.76 2.75 1.08 0.64 2.23 
(2.59)*** (2.24)** (0.84) (1.98)** (2.01)** (0.80) (5.24)*** (1.75)* (2.46)** (5.31)*** (1.52) (2.10)** 
Y2 
 -0.058 -0.055  -0.067 -0.046  0.089 -0.96  0.12 -0.72 
 (0.77) (0.11)  (0.83) (0.08)  (0.86) (1.74)*  (1.19) (1.37) 
Y3 
  -0.00041   -0.0032   0.16   0.13 
  (0.01)   (0.04)   (1.93)*   (1.63) 
GIP/GDP 
0.72 0.72 0.72    1.14 1.12 1.24    
(5.08)*** (5.07)*** (5.06)***    (5.79)*** (5.60)*** (5.96)***    
GIPd/GDP 
   0.49 0.48 0.48    0.88 0.87 0.93 
   (4.10)*** (4.00)*** (3.99)***    (5.43)*** (5.37)*** (5.63)*** 
GIPh/GDP 
   0.035 0.034 0.034    0.023 0.025 0.028 
   (1.13) (1.07) (1.07)    (0.69) (0.74) (0.85) 
GIPf/GDP 
   0.061 0.059 0.059    0.056 0.057 0.061 
   (2.04)** (1.97)** (1.97)**    (1.99)** (2.03)** (2.16)** 
Constant 
-3.40 -3.66 -3.66 -2.57 -2.89 -2.86 -1.91 -1.54 -3.17 -0.55 -0.16 -1.31 
(4.89)*** (4.77)*** (3.50)*** (3.14)*** (3.23)*** (2.25)** (3.19)*** (2.35)** (3.85)*** (1.03) (0.28) (1.81)* 
R2 (within) 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.44 0.44 0.45 
End. Of Y Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 
AR(1) No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 438 438 438 413 413 413 320 320 320 302 302 302 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Year dummy variables are included.  
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Table A5.4.4 Log Results with Fixed-effects for Industrial Soot and Dust 
Variables 
Soot Dust 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 
Y 
-0.076 -0.19 2.69 1.19 0.49 0.89 -0.24 -0.96 -0.67 -0.091 -0.81 0.39 
(0.30) (0.36) (1.98)** (2.71)*** (0.76) (0.63) (0.62) (1.38) (0.42) (0.22) (1.11) (0.25) 
Y2 
 0.030 -1.48  0.13 -0.056  0.18 0.029  0.17 -0.45 
 (0.24) (2.21)**  (1.43) (0.10)  (1.20) (0.03)  (1.16) (0.51) 
Y3 
  0.23   0.028   0.024   0.10 
  (2.29)**   (0.34)   (0.16)   (0.67) 
GIP/GDP 
1.15 1.14 1.32    0.84 0.82 0.83    
(4.67)*** (4.60)*** (5.11)***    (3.53)*** (3.39)*** (3.39)***    
GIPd/GDP 
   0.56 0.59 0.59    1.04 1.06 1.07 
   (3.79)*** (3.97)*** (3.98)***    (4.38)*** (4.39)*** (4.49)*** 
GIPh/GDP 
   0.030 0.031 0.032    0.039 0.041 0.042 
   (0.77) (0.81) (0.81)    (0.71) (0.73) (0.78) 
GIPf/GDP 
   0.0073 0.012 0.013    0.00092 0.0059 0.0062 
   (0.20) (0.33) (0.34)    (0.02) (0.14) (0.15) 
Constant 
-0.39 -0.27 -2.61 0.081 0.78 0.50 0.69 1.43 1.25 -0.21 0.37 -0.38 
(0.50) (0.31) (2.45)** (0.08) (0.71) (0.34) (0.63) (1.20) (0.86) (0.19) (0.32) (0.28) 
R2 (within) 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.14 
End. Of Y No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 
AR(1) Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No 
Observations 326 326 326 415 415 415 423 423 423 403 403 403 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Year dummy variables are included.  
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Appendix 5.5 Level Results  
Table A5.5.1 Level Results with Random-effects for Industrial Wastewater and COD 
Variables 
Wastewater COD 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 
Y 
0.041 2.80 3.17 0.18 2.92 2.55 -0.32 1.14 0.38 -0.076 1.16 0.60 
(0.07) (3.70)*** (2.46)** (0.26) (3.76)*** (1.73)* (0.26) (0.46) (0.07) (0.06) (0.45) (0.11) 
Y2 
 -0.060 -0.082  -0.059 -0.037  -0.039 0.0066  -0.033 0.0013 
 (5.03)*** (1.15)  (5.28)*** (0.43)  (0.80) (0.03)  (0.70) (0.00) 
Y3 
  0.00029   -0.00029   -0.00069   -0.00051 
  (0.30)   (0.25)   (0.22)   (0.15) 
GIP/GDP 
0.37 0.33 0.33    0.63 0.61 0.61    
(4.97)*** (4.75)*** (4.70)***    (2.72)*** (2.58)*** (2.55)**    
GIPd/GDP 
   0.38 0.34 0.34    0.50 0.49 0.49 
   (4.76)*** (4.50)*** (4.53)***    (1.84)* (1.76)* (1.75)* 
GIPh/GDP 
   0.56 0.44 0.43    1.57 1.52 1.52 
   (2.26)** (1.89)* (1.88)*    (3.20)*** (3.13)*** (3.10)*** 
GIPf/GDP 
   0.21 0.18 0.17    0.30 0.31 0.29 
   (1.60) (1.85)* (1.24)    (0.80) (0.81) (0.69) 
Constant 
-7.08 -29.92 -31.80 -6.73 -29.65 -27.58 -17.77 -28.31 -24.88 -13.84 -23.22 -20.60 
(0.31) (1.21) (1.31) (0.29) (1.18) (1.07) (1.04) (1.23) (0.73) (0.77) (1.00) (0.59) 
R2 (overall) 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.26 
DM 0.10 0.39 1.03 0.16 0.15 0.78 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.07 1.21 
Hausman 0.15 3.46 13.34 1.48 0.93 6.10 8.19 0.56 0.18 8.19 10.15 10.26 
AR(1) No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Turning point 
RE (FE) 
 
23,176 
(32,846) 
  
24,822 
(33,137) 
       
Observations 423 423 423 418 418 418 431 431 431 426 426 426 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Year dummy variables and province dummy 
variables are included. Turning point is in RMB at 1990 price.  
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Table A5.5.2 Level Results with Random-effects for Industrial CrVI and Petroleum-like matter 
Variables 
CrVI Petroleum 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 
Y 
0.067 0.067 0.075 0.0072 -0.0071 -0.0092 -0.88 2.91 6.53 0.25 3.56 6.94 
(1.40) (0.67) (0.34) (0.15) (0.07) (0.04) (0.91) (1.49) (1.77)* (0.20) (1.70)* (1.81)* 
Y2 
 -4.80e-06 -0.00059  0.00053 0.00068  -0.11 -0.37  -0.11 -0.36 
 (0.00) (0.03)  (0.16) (0.04)  (2.51)** (1.46)  (2.19)** (1.33) 
Y3 
  0.000012   -3.02e-06   0.0053   0.0051 
  (0.03)   (0.01)   (1.03)   (0.91) 
GIP/GDP 
0.019 0.019 0.019    0.55 0.55 0.55    
(2.92)*** (2.91)*** (2.87)***    (3.92)*** (3.89)*** (3.87)***    
GIPd/GDP 
   0.017 0.017 0.017    0.66 0.62 0.62 
   (2.92)*** (2.91)*** (2.88)***    (4.09)*** (3.78)*** (3.76)*** 
GIPh/GDP 
   0.056 0.056 0.056    0.17 0.14 0.19 
   (3.18)*** (3.16)*** (3.15)***    (0.58) (0.46) (0.60) 
GIPf/GDP 
   0.029 0.028 0.029    0.24 0.49 0.42 
   (2.36)** (1.97)** (1.82)*    (0.96) (1.86)* (1.51) 
Constant 
-2.57 -2.57 -2.59 -2.32 -2.20 -2.20 6.96 -23.24 -35.10 -1.56 -29.89 -39.69 
(3.72)*** (2.67)*** (2.78)*** (1.35) (1.18) (1.14) (0.22) (0.71) (1.16) (0.04) (0.88) (1.25) 
R2 (overall) 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.43 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.48 0.48 
DM 0.18 0.23 0.10 3.01* 3.44* 3.08* 0.00 0.43 0.43 0.01 0.12 0.13 
Hausman 0.24 0.23 1.60 3.82 2.87 3.29 2.78 7.58 1.50 3.06 0.91 0.31 
AR(1) No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Turning point 
RE (FE) 
       
13,090 
(-) 
  
15,601 
(-) 
 
Observations 383 383 383 379 379 379 423 423 423 418 418 418 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Year dummy variables and province dummy 
variables are included. Turning point is in RMB at 1990 price.  
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Table A5.5.3 Level Results with Random-effects for Industrial Waste Gas and SO2 
Variables 
Waste Gas SO2 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 
Y 
0.24 0.29 0.75 0.32 0.32 0.67 20.67 11.79 32.70 21.94 12.00 30.91 
(3.32)*** (2.24)** (2.18)** (4.59)*** (2.53)** (1.85)* (4.82)*** (1.80)* (2.51)** (4.83)*** (1.71)* (2.20)** 
Y2 
 -0.0016 -0.033  0.00018 -0.025  0.20 -0.97  0.22 -0.87 
 (0.39) (1.51)  (0.05) (1.04)  (1.71)* (1.40)  (2.02)** (1.10) 
Y3 
  0.00060   0.00047   0.016   0.015 
  (1.63)   (1.15)   (1.77)*   (1.41) 
GIP/GDP 
0.039 0.039 0.038    2.56 2.71 2.83    
(3.19)*** (3.18)*** (3.19)***    (3.71)*** (3.93)*** (4.10)***    
GIPd/GDP 
   0.050 0.050 0.048    2.63 2.78 2.76 
   (4.10)*** (4.04)*** (3.90)***    (4.17)*** (4.31)*** (4.33)*** 
GIPh/GDP 
   -0.011 -0.011 -0.0057    3.25 3.69 3.86 
   (0.39) (0.40) (0.20)    (1.40) (1.58) (1.64) 
GIPf/GDP 
   0.0035 0.0031 0.0040    1.43 1.48 2.26 
   (0.18) (0.16) (0.21)    (1.19) (1.30) (1.77)* 
Constant 
-2.18 -2.57 -4.16 -2.40 -2.36 -3.60 -362.45 -290.78 -399.77 -358.56 -275.83 -381.96 
(1.23) (1.40) (2.29)** (1.23) (1.17) (1.76)* (2.54)** (2.06)** (3.00)*** (2.49)** (1.97)** (2.79)*** 
R2 (overall) 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.62 
DM 1.73 1.46 0.29 0.35 0.51 0.00 0.62 0.62 0.05 0.00 0.00 1.50 
Hausman 0.28 9.17 0.63 2.13 0.13 0.08 66.03*** 11.13* 12.98** 26.38*** 16.26** 7.64 
AR(1) No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Turning point 
RE (FE) 
       
29,934 
(-) 
  
27,516 
(-) 
 
Observations 438 438 438 433 433 433 427 427 427 422 422 422 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Year dummy variables and province dummy 
variables are included. Turning point is in RMB at 1990 price. The relationship between income and SO2 emissions is U-shaped curve.  
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Table A5.5.4 Level Results with Random-effects for Industrial Soot and Dust 
Variables 
Soot Dust 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 
Y 
2.91 6.33 11.55 3.94 7.65 11.19 -3.03 8.86 3.44 0.11 8.21 3.18 
(1.43) (1.71)* (1.96)* (1.72)* (2.03)** (1.75)* (1.49) (2.00)** (0.35) (0.05) (1.76)* (0.32) 
Y2 
 -0.081 -0.37  -0.088 -0.29  -0.33 0.052  -0.24 0.12 
 (1.36) (1.38)  (1.38) (0.96)  (2.89)*** (0.08)  (1.90)* (0.18) 
Y3 
  0.0041   0.0029   -0.0074   -0.0071 
  (1.13)   (0.69)   (0.60)   (0.56) 
GIP/GDP 
0.76 0.70 0.73    1.20 1.15 1.14    
(2.55)** (2.28)** (2.39)**    (4.41)*** (4.28)*** (4.26)***    
GIPd/GDP 
   0.93 0.87 0.86    1.49 1.42 1.43 
   (2.64)*** (2.41)** (2.39)**    (5.16)*** (4.92)*** (4.92)*** 
GIPh/GDP 
   0.17 0.015 0.060    0.31 0.16 0.059 
   (0.38) (0.03) (0.14)    (0.45) (0.24) (0.08) 
GIPf/GDP 
   0.27 0.27 0.42    -0.15 0.23 0.25 
   (0.55) (0.60) (0.85)    (0.27) (0.37) (0.41) 
Constant 
-56.56 -82.38 -110.70 -60.47 -89.50 -109.90 4.95 -90.84 -70.74 -7.76 -77.69 -60.33 
(1.12) (1.55) (2.01)** (1.08) (1.54) (1.81)* (0.05) (0.85) (0.65) (0.08) (0.72) (0.55) 
R2 (overall) 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.37 
DM 0.05 0.11 1.29 1.65 1.82 2.03 9.96*** 3.21* 3.49* 4.45** 2.50 2.38 
Hausman 0.74 17.67** 10.40 0.64 0.45 2.12 1.27 3.74 11.44* 5.06 0.37 29.50*** 
AR(1) No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Turning point 
RE (FE) 
       
13,508 
(-) 
  
16,967 
(-) 
 
Observations 435 435 435 430 430 430 423 423 423 418 418 418 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Year dummy variables and province dummy 
variables are included. Turning point is in RMB at 1990 price. Endogeniety of Y is also controlled in Models 5 and 6 of Dust. 
315 
 
Table A5.5.5 Level Results with Fixed-effects for Industrial Wastewater and COD 
Variables 
Wastewater COD 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 
Y 
0.26 4.13 3.69 0.28 4.39 3.97 -0.41 1.06 -4.12 -0.57 2.89 7.08 
(0.39) (2.93)*** (1.49) (0.42) (3.08)*** (1.51) (0.16) (0.17) (0.33) (0.23) (0.52) (0.64) 
Y2 
 -0.063 -0.039  -0.066 -0.043  -0.029 0.23  -0.066 -0.28 
 (3.09)*** (0.34)  (3.24)*** (0.34)  (0.34) (0.48)  (0.89) (0.61) 
Y3 
  -0.00031   -0.00030   -0.0035   0.0028 
  (0.22)   (0.19)   (0.62)   (0.51) 
GIP/GDP 
0.31 0.27 0.27    0.64 0.63 0.60    
(3.98)*** (3.54)*** (3.50)***    (1.98)** (1.96)* (1.81)*    
GIPd/GDP 
   0.32 0.28 0.29    0.39 0.37 0.36 
   (3.83)*** (3.45)*** (3.44)***    (1.01) (0.96) (0.92) 
GIPh/GDP 
   0.23 0.17 0.16    2.44 2.37 2.45 
   (0.91) (0.69) (0.62)    (3.89)*** (3.78)*** (3.77)*** 
GIPf/GDP 
   0.29 0.25 0.24    1.39 1.40 1.60 
   (1.57) (1.44) (1.22)    (2.59)*** (2.59)** (2.64)*** 
Constant 
5.57 -18.98 -17.06 5.53 -20.88 -18.99 40.14 32.95 56.27 36.90 19.77 1.63 
(0.95) (2.52)** (1.85)* (0.88) (2.63)*** (1.89)* (1.39) (0.79) (0.83) (1.22) (0.49) (0.03) 
R2 (within) 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08 
End. Of Y No No No No No No No No No No No No 
AR(1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 
Observations 317 317 317 312 312 312 431 431 431 426 426 426 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Year dummy variables are included.  
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Table A5.5.6 Level Results with Fixed-effects for Industrial CrVI and Petroleum-like matter 
Variables 
CrVI Petroleum 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 
Y 
0.084 0.15 0.34 -0.066 -0.15 -0.40 -2.14 -0.074 1.43 -1.43 -0.60 1.79 
(0.93) (0.72) (0.79) (0.69) (0.67) (0.74) (1.48) (0.02) (0.25) (0.75) (0.16) (0.28) 
Y2 
 -0.0018 -0.013  0.0022 0.016  -0.052 -0.15  -0.024 -0.17 
 (0.35) (0.55)  (0.40) (0.57)  (0.80) (0.47)  (0.31) (0.51) 
Y3 
  0.00022   -0.00025   0.0018   0.0029 
  (0.46)   (0.48)   (0.31)   (0.46) 
GIP/GDP 
0.018 0.018 0.017    0.56 0.57 0.57    
(2.24)** (2.27)** (2.27)**    (3.35)*** (3.42)*** (3.41)***    
GIPd/GDP 
   0.011 0.012 0.013    0.63 0.62 0.62 
   (1.26) (1.30) (1.37)    (3.53)*** (3.40)*** (3.41)*** 
GIPh/GDP 
   0.066 0.065 0.064    0.39 0.41 0.43 
   (2.80)*** (2.77)*** (2.70)***    (0.94) (1.00) (1.05) 
GIPf/GDP 
   0.042 0.038 0.040    0.28 0.34 0.31 
   (2.54)** (1.92)* (1.92)*    (0.92) (1.22) (1.11) 
Constant 
-0.53 -0.91 -1.53 0.38 0.81 1.78 15.21 3.42 -2.06 9.85 5.35 -3.53 
(0.56) (0.68) (0.78) (0.44) (0.60) (0.77) (1.29) (0.19) (0.09) (0.70) (0.27) (0.13) 
R2 (within) 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 
End. Of Y No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 
AR(1) No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Observations 383 383 383 379 379 379 423 423 423 418 418 418 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Year dummy variables are included.  
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Table A5.5.7 Level Results with Fixed-effects for Industrial Waste Gas and SO2 
Variables 
Waste Gas SO2 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 
Y 
0.28 0.34 0.96 0.40 0.34 0.80 31.71 25.49 49.16 34.075 28.48 57.06 
(2.64)*** (2.06)** (2.39)** (3.54)*** (1.87)* (2.29)** (5.68)*** (2.52)** (2.65)*** (6.43)*** (2.67)*** (2.68)*** 
Y2 
 -0.0016 -0.039  0.0017 -0.026  0.12 -1.07  0.10 -1.34 
 (0.38) (1.53)  (0.42) (1.21)  (0.72) (1.28)  (0.63) (1.41) 
Y3 
  0.00067   0.00048   0.016   0.019 
  (1.51)   (1.30)   (1.49)   (1.58) 
GIP/GDP 
0.037 0.037 0.036    2.69 2.75 2.95    
(1.52) (1.52) (1.55)    (3.09)*** (3.14)*** (3.37)***    
GIPd/GDP 
   0.050 0.050 0.048    2.756 2.80 2.76 
   (2.71)*** (2.74)*** (2.64)***    (3.41)*** (3.39)*** (3.42)*** 
GIPh/GDP 
   -0.042 -0.042 -0.034    3.893 4.05 4.65 
   (0.58) (0.58) (0.49)    (1.55) (1.60) (1.81)* 
GIPf/GDP 
   -0.0085 -0.012 -0.0062    1.751 1.78 3.05 
   (0.21) (0.28) (0.15)    (1.14) (1.17) (1.85)* 
Constant 
-1.20 -1.52 -3.84 -1.92 -1.60 -3.38 -183.28 -152.77 -266.78 -205.958 -178.06 -306.99 
(0.52) (0.63) (2.13)** (0.95) (0.70) (1.65) (2.30)** (1.67)* (2.40)** (2.70)*** (1.99)** (2.49)** 
R2 (within) 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.50 
End. Of Y No No No No No No No No No No No No 
AR(1) No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Observations 438 438 438 433 433 433 427 427 427 422 422 422 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Year dummy variables are included.  
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Table A5.5.8 Level Results with Fixed-effects for Industrial Soot and Dust 
Variables 
Soot Dust 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model6 
Y 
4.88 10.64 17.48 6.53 13.60 16.89 -4.25 11.68 -4.53 0.90 8.17 -2.50 
(2.02)** (1.74)* (1.65) (2.52)** (2.14)** (1.21) (1.41) (1.61) (0.26) (0.24) (0.94) (0.12) 
Y2 
 -0.11 -0.44  -0.13 -0.29  -0.36 0.58  -0.17 0.40 
 (1.31) (1.13)  (1.51) (0.53)  (2.30)** (0.63)  (0.85) (0.37) 
Y3 
  0.0044   0.0021   -0.017   -0.010 
  (0.98)   (0.33)   (1.00)   (0.51) 
GIP/GDP 
0.88 0.82 0.88    1.49 1.49 1.50    
(2.25)** (2.07)** (2.21)**    (4.37)*** (4.44)*** (4.44)***    
GIPd/GDP 
   1.15 1.10 1.09    1.83 1.77 1.78 
   (2.47)** (2.32)** (2.29)**    (4.99)*** (4.79)*** (4.80)*** 
GIPh/GDP 
   -0.052 -0.25 -0.16    0.67 0.69 0.61 
   (0.08) (0.41) (0.23)    (0.75) (0.77) (0.69) 
GIPf/GDP 
   0.072 0.049 0.20    -0.19 0.10 0.15 
   (0.13) (0.10) (0.29)    (0.27) (0.12) (0.18) 
Constant 
18.81 -10.18 -44.46 3.52 -32.56 -47.94 8.56 -78.88 -15.48 -27.74 -65.94 -22.45 
(0.67) (0.29) (0.77) (0.12) (0.89) (0.72) (0.30) (1.70)* (0.20) (0.85) (1.25) (0.24) 
R2 (within) 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 
End. Of Y No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Observations 435 435 435 430 430 430 423 423 423 418 418 418 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Year dummy variables are included.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS 
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This thesis includes four empirical chapters. The first three studies examine the 
determinants of FDI in China from different perspectives and using different 
methodologies. The last examines the environmental effects of economic growth and 
foreign investment. In this chapter, we provide a brief review of the empirical results in 
Chapters 2-5, including the contributions and limitations. The second part of this chapter 
discusses plans for further research.   
6.1 Summary of Results 
In Chapter two, we test the intra-country pollution haven effect within China using a panel 
of 30 regions from 1999 to 2003, i.e. we examine whether differences in the environmental 
stringency affect the location choice of foreign investors in China. We use two measures of 
FDI, FDI per unit of GDP and FDI per capita. Distinct from abatement cost based or 0-3 
type measures employed in previous empirical PHH studies, we employ three measures of 
environmental regulations: the industrial pollution treatment investment, the administrative 
punishment cases related to environmental issues, and the pollution emission charge, which 
respectively reflects local government effort on environmental protection, the enforcement 
of regional environmental legislation, and the implementation of regional pollution levy 
system. We employ a FGLS estimator and address certain methodological weaknesses in 
the previous literature. The results suggest that, everything else being equal, FDI is 
attracted by weak environmental regulations. Therefore, to a certain extent, the findings 
support the existence of intra-country pollution havens within China. In terms of other 
control variables, we find that FDI prefers to locate in those regions with high income, 
good infrastructure, and low labour costs. These findings are consistent with previous 
empirical studies. However, we also find that FDI is attracted to regions with low 
population density and low education levels.   
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Chapter two is the first study that uses Chinese province data to examine the existence 
intra-country pollution havens. We address a number of limitations in previous PHH 
empirical studies. However, we do not include another structural determinant of FDI: the 
impact of corruption and/or bureaucracy due to the unavailability of existing data. This 
problem is addressed in Chapter three by constructing two indices to measure government 
characteristics. Chapter three firstly looks at the differences in regional government 
characteristics in China, and examines their impact on FDI inflows. 
Since we cannot find any established indices that proxy the regional government corruption 
and governance, we construct indices using the available objective data. According to the 
quality and properties of the data, and the corruption situation in China, we develop a 
variable that proxies the effort of the local government fighting against corruption, and an 
index that measures the local government efficiency. We follow the methodology in 
Chapter two and the results suggest that FDI is attracted to regions that have done the 
most to tackle corruption cases and that have the most efficient local government. We keep 
environmental stringency and other control variables in our estimating models and the 
results are broadly consistent with those in Chapter two.   
In Chapters two and three, we address most of the methodological limitations in previous 
PHH papers. However, we just take one year lags for all independent variables to control 
for the potential endogeneity of environmental stringency. Chapter four improves on this 
work by treating environmental regulation as endogenous, which has rarely been 
considered in previous PHH studies. 
In Chapter four, the exogeneity test suggests that, of the three environmental regulation 
measures, the industrial pollution treatment investment is endogenous. We thus apply an 
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instrumental variable approach to control for the endogeneity. The first stage results show 
that neither government effort fighting against corruption nor government efficiency has 
significant impact on the pollution treatment investment. The second stage results illustrate 
consistent negative effects of environmental regulation stringency on FDI inflows. And the 
larger elasticity suggests that the impact of pollution treatment investment is biased 
downwards in pervious chapters. However, this finding is not robust for sensitivity checks. 
In terms of our government variables, we find that government anti-corruption effort has a 
positive and significant effect on FDI inflows.  
The major difficulty of Chapter four is looking for the applicable instrumental variables. 
Our selected instrumental variables are valid but provide relatively weak results in the first 
stage regressions. Seeking out other better instrumental variables may help to improve the 
results.  
Chapter five investigates the relationship between FDI and the environment from another 
aspect. It examines the impacts of economic growth and foreign investment on 
environmental quality using a panel of 112 Chinese major cities from 2001 to 2004. A 
range of industrial pollution emissions are considered, including four water pollutants and 
four air pollutants. In order to find out the environmental effects of foreign firms, we split 
the total industrial output into three groups according to the ownership: output from 
domestic firms, output from firms funded by Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao, and output 
from firms invested by other foreign economies. We address many limitations of previous 
EKC literature, and report the log linear and quadratic random-effects estimation results. 
On balance, the results suggest that economic development have negative effects on 
environmental quality at current income levels in China. Total industrial output generally 
has positive effect on industrial pollution emissions and domestic firms always have the 
323 
 
strongest effects among the three groups. Firms invested by Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
Macao have moderate positive effects on three of the four water pollutants; while foreign 
invested firms are only found to have positive and significant impact on one water 
pollution emissions: petroleum-like matter. Therefore, foreign invested firms seem to be 
the most environmentally efficient.  
Chapter five makes two major contributions to the current literature. First, it considers the 
effects of economic growth on various environmental indicators using Chinese city level 
data, and the results are broadly robust across pollutants. Second, it reveals differences in 
the effects of firms by ownerships.  
The findings in this thesis provide important policy implications to both central and local 
governments in China. FDI has played an important role in China’s economic growth. It is 
regarded as an engine for economic growth, and a carrier of advanced technologies. My 
thesis suggests that FDI is not always blessing. Certain type of FDI from certain sources in 
certain sectors may seek to locate in ‘pollution heavens’ where environmental regulation is 
weak. Although my thesis shows that foreign firms are generally cleaner than the domestic 
firms, they are still polluting especially for water pollution emission. 
If Chinese government would like to retain the fast economic growth, a sustainable 
development policy is required.  The government has to rethink about the location, the 
sector and types of foreign direct investment. The government is recommended to put an 
emphasis on the ‘quality’ of FDI rather than the ‘quantity of FDI; encourage more 
environmental friendly knowledge and human capital intensive FDI and control FDI in 
high energy consumption and high pollution sectors. The negative effect of environmental 
stringency on FDI can be offset by the improvement of some factors that are attractive to 
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FDI, for example the quality of infrastructure, the enforcement of anti-corruption, the 
improvement of government efficiency. 
Current economic growth in China is found to have negative effect on the environmental 
quality. The existence of environmental Kuznets curve does not mean that environmental 
problem can be solved automatically without any special attention to the environment. To 
alleviate the pressure on the natural environment, the government has to enforce the 
environmental protection at the earlier stage of the development, through the improvement 
of environmental regulations at every administrative level. Now the State Environmental 
Protection Administration has been promoted to the cabinet ministry level during the 
March 2008 China National People’s Congress Session in Beijing. We hope that it will help 
for the reinforcement of regulation stringency and environmental protection.  
In addition, the government has to promote the structural change of Chinese industry, 
from manufacturing to services sectors, in order to reduce the industrial pollution 
emissions. Finally, the local government is recommended to promote environmental 
technology transfer of foreign firms to domestic firms, and increase the absorptive capacity 
of local firms by increasing the investment in, for example, R&D and education. 
Three of the four chapters have been turned into papers. The paper from Chapter two is 
going to be published in Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, Volume 13, No. 3, August 2008, 
pp. 332-353. The paper from Chapter three was submitted to Journal of Development Studies 
and got minor revision from the referees. We believe that it will be accepted when we 
resubmit after the revision. The paper from Chapter five is now under the review of 
Regional Science and Urban Economics.  
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6.2 Further Research 
In order to improve the thesis chapters, we plan to add the most recent years’ data and 
construct a panel for a longer time period. For chapters 2-4 we are able to construct the 
proxies of environmental regulations, government anti-corruption effort and government 
efficiency for the most recent years. In that case, we will establish a dynamic model, 
including lagged FDI variables on the right-hand-side of the model to control the AR(1) 
autocorrelation using model specification rather than econometric techniques. Other 
variables on the right-hand-side of the model will be at time t rather than t-1. Thus system 
GMM estimator is appropriate for such model and panel data with N>T and hence could 
be used to control the potential endogeneity of environmental regulations. We can control 
the impact of FDI and other variables to the stringency of environmental regulations. In 
addition, FDI may have causality impact to other variables, such as income, wage, 
infrastructure, anti-corruption effort and government efficiency. A simultaneous equation 
model is probably required and system GMM estimator is also suitable for such model. 
In terms of chapter five, we may also add more years’ data to the dataset. Then we are able 
to check whether we get similar turning points for wastewater and petroleum-like matter 
emissions, i.e. whether the cities that had passed the turning point during the observed 
period did reduce their emissions in the most recent years. With longer time period, EKC 
relationship may exist for other pollution emissions. A further improvement for Chapter 
five is to develop a simultaneous equations model in which the pollution emissions are 
determined by regulations, technology and industrial composition. In this case, we can 
estimate the scale effects, technique effects and composition effects caused by economic 
growth and foreign investment. Therefore, a major task is to find out valid measurements 
for regulations and technology at city level. 
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In terms of new research based on this thesis, the following three topics can be considered 
as noteworthy in the area of economic growth, FDI, governance, and the environment. 
This thesis considers the relationship between FDI and the environment from regional 
dimensions. Further research could be applied to industrial level data, i.e. from an industrial 
dimension. This has not been considered in any previous studies. The research questions 
could be: 1) whether FDI is attracted to the industrial sectors that have low environmental 
regulations; 2) whether FDI is attracted to heavy pollution-intensive industries; and 3) 
whether FDI have negative effects on the pollution emissions across industrial sectors. The 
recent released industrial FDI data make this research possible. Similar methodology that 
has been used in this thesis could be employed.  
The second is to investigate some interesting questions relating to environment using 
Chinese firm-level data rather than aggregated regional data. A problem we faced was that 
the current widely used firm-level databases do not provide any environmental information. 
Recently, the nongovernmental Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs has reported 
the names of enterprises, which have emitted excessive water and air pollutants above the 
national standards in recent years and are forced to make changes within a certain period. It 
is possible to link this information with a commonly used firm-level database and employ a 
Probit model to examine the factors that may affect the differences in environmental 
performance, including endogenous drivers such as firm size and ownership, and 
exogenous drivers such as industry, market and regulatory forces.    
Finally, the anti-corruption and government efficiency indices could be used in a wider 
range of topics. Such bureaucracy characteristics could be used as factors that influence the 
regional differences in economic growth and income inequality.  
327 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Aidt, T. S., 2003, ‘Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey’, The Economic Journal, Vol. 
113(491), pp. 632-52. 
Aliyu, M. A., 2005, ‘Foreign Direct investment and the Environment: Pollution Haven 
Hypothesis Revisited,’ Paper Prepared for the Eight Annual Conference on Global 
Economic Analysis at Lübeck, Germany, 9-11 Jun. 2005, Available online:- https:// 
www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/2131.doc [Accessed 19/April/2005]. 
Amiti, M. and B. Smarzynska Javorcik, 2008, ‘Trade Costs and Location of Foreign Firms 
in China’, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 85(1-2), pp. 129-149. 
Antweiler, W., Copeland, B. R. and M. S. Taylor, 2001, ‘Is Free Trade Good for the 
Environment?’, American Economic Review, Vol. 91(4), pp. 877-908. 
Arrow, K., Bolin, B., Costanza, R., Dasgupta, P., Folke, C., Holling, C. S., Jansson, B. O., 
Levin, S. Maler, K. G., Perrings, C., and D. Pimental, 1995, ‘Economic Growth, Carrying 
Capacity and the Environment’, Ecological Economics, Vol. 15(2), pp. 91-95.  
Baltagi, B. H., 2005, Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, 3rd ed., John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 
Chichester, UK. 
Bartik, T., 1988, ‘The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Business Location in the 
United States’, Growth and Change, Vol. 19(3), pp. 22-44. 
Baumol, W. J. and W. E. Oates, 1988, The Theory of Environmental Policy, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
328 
 
Beckerman, W., 1992, ‘Economic Growth and the Environment: Whose Growth? Whose 
Environment?’, World Development, Vol. 20(4), pp. 481-32. 
Birdsall, N. and D. Wheeler, 1993, ‘Trade Policy and Industrial Pollution in Latin America: 
Where Are the Pollution Havens?’, Journal of Environment and Development, Vol. 2(1), pp. 
137-49.  
Blundell, R. and S. R. Bond, 1998, “Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in 
Dynamic Panel Data Models”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 87(1), pp.115-43. 
Brainard, S. L., 1993, ‘An Empirical Assessment of the Factor Proportions Explanation of 
Multinational Sales’, NBER Working Paper No. 4583. 
Brainard, S. L., 1997, ‘An Empirical Assessment of the Proximity-Concentration Trade-off 
between Multinational Sales and Trade’, The American Economic Review, Vol. 87(4), pp. 
520-44.   
Brandt, L. and S. C. Zhu, 2005, ‘Technology Adoption and Absorption: the Case of 
Shanghai Firms’, Working paper of Department of Economics, Michigan State University, 
now under revision at Economics of Transition, Available online:- http://www.msu.edu/%  
7Ezhuc/China.pdf [Accessed 08/December/2007].  
Brunnermeier, S. B. and A. Levinson, 2004, ‘Examining the Evidence on Environmental 
Regulations and Industrial Location’, Journal of Environment and Development, Vol. 13(1), pp. 
6-41.  
329 
 
Carson, R., Jeon, Y., and D., McCubbin, 1997, ‘The Relationship between Air Pollution 
Emissions and Incomes: US Data’, Environment and Development Economics, Vol. 2(4), pp. 
433-50. 
Caves, R., 1982, Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge.  
Chapman, D., and J. Agras, 1999, ‘A Dynamic Approach to the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve Hypothesis’, Ecological Economics, Vol. 28(2), pp. 267-77.  
Cheng, L. K. and Y. K. Kwan, 2000, ‘What Are the Determinants of the Location of 
Foreign Direct Investment? The Chinese Experience’, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 
51, pp. 379-400. 
China Environment Protection 1996-2005, SEPA China, Available online:- http://www. 
zhb.gov.cn/law/hjjjzc/gjfb/200607/t20060724_91227.htm [Accessed 05/October/2007]. 
China View, 2006a, ‘Official: Governments Deserve Severe Punishment for Negligence 
Malpractice’, Available online:- http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-09/14/content 
_5092698.htm [Accessed 14/July/2007]. 
China View, 2006b, ‘Environmental Protection Officials Sacked Over Arsenide Pollution’, 
Available online:- http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/03/content_51 66901.htm 
[Accessed 14/July/2007]. 
China View, 2006c, ‘China’s Water Shortage Problem More Protruding in Future’, 
Available online:-http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-11/05/content_5292779.htm 
[Accessed 23/March/2007]. 
330 
 
China View, 2007, ‘20 Officials in Gansu Punished for Lead Contamination Scandal’, 
Available online:- http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-05/30/content_6174834.htm 
[Accessed 14/July/2007]. 
Cole, M.A., 2000, Trade Liberalisation, Economic Growth and the Environment, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK. 
Cole, M. A., 2003, ‘Development, Trade, and the Environment: How Robust is the 
Environmental Kuznets curve?’, Environment and Development Economics, Vol. 8(4), pp. 
557-80. 
Cole, M. A., 2004, ‘Trade, the Pollution Haven Hypothesis and the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve: Examining the Linkages’, Ecological Economics, Vol. 48(1), pp. 71-81. 
Cole, M. A. and R. J. R. Elliott, 2003, ‘Determining the Trade-Environment Composition 
Effect: The Role of Capital, Labour and Environmental Regulations’, Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 46(3), pp. 363-83.  
Cole, M.A. and R.J.R. Elliott, 2005, ‘FDI and the Capital Intensity of ‘Dirty’ Sectors: A 
Missing Piece of the Pollution Haven Puzzle’, Review of Development Economic, Vol. 9(4), 
pp.530-48. 
Cole, M. A., Elliott, R. J. R., and P. G. Fredriksson, 2006, ‘Endogenous Pollution Havens: 
Does FDI Influence Environmental Regulations?’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 
108(1), pp. 157-78.  
Cole, M. A., A. J. Rayner, and J. M. Bates, 1997, ‘The Environmental Kuznets Curve: An 
Empirical Analysis’, Environment and Development Economics, Vol. 2(4), pp. 401-16. 
331 
 
Copeland, B. R., 1994, ‘International Trade and the Environment: Policy Reform in a 
Polluted Small Open Economy’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 26(1), 
pp. 44-65.  
Copeland, B. R. and M.S. and Taylor, 1994, ‘North-South Trade and the Environment’, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109(3), pp. 755-87.  
Copeland, B. R. and M.S. and Taylor, 2003, Trade and the Environment: theory and Evidence, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Coughlin, C. C. and E. Segev, 2000, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in China: A Spatial 
Econometric Study’, The World Economy, Vol. 23(1), pp.1-23.  
Dasgupta, S., Laplante, B., Wang, H., and D. Wheeler, 2002, ‘Confronting the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16(1), pp. 147-68. 
De Bruyn, S. M., Van Den Bergh, J. C. J. M., and J. B., Opschoor, 1998, ‘Economic 
Growth and Emissions: Reconsidering the Empirical Basis of Environmental Kuznets 
Curve’, Ecological Economics, Vol. 25(2), pp. 161-75. 
Dean, J. M., 1992, ‘Trade and the Environment: A Survey of the Literature’, in Patrick L. 
(Ed.) International Trade and the Environment – World Bank Discussion Papers, The World Bank, 
Washington DC. 
Dean, J. M., 2002, ‘Does Trade Liberalization Harm the Environment? A New Test’, 
Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 35(4), pp. 819-82.  
Dean, J. M., Lovely M. E., and H. Wang, 2002, ‘Foreign Direct Investment and Pollution 
Havens: Evaluating the Evidence from China’, Available online:- http://faculty. 
332 
 
maxwell.syr.edu/lovely/Papers%20for%20Download/DEANLOVELYWANG100102.P
DF [Accessed 01/October/2004]. 
Dean, J. M., Lovely M. E., and H. Wang, 2005, ‘Are Foreign Investors Attracted to Weak 
Environmental Regulations? Evaluating the Evidence from China’, World Bank Working 
Paper No.3505.    
Ederington, J. and J. Minier, 2003, ‘Is Environmental Policy a Secondary Trade Barrier? An 
Empirical Analysis’, Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 36(1), pp. 137-54. 
Ekins, P., 1997, ‘The Kuznets Curve for the Environment and Economic Growth: 
Examining the Evidence’, Environment and Planning A, Vol. 29(5), pp. 805-30. 
Eliste, P. and P. G. Fredriksson, 2002, ‘Environmental Regulations, Transfers, and Trade: 
Theory and Evidence’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 43(2), pp. 
234-50. 
Eskeland, G. S., and A. E. Harrison, 2003, ‘Moving to Greener Pastures? Multinationals 
and the Pollution Haven Hypothesis’, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 70(1), pp. 1-23. 
Esty, D. C. and B. S. Gentry, 1997, ‘Foreign Investment, Globalisation and Environment’, 
Ch.6 in Globalisation and Environment: Preliminary Perspectives, OECD Proceedings, OECD, 
Paris. 
Fan, C. S., and H. I. Grossman, 2001, ‘Incentives and Corruption in Chinese Economic 
Reform’, Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Vol. 4(3), pp. 195-206. 
333 
 
Fan, J.P.H., Morck, R., Xu, L.C., and Yeung, B. Y., (2007), ‘Does “Good Government” 
Draw Foreign Capital? Explaining China’s Exceptional Foreign Direct Investment Inflow’, 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4206. 
Fisman, R., and R. Gatti, 1999, ‘Decentralization and Corruption: Cross-Country and 
Cross-State Evidence’, the World Bank, Available online:- http://info.worldbank.org 
/etools/docs/library/128799/fisman.pdf [Accessed 15/July/2006]. 
Forster, B., 1973, ‘Optimal Capital Accumulation in A Polluted Environment’, Southern 
Economic Journal, Vol. 39(4), pp. 544-47. 
Fredriksson, P. G., List, J. A., and D. L. Millimet, 2003, ‘Bureaucratic Corruption, 
Environmental Policy and Inbound US FDI: Theory and Evidence’, Journal of Public 
Economics, Vol. 87(7-8), pp.1407-30.   
Freeman, C. and J. Hagedoorn, 1994, ‘Catching Up or Falling Behind: Patterns in 
International Interfirm Technology Partnering’, World Development, Vol. 22(5), pp. 771-80. 
Fung, K. C., Iizaka, H., and S. Parker, 2002, ‘Determinants of U.S. and Japanese Direct 
Investment in China’, Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 30(3), pp. 567-78. 
Fung, K. C., Iizaka, H., and A. Siu, 2003, ‘Japanese Direct Investment in China’, China 
Economic Review, Vol. 14(3), pp. 304-15. 
Gao, T., 2002, ‘Labor Quality and the Location of Foreign Direct Investment: Evidence 
from FDI in China by Investing Country’, manuscript, University of Missouri. 
Gao, T., 2005, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in China: How Big are the Roles of Culture and 
Geography?’, Pacific Economic Review, Vol. 10(2), pp.153-66.  
334 
 
Gentry, B., 1998, Private Capital Flows and the Environment: Lessons from Latin America, London: 
Edward Elgar.  
Globerman, S., and D. Shapiro, 2002, ‘Global Foreign Direct Investment Flows: The Role 
of Governance Infrastructure’, World Development, Elsevier, Vol. 30(11), pp. 1899-1919.  
Globerman, S., and D. Shapiro, 2003, ‘Governance Infrastructure and US Foreign Direct 
Investment’, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 34(1), pp. 19-39. 
Globerman, S., Shapiro D. and Y. Tang, 2006, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in Emerging 
and Transition European Countries’, International Finance Review, Vol. 6, pp. 439-68. 
Goel, P. K., and M. A. Nelson, 1998, ‘Corruption and Government Size: A Disaggregated 
Analysis’, Public Choice, Vol. 97(1-2), pp. 107-20. 
Golden, M. A., and L. Picci, 2005, ‘Proposal for A New Measure of Corruption, Illustrated 
with Italian Data’, Economics and Politics, Vol. 17(1), pp. 37-75. 
Greenberg, D. (dg4@nyu.edu), 26 January 2004, ‘Re: st: Autocorrelation and 
Heteroskedasticity in Panel Models’, Email to Statalist (statalist@hsphsun2.harvard.edu), 
Available online:- http://www.statalist.eu/statalist/archive/2004-01/msg00655.html 
[Accessed 10/February/2007].    
Greene, W. H., 2003, Econometric Analysis, Fifth Edition, Pearson Education Upper Saddle 
River, New Jersey.  
Grimes, P., and J. Kentor, 2003, ‘Exporting the Greenhouse: Foreign Capital Penetration 
and CO2 Emissions 1980-1996’, Journal of World-Systems Research, Vol. 9, Special Issue: 
Globalization and the Environment, pp. 261-75.  
335 
 
Grossman, G. M., and A. B. Krueger, 1991, ‘Environmental Impacts of a North American 
Free Trade Agreement’, NBER Working Paper No. 3914, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Inc., published in The U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, Garber, P. ed., MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 1994.  
Grossman, G. M. and A. b. Krueger, 1995, ‘Economic Growth and the Environment’, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110(2), pp. 353-77. 
Gujarati, D. N., 1995, Basic Econometrics, 3rd ed., McGraw-Hill Inc., New York, U.S. 
Habib, M., and L. Zurawicki, 2002, ‘Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment’, Journal of 
International Business Studies, Vol. 33(2), 291-307. 
Harbaugh, W. T., Levinson, A., and D. M. Wilson, 2002, ‘Reexamining the Empirical 
Evidence for an Environmental Kuznets Curve’, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 84(3), 
pp. 541-51. 
He, J., 2006, ‘Pollution Haven Hypothesis and Environmental Impacts of Foreign Direct 
Investment: The Case of Industrial Emission of Sulphur Dioxide (SO2) in Chinese 
Provinces’, Ecological Economics, Vol. 60(1), pp. 228-45.  
He, Z., 2000, ‘Corruption and Anti-corruption in Reform China’, Communist and 
Post-communist Studies, Vol. 33(2), pp. 243-70. 
Head, K. and J. Ries, 1996, ‘Inter-City Competition for Foreign Direct Investment in China: 
Static and Dynamic Effects of China’s Incentive Areas’, Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 40 
(1), pp. 38-60. 
336 
 
Heerink, N., Mulatu, A., E. Bulte, 2001, Income Inequality and the Environment: 
Aggregation Bias in Environmental Kuznets Curves’, Ecological Economics, Vol. 38(3), pp. 
359-67.  
Henderson, D. J. and D. L. Millimet, 2007, ‘Pollution Abatement Costs and Foreign Direct 
Investment Inflows to U.S. States: A Nonparametric Reassessment’, The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, Vol. 89(1), pp. 178-83.  
Helpman, E., 1984, ‘A Simple Theory of International Trade with Multinational 
Corporations’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 92(3), pp. 451-71. 
Hettige, H., Mani, M., and D. Wheeler, 2000, ‘Industrial Pollution in Economic 
Development: The Environmental Kuznets Curve Revisited’, Journal of Development 
Economics, Vol. 62(2), pp. 445-75. 
Hill, R. J. and E. Magnani, 2002, ‘An Exploration of the Conceptual and Empirical Basis of 
the Environmental Kuznets Curve’, Australian Economic Papers, Vol. 41,(2), pp. 239-254. 
Hilton, f. G. and A. Levinson, 1998, ‘Factoring the Environmental Kuznets Curve: 
Evidence from Automotive Lead Emissions’, Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, Vol. 35(2), pp. 126-41. 
Hines, J. R., 1995, ‘Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Business after 1977’, 
NBER Working Paper 5266. 
Horstmann, I.J. and J.R. Markusen, 1989, ‘Firm-Specific Assets and the Gains from Direct 
Foreign investment’, Economica, Vol. 56(221), pp. 41-48.  
337 
 
Hu, A., 2001, ‘Corruption and Anti-corruption Strategies in China’, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace Website, Available online:- http://www.carnegieendowment.org/ 
events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=284 [Accessed 11/June/2006]. 
Isik, M., 2004, ‘Environmental Regulation and the Spatial Structure of the US Dairy Sector’, 
The American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 86(4), pp. 949-62.   
Jaffe, A. B., Peterson, S. R., Portney, P. R., and R. N., Stavins, 1995, ‘Environmental 
Regulation and the Competitiveness of US manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell 
Us?’, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 33(1), pp. 132-63. 
Jha, V., 1999, ‘Investment Liberalization and Environmental Protection: Conflicts and 
Compatibilities in the Case of India’, Occasional Paper No.1, UNCATD/CBS Project on 
Cross Border Environmental Management in Transnational Corporations, Copenhagen 
Business School. 
Jorgenson, A. K., 2006, ‘The Transnational Organization of Production and 
Environmental Degradation: A Cross-national Study of the Effects of Foreign Capital 
Penetration on Organic Water Pollution Intensity, 1980-1995’, Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 
87(3), pp. 711-30. 
Jorgenson, A. K., 2007a, ‘Foreign Direct Investment and Pesticide Use Intensity in 
Less-developed Countries: A Quantitative Investigation’, Society and Natural Resources, Vol. 
20(1), pp. 73-83.  
Jorgenson, A. K., 2007b, ‘The Effects of Primary Sector Foreign Investment on Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions from Agriculture Production in Less-developed Countries, 1980-1999’, 
International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Vol. 48, pp. 29-42.  
338 
 
Jorgenson, A. K., 2007c, ‘Does Foreign Investment Harm the Air We Breath and the 
Water We Drink? A Cross-national Study of Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Organic 
Water Pollution in Less-developed Countries, 1975 to 2000’, Organization and Environment, 
Vol. 20(2), pp. 137-56. 
Kao, A., Huang, J., and J. Pan., 2005, ‘China Governance Efficiency and Foreign Firect 
Investment’ (Chinese), Review of Taiwan Economics, Vol. 11(2), pp. 131-56. 
Kaufmann, R. K., Davidsdottir, B., Garnham, S., and P. Pauly, 1998, ‘The Determinants of 
Atmospheric SO2 Concentrations: Reconsidering the Environmental Kuznets Curve’, 
Ecological Economics, Vol. 25(2), pp. 209-20.  
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and P. Zoido- Lobatón, 1999a, ‘Aggregating Governance 
Indicators’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2195.   
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and P. Zoido- Lobatón, 1999b, ‘Governance Matters’, World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2196. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and M. Mastruzzi, 2003, ‘Governance Matters III: Governance 
Indicators for 1996-2002’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3106. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., and M. Mastruzzi, 2006, ‘Measuring Corruption: Myths and 
Realities’, World Bank Article, available online:- http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/ 
governance/pdf/six_myths_measuring_corruption.pdf [Accessed 20/December/2006]. 
Keller, W. and A. Levinson, 2002, ‘Pollution Abatement Costs and Foreign Firect 
Investmetn Inflows to the US States’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 84(4), pp. 
691-703. 
339 
 
Kentor, J. and P. Grimes, 2006, ‘Foreign Investment Dependence and the Environment: A 
Global Perspective’, in A. K. Jorgenson and E. Kick (Eds.), Globalization and the Environment 
(pp. 61-78), Leiden, Netherlands: Brill. 
Kuznets, S., 1955, ‘Economic Growth and Income Inequality’, American Economic Review, 
Vol. 45(1), pp. 1-28. 
Lekakis, J. N., and M., Kousis, 2001, ‘Demand for and Supply of Environmental Quality in 
the Environmental Kuznets Curve Hypothesis’, Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 8(3), pp. 
169-72.  
Leonard, J., 1988, Pollution and Struggle for World Product, Cambridge University Press, New 
York. 
Levinson, A., 1996a, ‘Environmental Regulations and Industrial Location’, in J. Bhagwati 
and R. Hudec, eds., Fair Trade and Harmonization, Vol.1. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Levinson, A., 1996b, ‘Environmental Regulations and Manufacturers’ Location Choices: 
Evidence from the Census of Manufactures’, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 62(1-2), pp. 
5-29.  
Levinson, A. and M.S. Taylor, 2008, ‘Unmasking the Pollution Haven Hypothesis’, 
International Economic Review, Vol. 49(1), pp. 223-54. 
Liang, F. H., 2006, ‘Does Foreign Direct Investment Harm the Host Country’s 
Environment? Evidence from China’, Working Paper of Haas School of Business, 
University of California, Berkeley.  
List, J. A., 2001, ‘US Country-level Determinants of Inbound FDI: Evidence from a 
340 
 
Two-step Modified Count Data Model’, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 
19(6), pp. 953-73. 
List, J. A. and C. Y. Co, 2000, ‘The Effects of Environmental Regulations on Foreign 
Direct Investment’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 40(1), pp. 1-20 
List, J. A. and C. A. Gallet, 1999, ‘The Environmental Kuznets Curve: Does One Size Fit 
All?’, Ecological Economics, Vol. 31(3), pp. 409-23.  
Liu, J., 2006, ‘Multinational Corporations Violating China’s Environmental Laws and 
Regulations’, World Watch News on 05/December/2006, Available online:- http://www. 
worldwatch.org/node/4764 [Accessed 15/July/2007]. 
Lomborg, B., 2001, The Sceptical Environmentalist, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lopez, R., 1994, ‘The Environment As A Factor of Production: The Effects of Economic 
Growth And Trade Liberalization’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 
27(2), pp. 163-84.  
Lopez, R., and S. Mitra, 2000, ‘Corruption, Pollution and the Kuznets Environment Curve’, 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 40(2), pp. 137-50.  
Magnani, E., 2000, ‘The Environmental Kuznets Curve, Environmental Protection Policy 
and Income Distribution’, Ecological Economics, Vol. 32(3), pp. 431-43.   
Ma, X., 2007, ‘China’s Environmental Governance’, chinadialogue, available online:- 
http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/789-China-s-environmental-govern
ance [Accessed 10/January/2008].  
341 
 
Markusen, J. R and. K. H. Zhang, 1999, ‘Vertical Multinationals and Host-Country 
Characteristics’, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 59(2), pp. 233-53.   
McConnell, K., ‘Income and the Demand for Environmental Quality’, Environment and 
Development Economics, Vol. 2(4), pp. 383-99.  
Millimet, D., List, J. A., and G. Stengos, 2003, ‘The Environmental Kuznets Curve: Real 
Progress or Misspecified Models?’, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 85(4), pp. 1038-48.  
Nahman, A., and G. Antrobus, 2005, ‘The Environmental Kuznets Curve: A Literature 
Survey’, South African Journal of Economics, Vol. 73(1), pp. 105-20. 
Ni, X., and L. Wang, 2003, ‘The Measurement of Corruption and the Estimation of Its 
Consequences in China’ (Chinese), Jianghan Tribune, Vol. 10, pp. 10-12. 
Nicholas, C. (Clive.Nicholas@newcastle.ac.uk), 10 August 2004, ‘Re: st: Autocorrelation 
and Heteroskedasticity in Panel Models’, Email to Statalist (statalist@hsphsun2.harvard. 
edu), Available online:- http://www.statacorp.com/statalist/archive/2004-08/msg00329. 
html [Accessed 10/February/2007].  
OECD, 2000, ‘Main Determinants and Impacts of Foreign Direct Investment on China’s 
Economy’, Working Paper on International Investment, No. 2000/4.  
OECD, 2001, OECD Environmental Outlook, Paris: OECD 
OECD, 2002, Environmental Benefits of Foreign Direct Investment: A Literature Review, 
ENV/EPOC/GSP (2001)10/FINAL, Pairs: OECD. 
Panayotou, T., 1993, ‘Empirical Tests and Policy Analysis of Environmental Degradation 
342 
 
at Different Stages of Economic Development’, World Employment Programme Research 
Working Paper No. 238.  
Panayotou, T., 1997, ‘Demystifying the Environmental Kuznets Curve: Turning A Black 
Box into A Policy Tool’, Environment and Development Economics, Vol. 2(4), pp. 465-84. 
Panayotou, T., 2003, ‘Economic Growth and the Environment’, Working Paper of Centre 
for International Development at Harvard University, No. 56. 
Pearson, C. S., 1987, Multinational Corporations, Environment, and the Third World, Duke 
University Press, Durham, NC. 
Pearson, P. J. G., 1994, ‘Energy, Externalities and Environmental Quality: Will 
Development Cure the Ills at Creates?’, Energy Studies Review, Vol. 6(3), pp. 199-216.  
Pei, M., 2007, ‘Corruption Threatens China’s Future’, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Policy Brief No.55.  
Perman, R. and D. I. Stern, 1999, ‘The Environmental Kuznets Curve: Implications of 
non-stationarity’, Working paper in Ecological Economics No. 9901, Centre of Resource 
and Environmental Studies, Australian National University.   
Perman, R. and D. I. Stern, 2003, ‘Evidence from Panel Unit Root and Cointegration Tests 
That the Environmental Kuznets Curve Does Not Exist’, Australian Journal of Agricultural 
and Resource Economics, Vol. 47(3), pp. 325-48. 
Picci, L., 2005, ‘Corruption Measurement and Control: Towards A Unified Approach’, 
Paper presented at IV Global Forum on Fighting Corruption, Brasília, Brazil, 7-10 June, 
2005. 
343 
 
Rasiah, R., 1999, ‘Transnational Corporations and the Environment: The Case of Malaysia’, 
Occasional Paper No.4, UNCATD/CBS Project on Cross Border Environmental 
Management in Transnational Corporations, Copenhagen Business School. 
Reuters News, 2006, ‘China Draws Line in Sand to End Pollution for Good’, by Chris 
Buckley, Available online:- http://today.reuters.com/News/CrisesArticle.aspx?storyId=PE 
K162398 [Accessed 31/October /2007]. 
Rothman, D. S., 1998, ‘Environmental Kuznets Curves – Real Progress or Passing the 
Buck? A Case for Consumption-based Approaches’, Ecological Economics, Vol. 25(2), pp. 
177-94. 
Runge, C. F., 1994, Freer Trade, Protected Environment: balancing Trade Liberalization with 
Environmental Interests, Council on Foreign Relations Books, New York.  
Selden, T. M. and D. Song, 1994, ‘Environmental Quality and Development: Is There a 
Kurznets Curve for Air Pollution Emissions?’, Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, Vol. 27(2), pp.147-62.  
Selden, T. M., and D., Song, 1995, ‘Neoclassical Growth, the J Curve for Abatement, and 
the Inverted U Curve for Pollution’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 
29(2), pp. 162-68. 
SEPA Environment Bulletin (various year), SEPA China, Available online:-  
http://www.zhb.gov.cn/plan/zkgb/ [Accessed 23/April/2005]. 
Shafik, N., 1994, ‘Economic Development and Environmental Quality: An Econometric 
Analysis’, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 46, Supplement, pp. 757-73.  
344 
 
Shafik, N. and Bandyopadhyay, S., 1992, ‘Economic Growth and Environmental Quality: 
Time Series and Cross-country Evidence’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 
WPS904.   
Shen, J., 2006, ‘A Simultaneous Estimation of Environmental Kuznets Curve: Evidence 
from China’, China Economic Review, Vol. 17(4), pp. 383-94. 
Smarzynska, B. K., and S. J. Wei, 2000, ‘Corruption and Composition of Foreign Direct 
Investment: Firm-Level Evidence’, NBER Working Paper 7969. 
Smarzynska, B. K. and S. J. Wei, 2001, ‘Pollution Havens and Foreign Direct Investment: 
Dirty Secret or Popular Myth?’, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 
No. 8465,  
Smarzynska-Javorcik, B. and S. J. Wei, 2005, ‘Pollution Havens and Foreign Direct 
Investment: Dirty Secret or Popular Myth?’, Contribution to Economic Analysis and Policy, 
Berkeley Electronic Press, Vol. 3(2), pp. 1244. 
Spangenberg, J. H., 2001, ‘The Environmental Kuznets Curve: A Methodological Artefact?’, 
Population and Environment, Vol. 23(2), pp. 175-91. 
Stern, D. I., 1998, ‘Progress on the Environmental Kuznets Curve?’, Environment and 
Development Economics, Vol. 3(2), pp. 173-96. 
Stern, D. I. and M. S. Common, 2001, ‘Is There An Environmental Kuznets Curve for 
Sulphur?’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 41(2), pp. 162-78. 
Stern, D. I., Common, M. S., and E. B. Barbier, 1996, ‘Economic Growth and 
Environmental Degradation: the Environmental Kuznets Curve and Sustainable 
345 
 
Development’, World Development, Vol. 24(7), pp. 1151-60. 
Suri, V. and D. Chapman, 1998, ‘Economic Growth, Trade and Energy: Implications for 
the Environmental Kuznets Curve’, Ecological Economics, Vol. 25(2), pp.198-208. 
Svensson, J. 2005, ‘Eight Questions about Corruption’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 
19(3), pp. 19-42. 
Takung Pao, 2006, ‘China Must Sternly Fight against Foreign-related Corruption’ (Chinese), 
by Hua Lin, Available online:- http://www.takungpao.com/news/06/09/19/EP-62444 
8.htm [Accessed 15/November/2006]. 
Tang R. and T. Tang, 2004a, ‘Particularity of Government Efficiency and Its Indexes for 
Measure’ (Chinese), Journal of Beijing Normal University (Social Science), Vol. 182, pp. 100-06. 
Tang R. and T. Tang, 2004b, ‘The Measurement of Provincial Government Efficiency of 
China in 2002’ (Chinese), Chinese Public Administration, Vol. 228, pp. 64-68.  
The Economist, 2004, ‘Special Report: A Great Wall of Waste – China’s Environment’, The 
Economist, Vol. 372 (8389), pp. 64, Available online:- http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink? 
index=5&did=681843761&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD
&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1203697411&clientId=9546 [Accessed 27/July/2007]. 
Tobey, J., 1990, ‘The Effects of Domestic Environmental Policies on Patterns of World 
Trade: An Empirical Test’, Kyklos, Vol. 43(2), pp. 191-209. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 1999, World 
Investment Report, Geneva: UNCTAD. 
346 
 
Vincent, J. R., Ali, R. M., and Associates, 1997, Environment and Development in A 
Resource-Rich Economy: Malaysia Under the New Economic Policy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.  
Walter, I., 1982, ‘Environmentally Induced Industrial Relocation to Developing Countries’, 
in S. J. Rubin and T. R. Graham (ed), Environment and Trade, Allanheld, Osmum Publisher, 
Totowa, NJ. 
Wang, H., 2000, ‘Pollution Charge, Community Pressure and Abatement Cost: An Analysis 
of Chinese Industries’, World Bank Website, Available online:- http://www.worldbank.org 
/nipr/work_paper/hua/costcurvewp.pdf [Accessed 16/September/2005]. 
Wang, H. and D. Wheeler, 2002, ‘Endogenous Enforcement and the Effectiveness of 
China’s Pollution Levy System’, World Bank, New Ideas in Pollution Regulation Working 
Paper. 
Wang, H. and D. Wheeler, 2005, ‘Financial Incentives and Endogenous Enforcement in 
China’s Pollution Levy System’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 49(1), 
pp. 174-96.  
Wei. S. J. , 1997, ‘How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?’, NBER Working 
Paper No. 6030. 
Wei. S. J., 2000, ‘How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?’, Review of Economics 
and Statistics, Vol. 82(1), pp. 1-11. 
Wei, Y., 2002, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in China: A Survey’, Lancaster University 
Management School Working Paper No. 2003/02, Available online:- http://www.lums.lan 
347 
 
cs.ac.uk/publications/viewpdf/000053/ [Accessed 05/May/2005]. 
Wei, Y. and X. Liu, 2001, Foreign Direct Investment in China: Determinants and Impact, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. 
Wei, Y., Liu, X., Parker, D., and K., Vaidya, 1999, ‘The Regional Distribution of Foreign 
Direct Investment in China’, Regional Studies, Vol. 33(9), pp. 857-67. 
Wheeler, D., 2001, ‘Racing to the Bottom? Foreign Investment and Air Pollution in 
Developing Countries’, Journal of Environment and Development, Vol. 10(3), pp. 225-45.  
Wheeler, D., and A. Mody, 1992, ‘International Investment Location Decisions: The Case 
of US Firms’, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 33(1-2), pp. 57-76. 
Wooldridge, J.M., 2000, Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, South-Western College 
Publishing. 
Wu, Y., 1999, Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in China, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK.  
Xian G., Zhang C., Zhang, Y., Ge, S. and J. X., Zhan, 1999, ‘The Interface between 
Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment: The Case of China’, Occasional Paper 
No.3, UNCATD/CBS Project on Cross Border Environmental Management in 
Transnational Corporations, Copenhagen Business School. 
Xing, Y. and C. D. Kolstad, 2002, ‘Do Lax Environmental Regulations Attract Foreign 
Investment?’, Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 21(1), pp. 1-22. 
Zarsky, L., 1999, ‘Havens, Halos, and Spaghetti: Untangling the Evidence about Foreign 
348 
 
Direct Investment and the Environment’, Unclassified OECD Paper for Workshop 3 of 
the Conference on Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment, the Hague, 
Netherlands, 28-29 Jan. 1999.  
 
 
